Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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C Davis sought to recall Washington Governor Jay Inslee. Davis filed five recall charges alleging that Governor Inslee violated the separation of powers, infringed on a number of constitutional rights, and improperly exercised emergency powers when issuing proclamations in response to the COVID -19 pandemic. In order to be placed on the ballot, a recall charge must be legally and factually sufficient to demonstrate an elected official’s malfeasance, misfeasance, or violation of the oath of office. The Washington Supreme Court held that the charges put forth by Davis were not legally or factually sufficient. View "In re Recall of Inslee" on Justia Law

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Defendant Mark Bartlett requested the City of Portland to release three city attorney opinions and one legal memorandum. The parties agreed that the documents were public records, were within the scope of the attorney-client privilege, and were more than 25 years old. The city declined to release the documents, arguing that they were exempt from the public records law because of the attorney-client privilege. The specific question presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s consideration in this case was whether the four documents that were prepared more than 25 years ago by the Portland City Attorney for the mayor and two city commissioners and that were subject to the attorney-client privilege had to be disclosed under ORS 192.390. The Court concluded those documents had to be disclosed. View "City of Portland v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Samuel Provenza, formerly employed as a police officer by defendant Town of Canaan (Town), appealed a superior court order: (1) denying his petition for declaratory judgment and “request for temporary and permanent injunctive and other relief”; and (2) granting the cross-claim of the intervenor, the Valley News. Provenza sought to bar public disclosure of an investigative report commissioned by the Town as a result of a motor vehicle stop in which he was involved while still employed by the Town as a police officer; the Valley News sought release of the report under RSA chapter 91-A, the Right-to-Know Law. See RSA ch. 91-A (2013 & Supp. 2021). Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Provenza v. Town of Canaan" on Justia Law

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The U.S. Constitution’s Territory Clause states that Congress may “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the United States.” In exercising its broad authority, Congress has maintained different federal tax and benefits programs for residents of the Territories than for residents of the states. For example, residents of Puerto Rico are typically exempt from most federal income, gift, estate, and excise taxes but not every federal benefits program extends to residents of Puerto Rico. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) applies only to residents of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 42 U. S. C. 1382c(a)(1)(B)(i).Madero received SSI benefits while a resident of New York. He moved to Puerto Rico, where he was no longer eligible to receive those benefits. Unaware of Madero’s new residence, the government continued to pay him SSI benefits but eventually sued to recover more than $28,000. Madero argued that Congress’s exclusion of residents of Puerto Rico from the SSI program violated the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court and the First Circuit agreed.The Supreme Court reversed. The Constitution does not require Congress to extend SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico. The Court applied the deferential rational-basis test. Congress’s decision to exempt Puerto Rico’s residents from most federal income, gift, estate, and excise taxes supplies a rational basis for distinguishing residents of Puerto Rico from residents of the states for purposes of the SSI benefits program. View "United States v. Vaello Madero" on Justia Law

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In November 2017, Saul Cisneros was charged with two misdemeanor offenses and jailed. The court set Cisneros’s bond at $2,000, and Cisneros’s daughter posted that bond four days later, but the County Sheriff’s Office did not release him. Instead, pursuant to Sheriff Bill Elder’s policies and practices, the Sheriff’s Office notified U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that the jail had been asked to release Cisneros on bond. ICE then sent the jail a detainer and administrative warrant, requesting that the jail continue to detain Cisneros because ICE suspected that he was removable from the United States. Cisneros was placed on an indefinite “ICE hold,” and remained in detention. During his detention, Cisneros, along with another pretrial detainee, initiated a class action in state court against Sheriff Elder, in his official capacity, for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the appellate court erred in concluding that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), C.R.S. (2021), of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) did not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts that result from the operation of a jail for claimants who were incarcerated but not convicted. The Supreme Court concluded section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waived immunity for such intentional torts. "In reaching this determination, we conclude that the statutory language waiving immunity for 'claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted' and who 'can show injury due to negligence' sets a floor, not a ceiling. To hold otherwise would mean that a pre-conviction claimant could recover for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a jail but not for injuries resulting from the intentionally tortious operation of the same jail, an absurd result that we cannot countenance." Accordingly, the judgment of the division below was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cisneros v. Elder" on Justia Law

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When a person is arrested for driving under the influence, the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") holds a hearing to determine if the driver's license should be suspended. The DMV requires that the hearing officers act as both advocates for the DMV as well as triers of fact. The DMV also authorizes managers to change hearing officers’ decisions, or demand hearing officers change their decisions, without providing notice to the driver.Plaintiffs, a group of lawyers, challenged the DMV's administrative hearings process on three grounds. The district court resolved one of Plaintiffs' grounds in favor of the DMV in summary judgment, entering judgment as a matter of law for Plaintiffs on their two remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the hearing officers' dual roles as an advocate for the DMV and adjudicator violates drivers’ due process rights; and (2) granting the DMV’s motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim.The Second Appellate District reversed on these issues, finding Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all their 1983 claim. The lack of neutral hearing officers violates drivers’ federal and state due process rights. The court also found that the trial court did not err in awarding attorneys fees to Plaintiffs. However, because Plaintiff's succeeded on appeal, the court remanded the case for a recalculation of the attorney's fee award. View "California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA2/" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reinstating Respondent's driving privileges, holding that the OAH incorrectly reversed the revocation of Respondent's driving privileges.After Respondent was arrested under suspicion for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs (DUI) a sample of his blood was drawn for testing. The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Respondent's driving privileges. When Respondent appealed, DMV advised that the blood sample had been destroyed without testing. The OAH reversed the revocation, reasoning that the State violated Respondent's due process rights by depriving him of the opportunity to present potentially exculpatory evidence as a result of his blood sample. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was error to find that the destruction of Respondent's blood sample violated his right to due process; and (2) reversing Respondent's revocation was error. View "Frazier v. Null" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to medical providers at Orange County Jail in 1983 claims alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Plaintiff, a detainee who died from a ruptured aortic dissection.The court stated to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that a reasonable official would have understood that their actions presented an unconstitutional substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Defendant, the on-call physician at the time, could not have reasonably believed that he could provide constitutionally adequate care without even examining a patient with Plaintiff’s symptoms. Therefore, the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to this Defendant.The court further held that the first nurse to see Plaintiff had access to facts from which an inference could be drawn that Plaintiff was at serious risk. The court held that the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to Defendant.The court also held that the second nurse to see Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity. Reasoning that a jury could not reasonably conclude that this Defendant was deliberately indifferent. Finally, the court held that the third nurse to see Plaintiff was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would have inferred that Plaintiff was at serious risk if not hospitalized. View "PATRICK RUSSELL V. JOCELYN LUMITAP" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs challenged President Biden’s September 9, 2021 order requiring all executive employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccination. After finding that the equities favored the plaintiffs and that they were likely to succeed at trial, the district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of President Biden’s Order nationwide.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prelamination injunction. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) provides “comprehensive and exclusive procedures” for the review of employment-related disputes between civil-service employees and the federal government. The court held that the CSRA provides meaningful administrative review of the plaintiff’s claims. Because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust available review under the CRSA, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claim. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their claim was "wholly collateral" to the CSRA scheme. View "Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden" on Justia Law

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Defendants-Appellants the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), the United States Department of State (“DOS”), and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) appealed from three orders of the district court for the Southern District of New York requiring they produce certain documents in response to FOIA requests filed by the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University (“Knight”). The court reasoned that FOIA is premised on “a policy strongly favoring public disclosure of information in the possession of federal agencies.” Halpern v. F.B.I., 181 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 1999). However, in some circumstances, Congress determined that other interests outweigh the need for transparency. These circumstances are embodied by a limited set of four statutory exemptions from FOIA’s disclosure requirements.Here, the court found that DOS established that the document includes specific guidance to DOS employees on detecting ties to terrorism. Thus, DOS and USCIS properly withheld the first two sets of documents under FOIA Exemption 7(E). However, the court remanded on the ICE issue because the record was unclear regarding whether ICE complied fully with the district court’s order. View "Knight v. USCIS et al." on Justia Law