Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Three shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sued the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Department of the Treasury, alleging harm from the unconstitutional removal restriction of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Their claims were based on the premise that if President Trump had been able to remove the FHFA Director without restrictions, he would have ended a provision that, in the event of liquidation, allowed the Treasury to recover its full preference before any other shareholder. The district court dismissed the shareholders' claims, finding that they did not sufficiently demonstrate any harm.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court noted that to challenge agency action, a party must not only show that the removal restriction is unconstitutional but also that the provision caused or would cause them harm. The court found that the shareholders' assertions did not satisfy this standard. They relied heavily on a post-presidency letter from President Trump expressing his desire to have removed the FHFA Director during his presidency. The court determined that this letter did not meet the criteria of a "public statement expressing displeasure" as outlined by the Supreme Court in Collins v. Yellen. Furthermore, the court found the shareholders' circumstantial evidence of harm speculative and insufficient to state a claim for relief. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims. View "Bhatti v. Fed. Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled on a case involving Halikierra Community Services LLC (Halikierra), a provider of home personal care services to Medicaid beneficiaries and the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS had placed Halikierra on Medicaid reimbursement prepayment review following several overbilling complaints, leading to several post-payment audits. The audits revealed that Halikierra had erroneously received excess Medicaid reimbursement funds on multiple occasions and found suspicious reimbursement claims.Halikierra filed a lawsuit against DHHS, alleging that the decision to place them on prepayment review violated their substantive due process and equal protection rights under the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DHHS, leading to an appeal from Halikierra.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that summary judgment was properly entered against Halikierra. The Court found that Halikierra’s evidentiary forecast failed to disclose any genuine issues of material fact in support of its claims. The Court concluded that DHHS's actions were not arbitrary or capricious, as the prepayment review was rationally related to a legitimate government interest, namely combating Medicaid fraud and ensuring that claims meet the requirements of federal and state laws and regulations. The Court also found no evidence of unequal treatment of Halikierra compared to other Medicaid providers. View "Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and other cigarette manufacturers and retailers challenged the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) new warning-label requirement for cigarette packages and advertisements, citing violations of the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the requirements of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA). The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs based on their First Amendment claim, without addressing the remaining claims.The FDA appealed, and the appellate court reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the warnings were both factual and uncontroversial, thus qualifying for scrutiny under the standard set by the Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of Supreme Court of Ohio. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the government could constitutionally require advertisers to disclose purely factual and uncontroversial information, provided the requirements are reasonably related to a substantial government interest and not unjustified or unduly burdensome.Applying the Zauderer standard, the court determined that the FDA's warnings were justified by the government's interest in promoting greater public understanding of the negative health consequences of smoking and were not unduly burdensome. As such, the court concluded that the warnings did not violate the First Amendment. The court remanded the case back to the district court for consideration of the remaining claims under the APA. View "R J Reynolds Tobacco v. FDA" on Justia Law

In this case, petitioners Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights and Samuel Dickman, M.D., sought a declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction against the Montana Attorney General and the Montana Secretary of State. The petitioners argued that the Attorney General wrongly determined that their proposed ballot issue was legally insufficient, had no authority to attach a fiscal statement to the ballot issue, and that their ballot statements complied with Montana Code Annotated sections 13-27-212 and -213.The Supreme Court of Montana held that the Attorney General did err in concluding that the proposed ballot issue was legally insufficient, as it did not violate the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. The proposal effects a single change to the Montana Constitution on a single subject: the right to make decisions about one's own pregnancy, including the right to abortion.The court also found that the Attorney General exceeded his authority by appending a fiscal statement to the proposed ballot issue because the budget director's fiscal note did not indicate that the issue would have a fiscal impact.Finally, the court declined to rule on the compliance of the petitioners’ ballot statements with Montana Code Annotated sections 13-27-212 and -213, directing the Attorney General to prepare a ballot statement in line with statutory requirements and forward it to the Montana Secretary of State.The court essentially concluded that the proposed ballot issue was legally sufficient and did not require separate votes for its multiple components, as they were all closely related to the central issue of reproductive rights. The court also confirmed that the Attorney General had overstepped his authority by attaching a fiscal statement to the ballot issue. View "Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the Board of Education of the County of Cabell challenged two state laws that required the Board to include funding for the Cabell County Public Library and the Greater Huntington Park and Recreation District in its excess levy proposals. The Board argued that these laws violated the equal protection guarantees of the West Virginia Constitution because they imposed funding requirements on the Board that were not required of other county boards of education.The court agreed with the Board, finding that the laws did indeed create a discriminatory classification. The court noted that 53 other county boards were free to seek voter approval of excess levy funding without such restrictions. The court could not find a compelling state interest to justify this unequal classification.The court also addressed a second issue related to equalization payments for fiscal years 2024 and 2025. The court concluded that although the Board was required to make annual payments to the Library and the Park District, it was not required to make equalization payments for these fiscal years.The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the respondents’ Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus. View "Board of Education v. Cabell County Public Library" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court of Texas concerned the City of Dallas and the Employees’ Retirement Fund of the City of Dallas. The issue at hand was whether a city ordinance could confer a third party the perpetual right to veto categories of future lawmaking. The Court of Appeals held that the City of Dallas could not amend Chapter 40A of its code of ordinances unless the board of trustees of the Employees’ Retirement Fund agreed to the amendment. However, the Supreme Court of Texas found that such delegation of lawmaking authority was not permissible.The Supreme Court of Texas based its ruling on the principle that a legislative body cannot bind its successors, and on the constitutional principle forbidding the city council from giving away its authority to legislate. The court determined that the board’s veto in § 40A-35(a) was unenforceable and cannot prevent an otherwise valid ordinance from taking effect.However, the court did not resolve whether the City must hold an election that submits § 8-1.5(a-1) to the voters before it can enforce that provision. The court declined to address this question and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. View "THE CITY OF DALLAS v. THE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT FUND OF THE CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada ruled on the constitutionality of assigning senior justices to temporarily serve on the Supreme Court in the event of a disqualified justice. The appellant, Valley Health System, LLC, argued that only the governor has the authority to replace a disqualified justice based on Article 6, Section 4(2) of the Nevada Constitution. However, the court disagreed, noting that Article 6, Section 19(1) authorizes the chief justice to recall any consenting retired state court justice or judge not removed or retired for cause or defeated for retention of office, and assign them to appropriate temporary duty within the court system.The court thus concluded that the Nevada Constitution authorizes both the governor's designation of lower court judges and the chief justice's temporary assignment of senior justices to replace disqualified justices. Therefore, the chief justice's assignment of senior justices to the case was constitutionally authorized, and the appellant's objection was overruled and its motion to designate lower court judges was denied. The court noted that this dual-method system is not completely unique and is also present in other states such as Tennessee. View "Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Murray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin was asked to review a decision by the state's Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) and determine whether Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. (CCB) and its four sub-entities were operated primarily for religious purposes, and thus exempt from making contributions to Wisconsin's unemployment insurance system. The Court decided that in determining whether an organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" according to Wisconsin Statute § 108.02(15)(h)2, both the motivations and activities of the organization must be examined.Reviewing the facts of the case, the court determined that while CCB and its sub-entities professed to have a religious motivation, their activities were primarily charitable and secular. The services provided by the sub-entities, which included job training, placement, and coaching, along with services related to daily living, could be provided by organizations of either religious or secular motivations, and thus were not "primarily" religious in nature.The court also rejected CCB's argument that this interpretation of the statute violated the First Amendment, as it did not interfere with the church's internal governance nor examine religious dogma. Instead, it was a neutral and secular inquiry based on objective criteria. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was asked to determine whether Arkansas Code § 23-92-604(c), also known as Act 1103, was preempted by federal law. Act 1103 prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from limiting the ability of healthcare providers, who are eligible for drug pricing discounts under the Section 340B Program, to contract with outside pharmacies for drug distribution.The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) sued the Commissioner of the Arkansas Insurance Department, arguing that Act 1103 was unconstitutional because it was preempted by the Section 340B Program and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, under theories of field, obstacle, and impossibility preemption.The court, however, disagreed with PhRMA's arguments. The court found that Act 1103 did not create an obstacle for pharmaceutical manufacturers to comply with 340B, rather it assisted in fulfilling the purpose of 340B. The court also found that Act 1103 did not make it impossible for drug manufacturers and wholesale distributors to comply with the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) Program under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.Therefore, the court held that Act 1103 was not preempted by either the Section 340B Program or the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. As such, the court affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the Intervenors and against PhRMA. View "Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs of America v. McClain" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the designation of Samark Jose Lopez Bello as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker (SDNT) by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. OFAC had simultaneously designated Bello and Tareck Zaidan El Aissami as SDNTs under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act), which authorizes sanctions against individuals playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking and those materially assisting in such trafficking.Bello sued OFAC and its Acting Director in the district court, alleging that his designation was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded OFAC's statutory authority, deprived him of fair notice and resulted in an unconstitutional seizure of property. Bello also claimed that OFAC failed to provide sufficient post-deprivation notice. The district court dismissed his claims, and Bello appealed.The appeals court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the Kingpin Act does permit simultaneous designation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 Traffickers and that this did not deprive Bello of fair notice of prohibited conduct. The court also found that OFAC had provided sufficient post-deprivation notice to satisfy due process, given the government's strong interest in preventing asset dissipation. View "Bello v. Gacki" on Justia Law