Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Smucker’s is a federal contractor that supplies food items to the federal government. In 2021, by Executive Order, President Biden directed all federal contractors to “ensure that all [their] employees [were] fully vaccinated for COVID-19,” unless such employees were “legally entitled” to health or religious accommodations. The order made contractors “responsible for considering, and dispositioning, such requests for accommodations.” In September 2021, Smucker’s notified its U.S. employees that it would “ask and expect” them to “be fully vaccinated.” A month later, in the face of “deadlines in the federal order,” Smucker’s announced a formal vaccine mandate with exemptions based on “sincerely held religious beliefs.”The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought religious exemptions, then sued Smucker's under the First Amendment's free-exercise guarantee. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. When Smucker’s denied the exemption requests, it was not a state actor. Smucker’s does not perform a traditional, exclusive public function; it has not acted jointly with the government or entwined itself with it; and the government did not compel it to deny anyone an exemption. That Smucker’s acted in compliance with federal law and that Smucker’s served as a federal contractor, do not by themselves make the company a government actor. View "Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Co." on Justia Law

More than a decade ago, Medicaid recipients filed this suit alleging that in violation of the Due Process Clause, the District of Columbia is failing to provide them notice and an opportunity to be heard when denying them prescription coverage. The case is now before the DC Circuit for the third time. In the first two appeals, the DC Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissals for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim, respectively. On remand, the district court once more dismissed the case, this time for mootness.   The DC Circuit again reversed and remanded with instructions to proceed expeditiously with discovery and allow Plaintiffs to make their case. The court explained that Plaintiffs challenged the District’s failure to give Medicaid recipients reasons for denying their prescriptions and an explanation of how to appeal, and uncontested evidence demonstrates that, notwithstanding the transmittal memorandum, some number of Plaintiffs are still not receiving the information they claim they are entitled to under the Due Process Clause. Because it is not “impossible for [the district] court to grant any effectual relief,” the case is not moot. View "Elsa Maldonado v. DC" on Justia Law

After a 19-year-old shot and killed seventeen people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, the Florida Legislature enacted the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which bans the sale of firearms to 18-to-20-year-olds. In doing so, the Legislature sought “to comprehensively address the crisis of gun violence, including but not limited to, gun violence on school campuses.” Shortly after the law passed, the NRA challenged it, alleging that the law violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in Florida’s favor. The NRA then filed an appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in Florida’s favor. The court explained that Florida enacted the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act—as its name indicates—for precisely the same reason as states in the Reconstruction Era adopted their firearm restrictions for 18-to-20-year-olds—to address the public-safety crisis some 18-to-20-year-olds with firearms represent. Because Florida’s Act is at least as modest as the firearm prohibitions on 18- to-20-year-olds in the Reconstruction Era and enacted for the same reason as those laws, it is “relevantly similar” to those Reconstruction Era laws. And as a result, it does not violate the Second Amendment. View "National Rifle Association, et al. v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement" on Justia Law

Appellant California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed from a judgment granting Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate (judgment). DMV contends the issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred in overturning the suspension of Plaintiff’s driver’s license (1) “by applying [former] Government Code section 11440.30.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the “Judgment Granting Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Awarding Costs And Attorney Fees To Petitioner” and remanded the cause to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment to provide that the matter shall thereafter be remanded to the DMV for further proceedings. The court concluded that former Government Code section 11440.30 was applicable to Plaintiff’s DMV driver’s license suspension hearing. Said former statute is fully consistent with other relevant statutes, including, without limitation, Vehicle Code sections 14100 through 14112 and Government Code section 11501. Further, the court concluded that both CCR section 115.07 and former Government Code section 11440.30 were mandatory and not merely directory. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an implied finding that Plaintiff was prejudiced by DMV’s failure to adhere to former government code section 11440.30. View "Ramirez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the county court neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying, without a hearing, Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.In 1985, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated rape and other offenses. In 2005, the Sex Offender Registration Board issued a decision ordering Petitioner to register as a level three sex offender, thereafter denying Petitioner's motion for relief from the registration requirement. In this petition, Petitioner brought, among other claims, constitutional challenges to both federal and state sex offender registration laws. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that no exceptional circumstances were present in this case warranting extraordinary relief. View "Rancourt v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the superior court against Plaintiffs and directed the court to enter a judgment declaring the "public comment policy" of the town of Southborough unconstitutional,holding that the town's public comment policy violated rights protected by articles nineteen and sixteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.At issue was the policy of the board of selectmen of Southborough that outlines the public comment portion of its meetings where town residents may address the board ("public comment policy"). Plaintiffs argued, among other claims, that the policy violated their constitutionally-protected right under article nineteen "to assemble, speak in a peaceable manner, and petition...town leaders for redress." The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court's decision rejecting the argument that the town's public comment policy was unconstitutional, in violation of articles nineteen and sixteen, holding that the town's civil restraints on the content of speech at a public comment session in a public meeting were forbidden under both articles nineteen and sixteen. View "Barron v. Kolenda" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for and was denied disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Plaintiff appealed the decision to the District of Minnesota, arguing in part that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who oversaw the case lacked authority because SSA Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill was not properly serving as Acting Commissioner when she ratified the ALJ’s appointment. The district court agreed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court found that Berryhill was properly serving as Acting Commissioner when she ratified the appointment. Plaintiff argued the district court’s decision can be affirmed because Berryhill was never directed to serve by the president. In essence, he argued the 2016 succession memo became null and void when administrations changed in 2017. The court concluded that this argument fails. The general rule is that presidential orders without specific time limitations carry over from administration to administration. Plaintiff provides no authority indicating succession orders are any different from other presidential orders. The text of the FVRA likewise does not change the default position that presidential orders, including succession memos under the FVRA, carry over from one administration to the next. View "Brian Dahle v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Theopalis Gregory, a former City of Wilmington Council President and Delaware lawyer, was convicted by jury for official misconduct. The charges stemmed from a $40,000 discretionary grant Gregory earmarked for his non-profit organization before leaving office. He personally received at least $15,000 of the grant after he left office. On appeal, Gregory argued the jury instructions were flawed because the trial judge did not define for the jury “official functions,” a necessary element of an official-misconduct conviction. He also argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because he was not performing official functions when he earmarked funds for his nonprofit. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Gregory’s conviction: Gregory did not object to the jury instructions, and the trial judge did not plainly err when he instructed the jury using the words of the statute. Further, the Court was satisfied that the jury had more than sufficient evidence to find that Gregory was performing official functions when he earmarked the $40,000. View "Gregory v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The 2020 Horseracing Safety and Integrity Act created a national framework to regulate thoroughbred horseracing, replacing several state regulatory authorities with a private corporation, the Horseracing Authority, the Act’s primary rule-maker. The Authority was not subordinate to the relevant public agency, the Federal Trade Commission, in critical ways. In 2022, the Fifth Circuit declared the Act unconstitutional because it gave “a private entity the last word” on federal law. Congress amended the Act to give the Federal Trade Commission discretion to “abrogate, add to, and modify” any rules that bind the industry, 15 U.S.C. 3053(e).The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit filed by Oklahoma, West Virginia, Louisiana, their racing commissions, and other entities that made the same claims as the Fifth Circuit case. While the challenges are not moot, the Authority is now subordinate to the FTC, which has “pervasive” oversight and control of the Authority’s enforcement activities, just as it does in the rulemaking context. The court rejected a “commandeering” challenge to a provision that requires state authorities to “cooperate and share information” with the Authority or federal agencies for lack of standing and rejected claims that the Act was coercive or punitive. View "State of Oklahoma v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner Midwest Ozone Group (MOG), an association of companies, trade organizations, and individual entities maintaining a collective interest in air quality petitioned for review of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) final action, entitled the Revised Cross-State Air Pollution Update Rule (Revised Rule) for the 2008 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which EPA promulgated in response to this Court’s remand in Wisconsin v. EPA, 938 F.3d 303 (D.C. Cir. 2019) In the Revised Rule, EPA addresses its failure to balance emissions obligations in accordance with 2008 ozone NAAQS and its prescribed date of attainment. On appeal, MOG contends that the Revised Rule is arbitrary and capricious and that EPA failed to conduct a legally and technically appropriate assessment as required by the Good Neighbor Provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA).   The DC Circuit denied the petition and held that the Revised Rule is an appropriate exercise of EPA’s statutory authority under the “Good Neighbor Provision.” The court explained that EPA appears to have chosen analytical techniques rationally connected to the Revised Rule and appropriately explained its use of the linear interpolation and subsequent methods for establishing the Revised Rule. In addition, EPA’s methodology did also incorporate photochemical modeling, MOG’s preferred technique, as the “foundation for its projections” and “merely layered an additional mathematical function, linear interpolation” over the original projected data to generate 2021 ozone concentrations. Further, MOG has not established that EPA’s linear interpolation method is oversimplified or that the agency has produced unreasonable results. View "Midwest Ozone Group v. EPA" on Justia Law