Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A school resource officer employed by the Lee County School District was fatally injured while directing traffic on a state highway when a speeding motorist struck his parked vehicle, causing it to hit him. At the time, a warning sign intended to alert drivers to the school zone was allegedly inoperable. The officer’s wife received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, but his two adult sons did not. The sons filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT), alleging negligence in maintaining the warning sign and failing to warn of a dangerous condition.The case was heard in the Lee County Circuit Court. MDOT moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from suit under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(l) because the decedent was a governmental employee whose injury was covered by workers’ compensation. The sons opposed, contending the statute did not bar their claims as wrongful death beneficiaries and, if it did, that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment to MDOT, finding the statute applied and provided immunity, and also upheld the statute’s constitutionality.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory interpretation and constitutional challenge de novo. The court held that wrongful death beneficiaries stand in the position of the decedent, and because the decedent could not have sued MDOT due to statutory immunity, neither could his sons. The court further held that Section 11-46-9(1)(l) does not violate the Mississippi Constitution’s remedy clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as the statute is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of protecting public funds. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment and upholding the statute’s constitutionality. View "Patterson v. State of Mississippi, ex rel. Attorney General Fitch" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs from Kauaʻi, Oʻahu, and Maui challenged a series of emergency proclamations issued by the Governor of Hawaiʻi, beginning in July 2023, which declared affordable housing a state emergency. These proclamations suspended various state laws and established expedited processes for approving and constructing housing projects, including the creation of a State Lead Housing Officer and a Build Beyond Barriers Working Group. The initial proclamations allowed all housing projects, not just affordable housing, to benefit from the suspended laws and expedited certification. Over time, the proclamations were revised, narrowing their scope and transferring certification authority to the Hawaiʻi Housing Finance and Development Corporation (HHFDC).The plaintiffs first filed a writ of quo warranto against the State Lead Housing Officer and the Working Group, arguing that the proclamations exceeded the governor’s statutory authority and violated constitutional provisions. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed the petition without prejudice, finding the mechanism inapplicable and the claims moot, but allowed amendment. Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint for declaratory relief against the governor and HHFDC, which was also dismissed for lack of standing and procedural defects. Plaintiffs appealed, and after briefing in the Intermediate Court of Appeals, the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi held that the case was justiciable, plaintiffs had standing based on their constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment, and procedural missteps did not bar their claims. The court articulated a standard for reviewing emergency proclamations: they must be rationally related to public health, safety, and welfare, and the executive actions must be reasonably necessary to address the emergency. Applying this, the court found the Sixth through Fifteenth proclamations valid, but held the first five exceeded the governor’s emergency powers. The court vacated the circuit court’s dismissal of the declaratory judgment claims. View "Nakoa v. Governor of the State of Hawai'i" on Justia Law

In March 2025, the President issued an executive order directing federal officials to eliminate non-statutory functions and reduce statutory functions of three federal agencies: the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS), the Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA), and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). These agencies, established and funded by Congress, provide grants and services to states and other entities. Following the executive order, the agencies terminated, reassigned, or placed on leave nearly all employees and canceled numerous grants, which plaintiffs—twenty-one states—alleged caused immediate and ongoing harm, including loss of services, forced layoffs, and canceled programming.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had suffered and would continue to suffer concrete injuries due to the agencies’ actions. The court determined that the agencies’ actions likely violated the Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional provisions, including the Take Care Clause and separation of powers. The injunction barred implementation of the executive order as to the three agencies, required reversal of actions taken to implement the order, restoration of employees, and resumption of grant funding, while allowing for efficiency measures not motivated by the executive order. The district court denied the government’s request for a stay of the injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed only the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The court denied the stay, holding that the government failed to make a strong showing of likely success on the merits, particularly because it did not adequately challenge the district court’s constitutional analysis and had not preserved certain arguments. The court also found that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor a stay. View "Rhode Island v. Trump" on Justia Law

Rockwood Auto Parts, Inc. and Rockwood Towing, Inc., along with their owner, Jacques Poli, had longstanding business relationships with the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office, performing vehicle maintenance and towing services. After Troy Goodnough was elected sheriff in 2020, Monroe County initiated a competitive bidding process for fleet maintenance, ultimately awarding the contract to Gerweck Nissan instead of Rockwood Auto. Goodnough also revised the county’s towing rotation, reducing Rockwood Towing’s share of business. Additionally, Goodnough and Sergeant Michael Preadmore conducted warrantless audits of Rockwood’s premises and Poli’s property to inventory county assets, which led to a state police investigation but no criminal charges.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights due to the warrantless searches, and asserting equal protection and due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment related to the loss of contracts and towing business. They also sought to impose municipal liability on Monroe County. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, finding no genuine disputes of material fact and concluding that the searches were consensual, the contract decisions had rational bases, and no protected property interest existed in the bidding process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the searches were conducted with valid consent, the changes to contracts and towing lists were supported by rational bases and did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination, and the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest in the fleet-maintenance contract. The court also found no basis for municipal liability under Monell, as no underlying constitutional violation was established. View "Rockwood Auto Parts, Inc. v. Monroe County" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought to provide free legal advice to low-income New Yorkers facing debt-collection lawsuits by training nonlawyer “Justice Advocates” to help individuals complete a state-issued check-the-box answer form. The organization and a prospective Justice Advocate argued that many defendants in such cases default due to lack of understanding, leading to severe consequences. However, New York law prohibits nonlawyers from providing individualized legal advice, and all parties agreed that the proposed activities would violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes.The plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that applying the UPL statutes to their activities would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits, holding that the UPL statutes, as applied, were a content-based regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the UPL statutes against the plaintiffs and participants in their program.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the UPL statutes, as applied, regulate speech. However, the Second Circuit held that the regulation is content neutral, not content based, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Because the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. The court did not reach a final decision on whether the statutes, as applied, ultimately violate the First Amendment, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. View "Upsolve, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

A company had been diverting large amounts of water from streams in East Maui for over twenty years under a series of annually renewed, so-called “temporary” permits issued by the state’s Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). Each year, the company applied to renew these permits, which allowed it to use state land and divert millions of gallons of water daily. In 2020, before BLNR voted to renew the permits for 2021, an environmental group timely requested a contested case hearing, arguing that new evidence and changed circumstances warranted further scrutiny. BLNR denied this request and proceeded to renew the permits, adding some new conditions.The environmental group appealed to the Environmental Court of the First Circuit, challenging both the denial of a contested case hearing and the permit renewals. The Environmental Court found that the group had a constitutionally protected right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by state law, and that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed. The court vacated the permits but stayed its order to avoid disruption, temporarily modifying the permits to reduce the allowable water diversion. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the group.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that the group’s protected interest was defined by some, but not all, relevant environmental laws, and that due process did not require a contested case hearing in this instance. The ICA further found that the Environmental Court lacked jurisdiction over the permit renewals and erred in modifying the permits and awarding attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reversed the ICA in relevant part. It held that the group’s constitutional right was defined by all cited environmental laws, including those governing coastal zone management. The court concluded that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed, and that the Environmental Court had jurisdiction to review both the denial of the hearing and the permit renewals. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Environmental Court’s authority to temporarily modify the permits and to award attorney fees and costs to the environmental group. View "Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

A Florida minister and licensed clinical Christian psychologist, who had provided court-mandated batterers’ intervention program (BIP) services for decades, sought certification from the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) to continue offering these services to individuals ordered by courts to attend BIPs following domestic violence convictions. The DCF denied his application because his curriculum incorporated a faith-based approach and addressed issues such as substance abuse and anger management, which conflicted with state regulations prohibiting faith-based ideology and requiring a specific psychoeducational model. The provider had previously operated without proper certification and had been denied certification in the past for similar reasons.After the DCF’s 2022 denial, the provider filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that the regulation violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of DCF, holding that court-ordered BIPs constitute government speech, and thus the state could set their content without implicating the First Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the curriculum and presentation of court-ordered BIPs are government speech. The court found that the state has historically used BIPs to communicate its own message, that participants would reasonably associate the program’s content with the government, and that the state exercises substantial control over the content. Because the programs are government speech, the provider’s Free Speech and Free Exercise claims could not proceed. The court also rejected the facial challenge to the regulation and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. View "Nussbaumer v. Secretary, Florida Dept of Children and Families" on Justia Law

Two pharmaceutical companies challenged a federal program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to negotiate prices for certain high-expenditure prescription drugs lacking generic competition. Under this program, manufacturers of selected drugs must either negotiate a price with CMS or face steep excise taxes on all sales of those drugs, unless they withdraw all their products from specific Medicare and Medicaid programs. Both companies had drugs selected for negotiation and, while litigation was pending, agreed to participate and reached negotiated prices.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey resolved the cases on cross-motions for summary judgment, as the parties agreed there were no material factual disputes. The District Court ruled in favor of the government, holding that the program did not violate the Takings Clause, the First Amendment, or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The companies appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit consolidated the appeals.The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s orders. It held that participation in Medicare and the negotiation program is voluntary, so there is no physical taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court found that economic incentives to participate do not amount to legal compulsion. It also held that the program’s requirements do not compel speech in violation of the First Amendment, as any speech involved is incidental to the regulation of conduct and participation is voluntary. Finally, the court concluded that the program does not impose unconstitutional conditions, as any compelled speech is limited to the contracts necessary to effectuate the program and does not restrict speech outside those contracts. The court affirmed summary judgment for the government. View "Bristol Myers Squibb Co v. Secretary United States Department of HHS" on Justia Law

A physician licensed in Florida worked at a weight management clinic, where he was responsible for maintaining a federal registration to dispense controlled substances. After a report of missing controlled substances at the clinic, local police and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began investigating. The investigation revealed that the physician had issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances without proper documentation of a doctor-patient relationship, failed to maintain required records, did not properly report or store controlled substances, and dispensed medication in violation of labeling requirements. The physician claimed that another clinic employee had forged his signature on some prescriptions and denied personal wrongdoing.The DEA issued an Order to Show Cause, notifying the physician of its intent to revoke his registration and deny pending applications, citing violations of federal and state law. The physician submitted a Corrective Action Plan but did not request a hearing. The DEA Administrator reviewed the evidence, including expert testimony and the physician’s admissions, and found that the physician’s continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. The Administrator revoked the registration and denied all pending applications, emphasizing the physician’s failure to accept responsibility and the inadequacy of his proposed corrective measures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the DEA’s final order under an abuse of discretion standard, deferring to the agency’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. The court held that the physician received adequate procedural due process, as he was given notice and an opportunity for a hearing, which he declined. The court also rejected the argument that the DEA was required to find knowing or intentional misconduct under Ruan v. United States, holding that such a mens rea requirement does not apply to administrative revocation proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 824. The petition for review was denied. View "Ashraf v. Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded $16 billion in grants to five nonprofit organizations to support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as part of a larger $27 billion congressional appropriation under the Inflation Reduction Act. The grants were structured through agreements between the nonprofits and EPA, with Citibank acting as a financial agent to hold and disburse the funds. After concerns arose regarding conflicts of interest, lack of oversight, and last-minute amendments to the grant agreements, EPA terminated the grants in early 2025. Citibank, following an FBI recommendation, froze the accounts associated with the grants. The nonprofits sued, seeking to prevent the termination and to restore access to the funds.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction, ordering EPA and Citibank to continue funding the grants. The district court found it had jurisdiction, concluding the plaintiffs’ claims were not essentially contractual and thus did not need to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. The court determined the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional, regulatory, and arbitrary and capricious claims, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs’ regulatory and arbitrary and capricious claims were essentially contractual, meaning jurisdiction lay exclusively in the Court of Federal Claims, not the district court. The court also held that the constitutional claim was meritless. The equities and public interest, the appellate court concluded, favored the government’s need for oversight and management of public funds. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law