Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying her motion for preliminary injunction of San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10(g) on the ground that both infringed upon her Second Amendment rights. The court concluded that section 4512, which requires handguns to be stored in a locked container when not carried on the person, burdens the rights protected by the Second Amendment because storage regulations such as section 4512 are not part of a long historical "tradition of proscription;" section 4512 is not a substantial burden on the Second Amendment; and, applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that section 4512 is substantially related to the important government interest of reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries. The court also concluded that section 613.10(g), which prohibits the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco, regulates conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment because restrictions on ammunition may burden the core Second Amendment right to self-defense and the record contained no persuasive historical evidence suggesting otherwise. Determining that plaintiff had standing to challenge section 613.10(g), the court concluded that section 613.10(g) is a reasonable fit to achieve its goal of reducing the legality of ammunition, and section 613.10(g) thus satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff would not succeed on the merits of her claims and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. View "Jackson v. City & Ctny. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an American citizen born in Iran, petitioned for review of a determination letter issued by DHS, seeking disclosure of his watchlist status, a meaningful opportunity to contest inclusion on any watchlist, and removal from all government watchlists. The watchlist at issue is the Consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). In Latif v. Holder, the court held that 49 U.S.C. 46110 did not grant circuit courts jurisdiction over broad constitutional claims - such as petitioner's - that seek removal from the TSDB. The court reaffirmed its holding in Latif and clarified that it is applicable even where a traveler's claims are brought as a challenge to a DHS Travel Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) determination letter. Accordingly, the court transferred to the district court where the jurisdictional defects that prevented the court from hearing petitioner's claims would not exist. View "Arjmand v. DHS" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the issuance of a permit by the State Department of Environmental Conservation, Division of Environmental Health to the Alaska Railroad Corporation for the use of herbicides to control vegetation along a railroad right-of-way. Two public interest organizations, Alaska Community Action on Toxics (ACAT) and Alaska Survival, contended that the Department’s issuance of the permit violated due process and the public notice requirement of AS 46.03.320; that the Department abused its discretion in accepting the permit application as complete and in denying standing and intervenor status to a third organization, Cook Inletkeeper; and that ACAT and Alaska Survival should not have been ordered to pay the costs of preparing the administrative record on appeal. The Department and the Railroad cross-appealed on the issue of attorney’s fees, contesting the superior court’s conclusion that ACAT and Alaska Survival were exempt from fees under AS 09.60.010(c) as constitutional litigants. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the challenges to the permit were moot due to its expiration and changes in the governing regulatory scheme. The Court affirmed the agency’s decisions regarding costs; the cross-appeals on attorney’s fees were withdrawn by agreement. View "Alaska Community Action on Toxics v. Hartig" on Justia Law

Criminal defendants Clement Poiroux, Lamar Osborne, Travis Blair, Christopher Raybon, Sara Hawkins, Brian Williams, Levorish Hudson, Joseph Johnson, Jr., Nicholas McNeil, and Willie Walker II, and McNeil & Stokley Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Metro Bonding Co., Bay Area Bail Bonds, LLC, A-Plus Bonding, Inc., Alternative Justice Bail Bonding, Inc., A-Advantage Bonding, LLC, Affordable Bail Bond, Inc., and Allstar Bail Bonds, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their claims against various district attorneys, circuit court clerks, and other state officials. Several of the criminal defendants and of the bail-bond companies sued the defendants and fictitiously named parties alleging claims related to Act No. 2012-535, Ala. Acts 2012 (codified as 12-14-31 and 12-19-311, Ala. Code 1975). The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies argued, among other things, that the fee assessed pursuant to 12-19-311(a)(1)a., Ala. Code 1975 ("the filing fee"), and the fee assessed pursuant to 12-19-311(a)(1)b., Ala. Code 1975 ("the back-end fee"), were unconstitutional. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of all claims regarding the back-end fees, all claims seeking monetary relief, and all claims against the defendant sheriffs. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the criminal defendants' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment insofar as it dismissed the bail-bond companies' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants other than the defendant sheriffs. View "Poiroux v. Rich" on Justia Law

Wayne Morrow filed a permissive appeal to the Circuit Court's order denying his request for a judgment declaring that the $100,000 cap on damages in section 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied to Morrow, a municipal employee who was sued in his individual capacity. In 2009, Alice Yu sought to have Alabama Power Company restore electrical service in her name at a commercial building she was leasing. The premises had been without power for approximately eight months. The City of Montgomery sent Morrow to perform an electrical inspection of the premises and clear the premises for service before electrical service was restored. Keandarick Russell, a minor, was staying with his great-grandmother, who lived next door to the premises. Russell was playing on the concrete pad on which the air-conditioning system was located and was electrocuted when he came in contact with a chain-link fence adjacent to the premises. When the incident occurred, wires from an uncovered junction box at the electrical source had come in contact with a portion of the fence, and, as a result, the fence had become electrified. Russell was electrocuted when he touched the fence. Shameka Caldwell, as Russell's mother and next friend, filed a wrongful-death action against multiple defendants, including Morrow and Yu for two fictitiously named defendants. In the amended complaint, Caldwell alleged that Morrow had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly inspected the premises and had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly allowed electrical service to be restored to the premises. In his answer, Morrow asserted that he was entitled to State immunity, to State-agent immunity, and to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the plain language of 11-47-190 did not limit the recovery on a claim against a municipal employee in his or her individual capacity, the $100,000 statutory cap on recovery would not apply to Caldwell's claims against Morrow. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Morrow's request for a judgment declaring that it would. View "Morrow v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

The City of Lebanon sought to annex several hundred acres of nearby property. The owners of the property subject to the annexation, including Appellees, filed a lawsuit against the City to invalidate the annexation ordinance. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City, by intentionally manipulating the annexation boundaries to guarantee a successful annexation, violated Appellees’ constitutional rights. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the boundaries of territory to be annexed must be “natural or regular” and that the boundaries of the proposed annexation in this case did not meet this standard. The Supreme Court reversed and declared the annexation valid, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in applying a “natural or regular” standard; and (2) the City’s annexation fully complied the the statutory requirements and did not violate Appellees’ constitutional rights. View "City of Lebanon v. Goodin" on Justia Law

A certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho was presented to the Idaho Supreme Court. Karen White and her development company, Elkhorn, LLC, sought to recover $166,496 paid to Valley County for "capital investments for roads in the vicinity of [their] White Cloud development." Phase I of White Cloud was completed and it was undisputed by the parties that the tax monies paid for Phase I were used by the County to complete capital investments for roads in the vicinity of the White Cloud development. The County conceded that it did not adopt an impact fee ordinance or administrative procedures for the impact fee process as required by the Idaho Development Impact Fees Act (IDIFA). The County also conceded it did not enact an IDIFA-compliant ordinance, because, at the time, the County believed in good faith that none was required. Plaintiff filed suit against the County claiming that the road development fee imposed by the County as a condition for approval of the White Cloud project violated Idaho state law and deprived Plaintiff of due process under both the federal and Idaho constitutions. In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff raised two claims for relief. The first claim for relief alleged that “Valley County’s practice of requiring developers to enter into a Road Development Agreement ("RDA," or any similar written agreement) solely for the purpose of forcing developers to pay money for its proportionate share of road improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by their development is a disguised impact fee, is illegal and therefore should be enjoined." The first claim for relief also alleged that, because the County failed to enact an impact fee ordinance under IDIFA, the imposition of the road development fees constituted an unauthorized tax. Plaintiff’s second claim for relief alleged that the County’s imposition of the road development fee constituted a taking under the federal and Idaho constitutions. The County argued Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to pay the RDA monies. Plaintiff denies that the payment was voluntary since it was required to obtain the final plat approval. The issue the federal district court presented to the Idaho Supreme Court centered on when the limitations period commences for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax. The Court answered that the limitations period for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax commences upon payment of the tax. View "White v. Valley County" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether one wrongfully convicted of a crime and placed in the Intensive Supervision Program, commonly known as house arrest, is entitled to compensation under Mississippi Code Sections 11-44-1 to -7. Frank Sanders Tipton was convicted of extortion and served time in Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) facilities as well as in the Intensive Supervision Program. After the Court vacated his judgment, Tipton filed a claim for compensation for wrongful conviction and incarceration. The State agreed to pay Tipton for his time served in prison but not for his time in the Intensive Supervision Program. After both sides filed for summary judgment, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the State, which Tipton appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Tipton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the City's Ordinance No. 2886-12, which generally prohibits targeted picketing within 50 feet of a residential dwelling. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of the City's motion to dismiss. At issue are sections 62-79 and 62-77. The court concluded that the Ordinance's ban on targeted picketing, section 62-79, was content-neutral, furthered a significant government interest, was narrowly tailored, and left open ample alternate channels for speech. Therefore, section 62-79 was facially constitutional and the district court dismissed plaintiff's challenge as to section 62-79. The court concluded however, that section 62-77 granted private citizens unbridled discretion to invoke the City's power to regulate speech in public fora abutting private residences. Accordingly, the court concluded that the loitering provision was facially unconstitutional and invalid. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Bell, et al. v. City of Winter Park, FL, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Fred Hector appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action against the City of Fargo for claims involving special assessments against his land. He argued the district court erred in granting Fargo summary judgment, because N.D.C.C. 40-26-07 authorized his action to judicially establish Fargo's special assessments as void to the extent the assessments exceeded Fargo's actual costs of improvements, and his claims were not barred by administrative res judicata. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded N.D.C.C. sections 40-26-01 and 40-26-07 authorized a court to review issues about a municipality's special assessments in the context of the adequate legal remedy of an appeal. Furthermore, the issues Hector raised in this action were res judicata. View "Hector v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law