Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Damarius Butts, Isaiah Obet, Charleena Lyles, and seven other people were shot and killed by law enforcement officers in King County, Washington in 2017. In response to community demands for greater police accountability, King County Executive (Executive) Dow Constantine issued a series of executive orders to reform the procedures for conducting coroner’s inquests. The King County Superior Court struck down those executive orders on various grounds, and nearly all parties appealed some aspect of that ruling. The Washington Supreme Court determined every party’s arguments had some merit and all prevailed to some degree. The Court held that the Executive’s authority to conduct coroner’s inquests included the power to establish the procedures by which those inquests are conducted, as long as those procedures are consistent with applicable state and county law. The Court therefore largely upheld Executive Constantine’s recent reforms. But the Court struck portions of the executive orders that the Families and the Law Enforcement Parties showed conflicted with state law, including those that would prevent inquest juries from fulfilling their duties under the Coroner’s Act. The Families were correct that the law required inquest juries be able to examine the involved officers and to decide whether those officers killed Butts, Obet, and Lyles by criminal means. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s order and remanded to grant in part the Families’ petitions for writs of mandamus. View "Family of Butts v. Constantine" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's claims for mandamus and relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), vacated the dismissal of Appellant's equal protection and due process claims and held that certain of the challenged rules challenged by Appellant were arbitrary and unenforceable.Appellant, a law firm, sued the Social Security Administration (SSA) challenging "the [SSA]'s byzantine and irrational rules that govern payment pf attorney's fees in Social Security disability cases." The district court dismissed Appellant's mandamus and APA claims on the grounds that sovereign immunity barred the mandamus claim and that the firm's challenges to the agency's fee-paying procedures were statutorily barred. The court later granted summary judgment for the SSA on the remaining three claims. The First Circuit held (1) mandamus relief was unavailable here because Appellant had another avenue for obtaining relief; and (2) the SSA's practice of denying attorneys fees under certain circumstances was arbitrary, and therefore, the rule must be eliminated. View "Marasco & Nesselbush, LLP v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (CARES Act), among other things, imposed a 120-day moratorium on evictions for rental properties receiving federal assistance. The CDC then issued a temporary eviction moratorium on September 4, 2020, that suspended the execution of eviction orders for nonpayment of rent. Before the CDC's order was originally set to expire on December 31, 2020, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which extended the CDC's order through January 31, 2021. The CDC's order was then extended again through March 31, 2021, and again through June 30, 2021, and again through July 31, 2021.Plaintiffs, several landlords seeking to evict their tenants for nonpayment of rent and a trade association for owners and managers of rental housing, filed suit alleging that the CDC's orders exceeds its statutory and regulatory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates their constitutional right to access the courts.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' failure to show an irreparable injury. The court declined to find that the CDC's order is unconstitutional, and failed to see how the temporary inability to reclaim rental properties constitutes an irreparable harm. Furthermore, the court explained that, without any information about a tenant’s financial or employment picture, the court has no way to evaluate whether she will ever be able to repay her landlord; to decide otherwise based solely on the CDC declaration would be to conclude that no one who signed the declaration is likely to repay their debts after the moratorium expires. Given the lack of evidence and the availability of substantial collection tools, the court could not conclude that the landlords have met their burden of showing that an irreparable injury is likely. View "Brown v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Alyse Galvin was an Alaska Democratic Party nominee for office, but registered as a nonpartisan voter. She sued to stop the state Division of Elections from sending out already-printed ballots for the 2020 general election, arguing that the Division’s ballot design, by omitting her nonpartisan voter registration, violated both a statutory directive to designate a candidate’s party affiliation on the ballot and Galvin’s right to free political association under the Alaska Constitution. After the superior court issued a temporary restraining order, the Division petitioned for review. But the following day, the superior court denied Galvin’s request for a preliminary injunction; the Alaska Supreme Court granted her emergency cross-petition for review and affirmed the superior court’s decision in a summary order with this explanation to follow. The Court concluded the Division’s evidence supported the superior court’s factual finding that granting Galvin’s requested injunction would have jeopardized the prospects of a successful and timely election. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvin’s requested preliminary injunction because granting the injunction could have imperiled the public interest in an orderly and timely election. View "Alaska Division of Elections v. Galvin" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief and dismissal of state and federal claims in an action brought by Slidewaters LLC, challenging the State of Washington's imposition of COVID-19 restrictions prohibiting the waterpark from operating during 2020 and imposing capacity limits in 2021.The panel concluded that defendants have the authority under Washington law to impose the restrictions and that doing so does not violate Slidewaters' asserted rights under the U.S. Constitution. In this case, the governor had the lawful authority under Revised Code of Washington 43.06.010(12) to issue Proclamation 20-05, because the pandemic was both a public disorder and a disaster affecting life and health in Washington. Furthermore, the State Department of Labor and Industries, in promulgating an emergency rule as part of the state's efforts to curb the pandemic, Washington Administrative Code 296-800-14035, acted within its scope of authority. The panel explained that government regulation does not constitute a violation of constitutional substantive due process rights simply because the businesses or persons to whom the regulation is applied do not agree with the regulation or its application; defendants provided a rational basis for the proclamations and related rules; and the substantive due process rights of Slidewaters, its owners, and its employees are not violated by defendants' actions. Therefore, Slidewaters' application for injunctive relief was properly denied and its claims were properly dismissed. The panel also concluded that the district court did not err in consolidating Slidewaters' motion for preliminary injunction with a hearing on the merits or in reaching Slidewaters' state law claims. View "Slidewaters LLC v. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court order and a judgment reversing a Department hearing officer’s decision to suspend Yonis Hussiene’s driving privileges for a period of 180 days. Hussiene was stopped by a state trooper for running a red light. Dash camera footage from the trooper's patrol vehicle did not show the traffic light for Hussiene. Rather, it showed only the traffic light across the intersection from the trooper. The footage showd the left turn signal lights for the traffic immediately next to the trooper turning green just as Hussiene left the intersection. After Hussiene was pulled over, the trooper detected an odor of alcohol, and Hussiene acknowledged drinking that night. The trooper administered field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test, and then he arrested Hussiene for driving under the influence. After finding there were sufficient grounds to stop the vehicle and Hussiene refused the chemical breath test, a hearing officer revoked Hussiene’s license for 180 days. Hussiene appealed the hearing officer’s decision to district court, and the court reversed the hearing officer’s decision, concluding, “[T]hat a reasoning mind could not have reasonably determined that Hussiene ran a red light.” The court held, “Hoffner failed to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Hussiene had violated or was about to violate the law.” The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court erred when it determined there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion for the traffic stop. The trooper had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Hussiene for failing to stop at a red light, and the weight of the evidence showed Hussiene refused the chemical breath test. The Court therefore reversed the order and the judgment of the district court and reinstated the hearing officer’s decision. View "Hussiene v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was a district court’s order requiring the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office (“EPCSO”) to give Regina Sprinkle access to internal investigation files about two of its deputies. EPCSO asked the Supreme Court to vacate the order and remand with instructions to quash the subpoena duces tecum (“SDT”) that prompted this action. The Court declined to do so, concluding the district court properly exercised its subject matter jurisdiction in resolving this controversy through a hearing to show cause, as provided under the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act (“CCJRA”), section 24-72-303, C.R.S. (2020), and correctly interpreted the CCJRA as requiring release of the records. View "In re Colorado v. Sprinkle" on Justia Law

Defendants, the New Hampshire Secretary of State (Secretary) and the Attorney General (collectively, the State), appealed a superior court order ruling that Laws 2017, chapter 205, also known as Senate Bill 3 (SB 3), was unconstitutional because it unreasonably burdened the right to vote in violation of Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution and violated the equal protection guarantees of the New Hampshire Constitution. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that SB 3 violated Part I, Article 11 of the State Constitution. Because the Court determined that SB 3 had to be stricken in its entirety, it did not address the State’s assertion that the trial court erred in determining that SB 3 also violated the equal protection guarantees of the State Constitution. View "New Hampshire Democratic Party v. New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Twenty-seven New Mexico county clerks sought an emergency writ to compel Respondent, Secretary of State Maggie Toulouse Oliver, to mail absentee ballots directly to all registered voters in lieu of conducting in-person voting in the June 2020 primary election. They requested this extraordinary relief because the primary election was scheduled amidst a global pandemic and national and statewide public health emergency: COVID-19, a novel, potentially fatal, viral disease that was spreading unchecked throughout the population. Petitioners alleged that in-person voting could not be conducted safely under those circumstances, and they urged the New Mexico Supreme Court to hold that the requested relief was necessary to protect the health of election workers, voters, and the general public. Respondent stipulated to the petition. The Supreme Court concluded the Election Code did not permit the Secretary of State to mail absentee ballots directly to voters without a prior request from the voter. However, the Election Code permitted the Secretary to mail absentee ballot applications to voters to encourage and facilitate absentee voting. Furthermore, the Court concluded that, under the circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the "clear and present risk to public health presented by mass gatherings and the executive orders mandating that all branches of government take all lawful steps to mitigate that risk," the Secretary of State had a duty to exercise her power to the fullest extent of the law to promote the safety of election workers and voters while conducting the June 2020 primary election. Therefore, the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary of State to mail absentee ballot applications to eligible voters to encourage absentee voting and minimize the health risk to the public. This remedy "promotes the public health goals mandated by the Governor while not infringing on the Legislature’s plenary power to establish election procedures." The Court issued this opinion to explain its reasoning. View "New Mexico ex rel. Riddle v. Toulouse Oliver" on Justia Law

Charitable organizations soliciting funds in California generally must register with the Attorney General and renew their registrations annually by filing copies of their IRS Form 990, on which tax-exempt organizations provide the names and addresses of their major donors. Two tax-exempt charities that solicit contributions in California renewed their registrations and filed redacted Form 990s to preserve their donors’ anonymity. The Attorney General threatened the charities with the suspension of their registrations and fines. The charities alleged that the compelled disclosure requirement violated their First Amendment rights and the rights of their donors. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the Attorney General.The Supreme Court reversed. California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as other forms of governmental action. Exacting scrutiny requires that a government-mandated disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest, even if it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that end.A dramatic mismatch exists between the Attorney General's asserted interest and the disclosure regime. While California’s interests in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing are important, the enormous amount of sensitive information collected through the disclosures does not form an integral part of California’s fraud detection efforts. California does not rely on those disclosures to initiate investigations. There is no evidence that alternative means of obtaining the information, such as a subpoena or audit letter, are inefficient and ineffective by comparison. Mere administrative convenience does not “reflect the seriousness of the actual burden” that the disclosure requirement imposes on donors’ association rights. It does not make a difference if there is no public disclosure, if some donors do not mind having their identities revealed, or if the relevant donor information is already disclosed to the IRS. View "Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta" on Justia Law