Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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In 2008, the City of Gulfport undertook a project to replace the infrastructure associated with its water and sewer systems relating to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The repair project involved federal, state, and local agencies and ultimately cost approximately $85 million to complete. The original design of the Area 3B project, the sewer infrastructure that crossed the Cowan Road property located north of U.S. Highway 90 and east of Highway 605 were to be replaced, and the new infrastructure was to be installed within the City’s existing easements across the properties. The Cowan Road property at issue was located in the Area 3B geographic zone. Robert “Kris” Riemann, P.E., then-director of the City’s department of public works, was notified that John Felsher had inquired about relocating the sewer infrastructure in Area 3B. Based on an agreement with Felsher to relocate the utilities, the City had the Area 3B design drawings redrafted to move the utilities. The City's project manager was notified that the discovery of underground telephone lines and other utilities required that the sewer line being relocated had to cut the northwest corner of the property. Cowan Road filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, advancing a claim for inverse condemnation against the City. The chancery court transferred the case to the Special Court of Eminent Domain in Harrison County. Due to the jurisdictional limits of county court, the case ended up in Harrison County Circuit Court. The circuit court entered an order granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the City on the issue of the date of the taking. The parties eventually settled the reverse condemnation claim, and the City agreed to pay $100,000 to Cowan Road & Hwy 90, LLC, for the improper and unlawful taking of its property. The issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court centered on the circuit court's grant of attorneys' fees and expenses: Gulfport argued that Cowan Road should not have been allowed to recover attorneys’ fees under Section 43-37-9. Finding that the statute applied and fees were appropriate, the Supreme Court affirmed. However, the Court found the trial judge abused his discretion by disallowing requests for postjudgment interest. View "City of Gulfport v. Cowan Road & Hwy 90, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

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The Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) regularly engages local parish jails to house convicted state prisoners. Five of the locally housed prisoners brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against local jail officials and DPSC officials. They alleged that the DPSC officials, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, looked away from the administrative failure they knew was leaving prisoners in jail who had served their sentences. The DPSC officials challenged the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.   Plaintiffs proceeded against Defendants under two theories, arguing that DPSC officials violated the Plaintiffs’ clearly established right to timely release from prison by: (1) failing to adopt policies ensuring the timely release of DPSC prisoners; and (2) directly participating in the conduct that caused their over detention.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants knew of a “pattern of similar constitutional violations,” such that their inaction amounted to a disregard of an obvious risk. DPSC’s Lean Six Sigma study revealed that 2,252 DPSC prisoners were annually held past their release date. Defendants cannot avoid the evidence that the study exposed unlawful detentions of prisoners. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendants’ awareness of this pattern of delays and their conscious decision not to address it rises to the level of deliberate indifference. Further, because a reasonable jury may find that Defendants’ inaction was objectively unreasonable in light of this clearly established law, they have failed to show they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Crittindon, et al v. LeBlanc, et al" on Justia Law

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Air Evac EMS, Inc., is an emergency air ambulance provider. Because the company's services are expensive, it markets and sells what it characterizes as a "debt cancellation program." Under this program, West Virginia residents pay a sum of money annually and any amount due on their bill in excess of what is covered by insurance will be canceled by the company.Through a series of communications and actions taken by West Virginia, Air Evac determined that the state was favoring a competitor. Air Evac brought several suits in district court. This one alleges that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner from taking any enforcement efforts. Following this case, Air Evac brought another case against the Commissioner that remains pending at the time of this appeal.The district court determined that the abstention doctrine applied, however, because the case presented "extraordinary circumstances," the court determined that abstention was not appropriate.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction to consider matters related to ongoing state criminal proceedings as well as quasi-criminal proceedings if the state proceeding is ongoing, implicates important state interests and provides an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. The Fourth Circuit determined that the district court properly analyzed the abstention factors. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Allan McVey" on Justia Law

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A father going through a contentious divorce was accused by his young daughter of sexual abuse. A Department of Human Services social worker observed the forensic interview, believed it was credible, obtained additional information primarily from the mother, and obtained an ex parte court order requiring the father to leave the family home. An ensuing adversary proceeding determined that the allegation was unfounded and that the mother had “wanted [the father] out of the house.” The DHS finding was set aside and, eventually, the father obtained physical care of the children. In the father's subsequent suit, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The claim of intentional interference with the parent-child relationship fails because that claim applies to extralegal actions— such as absconding with a child—not to judicially-approved acts. The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because the conduct here did not reach the level of an “outrage” necessary to sustain such a claim. The unreasonable search and seizure claim cannot succeed because there was no showing that the DHS social worker falsified the affidavit she submitted to the court or that the removal order would not have been granted without her questioned statements. The substantive due process claim fails because DHS’s conduct does not “shock the conscience.” A procedural due process claim cannot prevail because the father was provided with adequate process, which ultimately cleared his name. View "Lennette v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the circuit court dismissing Jefferson County Foundation, Inc.'s suit seeking a declaration that a series of transactions were an unlawful "de facto tax abatement," holding that there was no error.After the West Virginia Economic Development Authority (WVEDA) adopted a resolution to undertake a series of transactions with Roxul USA, Inc. (Rockwool) to finance the construction of a manufacturing plant the Foundation filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the transactions were a de facto tax abatement for Rockwool that violates both statute and the West Virginia Constitution. The business court dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) WVEDA was statutorily authorized to engaged in the transactions; (2) the transactions were not an exemption from tax; (3) the West Virginia Economic Development Act does not conflict with W. Va. Code 11-3-9; and (4) the transactions did not violate W. Va. Const. art. X, 1. View "Jefferson County Foundation, Inc. v. W. Va. Economic Development Authority" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs in this coordinated proceeding appealed postdismissal orders denying their motions for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In 2017, plaintiffs filed petitions against defendant Department of Water Resources (DWR) challenging the California WaterFix (WaterFix), a proposal to improve the State’s water supply infrastructure by constructing two 35-mile-long tunnels that would convey fresh water from the Sacramento River to pumping stations in the southern Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta (Delta). The lawsuits sought to compel DWR to rescind the WaterFix approvals, decertify the environmental impact report (EIR), and suspend activities related to the project until DWR complied with applicable laws. In 2019, while the coordination proceeding was pending, California’s newly elected Governor announced that he did not support WaterFix’s dual tunnel proposal and directed DWR to instead pursue a single tunnel conveyance. Shortly thereafter, DWR decertified the EIR and rescinded the project approvals. Consequently, all pending actions, including the validation suit, were dismissed. After the cases were dismissed, plaintiffs moved for attorney fees, asserting that they were “successful” parties under the catalyst theory because the litigation motivated DWR to voluntarily provide the relief sought in their petitions and answers. On appeal, plaintiffs argued: (1) the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard in determining there was no causal connection between the litigation and the relief obtained; and (2) the trial court’s finding of no causation is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard and therefore failed to consider all relevant evidence in the record. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for redetermination of the issue. View "Dept. of Water Resources Environmental Impact Cases" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs alleged they were sexually abused by Tyler, a Kentucky probation and parole officer, 2017-2019, while Plaintiffs served sentences for state convictions. In 2018, one victim filed a sexual harassment complaint but Tyler’s supervisor, Hall, concealed the complaint. The state terminated Hall and charged Tyler with rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, tampering with physical evidence, official misconduct in the first degree, and harassment.Plaintiffs brought their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Thirteenth Amendment, arguing that Defendants directly violated their rights. to be free from involuntary sexual servitude guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment and violated Plaintiffs’ Thirteenth Amendment rights to be free from “unwanted sexual physical contact,” “unwanted intrusion upon Plaintiffs’ person(s) for the sexual gratification of Defendants’ employee,” “sexual physical assault,” and “unwanted sexual contact.” Because the section 1983 limitations period had expired, Plaintiffs amended their complaint and claimed that their action arose out of the Thirteenth Amendment exclusively, disclaimed their arguments against Governor Beshear, and asserted that jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit; the Thirteenth Amendment neither provides a cause of action for damages nor abrogates state sovereign immunity against private damages actions. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that no state or federal law prohibits them from filing suit directly against the Commonwealth. View "Smith v. Commonwealth of Kentucky" on Justia Law

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On appeal, the district attorney argued that The Association of Deputy District Attorneys for Los Angeles County (“ADDA”) lacks standing to seek mandamus relief on behalf of its members and that he does not have a ministerial duty to comply with the legal duties ADDA alleges he violated, that the trial court’s preliminary injunction violates the doctrine of separation of powers and that the balance of the harms does not support preliminary injunctive relief.   The Second Appellate District affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order. The court concluded that ADDA has associational standing to seek relief on behalf of its members. The court concluded the voters and the Legislature created a duty, enforceable in mandamus, that requires prosecutors to plead prior serious or violent felony convictions to ensure the alternative sentencing scheme created by the three strikes law applies to repeat offenders. This duty does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by materially infringing on a prosecutor’s charging discretion; to the contrary, the duty affirms the voters’ and the Legislature’s authority to prescribe more severe punishment for certain recidivists. Further, neither the voters nor the Legislature can create a duty enforceable in mandamus to require a prosecutor to prove allegations of prior serious or violent felony convictions, an inherently discretionary act. Nor is mandamus available to compel a prosecutor to exercise his or her discretion in a particular way when moving to dismiss allegations of prior strikes or sentence enhancements under section 1385. View "The Association of Deputy District Attorneys etc. v. Gascon" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs., a Florida-based wine retailer, plus its owner and three North Carolina residents, initiated a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action, challenging a North Carolina alcoholic beverage control regime as unconstitutional. More specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that North Carolina’s regime, which prohibits out-of-state retailers — but not in-state retailers — from shipping wine directly to consumers in North Carolina (the “Retail Wine Importation Bar”), contravenes the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause. The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and named the Chair of the North Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission as a defendant (“N.C. Commission”). The district court awarded summary judgment to the N.C. Commission.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling, holding that even though the Retail Wine Importation Bar discriminates against interstate commerce — it is authorized by Section 2 of the 21st Amendment. The court explained that its analysis of North Carolina’s Retail Wine Importation Bar under the Tennessee Wine framework led the court to conclude that, although the Bar discriminates against interstate commerce, it is nevertheless justified on the legitimate non- protectionist ground of preserving North Carolina’s three-tier system. View "B-21 Wines, Inc. v. Hank Bauer" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the superior court reversing the decision of the Board to revoke Plaintiff's pension, ordering the permanent reinstatement of the pension, and declaring the pension revocation ordinance of the Town of Narragansett to be unconstitutionally vague, holding that the Board failed to make findings of fact or conclusions of law to support its decision.Plaintiff was a police officer with the Narragansett Police Department for twenty-eight years prior to his retirement. After Plaintiff pled guilty to transferring obscene matter to a person under the age of sixteen years the Board voted to revoke his pension under the pension revocation ordinance. Plaintiff and his wife sued. The trial justice concluded that the Board had violated Plaintiffs' due process rights in several respects and erred in declaring the pension revocation ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case, holding that the trial court failed to make competent factual findings on which to base an as-applied analysis of the constitutionality of the pension revocation ordinance. View "Riley v. Narragansett Pension Board" on Justia Law