Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal concerned whether Dr. Timothy Shrom and Debra Shrom were eligible under the Pennsylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act (Act) for payment from the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund (Fund) for costs they incurred in remediating contamination caused by fuel releases from underground storage tanks (USTs or tanks) located on their property. The Fund concluded, and the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board (Board) ultimately agreed, that the Shroms were ineligible for such payment because the subject USTs were not registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as required by Section 503 of the Act and the registration fees were not paid at the time of the fuel releases that gave rise to the Shroms’ claim for remediation costs. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision on appeal, concluding that: (1) the Shroms were eligible to receive payment from the Fund for remediation costs under the Act; (2) the Board’s holding relative to the timing of the payment of the Section 503 registration fees constituted an unlawful de facto regulation; and (3) contrary to the Board’s finding, payment of the Shroms’ claim did not appear to pose any imminent risk to the Fund’s solvency. Finding no error in the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shrom, et al v PA Underground Storage Tank" on Justia Law

People working part-time may qualify for weekly unemployment benefits, but must accurately report their income so the Indiana Department of Workforce Development can reduce their benefits accordingly. A claimant who knowingly fails to disclose earnings on a weekly application must repay all benefits received for that week and is subject to a civil penalty of 25% of that forfeited amount. Grashoff omitted her part-time income on 24 weekly applications. The Department determined that she knowingly violated the law and assessed a forfeiture and penalty totaling $11,190. An ALJ affirmed the sanction. Grashoff did not seek state judicial review but filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the sanction violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected the claim, classifying the entire forfeiture as remedial rather than punitive. The penalty is a punitive sanction subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny but is not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Grashoff conceded that the difference between the benefits she received and the smaller amount she would have received had she reported her income is purely remedial. The remaining forfeiture amount, even when considered together with the 25% penalty, is not a grossly disproportionate sanction for Grashoff’s knowing violations of the law. View "Grashoff v. Payne" on Justia Law

Air Excursions, LLC provides air transportation services in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. It claims that the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury) erroneously disbursed pandemic relief funds to a competitor airline and challenges that disbursement as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).   The DC Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint on the merits and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the competitor standing doctrine supplies the link between increased competition and tangible injury but does not, by itself, supply the link between the challenged conduct and increased competition. The latter must be apparent from the nature of the challenged action itself—as in U.S. Telecom Association—or from the well-pleaded allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the complaint failed to establish that Air Excursions has suffered a competitive injury satisfying Article III’s injury in fact requirement. View "Air Excursions LLC v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law

Article XIIIC was added to the California Constitution in 1996 after the passage of the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, or Proposition 218. Article XIIIC required that any new tax or increase in tax be approved by the voters. In 2010, article XIIIC was amended when Proposition 26 passed. Since then, “'tax' has been broadly defined to encompass 'any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government.'” Several charges were expressly excluded from this definition, but at issue in this case are charges “imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The government service or product at issue was electricity: Appellant was an individual residing in the City of Anaheim (the City) who claimed her local public electric utility approved rates which exceed the cost of providing electricity. She claimed the City has been transferring utility revenues to its general fund and recouping these amounts from ratepayers without obtaining voter approval. But because voters approved the practice through an amendment to the City’s charter, the Court of Appeal concluded the City has not violated article XIIIC, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on this basis. View "Palmer v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Albany County approving ConnectGen Albany County LLC's application for a Wind Energy Conversion System (WECS) permit to construct a wind farm on Albany County land, holding that Appellants were not entitled to relief.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) contrary to Appellants' argument on appeal, ConnectGen was not required to obtain a conditional use permit in addition to the WECS special use permit; (2) the Board's approval of the WECS special use permit was not arbitrary or capricious; and (3) Appellants failed to establish that the Board's approval of the WECS special use permit was a taking of private property in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 1, 32. View "Aanonsen v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Albany County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought the services of the customized postage program to print copies of an adaptation of his drawing of Uncle Sam being strangled by a snake labeled “Citizens United” and configured as a dollar sign. However, acting through Zazzle, Inc., a third-party vendor, USPS rejected Plaintiff’s proposed design due to its partisan message, even as it accepted other customers’ postage designs with obvious political content. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court against the Postal Service, contending that USPS’s customized postage program violated the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. In 2018, while Plaintiff’s case was pending in district court, the Postal Service amended the guidelines of its customized postage program to prohibit, inter alia, all “political” stamps. Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Complaint incorporating by reference every allegation from his First Amended Complaint and further alleging that the 2018 Guidelines were unconstitutional on its face. The district court granted summary judgment and declaratory relief to Plaintiff but declined to award injunctive relief.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court first noted that Plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief. The Postal Service rejected his customized stamp design due to its partisan message, even as USPS accepted other customers’ postage designs with obvious political content. As a result, Plaintiff suffered viewpoint discrimination, and his continuing inability to speak through custom stamps while others can is sufficient to support standing. However, the fact that Plaintiff has suffered injury sufficient to confer standing to seek injunctive relief does not necessarily make such relief appropriate on the merits. View "Anatol Zukerman v. USPS" on Justia Law

In March 2021, the Camden County Commission voted to ban Plaintiff from county property for one year because he allegedly disrupted and harassed county officials and employees. Plaintiff sued Camden County, the Camden County Commission, and Commissioner (collectively, “Defendants”), claiming that Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the First Amendment.Defendant sought a preliminary injunction against Defendants and a damages claim against the Commissioner. The District Court granted the preliminary injunction over the Commissioner’s qualified immunity defense, finding that Plaintiff adequately alleged a violation of clearly established rights. However, the court determined Defendants’ appeal of the injunction was moot because it would have expired in March 2022. View "Nathan Rinne v. Camden County" on Justia Law

The question presented for the Court of Appeal in this case was whether California could lawfully require anyone who seeks to vote in a presidential primary for a candidate of a particular political party to associate with that party as a condition of receiving a ballot with that candidate’s name on it. Plaintiffs contended that the answer was no, making Elections Code section 13102 unconstitutional. Defendants California Secretary of State and the State of California disputed this conclusion, asserting that the United States Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative on multiple occasions. Defendants pointed out, that when plaintiffs discuss a “right” to cast an expressive ballot simply for the sake of doing so, rather than to affect the outcome of an election, they have ceased talking about voting. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that elections have some “generalized expressive function.” California Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiffs’ inventive theories therefore did not supply a constitutional basis for evading binding legal precedent that foreclosed their arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. View "Boydston v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William Thompson and Simon Cole were professors at the University of California, Irvine, and taxpaying residents of Orange County. They filed a taxpayer lawsuit under California Code of Civil Procedure section 526a against Todd Spitzer, in his capacity as the Orange County District Attorney (OCDA), and the County of Orange (County; collectively, County defendants). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin County defendants from operating an allegedly unconstitutional DNA collection program (the OCDNA program) that authorized County prosecutors to obtain DNA samples from persons charged with misdemeanors. Specifically, County prosecutors offered to drop or reduce charges or punishments in exchange for alleged misdemeanants’ DNA, which the OCDA stored indefinitely in its own databank. Plaintiffs claimed the OCDNA program violates alleged misdemeanants’ rights to privacy, counsel, and due process and violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The trial court sustained County defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend, characterizing plaintiffs’ claims as facial challenges to the OCDNA program. It also noted that alleged misdemeanants were required to sign waivers to participate in the program, in which they waived their rights to privacy and counsel. These waivers, the court concluded, barred any facial challenges to the OCDNA program. Plaintiffs appealed this ruling. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer as to the claims based on the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process: these claims asserted both facial and as-applied challenges to the OCDNA program, and Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the OCDNA program, as implemented by the OCDA, was unconstitutional. The Court determined Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that including a DNA provision as part of a plea deal or negotiated dismissal was facially unconstitutional. The Court also concluded plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to bring their claims. On remand, the trial court was instructed to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to the claims for violations of the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process, and sustaining it as to the remaining claims. View "Thompson v. Spitzer" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the appointment of Social Security Administration Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). They argue that no one may serve as an acting officer under 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(2), which allows acting service while a nomination is pending in the Senate unless that nomination occurred during the initial 210-day period of acting service allowed by 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(1). Appellants assert that Section 3346(a)(2) serves only to toll Section 3346(a)(1)’s time limit and does not authorize an independent period of acting service.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Appellants’ argument because Section 3346(a)(1) and Section 3346(a)(2) are, by their plain text, disjunctive and independent. Because Berryhill was legally serving as Acting Commissioner, her appointments of the ALJs who decided Appellants’ cases were valid. The court explained that Appellants’ reading of the statute would shift the balance against the President. It would prevent him from designating anyone to serve as an acting officer if he submits a nomination after the 210-day period has elapsed, thus leaving the office vacant for as long as the Senate takes to consider it. View "Barbara Rush v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law