Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two freelance journalists, Spencer Woodman and George Joseph, brought separate actions at the Michigan Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Corrections (the MDOC), arguing that the MDOC wrongfully denied their requests under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs sought video and audio recordings of a prisoner altercation that resulted in the death of inmate Dustin Szot. The MDOC denied their FOIA requests, claiming the records were exempt from disclosure. Plaintiffs and the MDOC both moved for summary judgment. The Court of Claims ordered the MDOC to disclose the audio recording to plaintiffs and to produce the videos for an in camera review. The trial court permitted the MDOC to submit the videos in a format that obscured the faces of the employees and prisoners in the videos to protect those individuals. However, the MDOC provided the unredacted videos for in camera review. The Court of Claims ultimately ordered the MDOC to disclose the unredacted videos to plaintiffs. The MDOC moved for reconsideration, arguing that it did not need to disclose the videos or, alternatively, that it should have been allowed to redact the videos by blurring the faces of the individuals in the videos. The Court of Claims denied the motion but nevertheless permitted the MDOC to make the requested redactions and permitted plaintiffs’ counsel to view both the redacted and unredacted videos. Plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s reduced amount of attorney fees and the denial of punitive damages. The MDOC cross-appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs prevailed in full and thus were entitled to attorney fees under FOIA. The Michigan Supreme Court determined plaintiffs prevailed under MCL 15.240(6) because the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records and because plaintiffs obtained everything they initially sought; accordingly, the court was required to award reasonable attorney fees. Furthermore, pro bono representation was not an appropriate factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees; accordingly, the Court of Claims abused its discretion by reducing the attorney-fee award to plaintiffs' law firm on the basis of the firm's pro bono representation of plaintiffs. View "Woodman v. Department Of Corrections" on Justia Law

Fehlman was the Neillsville Police Department’s interim police chief in 2019. In 2020, Mankowski was hired as the permanent chief. Fehlman returned to being a rank-and-file officer. Over the next several months, Fehlman raised concerns about the management of the department, which Mankowski rebuffed. Fehlman and other officers requested a meeting with the Police & Fire Commission (PFC), where Fehlman raised concerns that Mankowski instilled fear in officers; Mankowski lacked professionalism and, while on duty, told a bar owner that he should consider having the owner’s wife dance topless; Mankowski ordered officers to turn off their body cameras in violation of department policy; Mankowski verbally abused suspects; Mankowski changed radio talk procedures in ways that threatened officer safety; Mankowski prioritized speed limit enforcement over responding to an allegation of child abuse at a school.Mankowski subsequently harassed Fehlman, taking away his work credit card and threatening charges of insubordination. Fehlman resigned from the NPD. Mankowski allegedly interfered with Fehlman’s job search by making false, negative comments (Fehlman was hired nonetheless). Fehlman also discovered that his NPD personnel file had been altered and that Mankowski gave information to the unemployment compensation office that led to a delay in benefits.Fehlman sued Mankowski under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. Fehlman’s statements to the PFC were made in his capacity as a public employee, not a private citizen. View "Fehlman v. Mankowski" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles (the City) approved a project at 1719-1731 North Whitley Avenue in Hollywood (the Project) that would replace 40 apartments subject to the City’s rent stabilization ordinance (RSO) with a hotel. The City determined the Project was exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to CEQA Guidelines relating to certain development projects. The relevant guideline addresses what is often referred to as the “infill” exemption or the “Class 32” exemption. Respondent United Neighborhoods for Los Angeles (United Neighborhoods) sought a writ of mandate in the Los Angeles Superior Court, arguing, among other things, that the in-fill exemption does not apply because the Project is not consistent with a General Plan policy concerning the preservation of affordable housing. The trial court granted the writ, effectively halting the Project until the City was to find the Project is consistent with that policy or 148-159 undertakes CEQA review. The City and real parties in interest appeal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order granting the petition for writ of mandate. The court explained that the City’s suggestion that the Project’s consistency with the Framework Element implies consistency “with the entirety of the General Plan” because of the Framework Element’s foundational role assumes, contrary to authority, the Framework Element stands in perfect harmony with the General Plan. However, the court explained that although it affirms the trial court, it does not suggest that the City was necessarily required to make formal findings that Housing Element policies are outweighed by competing policies favoring the Project. View "United Neighborhoods for L.A. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

In a challenge to the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency’s policy of towing safely and lawfully parked vehicles without a warrant based solely on the accrual of unpaid parking tickets, the Coalition argued that the warrantless tows are unreasonable seizures within the meaning of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial court denied a motion for a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief.The court of appeal reversed. The challenged warrantless tows are not permissible under the vehicular community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The defendants have not shown that legally parked cars with unpaid parking tickets that present no threat to “public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic” may be towed under that exception. The court rejected an argument that the governmental interest in deterring parking violations and nonpayment of parking fines justifies warrantless tows under the vehicular community caretaking exception. The tows at issue may not be justified by analogy to warrantless property seizures in the forfeiture context. View "Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The federal government funds certain expenses incurred by presidential candidates at specific times during their primary campaigns. Jill Stein, who ran for President in 2016, contends that a temporal limit on this funding unconstitutionally discriminates against minor-party candidates. Stein also contests an administrative ruling that she forfeited the right to document certain costs of winding down her campaign, which could have offset a repayment obligation that she owed the government.   The DC Circuit denied her petition. The court explained that FEC regulations required her to reassert the issue in her written submission for administrative review. Further, Stein argued that the Commission should be estopped from claiming forfeiture because its audit report stated that the winding down costs “estimated” for the period between September 2018 and July 2019 “will be compared to actual winding down costs and will be adjusted accordingly.” The court wrote that it does not read this statement to relieve Stein of her duty to address winding down costs in her request for administrative review, which was filed near the end of that period. The court explained that it recognizes that Stein could not predict the exact amount of future winding down costs. But she could have done much more to alert the FEC that she expected those costs to exceed the estimates in the audit report—and to do so by a substantial amount. View "Jill Stein v. FEC" on Justia Law

Appellant and her d her family sued Sudan, seeking compensation for a terrorist attack on their family. The question on appeal is whether we have jurisdiction. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a state sponsor of terrorism may be sued for personal injury arising from acts of terrorism. But in 2020, Congress enacted the Sudan Claims Resolution Act, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most terrorism-related claims against Sudan. Appellants argued that the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision is unconstitutional and therefore, that their claims against Sudan may be heard in federal court. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Supreme Court has long held that citizens have a constitutional right to access the courts. The court wrote that Appellants challenged Congress’ restoration of Sudan’s sovereign immunity, but these claims simply do not implicate the right to access the courts. Moreover, Appellants’ claims are in tension with the government’s power to establish inferior courts and espouse the claims of its citizens. However, the court modified the district court’s judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Chava Mark v. Republic of the Sudan" on Justia Law

Respondent G.W. had, in her lifetime, received a variety of mental health diagnoses, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. In May and June 2019, G.W. was arrested on a number of criminal charges, including criminal threatening and violation of a protective order, based upon her conduct towards a man with whom she previously had a romantic relationship and that man’s current partner (the complainants). G.W.’s conduct leading to her arrest included trespassing on the complainants’ property, contacting them after a protective order was in place, placing two improvised explosive devices and one incendiary device in the complainants’ vehicles, and making a bomb threat to the workplace of one of the complainants. G.W. appealed a circuit court decision ordering her involuntary admission to the Secure Psychiatric Unit (SPU) of the New Hampshire State Prison for a period of three years with a conditional discharge when and if clinically appropriate. On appeal, G.W. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that she met the involuntary admission standard. She also argued the court erred when it ordered that she remain in jail, where she had been detained on pending criminal charges, until a bed became available at the SPU. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the admission. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment in his Section 1983 suit arising from those portions of Plaintiff’s imprisonment that occurred as a result of an improper imposition of administrative post-release supervision (“PRS”) by New York State agencies, and subsequent improper imposition of PRS by a New York state court. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in limiting relief to $1 in nominal damages, denying him punitive damages as a matter of law, and granting summary judgment for Appellees on his false imprisonment claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court instructed the district court to consider further whether, under Vincent, compensatory damages may still be available to Plaintiff. Further, the court agreed with Plaintiff that material issues of disputed fact preclude summary judgment. Appellees’ Rule 56.1 statement stated that as of May 30, 2000, the maximum expiration date of Plaintiff’s sentence was February 13, 2008, and as of July 30, 2007, it was June 6, 2008. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s failure in the district court to object to Appellees’ statement of material facts does not preclude him from relying on inconsistencies in Appellees’ own evidence to identify a disputed issue of material fact that made it erroneous to enter summary judgment. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees on the false imprisonment claim. Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s challenge to his post-resentencing confinement is precluded by Appellees’ qualified immunity defense. View "Aponte v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California in an action alleging that California Government Code Section 3205 violates the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting local government employees from soliciting political contributions from their coworkers while state employees are not similarly barred. Plaintiffs Progressive Democrats for Social Justice, a political organization, and Krista Henneman and Carlie Ware, two officers of that organization (collectively “PDSJ”), sued to challenge the constitutionality of Section 3205. Henneman and Ware were deputy public defenders for Santa Clara County who supported Sajid Khan, a fellow county deputy public defender, in his campaign to become district attorney. Henneman and Ware determined that individually soliciting donations from their coworkers would violate Section 3205. They, therefore, did not engage in the solicitations and instead filed this lawsuit challenging Section 3205 as unconstitutional. The complaint alleged that California’s law violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by banning political solicitations among local employees but not among state employees. After filing suit, PDSJ moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of Section 3205, which the district court denied.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California. The panel held that the speculative benefits that Section 3205 may provide the Government were not sufficient to justify the burden on Plaintiffs’ expression. None of the materials before the State at the time of Section 3205’s enactment supported the statute’s distinction between local and state workers. Further, the court explained that Section 3205 did not account for agency size, which undercut the State’s argument that the statute was properly tailored to address the government’s interest, and Section 3205 was underinclusive as a means of limiting the actuality and appearance of partisan behavior by public employees. View "PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a First Amendment challenge to the City of Kingston’s prohibition against bringing signs and posters into public meetings of the Common Council held at Kingston City Hall. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Common Council meetings are limited public fora in which the City is permitted to reasonably restrict speech that undermines the purpose for which the forum had been opened. The district court granted the City’s motion, noting that government entities are permitted to regulate the manner in which the public participates in limited public fora. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that the City’s sign prohibition was unreasonable in light of the potential disruption or distraction that signs at Common Council meetings might pose.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Complaint itself and common sense offer a satisfactory rationale for the City’s sign prohibition, which undermines Plaintiffs’ assertions of unreasonableness. To be sure, there may be cases where restrictions on the form or manner of speech—including the use of signs—in a limited public forum would be unreasonable, but Plaintiffs have not pled such facts here. View "Tyler v. Kingston" on Justia Law