Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court enjoining a regulation to the extent it required insurers to give retroactive premium refunds but otherwise rejecting the lawsuit brought by National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), holding that the Nevada Division of Insurance (Division) had the statutory and constitutional authority to promulgate R087-20.While the Nevada Insurance Code permits insurers to use customer credit information when underwriting and rating personal property and casualty insurance, the Division promulgated a regulation, R087-20, after the governor's COVID-19 declaration of emergency led to mass unemployment across the state. R087-20 prohibited insurers from adversely using consumer credit information changes that occurred during the emergency declaration, plus two years. On behalf of itself and its members, NAMIC sued to invalidate the regulation. The district court largely rejected NAMIC's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Division did not exceed its authority in promulgating R087-20. View "Nat'l Ass'n of Mutual Insurance Cos." on Justia Law

The United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) permanently disqualified Euclid Market Inc. (“Euclid Market”) from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) after it determined Euclid Market had unlawfully trafficked SNAP benefits. After the USDA issued its final decision, Euclid Market filed an action in federal court under 7 U.S.C. Section 2023, requesting the district court set aside the USDA’s final decision. The district court found Euclid Market did not meet its burden to show the USDA’s action was invalid and entered judgment in favor of the government. Euclid Market appealed. Euclid Market argued that the district court erred by requiring it to produce transaction-specific evidence for every transaction raised by the USDA to meet its burden of proof.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded. The court agreed with Euclid Market that the transaction-specific standard is erroneous and that the district court applied such a standard in this case. A store’s failure to provide transaction-specific evidence for every transaction does not inherently doom its case. Concluding otherwise would create unnecessary tension with the fundamental principles of evidence. Further, a hardline rule that a store cannot prevail without transaction-specific evidence for each transaction raised by the USDA is inconsistent with the district court’s rightful discretion in weighing all of the relevant, admissible evidence to determine the validity of the disqualification by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Euclid Market Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

WinRed, a “conduit” political action committee (PAC), centralizes donations to Republican-affiliated candidates and committees. WinRed helps them set up a WinRed.com webpage where donors contribute. WinRed collects and distributes the earmarked contributions. WinRed.com’s technical and maintenance services are at least partly performed by a separate entity, WinRed Technical Services, LLC (WRTS). The relationship between WinRed and WRTS is not clear, but the Eighth Circuit accepts WinRed’s affidavit that it operates exclusively in the domain of federal elections. The district court dismissed WinRed, Inc.’s request for a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction preventing the Attorneys General from (1) investigating WinRed’s activities with respect to contributions; and (2) bringing a deceptive-practice action against it for those activities.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that WinRed gives two reasons to look beyond the statutory text. Neither succeeds. The court held that WinRed errs from the start by attacking a disclaimer mandate where none exists. Minnesota’s consumer-protection law prohibits deceptive practices, and federal law does not preempt Minnesota’s enforcing it against WinRed. Because an enforceable state law underlies General Ellison’s investigation, the investigation may proceed. View "WinRed, Inc. v. Keith Ellison" on Justia Law

Six months after United States and global health authorities declared COVID-19 a public health emergency, the city of Seattle (City) passed an ordinance (Seattle Ordinance 126094) authorizing hazard pay for certain workers who delivered food to consumers’ homes. By that time, Governor Inslee had issued stay-at-home orders requiring Washingtonians to leave home only for the most essential of trips. Among some of the conditions in the ordinance were that food delivery network companies could not reduce workers’ compensation or otherwise limit their earning capacity as a result of the ordinance, and they were prohibited from reducing the areas of the City they served or to pass on the cost of the premium pay to customers’ charges for groceries. The Washington Food Industry Association and Maplebear Inc., d/b/a Instacart, challenged the ordinance, seeking a declaration invalidating the ordinance on statutory and state and federal constitutional grounds. The trial court dismissed the statutory claim under chapter 82.84 RCW but permitted all remaining claims to proceed. After review of the limited record, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) affirming dismissal of the 82.84 RCW claim; (2) reversing dismissal of the equal protection claim; and (3) reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the privileges and immunities claim. The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wash. Food Indus. Ass'n v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Election code stated that a voter who submits an absentee or mail-in ballot must complete, date and sign a declaration printed on the envelope in which the ballot is returned. Petitioners contended that failure to comply with this instruction rendered a ballot invalid, and they challenged guidance from the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth that instructed county boards of elections to canvass and pre-canvass “[a]ny ballot return-envelope that is undated or dated with an incorrect date but that has been timely received by the county.” Petitioners asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: (1) to declare that absentee and mail-in ballots which were “undated or incorrectly dated” could not be included in the pre-canvass or canvass of votes; (2) to segregate such ballots; and (3) to direct the Acting Secretary to withdraw her guidance. For the November 8, 2022 election, the Supreme Court ordered the county boards of elections to refrain from counting any absentee or mail-in ballots that arrived in undated or incorrectly dated envelopes. The Court also directed county boards to segregate and preserve such ballots. And the Court dismissed Voter Petitioners from the case for lack of standing. The Court was evenly divided on the issue of whether failing to count undated or incorrectly dated ballots violated federal law, and accordingly issued no decision on that question. The Court issued this opinion to explain its reasoning from its November 1 per curiam order. View "Ball, et al. v. Chapman, et al." on Justia Law

Camden County, Georgia appealed a superior court's denial of its “Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Other Relief” concerning an order entered by Camden County Probate Judge Robert Sweatt, Jr., setting a special election for a referendum on whether resolutions authorizing the County’s purchase of land for a rocket launch facility should have been repealed (the “Referendum”). The County claimed the Referendum was not authorized under Subsection (b) (2) of Article IX, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution, which established home rule for counties (the “Home Rule Paragraph”) and that the results of the Referendum are a nullity. As a result, the County argued that the superior court erred in denying its petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus against Judge Sweatt and its petition for a judgment declaring that the Referendum was not authorized under the Constitution. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the superior court. View "Camden County v. Sweatt, et al." on Justia Law

The 1976 Magnuson–Stevens Act contemplated “[a] national program for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States,” 16 U.S.C. 1801(a)(6), and established the United States 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A 2007 amendment established national criteria for quota-based fishing programs, (limited access privilege programs) and authorized the quota-based fishing permits and licenses at issue in this Fifth Amendment takings claim, in which fishing businesses challenged four different permitting, licensing, and endorsement requirementsThe Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of a cognizable property interest in the fishing endorsements, licenses, and permits, separate from or appurtenant to their fishing vessels. Precedent establishes that fishing permits and licenses issued under the Act are revocable privileges, not compensable property interests. The Magnuson–Stevens Act refers to “congressional intent not to confer any right, title, or interest, and to preserve the government’s authority to revoke privileges enjoyed in” fishing licenses and permits. The National Marine Fisheries Service’s regulations did not create compensable property rights in permits or licenses. licenses; permits did not have the essential characteristics of compensable property—transferability and the right to exclude others. There is no inherent right in vessel ownership to fish within the EEZ. View "Fishermen's Finest, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court entering summary judgment for the Town of Pittsfield, New Hampshire and dismissing Plaintiff's allegation that the Town's zoning ordinance, as applied by the Town's Board of Selectmen, was unconstitutionally vague and violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff applied for and received a permit to keep a trailer on his property for storage purposes. In 2016 and 2017, the Board granted Plaintiff permit extensions. In 2018, the Board denied Plaintiff's request for a third extension and required him to remove the trailer from his property. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983 and challenging the ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court provided the requisite notice that it would reach Plaintiff's claim of content or viewpoint discrimination at summary judgment and properly entered summary judgment on this claim; (2) the Town's application of the ordinance against Defendant did not violate Defendant's equal protection rights; and (3) the ordinance, as applied by the Town, was not unconstitutionally vague. View "McCoy v. Town of Pittsfield, NH" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Public Service Commission's “fuel adjustment” regulation allows utilities to adjust the rates they charge customers to account for fluctuating fuel costs. Unreasonable charges are disallowed. The Commission considers the price the utility paid for raw materials, like coal. Kentucky utilities are encouraged to buy cheaper coal. Kentucky coal producers, however, pay a severance tax. Compared to states with no severance tax, Kentucky coal is expensive. The Kentucky House of Representatives encouraged the Commission to consider all costs, including fossil fuel-related economic impacts within Kentucky, when analyzing coal purchases under the regulation. The Commission issued a new regulation under which it would artificially discount a utility’s fuel costs by the amount of the severance tax paid to any jurisdiction.Foresight, an Illinois coal producer, challenged the regulation under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. While an appeal was pending, the Commission rescinded the regulation. A subsequent statute required the Commission to evaluate the reasonableness of fuel costs based on the cost of the fuel less any severance tax imposed by any jurisdiction. Foresight sued; the district court again denied the preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit remanded. Foresight is likely to be able to show that the law discriminates against interstate commerce. The Commission proffered no explanation for the statute except that it is designed to nullify the competitive disadvantages created by Kentucky’s severance tax. Illinois coal is worse off as a matter of basic economics and Supreme Court precedent; the law is purposefully discriminatory. View "Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (“the CFPB”) promulgated the Prepaid Rule, which regulates digital wallets and other prepaid accounts. As relevant here, the Rule requires financial institutions to make certain disclosures by using model language or other “substantially similar” wording. Challenging the Rule on statutory, administrative, and constitutional grounds, PayPal sued the CFPB. The district court reached only PayPal’s statutory claims, vacating part of the Rule because it mandated a “model clause” in violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”). In this case, PayPal and the CFPB proceed on the assumption that EFTA prohibits mandatory model clauses, and so the DC Circuit considered only whether the Prepaid Rule mandates such a clause.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court concluded the CFPB’s Prepaid Rule does not mandate a “model clause” in contravention of EFTA. That the Rule’s content and formatting requirements do not fall within the meaning of “model clause” does not necessarily mean the CFPB can impose whatever content and formatting requirements it chooses. The court directed that on remand, the district court may consider PayPal’s other challenges to the Rule, including the APA and constitutional claims, which remain to be addressed. View "PayPal, Inc. v. CFPB" on Justia Law