Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
Defense Distributed v. Bruck
Appellants (“Defense Distributed”) have challenged publication restraints imposed by the U.S. State Department, federal courts, and the State of New Jersey (“NJ”) after appellants published the internet computer-assisted design (“CAD”) files for a single-round plastic pistol. Although Defense Distributed is still prevented from publishing, the CAD files it published remain available on many other websites. At issue in this combined appeal and motion for mandamus relief stems from a district court’s (“DC”) order severing the case and transferring it to a federal court in NJ. The court found that the Defense Distributed satisfied the first two conditions for mandamus relief. Further, the NJ Attorney General did not carry its burden to demonstrate that transfer is more appropriate than the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.The court concluded that the DC’s order severing and transferring the claims against the NJAG to the District of New Jersey was a clear abuse of discretion, giving rise to an appropriate exercise of the court’s mandamus power. View "Defense Distributed v. Bruck" on Justia Law
In re Bailey
In 2014, a jury found petitioner Larry Bailey guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and leaving the scene of an accident and found true various enhancements. Petitioner was sentenced to 28 years in prison. In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to grant early parole consideration to persons convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. It also authorized the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) to adopt regulations in furtherance of its guarantee of early parole consideration. In 2017 and 2018, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) considered petitioner for Proposition 57 parole. In each of the parole consideration proceedings, the Board allowed petitioner to submit a written statement explaining why he should be granted parole. The Board, through written decisions by a deputy commissioner, both times denied petitioner parole. Petitioner requested administrative review of each of the parole decisions; both decisions were upheld. Petitioner thereafter filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus; the trial court denied petitioner’s claims challenging the evidentiary sufficiency of the parole denials, but granted petitioner habeas relief after finding he was entitled to “a live parole hearing at which [he] could attend.” The trial court interpreted Penal Code section 3041.5 “ ‘as providing for a hearing for all inmates eligible for parole consideration, at the very least to comply with federal and state due process concerns as well as equal protection.’ ” The trial court further ordered the Department to, within 60 days of the finality of the decision, promulgate new parole regulations to reflect the right to an in-person hearing under Proposition 57. The Department appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding Proposition 57 neither required nor impliedly incorporated an in-person hearing requirement, and the Department acted within its delegated authority under Penal Code section 32(b) when it adopted the parole regulations at issue in this appeal. The Court further concluded the absence of an in-person hearing did not violate equal protection principles, nor did it violate a prisoner’s right to procedural due process. View "In re Bailey" on Justia Law
Westlawn Cemeteries, LLC v. Louisiana Cemetery Board
The Louisiana Cemetery Board (“LCB”) challenged a district court’s judgment finding Louisiana Administrative Code 46:XIII.1503 C to be unconstitutional. Whether the Louisiana Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction was raised as an issue in an Answer to Appeal filed by appellees, Westlawn Cemeteries, L.L.C. and the Trustees of the Westlawn Memorial Park Perpetual Care Trust Fund. The Supreme Court determined it did not have appellate jurisdiction in this case because the LCB was not a “governing body” and did not exercise “legislative functions.” Its rules and regulations, therefore, were not “laws” for which appellate jurisdiction would lie with the Supreme Court. However, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to "avoid further delay, and is in the interest of judicial economy." The Court found that the trial court properly found LAC 46:XIII.1503 C to be unconstitutional. "As the only issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of the Rule, no purpose would be served by remanding this case to the appellate court before review would inevitably be sought in this Court." View "Westlawn Cemeteries, LLC v. Louisiana Cemetery Board" on Justia Law
Mellor, et al. v. Parish of Jefferson
Jefferson Parish directly appealed a trial court’s judgment finding that Jefferson Parish ordinance, Section 36-320, et seq., titled, “School Bus Safety Enforcement Program for Detecting Violations of Overtaking and Passing School Buses” (“SBSEP”), was unconstitutional. After receiving notices of alleged violations of Section 36-320, et seq., of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances, petitioners filed a class action Petition for Damages and Declaratory Judgment. They asserted multiple arguments against the SBSEP, including arguments based on violations of the Jefferson Parish Home Rule Charter and violations of Louisiana statutory law. Petitioners sought a judgment declaring Section 36-320, et seq. unconstitutional and the return of the fines they paid pursuant to the violations. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding Section 36-320, et seq., unconstitutional because it violated Article VI, Section 5(G) and Article VIII, Section 10(A) of the Louisiana Constitution. View "Mellor, et al. v. Parish of Jefferson" on Justia Law
Laborers’ International Union of North America v. Neff
Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought against tobacco companies, alleging that the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) preempts the County of Los Angeles's ban on the sale of all flavored tobacco products. The panel explained that the TCA's unique tripartite preemption structure governs its analysis of these issues. The TCA's text, framework, and historical context reveal that it carefully balances federal and local power by carving out the federal government's sole authority to establish the standards for tobacco products, while preserving state, local, and tribal authority to regulate or ban altogether sales of some or all tobacco products.The panel held that the TCA does not expressly preempt the County's sales ban. In this case, the preemption clause does not cover the County's sales ban, and in the alternative, the savings clause saves the County's sales ban from preemption. Furthermore, given that Congress explicitly preserved local authority to enact the very type of sales ban at issue here, the panel concluded that the TCA does not impliedly preempt the sales ban. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law
Hawkins, et al. v. Ivey, et al.
In response to economic conditions related to the spread of COVID-19, Congress established several programs that made additional federal funds available to the states for providing enhanced unemployment-compensation benefits to eligible individuals. Alabama elected to participate in the programs, and Shentel Hawkins, Ashlee Lindsey, Jimmie George, and Christina Fox, were among the Alabamians who received the enhanced benefits. As the spread of COVID-19 waned, Governor Kay Ivey announced that Alabama would be ending its participation in the programs. When Alabama did so, the claimants received reduced unemployment-compensation benefits or, depending on their particular circumstances, no benefits at all. Two months later, the claimants sued Governor Ivey and Secretary of the Alabama Department of Labor Fitzgerald Washington in their official capacities, alleging that Alabama law did not permit them to opt Alabama out of the programs. After a circuit court dismissed the claimants' lawsuit based on the doctrine of State immunity, the claimants appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Hawkins, et al. v. Ivey, et al." on Justia Law
Boyd, et al. v. Vermont
In October 2017, plaintiffs Sadie Boyd (a student at Twin Valley Middle High School in Whitingham, Vermont) Madeleine Klein (a resident and property owner in Whitingham), and the Town of Whitingham filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant State of Vermont, arguing that the education funding and property taxation system set forth in 16 V.S.A. ch. 133 and 32 V.S.A. ch. 135 violated the Education Clause, the Proportional Contribution Clause, and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. They claimed that the system was unconstitutional because it deprived plaintiff Boyd of an equal educational opportunity, required plaintiff Klein to contribute disproportionately to education funding, and compelled the Town to collect an unconstitutional tax. The civil division granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the alleged inequities were caused by the statutes in question or that the education property taxation system lacked a rational basis. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boyd, et al. v. Vermont" on Justia Law
Sulitzer v. Tippins
The SmileDirect parties developed an online service model for patients to access certain orthodontic services; they allege the defendants (members and employees of the California Dental Board) conspired to harass them with unfounded investigations and an intimidation campaign, to drive them out of the market. The district court dismissed the suit.
The Ninth Circuit reversed with respect to certain Sherman Act antitrust claims. The SmileDirect parties sufficiently pled Article III standing; they alleged an injury in fact that was fairly traceable to defendants’ challenged conduct and was judicially redressable. They sufficiently alleged anticompetitive concerted action, or an agreement to restrain trade. The court rejected an argument that regulatory board members and employees cannot form an anticompetitive conspiracy when acting within their regulatory authority.The court affirmed the dismissal of a claim under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce, and of a "disparate treatment" Equal Protection Clause claim. To plead a class-of-one equal protection claim, plaintiffs must allege that they have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. A class-of-one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed comparator in all material respects. Rather than claiming that they stood on the same footing as others, the SmileDirect parties argued their uniqueness. View "Sulitzer v. Tippins" on Justia Law
League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Commission
The Supreme Court held that the second revised General Assembly-district plan adopted by respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission violates Ohio Const. art. XI, sections 6(A) and 6(B) and ordered the Commission to be reconstituted.In the first time this issue was before the Supreme Court, the Court held that the Commission's original plan was invalid because the Commission had not attempted to meet the standards set forth in Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B). The Commission subsequently adopted a revised plan, but the Supreme Court invalidated that plan because the Commission again had not satisfied sections 6(A) and 6(B). At issue now before the Supreme Court was the Commission's second revised plan. The Commission invalidated the plan in its entirety, holding that the second revised plan violates sections 6(A) and 6(B) and the a newly reconstituted Commission must adopt a new plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution. View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law