Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a class action challenge to the constitutionality of Act 12 of 2019 (“Act 12”),3 which, inter alia, enacted changes to the Pennsylvania Human Services Code. In particular, the Court had to determine whether the lawmaking which culminated in the passing of Act 12 satisfied the state Constitution's Article III requirements. The Court held that the process by which the General Assembly passed Act 12 satisfied both the “original purpose” and “single subject” mandates found in Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Thus, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court and found the statutory enactment to be constitutional. View "Weeks, et al. v. Dept. Health Serv." on Justia Law

The 2019 Illinois Cannabis Regulation Act legalized the recreational use of cannabis and established a licensing system for cannabis dispensaries. Applications for the first licenses closed in 2020; by mid-2021 the Department had allocated 185 licenses using a lottery procedure. The issuance of licenses was stayed during state-court litigation. For a second group of licenses in 2022, the Department established a point system that heavily favored longtime Illinois residents. The plaintiffs want to invest in Illinois cannabis dispensaries but neither lived in Illinois.In March 2022, they filed suit raising a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the residency provisions and sought a preliminary injunction halting the completion of the allocated 2021 licenses and enjoining the ongoing process for 2022 licenses. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The denial of a preliminary injunction allowed the Department to issue the 2021 licenses; it did so, largely mooting the appeal. To the extent that unwinding the licenses remains possible, the judge weighed the equities and held that the plaintiffs waited too long to challenge the residency provisions; an injunction would severely harm reliance interests and disrupt the orderly completion of the first-round licensing process. At the time of the ruling, the Department had not finalized the criteria for the second group but a challenge was unripe because the Department might materially modify the criteria. The Department subsequently finalized the 2022 rules and deleted provisions favoring Illinois residents. View "Finch v. Treto" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the Mississippi Legislature’s passing and the Governor’s signing of House Bill 1020. The catalyst for the Legislature’s passing of House Bill 1020 was described as the “sweltering, undisputed and suffocating” crime problem in Jackson, Mississippi—a problem that has “crippled the criminal justice system.” While political and social controversy surrounded this bill, the bulk of the bill’s provisions, which are aimed at improving public safety and bolstering judicial resources in Jackson, were not at issue. Section 1 of House Bill 1020, directed the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Chief Justice to appoint four additional (and unelected) circuit judges to the existing Seventh Circuit Court District—the district comprised of the City of Jackson and all of Hinds County—for a term ending December 31, 2026. The second challenged provision, Section 4 of House Bill 1020, was a more ambitious endeavor that created a new statutory inferior court, much like a municipal court, to serve the CCID. Petitioners, and Jackson residents, Ann Saunders, Sabreen Sharrief, and Dorothy Triplett (collectively, Saunders) claimed both provisions violated Mississippi’s Constitution. The Hinds County Chancellor J. Dewayne Thomas, who held hearings on Saunders’s challenges, disagreed and dismissed her complaint. Saunders appealed. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the chancellor that the creation of the CCID inferior court in Section 4 of House Bill 1020 was constitutional. But the Court agreed with Saunders that Section 1’s creation of four new appointed “temporary special circuit judges” in the Seventh Circuit Court District for a specified, almost-four-year term violated the State Constitution’s requirement that circuit judges be elected for a four-year term. View "Saunders, et al. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ neighbor petitioned for a civil harassment restraining order against Plaintiffs and was granted a temporary restraining order. As a result of the TRO, Plaintiff was ordered to surrender his firearms to a California licensed firearms dealer. Certain California laws make it unlawful for any person subject to a “civil restraining order” issued by a California state court (including temporary restraining orders) to possess firearms or ammunition. Plaintiffs claim these laws violate the Second Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to them. Though Plaintiffs were subject to civil restraining orders when they filed their suit, the orders against them have expired, and in January 2023, a California court denied the latest request to extend them.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs’ action as moot. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that, although they were no longer subject to any firearm restrictions, the case fell within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. The panel noted that this doctrine is to be used sparingly, in exceptional situations, and generally only where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. The panel held that this case was moot because the relevant restraining orders have expired, a three-year-long restraining order is not too brief to be litigated on the merits, and there was no reasonable expectation that Plaintiffs will be subject to the same action again View "MIRANDA WALLINGFORD, ET AL V. ROBERT BONTA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, nineteen children in New York City’s foster care system, filed suit alleging “systemic deficiencies” in the administration of the City’s foster care system in violation of federal and state law. The named Plaintiffs moved to represent a class of all children who are now or will be in the foster care custody of the Commissioner of New York City’s Administration for Children’s Services and two subclasses. As remedies, they sought injunctive and declaratory relief to redress alleged class-wide injuries caused by deficiencies in the City’s administration—and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services’ oversight—of foster care. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its analysis of the commonality and typicality requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying class certification and remanded. The court held that the district court erred in its analysis of commonality and typicality under Rule 23. The court explained that the district court did not determine whether commonality and typicality exist with respect to each of Plaintiffs’ claims. Instead, it concluded that commonality was lacking as to all alleged harms because “Plaintiffs’ allegations do not flow from unitary, non-discretionary policies.” The court held that this approach was legal error requiring remand. Further, the court wrote that here, the district court largely relied upon its commonality analysis to support its finding that typicality was not satisfied. Thus, the deficiencies identified in its commonality inquiry can also be found in its handling of typicality. View "Elisa W. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In April 2019, Kevin Roberts applied to Judge Clarence Cuthpert, Jr., probate judge for Rockdale County, for a weapons carry license pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129. Judge Cuthpert denied Roberts’s application, finding that Roberts’s criminal history revealed five arrests between 1992 and 2004 for aggravated assault, affray, obstruction of the judiciary, cruelty to children in the first degree, simple battery, battery, and family violence battery. Judge Cuthpert noted that Roberts’s criminal history did not list the dispositions of Roberts’s arrests for obstruction of the judiciary or simple battery, but the other arrests had dispositions of not prosecuted, dismissed, or nolle prossed. Judge Cuthpert concluded that Roberts “lack[ed] good moral character[4] . . . [d]ue to his arrest[s] for several violent offenses” and that “the court need[ed] additional information[, including police reports,] to determine if this application should be approved.” After reconsideration, Judge Cuthpert again denied the petition, concluding that, “[b]ased upon [Roberts’s] history of violent offenses and failure to comply with the Court’s instructions to provide the incident reports and dispositions for [his previous five arrests],” Roberts was “not of good moral character.” Roberts thereafter filed a complaint seeking mandamus relief against Judge Cuthpert “in his official capacity,” declaratory judgment against Judge Cuthpert “in both his official and individual capacities,” and costs and attorney’s fees. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity for claims brought under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) and that the Separation of Powers Provision of the Georgia Constitution was not implicated by the recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, against a probate judge pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) because processing a weapons carry license did not involve the exercise of judicial power. The Court also concluded the probate judge in this case waived the defense of judicial immunity on the costs-and-fees claim asserted against him in his official capacity. View "Roberts v. Cuthper" on Justia Law

Wise Business Forms, Inc. (“Wise”) was the nation’s fourth largest printer of business forms, and was headquartered in Forsyth County, Georgia. A 36-inch metal pipe (“Subject Pipe”) ran underneath Wise’s property and had been in place since 1985. Approximately twenty-five feet of the drainage pipe extended into a two-acre tract of land west of Wise’s property (“Corner Tract”). The Corner Tract was undeveloped and forms a natural detention basin into which a large vertical concrete drainage structure with a large stormwater outlet pipe (“Feeder Structure”) was constructed. Wise asserted in its complaint that water from the Feeder Structure on the Corner Tract was designed to flow through the Subject Pipe underneath Wise’s property. The McFarland Parkway Widening Project extended McFarland Road from two lanes to four lanes and was completed in 2000. Wise alleged in its complaint that this project resulted in a substantial increase of the surface and stormwater runoff flowing underneath its property. In 2020, Wise filed a complaint against Forsyth County and the Georgia Department of Transportation (the “DOT”) raising claims for per se taking of Wise’s property, inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance, attorney fees. Wise amended its complaint to add a claim for inverse condemnation by abatable nuisance. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to clarify the standards for determining when a claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance accrues for purposes of applying the four-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-30 (a). The Court concluded that, although the Court of Appeals articulated one of the correct standards to apply in determining when the applicable statute of limitation begins to run on a permanent nuisance claim, the Court of Appeals failed to construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party; erred in concluding there was only one harm in this case that was “immediately observable” to the plaintiff when the nuisance at issue was completed; and erred in concluding that the statute of limitation had run on the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. View "Wise Business Forms, Inc. v. Forsyth County, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Santa Paula Animal Rescue Center, Inc. (SPARC) and Lucky Pup Dog Rescue (Lucky Pup) (collectively Appellants) appealed a judgment of dismissal following the trial court’s order sustaining, without leave to amend, Defendant County of Los Angeles’s (the County) demurrer to Appellants’ petition for writ of mandate. Appellants contend that the Hayden Act and, more specifically, Food and Agriculture Code section 31108 and similar provisions impose on the County a ministerial duty to (1) release a dog or other shelter animal to a requesting animal adoption or rescue organization with Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) status prior to euthanasia without first determining whether the animal has behavioral problems or is adoptable or treatable, and (2) release the aforementioned animal to the requesting animal rescue or adoption organization without requiring the organization to meet qualifications additional to having Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) status.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded that the demurrer was improperly granted because the County lacks discretion to withhold and euthanize a dog based upon its determination that the animal has a behavioral problem or is not adoptable or treatable. However, the County has discretion to determine whether and how a nonprofit organization qualifies as an animal adoption or rescue organization. View "Santa Paula Animal Rescue Center, Inc. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are two couples, both engaged to be married when they filed suit and a New York-based minister. Together, the individuals brought a constitutional challenge to state COVID-19 regulations that limited to fifty the number of attendees at social gatherings. After the expedited briefing, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction just forty-five minutes before the start time of the first of the two scheduled weddings. The first of the couples married in their planned ceremony and held their wedding celebration involving over 100 guests. A Second Circuit judge issued a temporary administrative stay of the district court’s order. A separate panel later dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the district court’s order after the second couple announced that, regardless of the outcome of the appeal, they no longer planned to hold a wedding. All five Plaintiffs then sought an award of attorney’s fees in the district court. The district court denied their motion.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Plaintiffs managed to secure a preliminary injunction with just forty-five minutes to spare after an abbreviated briefing schedule. The court further wrote that their initial success was fleeting: Defendants succeeded in obtaining a stay of the injunction from the court within two weeks of its issuance, and the district court’s order was later vacated after Plaintiffs intentionally mooted their claims during the pendency of Defendants’ appeal. The preliminary injunction in this case does not support a determination that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties eligible for attorney’s fees under Section 1988. View "DiMartile v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center (LaFHAC) sued Azalea Garden Properties, LLC (Azalea Garden), alleging that Azalea Garden discriminated on the basis of race and disability at its apartment complex in Jefferson, Louisiana, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court dismissed LaFHAC’s disability claim but allowed its disparate impact race claim to proceed, subject to one caveat: The district court certified a permissive interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the “predictably will cause” standard for FHA disparate-impact claims remains viable after Inclusive Communities Project Inc. v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019).   The Fifth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to dismiss LaFHAC’s claims without prejudice. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case. Along the same lines, the court wrote that it cannot consider the district court’s certified question. The court explained that LaFHAC has plausibly alleged a diversion of resources, as it shifted efforts away from planned projects like its annual conference toward counteracting Azalea Garden’s alleged discrimination. But “an organization does not automatically suffer a cognizable injury in fact by diverting resources in response to a defendant’s conduct.” The court wrote that LaFHAC failed to plead an injury because it failed to allege how its diversion of resources impaired its ability to achieve its mission. Thus, the court held that because LaFHAC has not alleged a cognizable injury, it lacks standing to bring the claims it alleges in this action. View "LA Fair Housing Action v. Azalea Garden" on Justia Law