Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Facing a tight deadline from the Ninth Circuit, the Environmental Protection Agency banned the use of chlorpyrifos on food crops. Two environmental groups petitioned the EPA in 2007 to have all tolerances revoked. In denying the petition, the EPA concluded that their objections were “not supported by valid, complete, and reliable evidence.”   The Eighth Circuit granted the petitions, finding that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court explained that in this case, the EPA believed it lacked discretion or at least acted that way. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion had already narrowed its options down to two: revoke the tolerances or modify them. With little time to act, the agency ruled out the second option, leaving only revocation by default. In doing so, however, it misread the statute and misunderstood the “scope of its discretion”. Therefore, the court set aside the decision as arbitrary and capricious. Further, the court explained that a partial ban was a real alternative for the EPA. It could have canceled some registrations and retained others that satisfied the statutory safety margin. View "RRVSG Assoc. v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the Arkansas Racing Commission's (ARC) decision to award the Pope County casino license to Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC (CNB) and Legends Resort and Casino, LLC (Legends) was a "legal nullity, void and of no effect," holding that the circuit court did not err.In this third iteration of appeals involving the issuance of the license Gulfside Casino Partnership (Gulfside) argued that the ARC's action was ultra vires because it was issued in violation of the clear language of amendment 100 to the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Gulfside, concluding that the casino license issued by the ARC jointly to CNB and Legends was an ultra vires action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its decision. View "Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership" on Justia Law

Governor DeSantis signed into law the Individual Freedom Act, also called the Stop W.O.K.E. Act. Seven professors and one student from public universities in Florida challenged the law in the district court as violative of their civil rights. Plaintiffs served subpoenas on fourteen non-party legislators—thirteen co-sponsors of the Act and one legislator who supported the bill during a Florida House of Representatives debate. The district court partially granted and partially denied the legislators’ motion. After the legislators appealed, the district court stayed the discovery order pending the resolution of this appeal. At issue on appeal is whether a common-law privilege shields state legislators from a discovery request made for the purpose of determining the legislators’ motives in passing a law.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that factual documents are within the scope of the privilege, which is unqualified in this kind of lawsuit. The court explained that according to Plaintiffs’ response to the Florida legislators’ motion to quash the subpoena, the plaintiffs served the subpoenas on the legislators to “determine whether there was a discriminatory motive behind the [Act].” By Plaintiffs’ own admission, the subpoenas’ purpose was to uncover the legislators’ motives in passing the law. “The privilege applies with full force against requests for information about the motives for legislative votes and legislative enactments.” So, the privilege applies with its usual force against the discovery of even the factual documents in the Florida legislators’ possession. Accordingly, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it determined otherwise. View "Leroy Pernell, et al. v. Robert Alexander Andrade, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against Judge Goldston and others present at the search. Plaintiff claimed that the warrantless search and seizure of his property violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, that the restrictions on recording the incident violated the First Amendment, and that Judge Goldston’s practice of conducting “home visits” violated the Equal Protection Clause by disadvantaging pro se litigants like himself. He sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as attorney’s fees and injunctive and declaratory relief. Judge Goldston moved for summary judgment, claiming she was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. The district court denied her motion. At issue on appeal is whether Judge Goldston is entitled to judicial immunity.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that judicial immunity protects only judicial acts. It does not shield the conduct of judges who step outside their judicial role, as Judge Goldston did when searching Plaintiff’s home. The court explained that while Judge Goldston might have had the authority to order a search, the proper authority to conduct the operation was the local sheriff’s department or some other appropriate law enforcement agency. The court explained that just as “judges do not do double duty as jailers,” so too they do not do double duty as sheriffs. View "Matthew Gibson v. Louise Goldston" on Justia Law

In July 2021, Texas Governor Greg Abbott issued an executive order that prohibited private individuals from providing ground transportation to migrants who were previously detained or subject to expulsion. The United States brought a lawsuit against Governor Abbott and the State of Texas, arguing that the executive order was preempted by federal law. Three nonprofit organizations and a retired lawyer also brought a Section 1983 suit against the Governor and the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”). The defendants moved to dismiss the suit brought by the private plaintiffs, arguing in part that the plaintiffs lacked standing and the suit against the Governor was barred by sovereign immunity. The district court rejected these arguments, and Governor Abbott appealed.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Governor that sovereign immunity bars the lawsuit brought by the private plaintiffs. The court explained Section 411.012 does not imbue the Governor with the “particular duty to enforce” the Executive Order. Second, even if the Governor had a particular duty to enforce GA-37 by commandeering DPS, he has not “demonstrated [a] willingness to exercise that duty.” Third, the Governor’s enforcement directive to DPS should have been sufficient to remove the Governor from this suit. Fourth, the court explained that if Plaintiffs want to show that the Governor silently invoked Section 411.012 and implicitly commandeered a state agency, they must plead facts to support that inference. Thus, the court held that sovereign immunity bars the private Plaintiffs’ suit against the Governor. View "USA v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Jackson Federation of Teachers (JFT) filed a complaint against the Jackson Public School District (JPS), alleging alleged that certain JPS policies violated the free speech rights of its employees. The trial court: (1) denied JPS’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing; (2) denied JPS’s motion to dismiss for mootness; (3) found that JPS’s three policies were in violation of article 3, section 11, and article 3, section 13, of the Mississippi Constitution; and (4) issued a permanent injunction enjoining JPS from enforcing the policies. JPS timely appealed. Because JFT failed to establish standing, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of JPS. View "Jackson Public School District v. Jackson Federation of Teachers, et al." on Justia Law

The court awarded Plaintiff fees after he prevailed on one of his six causes of action against his former employer ExakTime Innovations, Inc., on his complaint for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and related causes of action. The jury awarded Plaintiff $130,088 in damages on his claim ExakTime failed to engage in a good faith interactive process with him. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order awarding him $686,795.62 in attorney fees after the court applied a .4 negative multiplier to its $1,144,659.36 adjusted lodestar calculation “to account for [p]laintiff’s counsel’s . . . lack of civility throughout the entire course of this litigation.” Plaintiff contends the $457,863 reduction in attorney fees based on his counsel’s incivility must be reversed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that it may consider an attorney’s pervasive incivility in determining the reasonableness of the requested fees. A court may apply, in its discretion, a positive or negative multiplier to adjust the lodestar calculation—a reasonable rate times a reasonable number of hours—to account for various factors, including attorney skill. The court explained that the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff’s counsel was repeatedly, and apparently intentionally, uncivil to defense counsel—and to the court— throughout the litigation. View "Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations" on Justia Law

Vidal-Martinez, a non-citizen, was arrested three times for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. DHS detained him and initiated deportation. Vidal-Martinez filed a habeas petition, arguing that his detention was unconstitutional because it impeded his ability to defend himself against the drunk-driving charges. ICE transferred Vidal-Martinez to county custody “until the completion of [the] criminal matter, then released to his ICE detainer.” Vidal-Martinez was convicted of DUI and sentenced to 236 days in jail. He was then returned to ICE custody. Due to a lack of evidence that he posed a flight risk or a danger to the community, the district court granted Vidal-Martinez’s habeas petition and ordered his release.Vidal-Martinez filed a FOIA request, 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking disclosure from ICE of documents related to his custody transfer. ICE produced 561 pages of responsive documents, some of which contained redactions. Vidal-Martinez challenged ICE’s redactions. ICE submitted a Vaughn index and a declaration from its FOIA officer explaining the legal justification for each redaction, citing attorney-client, work product, deliberative process privileges, and identifying information of government employees. Vidal-Martinez responded that ICE committed criminal conduct by transferring him to Indiana, so the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied. The district court granted ICE summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no factual foundation in the record for criminal conduct or misconduct by ICE. The district court had an adequate factual basis to evaluate ICE’s withholdings. View "Vidal-Martinez v. United States Department Of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the legislature's grant of rulemaking authority to the Commission on Forensic Sciences was sufficient to authorize the Commission's promulgation of the Familial DNA Search (FDS) Regulations codified at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 6192.1 and 6192.3.In 2017, the DNA Subcommittee submitted to the Commission a recommendation to authorize familial DNA searches. The Commission adopted the recommendation, and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) formally adopted the recommendation as part of the FDS Regulations. Petitioners brought this N.Y. C.L.P.R. 78 proceeding arguing that Respondents lacked statutory authority to promulgate the FDA Regulations, therefore violating the New York Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court denied the petition on the merits, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had the statutory authority to promulgate the FDS Regulations. View "Stevens v. N.Y. State Division of Criminal Justice Services" on Justia Law

Chapter 423 of the Texas Government Code governs the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles—drones—in Texas airspace. In this case, Plaintiffs claimed a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. They also assert a constitutional right to fly drones at low altitudes over critical infrastructure facilities like prisons and large sports venues.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in Defendants’ favor on the constitutional claims. The court explained that it disagreed with Plaintiffs claim that a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. The court explained that though it does not foreclose any as-applied constitutional defenses to any hypothetical future prosecutions under the drone laws, we hold that these facial challenges fail. The court also rejected Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal claiming that federal regulations occupy the entire field of drone regulation. On this issue, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the field-preemption claim. The court explained that federal law expressly contemplates concurrent non-federal regulation of drones, especially where privacy and critical infrastructure are concerned. View "National Press v. McCraw" on Justia Law