Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against a public transit officer and Metropolitan Council under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officer violated plaintiff's constitutional rights when the officer arrested plaintiff at a downtown bus stop. The court concluded that the officer had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest based on plaintiff's nonverbal conduct and the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim; though the court agreed that the use of force in this case may have been unreasonable, and acknowledged that plaintiff described being pepper sprayed as a painful experience, plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence that he suffered more than de minimus injury; therefore, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim; the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's retaliatory arrest claim because the officer had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest; but the officer was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity from plaintiff's retaliatory use of force claim where plaintiff's First Amendment right to make comments and to obtain the officer's badge number was not clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Kopp, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as trustee for the next of kin of her deceased son, filed suit against five police officers and the city, alleging violations of the son's (1) Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable seizure, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and (2) the Minnesota wrongful death statute, Minn. Stat. 573.02. The court concluded that Officer Devick was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions during his initial encounter with the son where a reasonable officer faced with the same circumstances would not have known that the decision to kick and hit the son in an attempt to detain him clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions during the second encounter with the son where plaintiff failed to establish that the punches, kicks, knee strikes, and tasers they used on the son were unconstitutional. Even if the conduct was unconstitutional, it was not clearly established at the time. The court agreed with the district court's finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence showing that the officers intentionally apprehended the son in a way that they believed was prohibited by law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of official immunity and dismissal of the wrongful death claim against the individual officers. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the vicarious liability claim against the city. View "Smith v. City of Minneapolis, et al." on Justia Law

The State of Alabama, the Alabama Department of Finance, and the Comptroller of the State of Alabama, nonparties to the underlying action, appealed a circuit court order denying the State's motion to intervene as of right. Mrs. Frances Ann Yarbrough died intestate with no heirs that were in the line of descendant distribution. As a result, her assets escheated to the State of Alabama. The Supreme Court ordered the Estate to pay certain expenses of the Estate, and then to pay the balance of the Estate's funds to the State of Alabama. In that same order, the Court ordered the State of Alabama to pay the escheated funds to the St. Clair County's Circuit Clerk's office to be used by the Clerk 'to rehire some of the employees lost to proration.' The State, through its counsel Mr. Bledsoe, stated that the Estate's escheated funds must be used or applied in furtherance of education in accordance with the Alabama Constitution.Through counsel, Mr. Bledsoe, declared that there was no objection to disbursing the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. Based on that representation, the Estate moved the Supreme Court to Alter, Amend, or Vacate its earlier order to direct the State to pay the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. The State objected to the Supreme Court's order. In turn, the Supreme Court treated the objection as a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate, filed it with the circuit clerk, and set the matter for a hearing. Because the State was not a party to this matter, the State did not receive direct notice of the hearing. The Estate's counsel, Ms. Williams, however, provided the State notice of the hearing by e-mail to Mr. Bledsoe. The State did not appear at the hearing, and the Supreme Court denied the relief requested by the State. The circuit court then denied the State's motion to intervene. Because the circuit court failed to follow the Supreme Court's order, it reversed the circuit court's order denying the State's motion to intervene. "The circuit court exceeded its authority in attempting to appropriate the escheated funds." All issues having been decided on both the motion to intervene and the underlying action, a judgment was rendered for the State. View "Alabama et al. v. Estate Yarbrough" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs requested from the Acting Tax Commissioner a copy of the Computer-Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) files for all real property in the state. The Tax Commissioner denied the request for the CAMA files, claiming that it was not custodian of the files. Plaintiffs filed an action seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner and the Kanawha County Assessor (Respondents), concluding that the CAMA files were exempt from production under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commissioner was the custodian of the subject files; and (2) the circuit court erred in determining that the CAMA files were categorically exempt from disclosure under FOIA’s exemption for information of a personal nature. Remanded for submission of a Vaughn index and further findings. View "Hurlbert v. Matkovich" on Justia Law

Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence after his vehicle was stopped by a police officer responding to a telephone call and information obtained from an individual claiming she had observed the vehicle driving erratically. The Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order administratively revoking Respondent’s license. The Office of Administrative Hearings reversed Respondent’s license revocation, finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the officers had an articulable reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, and therefore the initial traffic stop was invalid and the resulting license revocation was improper. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that both the initial stop and the arrest were valid. Remanded for an order reinstating Respondent’s administrative license revocation. View "Dale v. Ciccone" on Justia Law

Appellant submitted requests for the personnel records of six employees of the West Licking Fire District to Appellee, the person responsible for public records for the district. Less than three business days after he had made the requests, Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. Appellee produced the documents two hours after the suit was filed. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, concluding that the records were produced in a reasonable amount of time and that Appellant had engaged in frivolous conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district responded to Appellant’s request in a reasonable amount of time, and therefore, the court of appeals correctly dismissed the complaint; and (2) the court of appeals must hold a hearing before awarding attorney fees for frivolous conduct. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Metzger" on Justia Law

The Pulaski County Election Commission (PCEC) filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the circuit court challenging the constitutionality of certain emergency rules promulgated by the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners (ASBEC) relating to absentee voters. The circuit court declared (1) the emergency rules were derivative of Act 595 of 2013, which amended the Arkansas election code to require that voters provide proof of identity when voting; (2) the Act was unconstitutional; and (3) the emergency rules were also unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly ruled that the rules relating to absentee voters promulgated by the ASBEC were unconstitutional; but (2) the circuit court erred in declaring the Act unconstitutional, as that issue was not pled or developed before the court. View "State Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a Maryland program subsidizing the participation of a new power plant in the federal wholesale energy market. Maryland's plan was ultimately formalized in the Generation Order. The district court agreed with plaintiffs' contention that the Maryland scheme was preempted under the Federal Power Act's (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824(b)(1), authorizing provisions, which grant exclusive authority over interstate rates to FERC. The court concluded that the Generation Order is field preempted because it seeks to regulate a field that the FPA has occupied. The court also concluded that the Generation Order is conflict preempted because it conflicts with the auction rates approved by FERC and conflicts with PJM's new entry price adjustment (NEPA). Accordingly, the court held that the Generation Order was preempted under federal law and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was arrested for violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.095, which prohibits flag desecration, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Cape Girardeau, the arresting police officer, and the prosecuting attorney. Both the arresting officer and attorney stated that they were unaware of the Supreme Court's decisions in Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman, which struck down statutes criminalizing flag desecration as unconstitutional. Plaintiff's charges were dismissed against him and he was released from jail. On appeal, the officer challenged the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and award of attorney's fees. The State, which intervened, appealed the district court's order declaring its flag desecration statute facially unconstitutional and the award of attorney's fees. The court concluded that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where a reasonably competent officer in his position would have known that plaintiff's expressive conduct was constitutionally protected and would have concluded no arrest warrant should issue for the expressive conduct engaged in by plaintiff. The court concluded that Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.095 was overbroad and criminalizes a substantial amount of expressive activity. Further, the statute was not susceptible to an appropriate narrowing construction and, therefore, the district court did not err in holding the statute to be facially unconstitutional. The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the officer and the state jointly and severally liable for attorney's fees and costs; the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees based on the rate for the St. Louis legal market, instead of Cape Girardeau; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Cape Girardeau. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Snider, III v. Peters" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles Times asked the City of Long Beach to release the names of the police officers involved in certain shootings. The Long Beach Police Officers Association (“Union”) sought injunctive relief against the City, attempting to prevent release of the names to the Times. The Times subsequently intervened, seeking disclosure of the names. The City supported the Union’s request for injunctive relief and opposed disclosure. The trial court denied the Union’s request for a preliminary or permanent injunction. The court of appeal upheld the denial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the particularized showing necessary to outweigh the public’s interest in the disclosure of the names of peace officers involved in the on-duty shootings was not made in this case. View "Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n. v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law