Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

San Diego City Attorney Mara Elliott successfully moved to strike a defamation complaint filed against her by a former political rival, Cory Briggs, under the California anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. Elliott spent the next seven months fruitlessly trying to collect on the unsatisfied judgment. She then filed a verified memorandum of costs claiming $13,789.10 in postjudgment collection costs, including $12,941.20 in attorney’s fees and $847.90 in other costs. The trial court awarded her the claimed costs, as well as $2,294.07 in postjudgment interest. Briggs appealed the cost award. Finding that the trial court properly awarded Elliott all of the costs identified in the memorandum of costs, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Briggs v. Elliott" on Justia Law

The National Marine Fisheries Service promulgated a rule requiring shrimp trawlers 25 feet or longer operating in offshore waters from North Carolina to Texas to install turtle excluder devices (TEDs), subject to a few preconditions. In 2012, NMFS proposed a more restrictive rule requiring TEDs for skimmer trawlers. The Final Rule required TEDs on all skimmer trawlers over 40 feet, including those that operate inshore. Louisiana’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) sued NMFS under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the Final Rule as arbitrary and capricious. Louisiana moved for summary judgment, focusing on the merits of its claims. NMFS opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court granted NMFS’s motion, holding that Louisiana had not carried its summary judgment burden to establish standing.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the record and procedural history of the case, the district court did not err in concluding that Louisiana failed to establish that it has standing to challenge the NMFS’s, Final Rule. The court reasoned that while the Final Rule’s EIS noted that the rule would adversely affect the shrimping industry across the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana failed to provide evidence, particularly substantiating the rule’s impact on its shrimping industry or, ergo, “a sufficiently substantial segment of its population.” Nor does Louisiana’s invocation of the “special solicitude” afforded States in the standing analysis rescue this argument, or for that matter, the State’s other arguments. View "Louisiana State v. NOAA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Defendant had not been lawfully arrested without a warrant and thus reversing the decisions of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to revoke Defendant's driver's license, holding that the circuit court did not err.A law enforcement officer arrested Defendant in his home without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed elsewhere. Rhe officer articulated no urgent need to arrest Defendant and admitted that he could have obtained a warrant from an impartial magistrate. The DMV applied evidence suggesting that Defendant might have driven while intoxicated from the scene of the misdemeanor to his home in three separate decisions revoking Defendant's driver's license. The circuit court reversed the revocation decisions, concluding that they were clearly wrong in light of the now-repealed W. Va. Code 17C-5A-2(f)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the DMV's suspension orders were founded upon an unlawful arrest. View "Frazier v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

In this case, three Latino voters from Franklin County, Washington alleged that the county’s system for electing its board of commissioners violated the Washington voting rights act of 2018 (WVRA) by “dilut[ing] the votes of Latino/a voters.” The plaintiffs (respondents on appeal) ultimately settled with defendants Franklin County and the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. The issues on appeal were raised by James Gimenez, a Franklin County voter who was allowed to intervene by the trial court. Immediately after his motion to intervene was granted, Gimenez moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim, arguing that the plaintiffs did not have standing and that the WVRA was facially invalid. The trial court denied Gimenez’s motion to dismiss, and he was not an active participant in the case thereafter. After the trial court entered a final order approving the parties’ settlement, Gimenez appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court, arguing that in his view, the WVRA protected some Washington voters but excluded others. Based on this interpretation, Gimenez argued that plaintiffs did not have standing because the WVRA did not protect Latinx voters from Franklin County as a matter of law. Gimenez also argued that the WVRA was repealed by implication and was facially unconstitutional because it required local governments to implement electoral systems that favored protected voters and disfavored others on the basis of race. The Supreme Court disagreed with Gimenez's interpretation of the WVRA, and found plaintiffs had stnging and the WVRA was valid and constitutional on its face. View "Portugal v. Franklin County" on Justia Law

The City of Pomona (the City) decided to allow commercial cannabis activities in specific locales within its boundaries. In doing so, the City determined it was exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Guidelines adopted to implement CEQA (Cal. Code Regs.) (Guidelines). Thus, when the City chose areas to locate commercial cannabis activities, it did not conduct additional environmental review under CEQA. Appellant wanted his storefront property included among the locales where commercial cannabis activity would be allowed. The City, however, excluded Appellant’s property. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of mandate to overturn the City’s designation of areas for permissible commercial cannabis activities. He contended the City made the decision improperly by foregoing further environmental review. The superior court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the City.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the City properly determined that the Project is Exempt per Guidelines Section 15183 and requires no additional environmental review. The court explained that substantial evidence shows the Project’s proposed commercial cannabis activities were similar to or “consistent” with existing land uses or development density established by the 2014 EIR and General Plan Update and thus meet the statutory exemption per Guidelines section 15183. Further, the court found that substantial evidence—the General Plan Update, the 2014 EIR, the Project, the DOS, and Findings of Consistency—shows the Project “has no project-specific effects” that are “peculiar” to it. View "Lucas v. City of Pomona" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the Missouri Constitution does not permit the General Assembly to limit the Conservation Commission's authority to expend and use conservation funds for constitutionally-enumerated purposes.The General Assembly enacted House Bill No. 2019 in 2020, appropriating $21 million to the Conservation Commission. The General Assembly, however, removed language from HB 2019 regarding use of the Commission's funds, including for land acquisition and payments in lieu of taxes (PILT). Later, the Commission attempted to withdraw funds to pay for a land acquisition and for PILT, but the Office of Administration denied the requests. The Commission and the Missouri Department of Conservation brought this action against the Attorney General and the Commissioner of the Office of Administration seeking declaratory relief to require certification of PILT payments. The circuit court ordered the Commissioner to certify the land purchase and PILT payments as requested. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in passing HB 2019, the General Assembly invaded the Commission's constitutional authority by attempting to limit the constitutionally-enumerated purposes for which the Commission could use its funds. View "Conservation Comm'n v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Governor Abbott filed suit on January 4, 2022. He alleged that the military vaccine mandate is arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). He also alleged that all but one of the Government’s planned enforcement measures violates the Constitution. For relief, Governor Abbott sought an order declaring the vaccination requirement and the challenged enforcement measures unlawful, Guardsmen. He also requested costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other relief the court deems proper. Governor Abbott then moved for an order preliminarily enjoining the defendants from enforcing the vaccine mandate against members of the Texas militia not in federal service. The district court denied the motion. The Governor appealed under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1).   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Governor Abbott’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Government conceded that its erstwhile vaccine mandate is unnecessary to military readiness by repealing it. The question, therefore, is whether the President can punish non-federalized Guardsmen in Texas who refused to get COVID injections before the President and Congress deemed such injections unnecessary. The court held that the Constitution’s text, history, and tradition foreclose the President’s efforts to impose such punishments. View "Abbott v. Biden" on Justia Law

Petitioner Todd Wood appealed after his driving privileges were suspended following breath alcohol testing (BAC) by the Idaho State Policy. After a lawful traffic stop, Wood submitted to BAC testing. His results were 0.178 and 0.175, both in excess of Idaho’s legal limit of 0.08. However, during the fifteen-minute pretest observation period, the deputy sheriff admittedly did not observe Wood for roughly three minutes to ensure mouth alcohol was not present by way of burp, external contaminant, or otherwise prior to evidentiary testing. Wood challenged his suspension and argued that his BAC results were inadmissible because they had not been obtained in compliance with the required fifteen-minute pretest observation procedure. The ALS hearing officer disagreed, reasoning that ISP had promulgated rules making the pretest observation period only discretionary; thus, Wood’s BAC test results were not based on unlawful procedure. Wood petitioned for judicial review and argued the BAC rules allowing for a discretionary observation period are violative of “due process” and “fundamental fairness.” Wood further argued that the automatic admission of BAC results in his ALS hearing, pursuant to section 18-8004(4), unconstitutionally usurped the judicial branch’s power over the admission of evidence. The district court rejected Wood’s arguments and upheld his administrative license suspension. Wood appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court on the same grounds, which likewise upheld the suspension. View "Wood v. ITD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests with six intelligence agencies for any records about the unmasking of members of President Trump’s campaign and transition team. Plaintiff sought to uncover what he alleges was inappropriate intelligence surveillance for political purposes. Declining to produce any records, the Agencies issued so-called Glomar responses, explaining that even the existence or nonexistence of such records was exempted from FOIA. The district court granted summary judgment for the Agencies, concluding that FOIA exempted the information Plaintiff requested and that the Agencies had no obligation to search for responsive records before invoking Glomar.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an agency properly issues a Glomar response when its affidavits plausibly describe the justifications for issuing such a response, and these justifications are not substantially called into question by contrary record evidence. Because the Glomar procedure protects information about even the existence of certain records, an agency need not search for responsive records before invoking it. Here, the Agencies have properly invoked Glomar on the grounds that the information Plaintiff seeks is protected by FOIA Exemptions One and Three, and nothing in the record suggests the Agencies acted in bad faith in issuing their responses. View "Gene Schaerr v. DOJ" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying three plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this suit brought to challenge the City of Des Moines' use of the state's income offset program to collect automated traffic citation penalties and granting summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to a preemption claim and a claim for unjust enrichment.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims that, among other things, the City's use of the income offset program amounted to an unconstitutional taking and that their right to procedural due process was violated. As to Plaintiffs' contention that the City's use of the program was preempted by state law, however, the district court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing one plaintiff's preemption claim with respect to his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and in dismissing two plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Livingood v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law