Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

WinRed, a “conduit” political action committee (PAC), centralizes donations to Republican-affiliated candidates and committees. WinRed helps them set up a WinRed.com webpage where donors contribute. WinRed collects and distributes the earmarked contributions. WinRed.com’s technical and maintenance services are at least partly performed by a separate entity, WinRed Technical Services, LLC (WRTS). The relationship between WinRed and WRTS is not clear, but the Eighth Circuit accepts WinRed’s affidavit that it operates exclusively in the domain of federal elections. The district court dismissed WinRed, Inc.’s request for a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction preventing the Attorneys General from (1) investigating WinRed’s activities with respect to contributions; and (2) bringing a deceptive-practice action against it for those activities.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that WinRed gives two reasons to look beyond the statutory text. Neither succeeds. The court held that WinRed errs from the start by attacking a disclaimer mandate where none exists. Minnesota’s consumer-protection law prohibits deceptive practices, and federal law does not preempt Minnesota’s enforcing it against WinRed. Because an enforceable state law underlies General Ellison’s investigation, the investigation may proceed. View "WinRed, Inc. v. Keith Ellison" on Justia Law

Six months after United States and global health authorities declared COVID-19 a public health emergency, the city of Seattle (City) passed an ordinance (Seattle Ordinance 126094) authorizing hazard pay for certain workers who delivered food to consumers’ homes. By that time, Governor Inslee had issued stay-at-home orders requiring Washingtonians to leave home only for the most essential of trips. Among some of the conditions in the ordinance were that food delivery network companies could not reduce workers’ compensation or otherwise limit their earning capacity as a result of the ordinance, and they were prohibited from reducing the areas of the City they served or to pass on the cost of the premium pay to customers’ charges for groceries. The Washington Food Industry Association and Maplebear Inc., d/b/a Instacart, challenged the ordinance, seeking a declaration invalidating the ordinance on statutory and state and federal constitutional grounds. The trial court dismissed the statutory claim under chapter 82.84 RCW but permitted all remaining claims to proceed. After review of the limited record, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) affirming dismissal of the 82.84 RCW claim; (2) reversing dismissal of the equal protection claim; and (3) reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the privileges and immunities claim. The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wash. Food Indus. Ass'n v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Election code stated that a voter who submits an absentee or mail-in ballot must complete, date and sign a declaration printed on the envelope in which the ballot is returned. Petitioners contended that failure to comply with this instruction rendered a ballot invalid, and they challenged guidance from the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth that instructed county boards of elections to canvass and pre-canvass “[a]ny ballot return-envelope that is undated or dated with an incorrect date but that has been timely received by the county.” Petitioners asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: (1) to declare that absentee and mail-in ballots which were “undated or incorrectly dated” could not be included in the pre-canvass or canvass of votes; (2) to segregate such ballots; and (3) to direct the Acting Secretary to withdraw her guidance. For the November 8, 2022 election, the Supreme Court ordered the county boards of elections to refrain from counting any absentee or mail-in ballots that arrived in undated or incorrectly dated envelopes. The Court also directed county boards to segregate and preserve such ballots. And the Court dismissed Voter Petitioners from the case for lack of standing. The Court was evenly divided on the issue of whether failing to count undated or incorrectly dated ballots violated federal law, and accordingly issued no decision on that question. The Court issued this opinion to explain its reasoning from its November 1 per curiam order. View "Ball, et al. v. Chapman, et al." on Justia Law

Camden County, Georgia appealed a superior court's denial of its “Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Other Relief” concerning an order entered by Camden County Probate Judge Robert Sweatt, Jr., setting a special election for a referendum on whether resolutions authorizing the County’s purchase of land for a rocket launch facility should have been repealed (the “Referendum”). The County claimed the Referendum was not authorized under Subsection (b) (2) of Article IX, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution, which established home rule for counties (the “Home Rule Paragraph”) and that the results of the Referendum are a nullity. As a result, the County argued that the superior court erred in denying its petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus against Judge Sweatt and its petition for a judgment declaring that the Referendum was not authorized under the Constitution. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the superior court. View "Camden County v. Sweatt, et al." on Justia Law

The 1976 Magnuson–Stevens Act contemplated “[a] national program for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States,” 16 U.S.C. 1801(a)(6), and established the United States 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A 2007 amendment established national criteria for quota-based fishing programs, (limited access privilege programs) and authorized the quota-based fishing permits and licenses at issue in this Fifth Amendment takings claim, in which fishing businesses challenged four different permitting, licensing, and endorsement requirementsThe Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of a cognizable property interest in the fishing endorsements, licenses, and permits, separate from or appurtenant to their fishing vessels. Precedent establishes that fishing permits and licenses issued under the Act are revocable privileges, not compensable property interests. The Magnuson–Stevens Act refers to “congressional intent not to confer any right, title, or interest, and to preserve the government’s authority to revoke privileges enjoyed in” fishing licenses and permits. The National Marine Fisheries Service’s regulations did not create compensable property rights in permits or licenses. licenses; permits did not have the essential characteristics of compensable property—transferability and the right to exclude others. There is no inherent right in vessel ownership to fish within the EEZ. View "Fishermen's Finest, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court entering summary judgment for the Town of Pittsfield, New Hampshire and dismissing Plaintiff's allegation that the Town's zoning ordinance, as applied by the Town's Board of Selectmen, was unconstitutionally vague and violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff applied for and received a permit to keep a trailer on his property for storage purposes. In 2016 and 2017, the Board granted Plaintiff permit extensions. In 2018, the Board denied Plaintiff's request for a third extension and required him to remove the trailer from his property. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983 and challenging the ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court provided the requisite notice that it would reach Plaintiff's claim of content or viewpoint discrimination at summary judgment and properly entered summary judgment on this claim; (2) the Town's application of the ordinance against Defendant did not violate Defendant's equal protection rights; and (3) the ordinance, as applied by the Town, was not unconstitutionally vague. View "McCoy v. Town of Pittsfield, NH" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Public Service Commission's “fuel adjustment” regulation allows utilities to adjust the rates they charge customers to account for fluctuating fuel costs. Unreasonable charges are disallowed. The Commission considers the price the utility paid for raw materials, like coal. Kentucky utilities are encouraged to buy cheaper coal. Kentucky coal producers, however, pay a severance tax. Compared to states with no severance tax, Kentucky coal is expensive. The Kentucky House of Representatives encouraged the Commission to consider all costs, including fossil fuel-related economic impacts within Kentucky, when analyzing coal purchases under the regulation. The Commission issued a new regulation under which it would artificially discount a utility’s fuel costs by the amount of the severance tax paid to any jurisdiction.Foresight, an Illinois coal producer, challenged the regulation under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. While an appeal was pending, the Commission rescinded the regulation. A subsequent statute required the Commission to evaluate the reasonableness of fuel costs based on the cost of the fuel less any severance tax imposed by any jurisdiction. Foresight sued; the district court again denied the preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit remanded. Foresight is likely to be able to show that the law discriminates against interstate commerce. The Commission proffered no explanation for the statute except that it is designed to nullify the competitive disadvantages created by Kentucky’s severance tax. Illinois coal is worse off as a matter of basic economics and Supreme Court precedent; the law is purposefully discriminatory. View "Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (“the CFPB”) promulgated the Prepaid Rule, which regulates digital wallets and other prepaid accounts. As relevant here, the Rule requires financial institutions to make certain disclosures by using model language or other “substantially similar” wording. Challenging the Rule on statutory, administrative, and constitutional grounds, PayPal sued the CFPB. The district court reached only PayPal’s statutory claims, vacating part of the Rule because it mandated a “model clause” in violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”). In this case, PayPal and the CFPB proceed on the assumption that EFTA prohibits mandatory model clauses, and so the DC Circuit considered only whether the Prepaid Rule mandates such a clause.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court concluded the CFPB’s Prepaid Rule does not mandate a “model clause” in contravention of EFTA. That the Rule’s content and formatting requirements do not fall within the meaning of “model clause” does not necessarily mean the CFPB can impose whatever content and formatting requirements it chooses. The court directed that on remand, the district court may consider PayPal’s other challenges to the Rule, including the APA and constitutional claims, which remain to be addressed. View "PayPal, Inc. v. CFPB" on Justia Law

This case arises from major flooding events in the Houston area in 2016 and 2017. Local political subdivisions sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers, seeking compliance with alleged regulatory obligations. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The fundamental issue in the case is whether the Corps has violated any enforceable, legal obligation in the management of the relevant dams and reservoirs. A potential source for obligations imposed on the Corps is the 2012 Water Control Manual (“WCM”) adopted by the Corps for flood control in the relevant watershed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Section 702 of the APA has been satisfied in that the complaint alleges Plaintiffs have been aggrieved by agency action, that the suit is not one for money damages, and that the injury arises from an officer or employee who has acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of law. Further, the court held that the Tucker Act does not provide an “adequate remedy” to the County’s claims within the meaning of Section 704. Further, the court wrote that since the regulation does not specify when such conditions require the Corps to update a WCM, the Corps must exercise discretion in deciding when updating a WCM is necessary. Such discretion is antithetical to a mandatory duty. Thus the court concluded there is no discrete, mandatory duty to revise. View "Ft Bend Cty v. US Army Corps" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 lawsuit stemming from her son’s death while under the supervision of employees at an Arkansas jail. She alleged that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her son’s serious medical needs. The district court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it disagreed with the district court’s opinion that a layperson would recognize seizure-like activity as a serious medical need that one of the Defendant’s deliberately ignored. The court reasoned that a reasonable jury could not conclude from this description of events that Defendant was aware of a serious medical need. Second, a reasonable officer would not necessarily infer that seizure-like activity in these circumstances required him to take additional action. The decedent was behaving normally at booking, though very thirsty and reportedly under the influence of methamphetamine. It isn't unreasonable to believe that whatever medical episode he experienced during transport (if he actually experienced one) had fully resolved itself by the time Defendant encountered him.   Further, the court explained that in these circumstances, Defendants can't be faulted for presuming that the medical staff best knows the quantity and quality of information needed for assessments. And even though the decedent was obviously sick, recognizing that someone is sick is not the same as knowing that he is receiving inadequate care from a trained medical professional. View "Donna Reece v. S. Williams" on Justia Law