Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner David Montenegro appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for injunctive relief seeking to compel the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), to issue him a personalized vanity motor vehicle registration plate reading "COPSLIE." He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the DMV’s denial of his request violated his right to free speech. Because the Court found that the regulation relied upon by the DMV in denying petitioner’s request was unconstitutionally vague, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Montenegro v. New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles " on Justia Law

Petitioners and other members of the East Meadow Teachers Association displayed picketing signs from their cars parked where parents were dropping their children off at Woodland Middle School. The Board of Education of the East Meadow Union Free School District (District) charged Petitioners with misconduct related to the demonstration, claiming that Petitioners created a safety risk by parking their cars so that students had to be dropped off in the middle of the street instead of at curbside. Petitioners were found guilty of misconduct. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings against them violated their right to free speech. Supreme Court denied the petitions. The Appellate Division reversed after applying the two-part balancing test set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the picketing demonstration was a form of speech protected by the First Amendment; but (2) Petitioners’ interests in engaging in constitutionally protected speech in the particular manner they employed on the day in question were outweighed by the District’s interests in safeguarding students and maintaining effective operations at the middle school. View "Santer v. Bd. of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioners were two medical providers whose patients included individuals insured by the State’s primary health benefit plan. The State Comptroller reviewed Petitioners’ billing records as part of an audit of billing practices in the health care industry for claims paid by the State. While Petitioners conceded that the State paid eighty percent of the costs of their services, Petitioners challenged the Comptroller’s authority to audit their books. Supreme Court concluded that the Comptroller lacked constitutional authority to audit Petitioners because Petitioners were “not a political subdivision of the State.” The Appellate Division modified Supreme Court’s orders to reinstate the audits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State Constitution does not limit the Comptroller’s authority to audit, as part of its audit of State expenditures, the billing records of private companies that provide health care to beneficiaries of a State insurance program. View "Martin H. Handler, M.D., P.C. v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a delay of approximately twenty months in scheduling a driver's license revocation hearing was a violation of the driver's constitutional right to a speedy trial (as guaranteed by the State Constitution). Plaintiff-driver Phillip Pierce appealed the suspension of his driver's license in an administrative proceeding for driving under the influence (DUI). The trial court agreed that plaintiff's constitutional right was violated and set aside the revocation order and reinstated Pierce's driving privileges. A divided Court of Civil Appeals reversed. Although expressing its concern related to the inordinate delay in the proceedings, the appellate court determined that Pierce had not asserted his right to a speedy resolution of his cause, was not prejudiced by the postponement, and that the Department did not abuse its discretion in waiting almost two years to finalize the charges in the cause. Knowing that its complaining witness was scheduled to be deployed to serve his country, the Department of Public Safety intentionally postponed the proceeding and did not schedule a hearing to allow the driver to be heard either on the merits or on the delay. These delays occurred despite the driver's timely request for a hearing. Under those unique facts, the Supreme Court held that the driver's right to a speedy hearing was violated and ordered reinstatement of his driving privileges. View "Pierce v. Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit contending that a Florida tax on motor and diesel fuel purchased off tribal lands violated the Indian Commerce Clause, the Indian sovereignty doctrine, and the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that Florida has not waived its sovereign immunity from this federal suit. Without a valid abrogation by Congress, Florida was immune from suit regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Further, the Tribe could not circumvent the sovereign immunity of Florida by suing the Director of the Department based on the decision in Ex parte Young where the Department, not the Director, is the real, substantial party in interest in this suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of FL Dept. of Revenue, et al." on Justia Law

Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties. In 2011 Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager under then-existing law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of retired city employees and severance benefits, including pension benefits, for retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Retired employees sued under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied an injunction. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters later rejected Public Act 4 by referendum. Following rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit again vacated and remanded for consideration of whether, under section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Public Act 4 prescribed a method of composition of indebtedness that binds the retirees without their consent and, if so, whether principles of state sovereignty preclude application of section 903(1) in this case; whether the emergency manager’s orders were legislative acts under the Contract Clause; whether the reductions and eliminations of health care benefits were “necessary and reasonable” under the Contract Clause; whether the retirees’ procedural due process claim is viable; and, assuming the Due Process Clause’s procedural protections apply, whether the collective bargaining agreements, considered in their entireties, establish protected property rights. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

Since 1999, Greece, New York has opened monthly town board meetings with a roll call, recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, and a prayer by a local clergy member. While the prayer program is open to all creeds, nearly all local congregations are Christian. Citizens alleged violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause by preferring Christians over other prayer givers and by sponsoring sectarian prayers and sought to limit the town to “inclusive and ecumenical” prayers that referred only to a “generic God.” The district court entered summary judgment upholding the prayer practice. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that some aspects of the prayer program, viewed in their totality by a reasonable observer, conveyed the message that the town endorsed Christianity.  A divided Supreme Court reversed, upholding the town’s practice. Legislative prayer, while religious in nature, has long been understood as compatible with the Establishment Clause. Most states have also had a practice of legislative prayer and there is historical precedent for opening local legislative meetings with prayer. Any test of such a practice must acknowledge that it was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the scrutiny of time and political change. The inquiry is whether the town of Greece's practice fits within that tradition. To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force legislatures sponsoring prayers and courts deciding these cases to act as censors of religious speech, thus involving government in religious matters to a greater degree than under the town’s current practice of neither editing nor approving prayers in advance nor criticizing their content after the fact. It is doubtful that consensus could be reached as to what qualifies as a generic or nonsectarian prayer. The First Amendment is not a “majority rule” and government may not seek to define permissible categories of religious speech. The relevant constraint derives from the prayer’s place at the opening of legislative sessions, where it is meant to lend gravity  and reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage. Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based only on the content of a particular prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation. If the town maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers to achieve religious balance.  View "Town of Greece v. Galloway" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, school committees of Woonsocket and Pawtucket and unnamed students, parents, and the superintendents from both districts, brought suit against the legislative and executive branches of Rhode Island’s state government challenging the state’s school funding formula. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Education Clause as well as violations of their substantive due process and equal protection rights because the formula failed to allocate adequate resources to less affluent communities. The superior court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) prior case law as well as the separation of powers doctrine warranted dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Education Clause claim; and (2) Plaintiffs’ complaint was insufficient to establish potential substantive due process claims. View "Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee " on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage exempt from municipal property taxation $150,000 of the assessed value of the residence of an owner who is a senior citizen or disabled veteran. But the full value of the exemption is potentially unavailable if a person who is not the owner’s spouse also occupies the residence. Contending that the exemption program violated their rights to equal protection and equal opportunities, three Anchorage same-sex couples in committed, long-term, intimate relationships sued the State and the Municipality. The superior court ruled for all three couples. The State and Municipality appealed. As to two of the couples, the Supreme Court affirmed: same-sex couples, who may not marry or have their marriages recognized in Alaska, cannot benefit or become eligible to benefit from the exemption program to the same extent as heterosexual couples, who are married or may marry. The exemption program therefore potentially treats same-sex couples less favorably than it treats opposite-sex couples even though the two classes are similarly situated. The identified governmental interests do not satisfy even minimum scrutiny. The exemption program therefore violates the two couples’ equal protection rights as guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. As to the third couple, the Court reversed the ruling in their favor because it concluded that the program did not exempt a residence from taxation unless the senior citizen or veteran had some ownership interest in it. If the senior citizen or veteran has no actual ownership interest, the program treats a same-sex couple the same as a heterosexual couple by denying the exemption to both couples, rendering marital status and the ability to marry irrelevant. Because the senior citizen member of the third couple had no ownership interest in the residence, that couple had no viable equal protection claim. View "Alaska v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

A group of citizens sued two borough assembly members, alleging various violations of borough and state conflict of interest laws and the common law conflict of interest doctrine. After the borough took official action facilitating the assembly members’ defense, the citizens moved to enjoin the assembly members from using their official positions to defend the lawsuit or pursue personal financial gain. The superior court granted a preliminary injunction under the balance of hardships standard, concluding that the citizens faced the possibility of irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted and that the assembly members were adequately protected by the injunction. The assembly members filed a petition for review, which the Supreme Court granted. They argued that the superior court applied the wrong preliminary injunction standard and that the injunction violates their free speech rights. The Court agreed: the trial court should have applied the probable success on the merits standard because the injunction did not adequately protect the assembly members, and the injunction imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The Supreme Court vacated the injunction in full. View "Alsworth v. Seybert" on Justia Law