Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Idaho Constitution protects abortion from the legislature's broad power to enact laws concerning the public’s health, welfare, and safety. Planned Parenthood Great Northwest, Hawaii, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, and Caitlin Gustafson, M.D., on behalf of herself and her patients (collectively “Petitioners”), brought three petitions, each seeking a writ of prohibition and declaratory relief blocking implementation and enforcement of recently enacted laws in Idaho. Petitioners also raised various facial challenges, claiming these laws offend important constitutional principles, such as equal protection, due process, the special laws provision, the separation of powers doctrine, and purported “informational privacy” protections under the Idaho Constitution. Petitioners further claimed that the Idaho Human Rights Act limited the legislature’s ability to regulate abortion through the Total Abortion Ban and 6-Week Ban. After careful consideration of the issued raised, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Petitioners’ requests for extraordinary writs of prohibition and declaratory relief. View "Planned Parenthood Great Northwest, et al. v. Idaho" on Justia Law

A real estate development company PEM Entities LLC (PEM), asserts a North Carolina county violated the Federal Constitution and state law by imposing new rules for getting water and sewage services. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding the company lacked standing to bring its takings and due process claims, its equal protection claim was too insubstantial to raise a federal question, and the court should not exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims once the federal claims were dismissed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that without a constitutionally protected property interest, PEM’s takings and due process claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of PEM’s takings and due process claims because they fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Further, the court concluded the district court was right to dismiss PEM’s equal protection claim but should have done so for failure to state a claim rather than lack of jurisdiction. Thu, having concluded the district court correctly dismissed all of PEM’s federal claims, the court saw no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "PEM Entities LLC v. County of Franklin" on Justia Law

In 2021, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act ("the Act"), which prohibited an abortion after around six weeks gestation. This was before many women—excluding those who were trying to become pregnant and were therefore closely monitoring their menstrual cycles—even know they were pregnant. The Supreme Court held that the decision to terminate a pregnancy rested upon the "utmost personal and private considerations imaginable," and implicates a woman's right to privacy. "While this right is not absolute, and must be balanced against the State's interest in protecting unborn life, this Act, which severely limits—and in many instances completely forecloses—abortion, is an unreasonable restriction upon a woman's right to privacy and is therefore unconstitutional." View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, et al. v. South Carolina, et al." on Justia Law

The City of Industry sued Cordoba Corporation, among others, after uncovering allegedly fraudulent billings for a solar energy development. Cordoba filed a cross-complaint, but the trial court granted the City’s special motion to strike it as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc., Section 425.16), or anti-SLAPP motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order. The court explained that Cordoba does not deny filing a lawsuit is protected activity. Instead, it argues its three causes of action arise not from the City’s petitioning activity, but from the City’s noncompliance with its contractual obligations. The court wrote that this is a distinction without a difference. Further, the court explained that the court properly struck Cordoba’s breach of contract claim because the conduct Cordoba attacked was protected petitioning activity. Moreover, the court held that Cordoba cannot satisfy its burden because each of its three causes of action fails to state a valid claim. View "Cordoba Corp. v. City of Industry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Reed Scott-Schwalbach sought review of the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 5 (2024) (IP 5), contending that various aspects did not comply with the requirements for ballot titles set out in ORS 250.035(2). The proposal would create a constitutional right for parents to select any kindergarten-through-twelfth-grade (“K-12”) Oregon public school statewide, including any public charter school, for their children to attend throughout each school year, defined in the measure as a parent’s “chosen school.” Unless an exception set out in the measure applies, the chosen school district would be required to admit the child for enrollment in the chosen school. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with those requirements. The Court concluded that the caption, the “yes” result statement, and the summary had to be modified. View "Scott-Schwalbach v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Section 20.5 of North Carolina’s 2017 Farm Act contains provisions making it illegal to enter into two types of contractual agreements: (1) any settlement agreement conditioned on an agricultural producer’s union affiliation (the Settlement Provision) and (2) any agreement that would require an agricultural producer to process dues checkoffs for its farmworker-employees (the Dues Provision). The Farm Labor Organizing Committee and others (collectively, FLOC) contend that these prohibitions violate the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. FLOC initiated this action against the Attorney General of North Carolina and the Governor of North Carolina (collectively, the State). The district court held that the Settlement Provision violated the Constitution and so enjoined it, but upheld the constitutionality of the Dues Provision, and then held that neither provision violated Section 1981.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court as to the Settlement Provision and vacated the accompanying injunction, but affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that a rational basis supports Section 20.5. Agriculture is North Carolina’s largest industry, which makes it a subject of great interest for state legislators. The state also embraces its right-to-work policies and has worked repeatedly to strengthen them. In addition to these general bases for enacting Section 20.5, both challenged provisions respond to discrete legislative concerns. Further, the Settlement Provision prohibits parties from conditioning a settlement agreement on an agricultural producer’s union affiliation. Thus, the court rejected the broad reading advanced by FLOC and adopted by the district court that this statutory provision bars any settlement agreement between an agricultural producer and labor union. View "Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Joshua Stein" on Justia Law

Appellants, three Sikh men, intended to join the Marines. However, existing Marines pre-enlistment requirements pertaining to hair length, beards, and a prohibition on wearing certain non-uniform items, conflicted with their faith. The Marines allowed an accommodation, but only after the men completed basic training.Appellants sought a preliminary injunction, and the district court refused. After considering the competing interests in the case, the D.C. Circuit reversed the decision as it related to two men, finding that they showed a likelihood for success on the merits and proved irreparable harm. The court remanded the third man's case for further proceedings. View "Jaskirat Singh v. David Berger" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gulf Shores City Board of Education and Kelly Walker appealed a circuit court's dismissal of their complaint seeking certain declaratory and mandamus relief against the Superintendent of the Alabama State Board of Education; the Revenue Commissioner of Baldwin County; certain Baldwin County Commissioners; the Baldwin County Board of Education; a Baldwin County Circuit Judge; the Baldwin County District Attorney; and Coastal Alabama Community College ("CACC"). This case involved the interplay among § 16-13-31(b), § 40-12-4, and § 45-2-244.077, Ala. Code 1975, a part of § 45-2-244.071 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the local-tax act"), which authorized the Baldwin County Commission to levy a 1% sales tax in Baldwin County paralleling the state sales tax found in § 40-23-1 through § 40-23-4, Ala. Code 1975. In 2017, the Gulf Shores Board was created to oversee an independent city school district pursuant to a resolution adopted by the City of Gulf Shores. The Gulf Shores Board and the Baldwin County Board entered into negotiations that resulted in a separation agreement pursuant to which the Gulf Shores Board obtained certain assets and assumed certain liabilities of the Baldwin County Board. Additionally, the separation agreement provided that taxes collected specifically to fund public schools in Baldwin County would be apportioned according to the apportionment provisions in § 16-13-31(b) and § 40-12-4(b) so as to include the Gulf Shores Board as a recipient. However, the separation agreement did not address apportionment of the proceeds of the local tax. The president of the Gulf Shores Board stated in his affidavit that the "parties specifically agreed to disagree [as to] whether the [local] tax was required to be apportioned." The Gulf Shores Board demanded but did not receive a share of the local-tax proceeds. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against the superintendent, the revenue commissioner, and the county commissioners, seeking mandamus relief requiring that the local-tax proceeds be apportioned to include the Gulf Shores Board as a recipient and/or a judgment declaring that the local-tax act was unconstitutional. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Gulf Shores Board lacked standing to bring its constitutional claim, and Walker could not show that the local tax was a levy of special taxes on her as a citizen of a definite locality expended in some other locality. Accordingly, dismissal was affirmed. View "Gulf Shores City Board of Education, et al. v. Mackey, et al." on Justia Law

Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd. obtained the injunction barring the Florida Surgeon General from enforcing a prohibition against businesses requiring proof of vaccination as a condition of service. But Norwegian recently filed a suggestion of mootness stating that it no longer requires proof of vaccinations on its cruises. Yet, Norwegian’s filings make clear that it has not suspended its vaccination requirements permanently or categorically. It also continues to defend its entitlement to equitable relief by asking us to leave the preliminary injunction intact.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Norwegian’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. The court explained that it agrees with the Surgeon General that a “live dispute” exists because Norwegian has not established that it has relaxed its vaccination requirements permanently or categorically. “The possibility that a party may change its mind in the future is sufficient to preclude a finding of mootness.” The court explained Norwegian has offered no evidence of its vaccine policies or its intentions for the future beyond the boilerplate statement that it is not requiring COVID-19 vaccination for now and for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Norwegian appears to concede that it has not abolished its policy forevermore.’The court saw no reason to believe that Norwegian will not seek to reinstate its policy given its continued insistence that the Florida law is unconstitutional. View "Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd, et al. v. State Surgeon General" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, firefighters and their union, alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. Mayor Copeland, a former firefighter of 26 years, had implemented cost-cutting measures, including freezing the firefighters' salaries and benefits. During Copeland’s reelection campaign, the firefighter’s political action committee endorsed Copeland’s opponent and other candidates who opposed Copeland’s policies. Copeland was reelected. Several firefighters protested at Copeland’s inauguration. Copeland vetoed an ordinance to restore some of the benefits and directed Fire Chief Serna to develop a new schedule. An 8/24 schedule, whereby a firefighter would work eight hours and then be off 24 hours was proposed. No other fire department in the country has adopted that schedule, which assigns firefighters to different shifts every day. In a secretly-recorded conversation, Serna said: “You can call it retaliation.” The defendants proposed to give up the schedule in exchange for the Union giving up its right to lobby the Common Council. The Union rejected the proposal; the city implemented the 8/24 schedule. The Council later returned the firefighters’ to a 24/48 schedule. Copeland sued the Council, alleging that the ordinance violated his executive power. The state court agreed with Copeland and struck the ordinance—leaving the 8/24 schedule in effect.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction, ordering the city to immediately begin reinstating the old work schedule. There was no evidence that the 8/24 schedule would result in cost savings; the firefighters would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of East Chicago, Indiana" on Justia Law