Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether law enforcement officers violated the Alaska Constitution by conducting warrantless aerial surveillance of a private property with high-powered optics to investigate a tip about marijuana cultivation. The property was located in an isolated area near Fairbanks and was surrounded by trees that obstructed ground-level view. The officers' aerial surveillance aided by a high-powered zoom lens led to a search warrant, which uncovered marijuana plants, methamphetamine, scales, plastic bags for packaging, a loaded AK-47 rifle, and a large amount of cash. The defendant, McKelvey, was subsequently charged with criminal offenses.The Superior Court denied McKelvey's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the aerial surveillance, holding that although McKelvey had a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation was objectively unreasonable given the visibility of his property from the air. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that under the Alaska Constitution, a warrant was required for law enforcement to use high-powered optics for aerial surveillance of a private property.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that conducting aerial surveillance of a person's property using high-powered optics constitutes a search that requires a warrant under the Alaska Constitution. The court reasoned that such surveillance has the potential to reveal intimate details of a person's private life and could discourage Alaskans from using their private outdoor spaces. The court concluded that the chilling effect of such surveillance outweighed the utility of the conduct as a law enforcement technique. View "State of Alaska v. Mckelvey" on Justia Law

In Rhode Island Truck Center, LLC v. Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was asked to determine whether a Rhode Island truck dealer could challenge a ruling by a Rhode Island state agency that it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief for alleged violations of a Rhode Island law regulating motor-vehicle dealers and manufacturers. The violations in question were committed by an out-of-state truck manufacturer. The plaintiff, Rhode Island Truck Center, LLC ("RITC"), argued that the manufacturer's establishment of a dealership outside of Rhode Island violated the law and harmed RITC's business. The District Court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer, Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, arguing that the state agency lacked authority to apply Rhode Island law extraterritorially.The Court of Appeals concluded that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case under the federal-question jurisdiction. The court then certified a question of state law to the Rhode Island Supreme Court concerning whether a "relevant market area" specified in Rhode Island law could extend beyond Rhode Island's borders. The court affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on another claim, where RITC challenged the Board's dismissal of a claim related to Daimler's denial of a Western Star franchise to RITC. The court held that the District Court did not err in concluding that the relief requested would have an extraterritorial effect that violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. View "Rhode Island Truck Ctr v. Daimler Trucks North America" on Justia Law

In November 2018, Joseph Hoskins was stopped by a Utah state trooper, Jared Withers, because his Illinois license plate was partially obscured. The situation escalated when Trooper Withers conducted a dog sniff of the car, which led him to search the car and find a large amount of cash. Mr. Hoskins was arrested, and his DNA was collected. Mr. Hoskins sued Trooper Withers and Jess Anderson, Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendments and state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Trooper Withers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop because Utah law requires license plates to be legible, and this applies to out-of-state plates. The court also found that the dog sniff did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop, as Mr. Hoskins was searching for his proof of insurance at the time. The court ruled that the trooper's protective measures, including pointing a gun at Mr. Hoskins, handcuffing him, and conducting a patdown, did not elevate the stop into an arrest due to Mr. Hoskins's confrontational behavior.The court further held that the dog's reaction to the car created arguable probable cause to search the car and that the discovery of a large amount of cash provided arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Hoskins. The court found that Trooper Withers did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights by pointing a gun at Mr. Hoskins in retaliation for protected speech or as excessive force. Lastly, the court found no violation of Mr. Hoskins's due process rights related to the handling of his DNA sample, as neither the Due Process Clause nor state law created a protected interest in a procedure to ensure the destruction of his DNA sample. View "Hoskins v. Withers" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Great Northern Properties, L.P. ("GNP"), filed a lawsuit against the United States, alleging a Fifth Amendment taking of its coal leases on the Otter Creek property in Montana. GNP claimed that the federal government, through the Montana state regulatory authority, denied the necessary permits for coal mining. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that GNP could not establish that Montana's actions were coerced by the federal government or that Montana acted as an agent of the federal government. The court also noted that the federal government did not dictate the outcome in individual permitting cases and that state law governed the permitting process. Therefore, the federal government was not responsible for the permit denial, as Montana was not coerced to enact its own regulatory program following the passage of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Furthermore, the court rejected GNP's claim that the existence of federal standards created an agency relationship between the federal government and Montana. View "GREAT NORTHERN PROPERTIES, L.P. v. US " on Justia Law

Thomas Rhone, a property owner in Texas City, Texas, had his apartments declared a nuisance by a Municipal Court of Record. Rhone disputed this decision in state court, but the City moved the case to federal district court. There, Rhone's claims were dismissed on summary judgment. Rhone appealed the district court's decision, challenging the standard of review and its conclusions regarding his constitutional claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered a limited remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the role of the City Attorney in finalizing the Municipal Court’s order of abatement.Rhone's property, three apartment buildings, passed a city inspection in 2013 without any issues regarding a lack of a certificate of occupancy being raised. However, following an inspection in 2020, Texas City informed Rhone that his buildings were substandard and that he would need a certificate of occupancy to operate them. Rhone argued that city officials interfered with his efforts to remedy the violations claimed by the City and imposed conditions that made it impossible for him to preserve the value of his property by repairing the apartment buildings to bring them into compliance with the Texas City Code instead of demolishing the structures.After the city filed an administrative action in its Municipal Court of Record, the court ordered the demolition of the apartment buildings, finding them to be "dilapidated, substandard, unfit for human habitation, a hazard to the public health, safety, and welfare," and a nuisance. Rhone appealed this order in the 122nd Judicial District Court of Galveston County, but the City removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Galveston under federal-question jurisdiction. The federal district court ultimately granted partial summary judgment in favor of Texas City.The Court of Appeals held that any of Rhone's claims that would only interfere with the demolition of the buildings on his property were moot due to the demolition of the buildings. However, the court also held that the demolition did not eliminate a potential takings claim. The court ordered a limited remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the role of the City Attorney in finalizing the Municipal Court’s order of abatement. The court also held that Rhone has not shown that an initial inspection by a city fire marshal and an issuance of a citation that has consequences on his use of the property violate federal law. View "Rhone v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA), which allows certain qualified retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms, and its relation to New Jersey’s more restrictive retired police officer permitting law. The retired law enforcement officers from various agencies claimed that LEOSA provided them with a federal right to carry concealed firearms in New Jersey, superseding the state law. The State of New Jersey argued that LEOSA did not provide an enforceable right and, if it did, it would only apply to officers who retired from federal or out-of-state law enforcement agencies—not to officers who retired from New Jersey law enforcement agencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that LEOSA does provide certain retired officers who meet all the statutory requirements with an enforceable right, and that right extends equally to officers who retired from New Jersey agencies and those who retired from federal or out-of-state agencies. The court held that the federal statute also preempts contrary aspects of New Jersey law. Therefore, the court affirmed the District Court’s order granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the retired officers, allowing them to carry concealed firearms. View "Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the Ivy Hill Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, finding that the Commonwealth Court violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule by dismissing the Congregation's petition against the Department of Human Services. According to the faith's tenets, congregation elders are obligated to maintain the confidentiality of confessions, which might include confessions of child abuse. The Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) identifies certain individuals, including clergymen, as mandated reporters of child abuse. The Congregation filed a petition for review, asking for a declaration on whether their elders are entitled to the clergyman privilege, which would protect them from the mandatory reporting requirements of the CPSL. The Commonwealth Court dismissed the petition, reasoning that the Department of Human Services was not a proper defendant and that declaratory relief would not terminate the controversy. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that this dismissal violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule as it directly contradicted the Commonwealth Court's prior determination on the same issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ivy Hill Cong. of Jehovah Witnesses v. DHS" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona addressed two key issues related to the City of Scottsdale's decision not to award a license to operate competitive youth swimming programs at its public aquatic centers to Neptune Swimming Foundation, despite Neptune submitting a financially lucrative proposal through a request-for-proposal (RFP) process. Instead, the City chose to extend an existing license agreement with Scottsdale Aquatic Club (SAC), which had operated programs at the centers for over fifty years.The court first addressed whether a bid from a higher bidder should be considered when determining whether the City violated the Arizona Constitution's Gift Clause, which prohibits public entities from making donations or grants to any individual, association, or corporation. The court held that the higher bid in the RFP process was relevant, but not conclusive, in determining the fair market value of the license. A public entity does not necessarily violate the Gift Clause by choosing a less profitable arrangement. The court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the City on this issue.The second issue was whether the City abused its discretion by failing to follow its own procurement process rules when it canceled the RFP and extended SAC's existing license agreement. The court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the City violated its own procurement process, which should have precluded summary judgment for the City on this issue. The court therefore reversed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the City on this issue and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "NEPTUNE SWIMMING FOUNDATION v CITY OF SCOTTSDALE" on Justia Law

In 2022, Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 113, amending the state constitution to disqualify any state legislator who accumulates 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative session from holding office "for the term following the election after the member’s current term is completed." The Secretary of State interpreted this to mean that the disqualification applies to a legislator’s immediate next term. However, a group of legislators challenged this interpretation, arguing that the disqualification should apply one term later.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that the measure's disqualification applies to the legislator’s immediate next term of office. The Court found that the text of the amendment was capable of supporting the Secretary's interpretation. This interpretation was also supported by the ballot title and the voters’ pamphlet, which repeatedly described the disqualification as occurring immediately following the legislator’s current term. The Court concluded that voters would have understood the amendment in light of these materials. Therefore, the Court upheld the Secretary's rules implementing the amendment. View "Knopp v. Griffin-Valade" on Justia Law

Four Iranian nationals, who had previously completed mandatory military service in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), were denied visas to enter the United States. Their family members, three U.S. citizens and one lawful permanent resident, filed a suit against the President and several federal officials responsible for visa applications. They alleged that the defendants unlawfully deprived visa applicants the opportunity to establish eligibility for terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds (TRIG) exemptions, violating their rights under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which bars judicial review of consular decisions. The Plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applied, and that the plaintiffs failed to show any evidence of bad faith that could overcome this doctrine. The court also held that the applicants were not entitled to any more explanation for their visa denials than the citation to the section of the law on which the denial was based. View "Pak v. Biden" on Justia Law