Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Supreme Court focused on two appeals (case no. 1101384 and case no. 1110310) and two petitions for writs of mandamus (case no. 1101313 and case no. 1110158) filed by the State of Alabama, all challenging orders entered by a circuit judge in Greene County requiring State officials to return to items seized by the State as contraband pursuant to search warrants previously issued by the Greene Court. In addition, the Supreme Court reviewed a petition for a writ of mandamus (case no. 1130598) filed by the State seeking relief from the refusal of a district judge in Greene County to issue warrants similar to the warrants involved in the first four cases based on evidentiary submissions similar to those provided by the State in those same four cases. The latter case involved the same potential defendants and gaming establishments as the first four cases, as well as similar gambling devices alleged by the State to be illegal. Moreover, the district judge in case no. 1130598 relied upon the judgment of the trial judge in the former cases in refusing to issue the warrants in that case. Upon review of the trial record of all parties' cases involved, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court was asked to preemptively adjudicate (within the confines of a motion filed under Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P.) the lawfulness of property seized as contraband. The Court concluded the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to do so. Therefore the Supreme Court vacated the orders of the trial court in case no. 1101384 and 1110310 and dismissed those actions. The Court dismissed the appeals in those cases, and the related petitions for writ of mandamus then pending in case no. 1101313 and case no. 1110158. As to case no. 1130598, the Court, by separate order, granted the State's petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded this case for the immediate issuance of the warrants for which the State applied. View "Alabama v. Greenetrack, Inc. " on Justia Law

The respondent in this mental health commitment proceeding argued that the delay between his detention and his involuntary commitment hearing violated time limits imposed by statute and due process of law. After review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the relevant statutory time limit began upon a respondent’s arrival at an evaluation facility, that there was no obvious or prejudicial statutory violation in this case, and that the delay in this case did not violate due process. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the respondent’s appeal of his involuntary medication order was moot. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Gabriel C." on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Sandy Springs and two individual homeowners, John E. Balsam and Jerry Burnstein, filed suit against Fulton County, its Board of Commissioners, and its Director of Public Works. Sandy Springs sought a declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief on whether Fulton County retained ownership of and responsibility for two drainage retention ponds and a dam located within Sandy Springs. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Sandy Springs, and Fulton County appealed, contending that it was prohibited from maintaining the detention ponds pursuant to the Georgia constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found that Fulton County retained current ownership of and responsibility for the easements it held over the dam and retention ponds located in Sandy Springs. However, any concomitant responsibility continued only until the easements at issue were legally transferred, terminated, or prospectively abandoned. As a result, to the extent that the trial court's order could be read to indicate that Fulton County had to maintain the easements in perpetuity, the Court reversed. View "Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs" on Justia Law

The Wyoming Department of Revenue (Department) directed Appellants, on-line travel companies (OTCs), to collect and remit taxes on the total amounts they collected from customers booking hotel rooms in Wyoming. The State Board of Equalization (SBOE) upheld the order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the SBOE did not err in finding that the full amount paid by a customer to the OTCs for a reservation of a hotel room in Wyoming was taxable to the Department; (2) the Department’s imposition of sales tax on the full amount collected by the OTCs did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to the OTCs; and (3) the imposition of the sales tax did not violate the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act. View "Travelocity.com LP v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the decade-long litigation regarding the regulation of Puerto Rico’s milk industry. The district court approved a comprehensive Settlement Agreement reached by the original parties: the government defendants, including the Office of the Milk Industry Regulatory Administration for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Spanish acronym “ORIL”), and the plaintiff milk processors, Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. and Suiza Dairy, Inc. After the district court approved of the Agreement, ORIL filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, challenging the portion of the district court order opining that Puerto Rico had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by entering into the Agreement. The district court denied ORIL’s motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) held that the language at issue was merely a statement of dicta and not a judgment, and consistent with this construction, the district court was strongly encouraged to strike the statement; and (2) otherwise dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. View "Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Comas-Pagan" on Justia Law

The Board and School District appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing Reg. I.Q. Reg. I.Q. governs the "extended use" of school facilities outside of school hours by outside organizations and individuals. The district court found that enforcement of Reg. I.Q. to exclude religious worship services would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did not entitle Bronx Household to a grant from the Board of a subsidized place to hold religious worship services; the Supreme Court's ruling in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah that invidiously discriminatory ordinances targeting a religious practice of a particular religion were subject to strict scrutiny had no application to Reg. I.Q.; if the Board has a reasonable, good faith concern that making its school facilities available for the conduct of religious worship services would give rise to a substantial risk of violating the Establishment Clause, the permissibly of the Board's refusal to do so did not turn on whether such use of school facilities would in fact violate the Establishment Clause; and therefore, Reg. I.Q. did not violate plaintiffs' rights to free exercise of religion, whether or not it was subject to strict scrutiny. The court also concluded that the district court erred in concluding that Reg. I.Q. violates the Establishment Clause because it compelled the Board to become excessively entangled with religion by deciding what were religious worship services. The court considered Bronx Household's other arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the injunction barring enforcement of Reg. I. Q. View "Bronx Household v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a combined petition challenging the legal sufficiency of Initiative No. 171 (I-171), a proposed ballot measure that would prohibit the state and its political subdivisions from using funds, resources, or personnel to administer or enforce the federal Affordable Care Act, among other things. Petitioners sought an order enjoining the Secretary of State from approving petitions for circulation to the electorate for signatures or otherwise submitting the measure for approval by the voters and further sought a declaration that I-171 was unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) the Attorney General correctly determined that I-171 was legally sufficient; and (2) the ballot statements for I-171 satisfy the requirements of law. View "Hoffman v. State" on Justia Law

Addison Township issued Jerry Barnhart a misdemeanor citation for operating a shooting range without a zoning compliance permit. The case proceeded to a bench trial. After the township presented its case, the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict dismissing the case, ruling that defendant's activities were protected under MCL 691.1542a(2). The Circuit Court affirmed. In an unpublished opinion the Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of the citation and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of the panel’s interpretation of the term "sport shooting range" and for a determination whether defendant was in compliance with "generally accepted operation practices" as required by the statute. On remand, the township moved to enforce the ordinance, and defendant moved for a declaratory judgment and dismissal. The district court granted defendant's motion, concluding that defendant was operating a sport shooting range in compliance with generally accepted operation practices. The circuit court remanded the case to the district court to examine the provisions of the sport shooting ranges act (SSRA) as a whole and to consider whether MCL 691.1542a(2) applied to all local ordinances or only those attempting to regulate shooting ranges. On remand, the district court again ruled in favor of defendant. The circuit court reversed, holding that defendant’s activities were not protected under MCL 691.1542a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that in order for MCL 691.1542a(2) to apply to a shooting range, it must: (1) be a sport shooting range that also existed as a sport shooting range as of July 5, 1994; and (2) the sport shooting range must operate in compliance with the generally accepted operation practices. The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting MCL 691.1541(d) when it held that a shooting range owner could not have a commercial purpose in operating a sport shooting range. Defendant's shooting range was entitled to protection under MCL 691.1542a(2). The case was once again remanded for dismissal. View "Addison Township v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

Fradco, Inc., contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury that disallowed a sales tax deduction following an audit. Through its resident agent, Fradco requested the department send all information regarding tax matters to the certified public accountant (CPA) that Fradco designated. The department mailed a copy of its preliminary decision and order of determination to Fradco's CPA. It sent the final assessment only to Fradco's place of business. Fradco's CPA inquired about the final assessment and was informed a month later that a final assessment had been issued, that no appeal had been taken, and that the matter was now subject to collection. The letter did not include a copy of the assessment. The department sought summary judgment in Fradco’s appeal, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal had not been filed within 35 days after the final assessment. The tribunal denied the motion, concluding that state law provided a parallel notice requirement whenever a taxpayer properly filed a request that notices be sent to a representative and that notice to Fradco alone had not been sufficient to start the 35-day period. Similarly, SMK, LLC, contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury. SMK had hired a CPA and designated him to represent it for purposes of the sales tax audit, giving him limited authorization to inspect or receive confidential information, represent SMK, and receive mail from the department. The department faxed the CPA a notice stating that the audit package had been submitted. It sent a final assessment to SMK via certified mail, although SMK claimed that it did not receive the final assessment. The CPA made several inquiries to the department and received no answers from the department. Five days after the appeal period had allegedly run, the department sent SMK's CPA the final assessment and a letter stating that the deadline for appeal had passed. The Supreme Court granted the department leave to appeal and ordered that the Fradco and SMK appeals be heard together. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that if a taxpayer has appointed a representative, the Department of Treasury must issue notice to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s official representative before the taxpayer’s 35-day appeal period under MCL 205.22(1) begins to run. View "Fradco, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

On Sept. 18, 2013, Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question 767 was filed with Secretary of State. The Initiative Petition proposes amendments to the State Constitution with an ultimate primary purpose of constructing storm shelters for schools. Proponents also filed with the Secretary of State a proposed ballot title for their proposed Initiative. The Oklahoma Attorney General disagreed with Proponents' ballot title and then prepared and filed with the Secretary of State a new ballot title for the Initiative. The Proponents disagreed with the Attorney General's version and appealed to the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that: (1) a proponent of an initiative petition must file or submit a copy of the initiative petition and a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General when the proponent files the initiative petition and ballot title with the Secretary of State; (2) the Attorney General must file a response to a ballot title within five business days from the date the ballot title is filed; (3) the Attorney General's section 9(D) response to a ballot title is statutorily effective although the Attorney General's response was filed two days late; (4) a proponent of an initiative who challenges a ballot title prepared by the Attorney General has the burden to show that the Attorney General's ballot title is legally incorrect, or is not impartial, or fails to accurately reflect the effects of the proposed initiative; (5) the Attorney General's ballot title challenged in this proceeding was legally correct, impartial, and accurately reflected the effects of the proposed initiative; (6) when a ballot title appeal has been made, a proponent's ninety-day period of time to collect signatures commences when the ballot title appeal is final. View "In re: Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question No. 767" on Justia Law