Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal arising out of a challenge to Rhode Island's liquor laws the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants as to all claims, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to the constitutionality of the in-state-presence requirement for retailers.Plaintiffs, Rhode Island wine consumers, brought this action alleging that, in violation of the Commerce Clause, Rhode Island consumers are denied access to alcohol deliveries from out-of-state retailers. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the lower judgment in part, holding that the district court erred in entering summary judgment as to the constitutionality of the in-state-presence requirement for retailers and remanded for a fuller consideration of the parties' respective offers of proof. The district court upheld the in-state-presence requirement for retailers. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment in part and vacated it in part and remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding that a discriminatory aspect of the State's version of the "three-tier system" could not be affirmed. View "Anvar v. Dwyer" on Justia Law

In this action, the Wahkiakum School District (WSD) alleged the State of Washington “fail[ed] to amply fund the [WSD]’s needed facilities [and] infrastructure.” WSD argued that this failure violated the Washington Constitution, article IX, section 1. The complaint explained the impact of this lack of ample funding for facilities and infrastructure: “The [WSD] is a poor, rural school district located along the banks of the Columbia River. It has less than 500 students. Approximately 57% of its students are low income. It has less than 3500 registered voters. And the per capita income of its voters is approximately $29,000.” Specifically, the WSD requested that the State pay the cost of rebuilding its elementary, middle, and high schools; it estimated more than $50 million in construction costs. The State moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (CR 12(b)(6)) and for lack of jurisdiction (CR 12(b)(1)). In support of its motion, the State argued, “[F]unding for school construction and other capital expenditures is governed by entirely different constitutional and statutory provisions that primarily look to local school districts themselves, with the State providing funding assistance. As such, WSD fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted . . . .” It also argued that the court could not award monetary damages because the legislature has not created a private right of action and monetary damages would violate separation of powers principles. The WSD conceded that it failed to file a tort claim form and thus that its claim for monetary damages was barred. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. After review, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the constitution did not include capital construction costs within the category of “education” costs for which the State alone must make “ample provision.” The Court thus affirmed the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss. View "Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. Washington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife to revoke or suspend Appellant's hunting license for three years and his guide license for one year, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Commissioner’s interpretation of the statute mandating revocation of Appellant's hunting license for one year was correct, and her action revoking Appellant's hunting license for one year was supported by substantial evidence; (2) Appellant did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality to demonstrate that the statute governing hunting license revocation and suspension was constitutionally vague; and (3) the Legislature acted within constitutional bounds in delegating authority to the Commissioner to establish standards of competency for licensed guides. View "Wood v. Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

The Center for Biological Diversity, Sierra Club, and Grand Canyon Wildlands Council (collectively, “CBD”) contend that the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) is liable under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), for “contributing to the past or present . . . disposal” of lead ammunition in the Kaibab National Forest. The district court concluded that USFS is not liable as a contributor under RCRA and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that (a) the Forest Service’s choice not to regulate despite having the authority to do so does not manifest the type of actual, active control contemplated by RCRA; (b) although the Forest Service has the authority to further regulate Special Use permits, it has not done so, and RCRA does not impose a duty on the Forest Service to do so; and (c) mere ownership is insufficient to establish contributor liability under RCRA. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying CBD’s motion to amend its complaint to add RCRA claims against Arizona officials because CBD’s proposed amendment did not add any new claims or allegations against the Forest Service, and its claims against Arizona officials were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, the panel denied as moot CBD’s request that this case be reassigned to a different district judge. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ET AL V. USFS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Three individuals filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wayne County has a policy or practice of seizing vehicles and their contents without probable cause, simply because of the vehicle’s location in an area generally associated with crime. Wayne County impounds the vehicles and their contents until the owner pays a redemption fee: $900 for the first seizure, $1,800 for the second, and $2,700 for the third, plus towing and storage fees. The owner's only alternatives are to abandon the vehicle or to wait for prosecutors to decide whether to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings. Before a forfeiture action is brought, there are multiple pretrial conferences involving the owner and prosecutors, without a judge; prosecutors attempt to persuade the owner to pay the fee by pointing out that storage fees accrue daily. Missing just one conference results in automatic forfeiture. It takes at least four months, beyond any previous delays to arrive before a neutral decisionmaker. The seizure proceedings are conducted under Michigan’s Nuisance Abatement statute, the Controlled Substances Act, and the Omnibus Forfeiture Act, which do not protect plaintiffs from the pre-hearing deprivation of their properties.The Sixth Circuit held that Wayne County violated the Constitution when it seized plaintiffs’ personal vehicles—which were vital to their transportation and livelihoods— with no timely process to contest the seizure. Wayne County was required to provide an interim hearing within two weeks to test the probable validity of the deprivation. View "Ingram v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

The issue before the court is whether Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in Gatesville, Texas, has a right to be heard before the prison decides whether to approve or deny her request to transfer money from her inmate trust account to an outside bank account. The district court answered no and granted summary judgment to the Appellees.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and reversed. The court wrote that Plaintiff provided evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated, which precludes summary judgment. The court explained that Plaintiff’s property interests were undoubtedly at stake, and, considering the evidence that was before the district court, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the procedures were adequate, there were alternative safeguards, or that the administrative burden would be too great. It is up to a factfinder to determine whether Plaintiff can prove her case. Accordingly, the court held that the district court erred in not vacating the judgment and granting Plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings. View "Calhoun v. Collier" on Justia Law

The City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota, designated Veterans Memorial Park as a limited public forum and granted permits to two groups to place monuments there. Before the Satanic Temple could place its monument, the City closed the Park as a limited public forum and terminated both permits. The Satanic Temple sued the City. The district court dismissed its claims, except for promissory estoppel. When the Satanic Temple moved to amend its complaint, a Magistrate Judg2denied its motion. The Satanic Temple filed a second suit, reasserting the dismissed claims and adding new ones. The district court held that res judicata bars the second suit and granted summary judgment to the City on the promissory estoppel claim from the first suit.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Satanic Temple failed to plausibly allege that closing the Park as a limited public forum was unreasonable or viewpoint discriminatory. The court further explained that the Satanic Temple asserted that the City violated its free exercise rights. The court explained that although the Enacting and Recession Resolutions were facially neutral, facial neutrality is not a safe harbor if the City’s actions targeted the Satanic Temple’s religious conduct. However, the Satanic Temple failed to plausibly claim that its display was targeted. Moreover, the Satanic Temple has not plausibly alleged that it and the Veterans Club were similarly situated or that it was treated differently. The City gave a permit to both groups, had no control over the fact that the Veterans Club placed its statue first, and closed the Park as a limited public forum to everyone. View "The Satanic Temple v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law

This original proceeding involves a protracted legal battle between several rural telephone companies and the Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”). Petitioners are telephone corporations that provide telephone service in rural areas. After the Rural Telephone Bank (“RTB”) had just dissolved and redeemed all shares of stock it had issued. Many telephone companies, including Petitioners, owned RTB stock. The Commission had clarified in a 2006 decision that all gains on the sale of public utility company assets that were never in rate base accrue to company shareholders. Relying on this decision, the companies that never had stock in rate base so stated in the application and did not disclose any of their redemption proceeds. The Commission penalized the companies in the amount of $2,752,000 for violating Rule 1.1. The companies challenged the decision in an administrative appeal, but the Commission denied rehearing.   The Fifth Appellate District annulled penalty decision and the decision denying rehearing. The court agreed that Petitioners lacked fair notice of their obligation to disclose their redemption proceeds in the 2007 application. The court explained that Petitioners’ redemption proceed amounts were irrelevant to a ratemaking determination because Petitioners’ shares were never in rate base. All gains or losses on the redemption accrued to Petitioners’ shareholders, not the ratepayers. No other allocation was legally allowed. The Commission should have instructed Petitioners to disclose their redemption proceeds in the Application if that is what the Commission wanted from Petitioners. But the Commission did not give fair notice to Petitioners of this disclosure requirement and penalized them for essentially failing to intuit the disclosure requirement. View "Kerman Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was brutally beaten by three Maryland corrections officers because they believed he had taken part in an assault on another officer. He sued their warden along with the officers who attacked him and their direct supervisors. A federal jury awarded Plaintiff $700,000. The warden appealed. He argued that this case should never have proceeded to trial because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before suing. He also believes the district court should have found that the evidence failed to support the jury’s verdict and that he was entitled to qualified immunity.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court held that Plaintiff was not required to exhaust because no administrative remedies were available, the evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and the warden was not entitled to qualified immunity based on the facts found by the jury. The court explained that this case was properly tried before a jury because inmates cannot receive any relief through Maryland’s administrative grievance proceedings when the Intelligence and Investigative Division is investigating the subject matter of the grievance. And the jury’s role in trials is enshrined in the Seventh Amendment for good reason. Resolving factual disputes, weighing the evidence, and determining whom to believe is within its province. When a jury performs these functions, the court will not disturb its conclusions based on a cold record unless those conclusions lack evidentiary support. Here, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions. And based on how the jury resolved these issues, the warden’s conduct violated clearly established law. View "Kevin Younger v. Tyrone Crowder" on Justia Law

Over 20 years ago, taxpayers sued Kentucky and Sunrise, a religiously affiliated organization, for alleged violations of the Establishment Clause by paying for religious services that Sunrise allegedly imposed on children in state custody. The Sixth Circuit remanded the approval of a 2013 settlement. In 2015, the parties replaced monitoring provisions that mentioned Sunrise with general language about “any Agency.” The Third Circuit held, for the third time, that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their Establishment Clause claim but that the 2015 Amendment required new regulations or modifications to existing regulations for implementation, which meant the Amendment violated Kentucky law. In 2021 Kentucky and the plaintiffs jointly moved to dismiss the case with prejudice. Kentucky agreed to pursue new regulations in good faith; certain provisions of the Agreement would not take effect unless those regulations were adopted. The Settling Parties did “not” seek to have the court retain jurisdiction for enforcement, nor to incorporate the Agreement in the order of dismissal.Noting that the motion was filed by “the parties to the sole remaining claim,” the Establishment Clause claim against Kentucky, the district court dismissed the case. The court refused to address the terms of the 2021 Agreement, which was not properly before it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “Sunrise no doubt is frustrated to find itself unable to vindicate the legality of its program” but federal courts do not decide constitutional issues in the abstract. View "Pedreira v. Sunrise Children's Services, Inc." on Justia Law