Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Colorado established a Universal Preschool Program (UPK) following a 2020 voter-approved proposition and subsequent legislation. The program provides public funding for voluntary, universal preschool and requires participating preschools to sign a nondiscrimination agreement. This agreement mandates that preschools offer equal enrollment opportunities regardless of characteristics such as race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income, or disability. The plaintiffs—two Catholic parishes, their preschools, the Archdiocese of Denver, and two parents—challenged the nondiscrimination requirement, arguing that it conflicted with their religious beliefs, particularly regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, and violated their rights under the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held a three-day bench trial. The court found that the nondiscrimination requirement did not violate the First Amendment, denied the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, and dismissed the Archdiocese for lack of standing. However, the court did enjoin the state from enforcing the nondiscrimination requirement as to religious affiliation for as long as a congregation preference existed, a ruling not challenged on appeal. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of injunctive relief and the dismissal of the Archdiocese.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the nondiscrimination requirement is a neutral law of general applicability and does not target religious status or use. The court found no evidence of religious hostility or individualized exemptions that would undermine general applicability. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ expressive association claim, distinguishing the facts from Supreme Court precedents. Applying rational basis review, the court concluded that the requirement is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of ensuring equal access to preschool. The district court’s denial of injunctive relief was affirmed. View "St. Mary Catholic v. Roy" on Justia Law

Patrick Jones Jr. was hired as a probationary deputy sheriff by the Lake County Sheriff’s Office and sent to a police training academy. During his training, Jones obtained a document from his girlfriend, believing it to be a study guide, and offered to share it with classmates. The document was actually a cheat sheet for a prior version of the Illinois state law enforcement exam. After an investigation by the training institute, which concluded Jones likely did not understand the document’s true nature, the Sheriff’s Office nonetheless terminated his employment. The termination letter, authored by Undersheriff Lawrence Oliver, cited Jones’s conduct as violating the office’s code of conduct and was distributed internally and to the office’s Merit Commission. Jones later struggled to find new law enforcement employment, attributing this difficulty to the termination letter.Jones filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging that the termination letter was defamatory and that it deprived him of occupational liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Office and Undersheriff Oliver, finding that Jones failed to show it was virtually impossible for him to find new employment and that the statements in the letter were either true or opinion, and that Oliver was entitled to absolute immunity under Illinois law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Sheriff’s Office was not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Jones did not allege a policy or custom as required for municipal liability. The court further held that Jones’s occupational liberty claim failed because there was no evidence that Undersheriff Oliver publicly disclosed the termination letter. Finally, the court held that Undersheriff Oliver was entitled to absolute immunity under Illinois law for statements made within the scope of his official duties. View "Jones v. Lake County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated from China to the United States and later became a U.S. citizen founded an educational institution that participated in a Department of Defense tuition program. In 2010, the FBI began investigating her for statements made on immigration forms, conducting interviews, searches, and seizing personal and business materials. Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office ultimately declined to file charges, Fox News later published reports about her, including confidential materials from the FBI investigation. These reports cited anonymous sources and included documents and photographs seized during the FBI’s search. Following the reports, the Department of Defense terminated her institution’s participation in the tuition program, resulting in significant financial losses.She filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the FBI and other federal agencies, alleging violations of the Privacy Act due to the unauthorized disclosure of her records. During discovery, she was unable to identify the source of the leak despite extensive efforts. She then subpoenaed a Fox News journalist, who authored the reports, to reveal her confidential source. The journalist invoked a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege. The district court found that the plaintiff had met the requirements to overcome this privilege—demonstrating both the centrality of the information to her case and exhaustion of alternative sources—and ordered the journalist to testify. When the journalist refused, the court held her in civil contempt.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that, under its precedents, a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege may be overcome in civil cases if the information sought is crucial to the case and all reasonable alternative sources have been exhausted. The court also declined to recognize a broader federal common law reporter’s privilege. View "Chen v. FBI" on Justia Law

A group of broadband internet providers in Georgia entered into contracts with the Georgia Department of Transportation to install and maintain their equipment along public rights of way. These contracts set annual permit fees and included a clause stating that the contracts would remain in effect until the parties entered into a new agreement. In 2021, the Department amended its rules, increasing permit fees and requiring providers to sign new contracts. The providers refused, and the Department notified them that, absent new agreements, they would be subject to the new rules. The providers then filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that their contracts were enforceable, not terminable at will, and that the Department’s actions impaired their contractual rights in violation of the United States and Georgia Constitutions.The Superior Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that sovereign immunity was waived under Article I, Section II, Paragraph V(b) of the Georgia Constitution because the providers sought declaratory relief from alleged unconstitutional acts. The court granted summary judgment to the providers, holding that the contracts were enforceable and not terminable at will by the Department.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The Court agreed with the lower court that sovereign immunity was waived for this declaratory judgment action, as the providers sought relief from acts allegedly violating constitutional provisions. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the contracts. It held that the contracts were of indefinite duration and, under longstanding Georgia law, were terminable at will by either party with notice. The Court affirmed the waiver of sovereign immunity but vacated the judgment granting declaratory and injunctive relief, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Dovetel Communication, LLC" on Justia Law

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2016 of conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, robbery, and first-degree kidnapping, receiving concurrent sentences including 8 to 20 years for robbery and 5 years to life for kidnapping. In November 2022, the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners assessed him as a high risk to reoffend, denied parole, and scheduled his next hearing for January 2025. The petitioner requested a reassessment, arguing the risk level was incorrect. The Board found an error, reassessed him as moderate risk, and held a new hearing in April 2023, but again denied parole and rescheduled the next hearing for November 2025, nine months later than originally set.The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, arguing that the Board unlawfully punished him for seeking reconsideration by delaying his next parole hearing. He claimed this delay was vindictive and violated his due process rights, relying on the presumption of vindictiveness established in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and its progeny.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the presumption of vindictiveness may generally arise in parole proceedings if the Board, upon reconsideration, extends the time before a prisoner may be considered for parole again. However, the court concluded that the presumption does not apply when the Board corrects its own error without prompting from an outside tribunal. The court further found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate actual vindictiveness. The Board acted within its statutory discretion in scheduling the next hearing, and the petition for writ relief was denied. View "Stewart v. Board of Parole Commissioners" on Justia Law

After the Washington Medical Commission adopted a policy to discipline physicians for spreading COVID-19 “misinformation,” several plaintiffs—including physicians who had been charged with unprofessional conduct, physicians who had not been charged, and advocacy organizations—filed suit. The Commission’s actions included investigating and charging doctors for public statements and writings about COVID-19 treatments and vaccines. Some plaintiffs, such as Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Siler, were actively facing disciplinary proceedings, while others, like Dr. Moynihan, had not been charged but claimed their speech was chilled. Additional plaintiffs included a non-profit organization and a public figure who alleged their right to receive information was affected.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The court found that the claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe, and that the doctrine of Younger abstention required federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. The district court also addressed the merits, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible First Amendment or due process claim, but the primary basis for dismissal was abstention and ripeness.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger abstention barred claims challenging ongoing state disciplinary proceedings (including as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, and due process claims) for all plaintiffs subject to such proceedings. The court also held that Younger abstention did not apply to claims for prospective relief by plaintiffs not currently subject to proceedings, but those claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe because no concrete injury had occurred and further factual development was needed. The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "STOCKTON V. BROWN" on Justia Law

A journalist sought access to meetings of the Tennessee Judicial Advisory Commission, which advises the Tennessee Supreme Court on rules of practice and procedure. The Commission’s meetings had been open to the public until 2018, when they were closed following a disruption by a member of the public. The journalist argued that closing these meetings violated his First Amendment rights by denying him access to government proceedings.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee initially granted the journalist a preliminary injunction, allowing public access to the meetings. However, after discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Director of the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts, and dissolved the injunction. The journalist appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the First Amendment does not provide a general right of access to government information or proceedings. It explained that the “experience-and-logic” test, derived from Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County, applies only to adjudicatory proceedings, such as criminal trials or formal administrative hearings. The court found that the Commission’s meetings are purely advisory and not adjudicatory in nature, as they do not involve adversarial proceedings or have binding legal effect. Therefore, the experience-and-logic test was inapplicable, and the journalist’s First Amendment claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant. View "McCaleb v. Long" on Justia Law

Several individuals and a firearms instruction company challenged various aspects of New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA) and the way the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD) implements the law. The individual plaintiffs, all Suffolk County residents, objected to requirements for obtaining a handgun license, including a “good moral character” standard, an in-person interview, disclosure of household members and character references, a list of social media accounts, and completion of eighteen hours of firearms training. They also alleged that the SCPD’s process for scheduling interviews and issuing licenses could take years, far exceeding statutory timelines. Additionally, the plaintiffs, including firearms instructors, challenged an alleged SCPD policy of arresting unlicensed individuals participating in live-fire training, despite a state law exemption for such training.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the individual applicants lacked standing to challenge the CCIA’s requirements because they had not completed the application process, and that none of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the SCPD’s arrest policy due to a lack of credible threat of enforcement. The district court did not address the challenge to the SCPD’s processing delays.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the applicants did have standing to challenge the CCIA’s requirements and the SCPD’s processing delays, but affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their facial Second Amendment challenges, except for the social media disclosure requirement, which was already preliminarily enjoined in another case, rendering that issue moot. The court also found that at least one plaintiff had standing to challenge the SCPD’s arrest policy and vacated the district court’s ruling on that issue, remanding for further proceedings. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Giambalvo v. Suffolk Cnty." on Justia Law

An individual pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offenses committed against two girls, aged thirteen and fourteen, when he was eighteen years old. The offenses included several instances of rape and indecent assault. The individual had a history of psychological diagnoses, including autism spectrum disorder. After his conviction, the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) initially classified him as a level three sex offender, which would require the highest level of public notification. The individual challenged this classification, leading to a de novo hearing before a SORB hearing examiner.At the hearing, the examiner found by clear and convincing evidence that the individual posed a moderate risk of reoffense and a moderate degree of danger, resulting in a reclassification to level two. The examiner considered several statutory and regulatory factors, including the number of victims, the nature and location of the offenses, and the individual’s psychological profile. The examiner also considered the fact that the individual committed multiple offenses, including repeated offenses against one victim, as relevant to the degree of dangerousness. The examiner determined that Internet publication of the individual’s registration information would serve a public safety interest. The individual sought judicial review in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which affirmed the SORB’s decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the SORB hearing examiner did not err in considering the individual’s multiple offenses as relevant to dangerousness under regulatory factor thirty-seven, even though such consideration is limited under factor two, which addresses risk of reoffense. The court also declined to find the application of factor thirty-seven unconstitutional due to a lack of empirical evidence, given the statutory mandate to consider the number of offenses. The court affirmed the classification as a level two offender and the requirement for Internet dissemination of registration information. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law