Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A Council of ten members, appointed by the President, supervises the work of the Conference. The question, in this case, is whether an appointee to the Council is removable at will by the President. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Congress designed the Conference to be a forum inside the Executive Branch for shop talk and collaboration with external experts. It has no adjudicatory or legislative features that would clearly signal a need for some measure of independence from Presidential control. And nothing in the text of the legislation creating the Conference and Council hints at a congressional intent to limit the President’s removal power, let alone overcomes the presumption of presidential control over Executive Branch officials. The statute, in other words, gives no indication that Congress intended to take the unusual and potentially constitutionally troublesome step of tying the President’s hands when it comes to the at-will removal of such a core Executive Branch officer as a member of the Administrative Conference’s Council. View "Roger Severino v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

The H-1B visa program allows foreign nationals to work in the United States in specialized positions for sponsoring employers. By regulation, any such employer must file amended paperwork with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services whenever it makes a “material change” in the terms of covered employment. In Simeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I & N Dec. 542 (AAO 2015), USCIS interpreted that phrase to include a change in the place of employment. And in an ensuing guidance document, USCIS memorialized this interpretation and exercised discretion to limit its retroactive enforcement. ITServe Alliance, Inc., a trade association representing employers, seeks a declaratory judgment that Simeio and the guidance document are unlawful. ITServe contends that Simeio was a procedurally defective rulemaking and that USCIS lacks statutory authority to require the amended filings.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that ITServe has Article III standing to raise these arguments, but the court rejected them on the merits. The court explained that because USCIS may consider LCA-related issues in exercising its own authority to approve, disapprove, or revoke H-1B petitions, it may require new or amended petitions corresponding to changes in the place of employment that necessitate the filing of new LCAs. View "ITServe Alliance, Inc. v. DHS" on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a 2019 lease by Respondents the City of Sandpoint (“the City”) to The Festival at Sandpoint (“The Festival”), a nonprofit corporation, to operate a multi-day music concert series in War Memorial Field Park. The Festival had a long-standing policy of prohibiting festival patrons from bringing weapons, including firearms, into the event. On August 9, 2019, Scott Herndon and Jeff Avery purchased tickets to the festival and attempted to enter. Avery openly carried a firearm and Herndon possessed a firearm either on his person or in a bag (the record was unclear on this point). Security personnel for the event denied entry to both. After discussions with a City police officer and the City’s attorney, who was coincidentally attending the same event in his private capacity, Herndon and Avery eventually left the music festival and received a refund for their tickets. Appellants Herndon, Avery, the Idaho Second Amendment Alliance, Inc., and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. subsequently sued the City and The Festival, asserting several claims, including seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the Respondents from violating the Idaho and United States Constitutions, particularly the Second Amendment and the Idaho Constitution’s provision securing the right to keep and bear arms in public for all lawful purposes. The district court ultimately granted the Respondents’ motions for summary judgment, awarded both the City and The Festival attorney fees and costs, and dismissed all the Appellants’ claims with prejudice. The issue raised on appeal was whether a private party who leased public property from a municipality may govern those who come and go from the property during the lease. The Idaho Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Herndon v. City of Sandpoint" on Justia Law

Appellants in these tandem appeals are each a parent of a disabled child. Arguing that his or her child was entitled to benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i), each parent brought an administrative action against his or her local education agency and prevailed. Subsequently, each parent brought a federal action for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(B). In each case, the district court awarded less attorneys’ fees than the parent requested, and the parents appealed.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of travel-related fees in No. 21-1961 and remanded for further proceedings. The court otherwise affirmed the judgments of the district courts. The court found that it was persuaded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation of reasonable attorneys’ fees in each case. Further, the court wrote that the district courts that declined to award prejudgment interest did not abuse their discretion because “delays in payment” may be remedied by “application of current rather than historic hourly rates.” However, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied any travel-related fees to M.D.’s counsel. A district court may permissibly adjust excessive travel costs. But the district court could not “eliminate all of the hours submitted by [CLF] as travel time” by denying travel-related fees altogether. View "H.C. v. NYC DOE, et al." on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and orders approving a settlement between Robert Allum and Montana State Fund and dismissing Allum's claims for benefits, holding that Allum resolved all of his dispute benefits, and therefore, the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) did not have jurisdiction over Allum's remaining stand-alone constitutional challenges.The State Fund accepted liability for the knee injury Allum received at work. Later, Allum notified State Fund that he also asserted a back condition resultant from his knee injury. Allum filed a petition seeking a hearing on his injury claims and also sought a hearing on his claims challenging the constitutionality of the Montana Workers' Compensation Act and the WCC. Allum and State Fund settled the injury claims prior to trial. The WCC approved the settlement agreement and then concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address Allum's constitutional challenges because Allum had resolved all of his benefit disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC's conclusions of law were correct. View "Allum v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC (Gannett) sought an award of attorneys’ fees from its common law right of access claim to Internal Affiars (IA) files pertaining to a former Neptune Township, New Jersey police officer. In 2015, the former officer, Philip Seidel, killed his former wife. After a local prosecutor’s office issued a report on the Seidel case that was based in part on Seidle’s IA files, Gannett submitted an Open Public Records Act (OPRA) request and one under the common law, seeking copies of those files. The Township denied the request. A trial court ultimately dismissed Gannett’s OPRA claim but ordered the release of the contested records, redacted in accordance with guidelines prescribed in the court’s opinion, on the sole basis of the common law right of access. The trial court granted a partial fee award. The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) it affirmed the trial court’s determination that Gannett had no claim under OPRA but was entitled to a redacted version of Seidle’s IA files pursuant to the common law; and (2) it held that the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a right to counsel fees in common law right of access cases under certain circumstances in Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 57 (2008). On the facts presented, however, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s partial award of counsel fees. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, the Appellate Division’s judgment. “Imposing fee-shifting in this category of cases would venture far beyond the narrow exceptions to the American Rule that New Jersey courts have adopted to date. Accordingly, Gannett is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees in this appeal.” View "Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. Township of Neptune" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that government agents searched his cell phone at the border without a warrant on at least five occasions and that agents copied data from his cell phone at least once. Plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the respective heads of each entity in their official capacity (collectively, the government), challenging the searches, as well as ICE and CBP policies regarding border searches of electronic devices. In the district court, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction preventing the government from searching his cell phone at the border without a warrant. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial threat he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. The court reasoned that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the ICE and CBP policies authorize warrantless searches. Further, the allegations in Plaintiff’s verified complaint are evidence of a pattern of warrantless searches of Plaintiff’s cell phone. However, Plaintiff has no additional evidence to establish that he will be stopped by border agents in the future and that the agents will search his cell phone without a warrant. View "Anibowei v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Texas and Missouri filed suit seeking to compel DHS to employ the $2.75 billion Congress allocated “for the construction of [a] barrier system along the southwest border” before those funds expire. The district court dismissed Texas for “claim splitting,” held that Missouri did not have standing to sue, and denied the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The states appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to "expeditiously consider the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction." The court explained Texas should not have been dismissed for claim splitting because Texas’s Article III standing confers federal jurisdiction. In terms of causation, Texas needs only to have alleged facts showing the Federal Defendants’ conduct is a cause-in-fact of the injury that the State asserts. Here, Texas claimed that border barriers (i) reduce illegal entries in areas where constructed, and (ii) increase the rate at which illegal aliens are detected and apprehended.However, the court declined to order the states' requested remedy, instead remanding the case to the district court. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law