Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A service-disabled veteran and his company, MJL Enterprises, LLC, alleged that the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Section 8(a) Business Development Program discriminated against him based on race. The program uses a race-conscious presumption to determine social disadvantage, which the plaintiffs argued was unconstitutional. They sought a declaration that the program's racial classifications were unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case, ruling it moot due to changes in the 8(a) Program following an injunction in another case, Ultima Services Corp. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The district court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate economic disadvantage and could not establish social disadvantage without the presumption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s ruling on mootness, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the case was not moot because the changes to the 8(a) Program were not final and could be appealed. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal based on lack of standing. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact, as they did not show they were "able and ready" to bid on 8(a) Program contracts due to their inability to meet the program’s social and economic disadvantage requirements. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not establish causation or redressability, as their ineligibility for the program was not solely due to the race-conscious presumption.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Hierholzer v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. The County's fire and public works departments deemed the road adequate for the project. Despite JCCrandall's objections, the County granted the CUP, and the Board of Supervisors upheld this decision.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, that state law required their consent for such activities, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County's decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall's right to exclude unauthorized persons from their property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court also found that the County's reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b), which deems cannabis activities lawful under California law, defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Robert Mann, a taxpayer, filed a lawsuit against the State of California and the California Highway Patrol (CHP), challenging CHP’s vehicle impound policies. Mann argued that the impoundment of vehicles without a warrant and inadequate notice procedures constituted illegal expenditures of public funds. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what he characterized as wasteful, unlawful, and unconstitutional law enforcement policies. The trial court granted a permanent injunction requiring CHP to consider vehicle owners’ ability to pay towing and storage fees during impound hearings and vehicle release procedures, and to revise its notice form to advise owners of procedures for retrieving impounded vehicles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially reviewed the case. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the trial court granted a motion for judgment against Youth Justice Coalition and entered judgment in favor of defendant Warren A. Stanley, who had retired before the trial. The court found that Stanley, as a former public officer, was no longer a proper defendant. The trial court issued a permanent injunction requiring CHP to revise its vehicle impound procedures, including considering the ability to pay and revising notice forms.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the injunction improperly required CHP to contravene valid statutes, relied on inapplicable case law, conflicted with the existing statutory scheme, and mandated unnecessary revisions to its notice procedures. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in requiring CHP to conduct ability-to-pay hearings and revise its notice forms, as these requirements were not mandated by due process and conflicted with statutory provisions. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellant. View "Mann v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

Two Starbucks employees, Echo Nowakowska and Tristan Bussiere, were terminated after engaging in labor organizing activities. Starbucks claimed the terminations were due to policy violations and poor performance. However, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the terminations were motivated by the employees' organizing activities, violating Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRB sought enforcement of its order, while Starbucks cross-petitioned for review on several issues, including the constitutionality of the NLRB's administrative law judges (ALJs) and the sufficiency of evidence supporting the NLRB's conclusions.The ALJ concluded that Starbucks failed to prove it would have terminated the employees absent their organizing activities. The ALJ found substantial evidence that the terminations and reduction in hours were motivated by anti-union animus, supported by internal communications and the timing of disciplinary actions. The NLRB adopted the ALJ's findings and ordered Starbucks to reinstate the employees and compensate them for lost earnings and benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Starbucks' constitutional challenge to the ALJ removal protections and found that Starbucks failed to demonstrate injury from these protections. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB's conclusions that the terminations and reduction in hours were due to the employees' organizing activities. Additionally, the court upheld the NLRB's finding that Starbucks knew about the employees' recording activities before their terminations, precluding the use of after-acquired evidence to limit remedies.However, the court vacated the portion of the NLRB's order requiring Starbucks to compensate the employees for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms, finding it exceeded the Board's authority under the NLRA. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "NLRB v. Starbucks Corp" on Justia Law

Chesla A. Scott challenged the Idaho Department of Labor's service of three determination notices, claiming she did not receive them while temporarily working out-of-state. The Department mailed the notices to her last known address, and Scott missed the fourteen-day appeal period. When she attempted to appeal, the Department's Appeals Examiner dismissed her appeal as untimely. Scott argued that the Department's service by mail did not meet constitutional due process requirements.The Appeals Examiner conducted a hearing and concluded that Scott's appeal was untimely under Idaho Code section 72-1368(3) and (5). The Idaho Industrial Commission affirmed this decision, denying Scott's request for a new hearing and conducting a de novo review of the record. The Commission also concluded that Scott had not timely filed her appeal.Scott appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the Department's service by mail was constitutionally inadequate. The Court reviewed whether Scott exhausted her administrative remedies and preserved her constitutional challenge. The Court held that Scott had exhausted her administrative remedies and preserved her due process claim, allowing it to be reviewed.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that the Department's mailing of the determination notices was reasonable under all the circumstances and did not violate due process. The Court found that the Department's method of service was reasonably calculated to provide notice, and Scott's failure to receive the notices was not due to any fault of the Department. The Court did not award attorney fees to either party but awarded costs to the Department. View "Scott v. Home Depot USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Orange City passed an ordinance requiring periodic inspections of rental properties. If entry for inspection is refused, the ordinance allows the city inspector to seek legal remedies, including obtaining an administrative search warrant. Certain owners and renters of rental units challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution because it did not require the city to show traditional probable cause before seeking a warrant.The Iowa District Court for Sioux County ruled in favor of the challengers, declaring the ordinance's mandatory inspection requirement unconstitutional and enjoining the city from seeking administrative warrants under the ordinance. The court awarded nominal damages to the plaintiffs.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower court's ruling. The court noted that in a facial challenge, the challenger must prove that the ordinance is unconstitutional in all its applications. The court found that there are scenarios where the ordinance could operate constitutionally, such as when traditional probable cause is present, when non-warrant legal remedies are pursued, or when inspections are conducted by certified third-party inspectors, exempting the property from city inspections. Therefore, the facial challenge could not succeed.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The main holding was that the ordinance's inspection regime could operate constitutionally in certain circumstances, thus the facial challenge to the ordinance failed. View "Singer v. City of Orange City" on Justia Law

Blake Jeffreys was arrested during a sting operation after unknowingly communicating with an undercover police officer and arranging to meet at a hotel for sex in exchange for $120. On May 14, 2021, Jeffreys pled guilty to promoting human trafficking. The Jefferson Circuit Court sentenced him to one year in prison, probated for five years, and ordered him to pay a $10,000 fee under KRS 529.130. Jeffreys requested the trial court waive the payment under KRS 534.030(4), but the court declined. Jeffreys appealed, arguing the fee was an unconstitutional excessive fine and should be waived.The Court of Appeals rejected Jeffreys' arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision. Jeffreys sought discretionary review from the Kentucky Supreme Court, focusing solely on the argument that the fee should be waived. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted the motion for review.The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that KRS 529.130 imposes a human trafficking victims service fee, not a fine, and is not subject to waiver under KRS 534.030(4). The court also found that KRS 453.190, which defines a "poor person" for the purpose of waiving court costs, does not apply to the fee imposed under KRS 529.130. However, the court noted that Jeffreys could seek a show cause hearing under KRS 534.020(3)(a)1 to potentially reduce or waive the payment based on his ability to pay. The court emphasized that the trial court should consider various factors, including the defendant's financial status and dependents, when determining the ability to pay. View "JEFFREYS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Montana Legislature passed House Bill 407 (HB 407), which preempted local ordinances, resolutions, initiatives, or referendums regulating the use, sale, or taxation of certain containers, including single-use plastics. Bozeman, which adopted a self-government charter in 2000, was affected by this bill. In 2023, a member of the Cottonwood Environmental Law Center submitted a local ballot initiative to regulate single-use plastics in Bozeman. The Gallatin County Election Administrator rejected the petition, citing the prohibition under § 7-5-131(2)(f), MCA. Cottonwood and other plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of HB 407.The First Judicial District Court granted Cottonwood's motion for partial summary judgment, finding § 7-5-131(2)(f), MCA, unconstitutional under Article XI, Section 8, of the Montana Constitution. The court certified its order as final, allowing the initiative to be placed on the 2024 general election ballot, where it passed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the Legislature may place limits on the powers of local government, including the power of local initiatives, as long as these limits do not infringe on other constitutional rights. The court found that § 7-1-111(21), MCA, which prohibits local government units with self-government powers from regulating auxiliary containers, is constitutional. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's decision, holding that § 7-5-131(2)(f), MCA, is not facially unconstitutional under Article XI, Section 8, of the Montana Constitution. View "Cottonwood v. State" on Justia Law

Randell Shepherd, a career coal miner, filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), invoking the Act’s presumption that he was entitled to benefits due to his over fifteen years of mining and total disability from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), bronchitis, and emphysema. Incoal, Inc., Shepherd’s most recent employer, contested his entitlement, arguing that his disability was caused by smoking, not mining. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Incoal’s expert opinions unpersuasive and inconsistent with the Act’s regulations and preamble, which recognize pneumoconiosis as a latent and progressive disease. The ALJ ruled that Incoal failed to rebut the presumption that Shepherd was entitled to benefits. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed the ALJ’s decision.Incoal petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review, arguing that the ALJ improperly relied on the regulatory preamble over their evidence and that the presumption was effectively irrebuttable, violating the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and correctly applied the law.The Sixth Circuit held that the ALJ was entitled to reference the preamble to assess the credibility of expert opinions and found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the BLBA’s rebuttable presumption is constitutional, as it is based on a rational relationship between the length of a miner’s career and the risk of pneumoconiosis. The court concluded that Incoal’s arguments were unpersuasive and that the ALJ applied the correct legal principles. Consequently, the court denied Incoal’s petition for review. View "Incoal, Inc. v. OWCP" on Justia Law

The case involves the Pennsylvania Professional Liability Joint Underwriting Association (JUA), which was established by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nearly fifty years ago to address a medical malpractice insurance crisis. The JUA acts as a professional liability insurer of last resort for high-risk medical providers and is funded solely by premiums paid by its policyholders. Over the years, the JUA has accumulated a surplus of about $300 million through investments. From 2016 to 2019, the Commonwealth attempted to transfer the JUA’s surplus to the General Fund or assume control of the JUA through legislative actions.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case multiple times. In 2017, the JUA sued the Governor after the enactment of Act 44, which mandated the transfer of $200 million from the JUA to the General Fund. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction and later summary judgment in favor of the JUA, holding that the JUA was a private entity and that the Act violated the Takings Clause. In 2018, after the enactment of Act 41, which placed the JUA under the control of the Insurance Department and mandated the transfer of all its assets, the JUA again sued. The District Court ruled in favor of the JUA, reiterating its earlier decision. In 2019, the JUA challenged Act 15, which required the JUA to be funded by the Commonwealth and categorized it as a Commonwealth agency. The District Court granted partial summary judgment for the JUA, holding that certain provisions of Act 15 constituted a regulatory taking and violated the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and applied the principles from Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward to determine whether the JUA is a public or private entity. The Court concluded that the JUA is a public entity because it was created to serve a public purpose, exercises the Commonwealth’s coercive power, and only the Commonwealth has a legally protectable interest in the JUA. Consequently, the JUA cannot assert constitutional claims against the Commonwealth. The Court reversed the District Court’s rulings in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania Professional Liability Joint Underwriting Association v. Governor of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law