Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

SCS Carbon Transport, LLC (SCS) plans to develop a pipeline network to transport carbon dioxide (CO2) through South Dakota. Several landowners (Landowners) along the proposed route refused to allow SCS pre-condemnation survey access, which SCS claims is authorized by SDCL 21-35-31. Landowners sued in both the Third and Fifth Judicial Circuits, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the surveys. These proceedings resulted in a consolidated appeal from six lawsuits filed by Landowners and one by SCS.The Third Circuit granted SCS summary judgment, determining that SCS was a common carrier and that SDCL 21-35-31 was constitutional. The Fifth Circuit also granted SCS summary judgment, adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning. Landowners appealed, arguing that SCS is not a common carrier, CO2 is not a commodity, and that SDCL 21-35-31 violates the takings and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the circuit courts’ grants of summary judgment on the common carrier issues. The court held that SCS’s ability to conduct pre-condemnation surveys depends on whether it is a common carrier vested with the power of eminent domain. The record did not demonstrate that SCS is holding itself out to the general public as transporting a commodity for hire. The court also found that the circuit courts abused their discretion in denying Landowners’ request for further discovery.The court further held that SDCL 21-35-31 only authorizes limited pre-condemnation standard surveys, which are minimally invasive superficial inspections. The statute, as strictly interpreted, does not violate the federal or state constitutions. The court concluded that any actual damage caused by the surveys must be justly compensated, with the amount determined by a jury. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Strom Trust v. SCS Carbon Transport, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2016, John O. Kalu, an inmate at FCI Allenwood, alleged that he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by Lieutenant K. Middernatch. Kalu reported the first two incidents to Warden Spaulding, who responded that he would investigate but took no further action. Following his report, Kalu was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and later returned to the general population, where he was assaulted a third time. Kalu also claimed that he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, including being forced to sleep on a cold metal bunk in freezing temperatures without adequate clothing.Kalu filed a pro se complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Spaulding and Lt. Middernatch, seeking damages under Bivens for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Kalu’s claims against Warden Spaulding for lack of personal involvement but allowed the sexual assault claim against Lt. Middernatch to proceed. Kalu later amended his complaint, but the District Court ultimately dismissed all claims, determining that they presented new Bivens contexts and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that Kalu’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault and conditions-of-confinement claims presented new Bivens contexts. It found that special factors, including the availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program, Congress’s omission of a standalone damages remedy in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and separation of powers principles, counseled against extending Bivens liability. The court also agreed that Kalu’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim against Warden Spaulding for deliberate indifference or failure to protect. View "Kalu v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of quo warranto challenging the authority of the Financial Impact Estimating Conference to issue a revised financial impact statement for a proposed constitutional amendment titled “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion.” The petitioners, Floridians Protecting Freedom and Sara Latshaw, argue that the Estimating Conference acted beyond its authority. The respondents include the Financial Impact Estimating Conference, its four principals, the President of the Florida Senate, and the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives.The Estimating Conference initially submitted a financial impact statement in November 2023. Following a Florida Supreme Court decision in April 2024, which did not address the financial impact statement, the petitioners filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court, claiming the original statement was outdated and misleading. The circuit court ruled in favor of the petitioners, remanding the statement for redrafting. The government appealed, but the First District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot after the Estimating Conference voluntarily issued a revised statement in July 2024. The petitioners then sought relief from the Florida Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition for a writ of quo warranto. The Court held that the petitioners waived or forfeited their right to challenge the Estimating Conference’s authority by actively participating in the revision process without objecting to the Conference’s authority. The Court emphasized that the petitioners had accepted the legality of the revision process and focused on influencing the content of the revised statement. Consequently, the Court did not address the merits of the petition or the substantive legality of the revised financial impact statement. View "Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. v. Passidomo" on Justia Law

In 2023, the City of Mansfield, Texas, enacted ordinances regulating Unattended Donation Boxes (UDBs), which led to enforcement threats against Arms of Hope (AOH), a charitable organization with three non-compliant UDBs. AOH sued, claiming the ordinances infringed on its First Amendment rights. The district court found AOH likely to succeed on the merits and preliminarily enjoined the city's enforcement of the ordinances.The City of Mansfield appealed the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, while AOH cross-appealed, arguing the district court should have applied strict scrutiny instead of intermediate scrutiny. During the appeal, the city enacted new ordinances in 2024 that addressed many of the district court's concerns and repealed the 2023 ordinances to the extent they conflicted.The Fifth Circuit determined that the new ordinances rendered the appeal and cross-appeal moot because the 2023 ordinances no longer had any effect. The court noted that the case itself was not moot, as the district court could still address any remaining issues under the new ordinances. The court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal as moot but did not vacate the preliminary injunction, as the mootness resulted from the city's voluntary actions. View "Arms of Hope v. City of Mansfield" on Justia Law

Thomas Zundel attempted to purchase a firearm but was denied due to a 1990 simple assault charge in Jamestown Municipal Court, which was flagged in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The charge was noted as continued for a year pending counseling, with no conviction confirmed. Zundel's voluntary appeal to the FBI was denied because the final disposition of the case was missing. Zundel sought records from various agencies, but none had documentation beyond the initial arrest. He then petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to close the case and restore his constitutional rights.The Jamestown Municipal Court and other respondents argued that Zundel had an adequate remedy in federal court, referencing Ross v. Fed. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that a federal suit would not adequately address the state court records issue. The court emphasized the municipal court's duty to maintain accurate records and noted that the missing record should have been retained permanently according to administrative rules.The North Dakota Supreme Court granted the petition in part, ordering the Jamestown Municipal Court to conduct a diligent inquiry to locate or reconstruct the missing record and document the results. The court denied Zundel's requests for declaratory relief regarding the nature of the 1990 charge and his right to possess a firearm, citing a lack of evidence in the record to make such determinations. The court's decision underscores the importance of accurate court records for due process and public accountability. View "Zundel v. City of Jamestown" on Justia Law

Two non-domiciliary companies, S&H Independent Premium Brands East, LLC, and S&H Independent Premium Brands West, LLC, import and distribute European alcoholic beverages in the United States. They hold certificates of compliance under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 138, Section 18B, allowing them to sell alcoholic beverages to licensed wholesalers in Massachusetts. In 2019, an Austrian malt beverage producer, Stiegl Getränke & Service GmbH & Co. KG, terminated its distribution agreement with S&H without prior notice and entered into a new agreement with another distributor, Win-It-Too, Inc.S&H filed a petition with the Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission (ABCC), alleging that Stiegl violated Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 138, Section 25E, which prohibits suppliers from refusing to sell to any licensed wholesaler without good cause. The ABCC dismissed the petition, stating that Section 25E protections apply only to wholesalers licensed under Section 18, not to certificate holders under Section 18B. S&H then sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which upheld the ABCC's decision, agreeing that Section 25E protections do not extend to Section 18B certificate holders.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the term "any licensed wholesaler" in Section 25E refers only to wholesalers licensed under Section 18, not to certificate holders under Section 18B. The Court also concluded that this interpretation does not violate the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution, as Section 18B certificate holders and Section 18 licensed wholesalers serve different roles in the regulatory framework. Therefore, the ABCC's decision to dismiss S&H's petition was upheld. View "S&H Independent Premium Brands East, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of surplus state property owned by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). The property, located at 3311 West State Street in Boise, was declared surplus after a flood rendered its largest building unusable. The Idaho Department of Administration (DOA) initiated a bidding process, and the petitioners, a group of business entities, submitted the highest bid. Despite negotiating a purchase and sale agreement, the DOA did not finalize the sale due to legislative actions that revoked its authority to dispose of the property and transferred control back to the ITD Board.The petitioners filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of prohibition and mandate. They argued that the legislative provisions revoking the DOA's authority were unconstitutional, violating the single-subject rule of the Idaho Constitution. They sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate these provisions and compel the DOA to complete the sale. The Idaho House of Representatives and its Speaker intervened, and the State Board of Examiners disclaimed further participation, having fulfilled its statutory duties.The Idaho Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action. The court found that while the petitioners demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury from the halted sale, they failed to show that a favorable decision would redress their injury. The court noted that the petitioners did not have a legally enforceable right to purchase the property, as the DOA had discretion in concluding the sale. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioners did not meet the criteria for relaxed standing, as other parties, such as the DOA and ITD, could potentially bring the constitutional claim. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for writs of prohibition and mandate. View "Hawkins Companies, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves several states suing the President of the United States, the Secretary of Education, and the U.S. Department of Education to prevent the implementation of a plan to forgive approximately $475 billion in federal student loan debt. The plan, known as SAVE, significantly alters the existing income-contingent repayment (ICR) plan by lowering payment amounts, often to $0 per month, and forgiving principal balances much sooner than previous plans.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted a preliminary injunction in part, finding that Missouri had standing through its state instrumentality, MOHELA, which faced certain irreparable harm. The court concluded that the states had a fair chance of success on the merits, particularly that loan forgiveness under SAVE was not statutorily authorized and violated the separation of powers under the major-questions doctrine. However, the court only enjoined the ultimate forgiveness of loans, not the payment-threshold provisions or the nonaccrual of interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court that Missouri had standing. The court found that the states demonstrated a fair chance of success on the merits, noting that the SAVE plan's scope was even larger than a previously contested loan-cancellation program. The court also found that the Government's actions had rendered the district court's injunction largely ineffective. Balancing the equities, the court decided to grant in part and deny in part the states' motion for an injunction pending appeal, prohibiting the use of the hybrid rule to circumvent the district court's injunction. The injunction will remain in effect until further order of the court or the Supreme Court of the United States. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of North Carolina’s sex offender registration statute, arguing that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution by retroactively imposing new punishments for crimes committed in the past. The statute requires offenders to report personal information to law enforcement and restricts where they can live, work, and visit. The plaintiffs, including two nonprofit organizations and two individuals, sought to bar the retroactive application of certain amendments to the statute.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held a bench trial and found that the statute was nonpunitive and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court concluded that the legislature intended to create a civil, nonpunitive scheme and that the plaintiffs failed to show by the clearest proof that the statute’s effects were punitive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the legislature intended to enact a civil, nonpunitive scheme aimed at protecting public safety. The court also found that the statute was rationally connected to this nonpunitive purpose and was not excessive in relation to its goal. Although the statute imposed significant burdens on registrants, the court concluded that these burdens did not amount to punishment. The court held that the plaintiffs did not provide the clearest proof that the statute’s effects were so punitive as to override the legislature’s intent.Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the constitutionality of North Carolina’s sex offender registration statute under the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "National Assoc. For Rational Sexual Offense Laws v. Stein" on Justia Law

In 2017, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III began investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, during which Giorgi Rtskhiladze testified before a grand jury. When the Department of Justice (DOJ) released a redacted version of Mueller’s report, it included information that Rtskhiladze claimed was inaccurate and damaging to his reputation. Rtskhiladze sued for both equitable and monetary relief and sought a copy of his grand jury testimony transcript.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Rtskhiladze lacked standing for his equitable claims, failed to state a claim for damages, and was not entitled to obtain a copy of the transcript. The court found that Rtskhiladze had abandoned his separate damages claim against DOJ and Mueller personally and forfeited arguments about this claim on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Rtskhiladze has standing to bring all his claims and remanded the equitable claims for further consideration. The court agreed with the district court that Rtskhiladze failed to state a claim for damages under the Privacy Act, as he did not allege "intentional or willful" conduct by DOJ. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Rtskhiladze’s request to obtain a copy of his grand jury testimony transcript, emphasizing the government’s interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy and preventing witness intimidation.In summary, the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Rtskhiladze’s equitable claims for lack of standing, affirmed the dismissal of his damages claim for failure to state a claim, and upheld the denial of his request to obtain a copy of his grand jury transcript. View "Rtskhiladze v. Mueller" on Justia Law