Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant and her d her family sued Sudan, seeking compensation for a terrorist attack on their family. The question on appeal is whether we have jurisdiction. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a state sponsor of terrorism may be sued for personal injury arising from acts of terrorism. But in 2020, Congress enacted the Sudan Claims Resolution Act, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most terrorism-related claims against Sudan. Appellants argued that the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision is unconstitutional and therefore, that their claims against Sudan may be heard in federal court. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Supreme Court has long held that citizens have a constitutional right to access the courts. The court wrote that Appellants challenged Congress’ restoration of Sudan’s sovereign immunity, but these claims simply do not implicate the right to access the courts. Moreover, Appellants’ claims are in tension with the government’s power to establish inferior courts and espouse the claims of its citizens. However, the court modified the district court’s judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Chava Mark v. Republic of the Sudan" on Justia Law

Respondent G.W. had, in her lifetime, received a variety of mental health diagnoses, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. In May and June 2019, G.W. was arrested on a number of criminal charges, including criminal threatening and violation of a protective order, based upon her conduct towards a man with whom she previously had a romantic relationship and that man’s current partner (the complainants). G.W.’s conduct leading to her arrest included trespassing on the complainants’ property, contacting them after a protective order was in place, placing two improvised explosive devices and one incendiary device in the complainants’ vehicles, and making a bomb threat to the workplace of one of the complainants. G.W. appealed a circuit court decision ordering her involuntary admission to the Secure Psychiatric Unit (SPU) of the New Hampshire State Prison for a period of three years with a conditional discharge when and if clinically appropriate. On appeal, G.W. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that she met the involuntary admission standard. She also argued the court erred when it ordered that she remain in jail, where she had been detained on pending criminal charges, until a bed became available at the SPU. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the admission. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment in his Section 1983 suit arising from those portions of Plaintiff’s imprisonment that occurred as a result of an improper imposition of administrative post-release supervision (“PRS”) by New York State agencies, and subsequent improper imposition of PRS by a New York state court. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in limiting relief to $1 in nominal damages, denying him punitive damages as a matter of law, and granting summary judgment for Appellees on his false imprisonment claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court instructed the district court to consider further whether, under Vincent, compensatory damages may still be available to Plaintiff. Further, the court agreed with Plaintiff that material issues of disputed fact preclude summary judgment. Appellees’ Rule 56.1 statement stated that as of May 30, 2000, the maximum expiration date of Plaintiff’s sentence was February 13, 2008, and as of July 30, 2007, it was June 6, 2008. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s failure in the district court to object to Appellees’ statement of material facts does not preclude him from relying on inconsistencies in Appellees’ own evidence to identify a disputed issue of material fact that made it erroneous to enter summary judgment. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees on the false imprisonment claim. Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s challenge to his post-resentencing confinement is precluded by Appellees’ qualified immunity defense. View "Aponte v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California in an action alleging that California Government Code Section 3205 violates the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting local government employees from soliciting political contributions from their coworkers while state employees are not similarly barred. Plaintiffs Progressive Democrats for Social Justice, a political organization, and Krista Henneman and Carlie Ware, two officers of that organization (collectively “PDSJ”), sued to challenge the constitutionality of Section 3205. Henneman and Ware were deputy public defenders for Santa Clara County who supported Sajid Khan, a fellow county deputy public defender, in his campaign to become district attorney. Henneman and Ware determined that individually soliciting donations from their coworkers would violate Section 3205. They, therefore, did not engage in the solicitations and instead filed this lawsuit challenging Section 3205 as unconstitutional. The complaint alleged that California’s law violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by banning political solicitations among local employees but not among state employees. After filing suit, PDSJ moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of Section 3205, which the district court denied.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California. The panel held that the speculative benefits that Section 3205 may provide the Government were not sufficient to justify the burden on Plaintiffs’ expression. None of the materials before the State at the time of Section 3205’s enactment supported the statute’s distinction between local and state workers. Further, the court explained that Section 3205 did not account for agency size, which undercut the State’s argument that the statute was properly tailored to address the government’s interest, and Section 3205 was underinclusive as a means of limiting the actuality and appearance of partisan behavior by public employees. View "PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a First Amendment challenge to the City of Kingston’s prohibition against bringing signs and posters into public meetings of the Common Council held at Kingston City Hall. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Common Council meetings are limited public fora in which the City is permitted to reasonably restrict speech that undermines the purpose for which the forum had been opened. The district court granted the City’s motion, noting that government entities are permitted to regulate the manner in which the public participates in limited public fora. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that the City’s sign prohibition was unreasonable in light of the potential disruption or distraction that signs at Common Council meetings might pose.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Complaint itself and common sense offer a satisfactory rationale for the City’s sign prohibition, which undermines Plaintiffs’ assertions of unreasonableness. To be sure, there may be cases where restrictions on the form or manner of speech—including the use of signs—in a limited public forum would be unreasonable, but Plaintiffs have not pled such facts here. View "Tyler v. Kingston" on Justia Law

The Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Pretrial Practices made multiple recommendations to “ensure defendants are not denied liberty solely due to their inability to financially secure their release from custody.” In 2021, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed, the Safety, Accountability, Fairness, and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act, revising the standards for police use of force, conferring new authority on the Attorney General concerning alleged civil rights violations by law enforcement, and imposing new requirements for correctional facilities.The Act rebuilt Illinois’s statutory framework for the pretrial release of criminal defendants, 725 ILCS 5/110, establishing a default rule that all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release on personal recognizance subject to conditions of release, such as electronic monitoring or home supervision. Although the Act eliminates monetary bail it allows the court to order pretrial detention of criminal defendants in specified cases. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a defendant’s eligibility for pretrial detention. The trial court rejected claims that the Act violated the state’s constitutional single-subject and three-readings requirements and was void for vagueness but entered summary judgment, finding that certain provisions violated the bail, crime victims’ rights, and the separation of powers clauses of the Illinois Constitution.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois Constitution does not mandate monetary bail as the only means to ensure criminal defendants appear for trials or the only means to protect the public. The Act’s pretrial release provisions set forth procedures commensurate with the balance between the individual rights of defendants and the individual rights of crime victims. The legislature has long regulated the bail system. View "Rowe v. Raoul" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the order of the district court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the State of Rhode Island, acting by and through the Division of Taxation (Division), in this appeal stemming from a series of transactions for the purchase and sale of gasoline, holding that the district court erred in granting the Division's motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.The tax at issue was levied on a transaction between Plaintiff and another party and was the subject of several transactions between various entities. Plaintiff reimbursed a third-party for the tax assessed on the sale of 300,000 barrels of gasoline and then initiated this action alleging constitutional violations and violations of the Motor Fuel Tax. The trial judge dismissed the case for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial judge erroneously dismissed the action based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. View "Gunvor USA, LLC v. State, ex rel. Division of Taxation" on Justia Law

Google owns YouTube, an online video-sharing platform that is popular among children. Google’s targeted advertising is aided by technology that delivers curated, customized advertising based on information about specific users. Google’s technology depends partly on what Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulations call “persistent identifiers,” information “that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services.” In 2013, the FTC adopted regulations under COPPA that barred the collection of children’s “persistent identifiers” without parental consent. The plaintiff class alleged that Google used persistent identifiers to collect data and track their online behavior surreptitiously and without their consent. They pleaded only state law causes of action but also alleged that Google’s activities violated COPPA. The district court held that the “core allegations” in the third amended complaint were preempted by COPPA.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the third amended complaint on preemption grounds. The court remanded so that the district court can consider, in the first instance, the alternative arguments for dismissal to the extent those arguments were properly preserved. The panel held that state laws that supplement, or require the same thing as federal law, do not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives, and are not “inconsistent.” The panel was not persuaded that the insertion of “treatment” in the preemption clause evinced clear congressional intent to create an exclusive remedial scheme for enforcement of COPPA requirements. The panel concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by COPPA. View "CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant John Bradbury was resident of the City of Lewiston, Idaho and was an elected member of its city council. While serving in that capacity, he filed a petition alleging nine causes of action concerning various City funds and services, including those related to water, sanitation, wastewater, city streets, the library, and the municipally-owned Bryden Canyon Golf Course. Bradbury contended the City had been collecting excessive utility fees and improperly spending municipal funds. Bradbury sought declaratory and equitable relief. He appealed when the district court dismissed most of his claims at summary judgment, and raised additional errors for appellate review. The Idaho Supreme Court determined only that the district court erred in determining that the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) precluded recovery on a constitutional claim seeking equitable relief. The Court determined a remand was unnecessary where Bradbury conceded he was seeking no such remedy for himself. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Bradbury v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

Intellistop, Inc. (Intellistop) invented and sells a module that fits into a commercial motor vehicle’s existing brake light system and pulses the brake lights with each application of the brakes. Because the module replaces the steady-burning lights with pulsing lights when installed, Intellistop applied for an exemption. The FMCSA denied Intellistop’s application, and Intellistop petitioned for review, arguing that the FMCSA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit denied Intellistop’s petition. The court explained that the FMCSA sufficiently explained the difference between Intellistop’s application and the exemptions it had previously approved. The FMCSA explained that the “crucial distinction” between Intellistop and the previous exemption applicants was that only Intellistop’s technology modified “the functionality of original equipment manufacturers’ lamps, which are covered by an existing FMVSS.” The FMCSA adequately explained that it treated Intellistop’s application differently because Intellistop was the only exemption applicant that altered the vehicle’s brake light system to function in a way that would not maintain steady-burning brake lights.   Finally, the FMCSA’s concern that Intellistop’s exemption would alter original equipment manufacturer's lights covered by an FMVSS buttresses its conclusion that monitoring Intellistop’s module would be more difficult than monitoring other exemptions. Because previous exemptions used a supplemental pulsing light while maintaining steady-burning brake lights, they did not present the monitoring complication both the FMCSA and the NHTSA feared could result from Intellistop’s module. View "Intellistop Inc. v. DOT" on Justia Law