Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners the Oklahoma State Medical Association, Oklahoma Dental Association, the Oklahoma Osteopathic Association, the Oklahoma Society of Anesthesiologists, Inc., and Oklahoma Chapter American Academy of Pediatrics, Inc., asked the Oklahoma Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to declare the actions of Respondents Kevin Corbett, CEO of the Oklahoma Health Care Authority and the State of Oklahoma ex rel. the Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA), to implementing a new managed care program known as SoonerSelect, was not statutorily authorized and that such actions were therefore ultra vires. In the alternative, if the Supreme Court finds statutory authorization existed, Petitioners sought a declaration that Respondents violated the non-delegation doctrine. Petitioners also asked the Supreme Court to invalidate the Respondents' actions, including the request for proposal (RFP) and contract awards, because the Respondents failed to promulgate administrative rules to govern their implementation in violation of 75 O.S. 2011, sections 302(D) and (E). Finally, the Petitioners asserted the SoonerSelect program would require mandatory enrollment in violation of article II, Section 37(B) of the Oklahoma Constitution. The Petitioners requested the Supreme Court issue a writ of prohibition barring the Respondents from implementing SoonerSelect until such time as the Oklahoma Legislature has conferred the necessary authority. In the alternative, if the Court found such authority already existed in statute, then Petitioners requested the Court issue a writ of mandamus requiring the Respondents to promulgate administrative rules governing the SoonerSelect program prior to further implementation of the program. The Supreme Court agreed with Petitioners' assertion that the Legislature did not authorize the creation of the SoonerSelect program. It therefore did not find it necessary to engage in a thorough examination of the statutes to determine if there was a non-delegation doctrine violation. The OHCA did not promulgate any rules governing SoonerSelect for to review in order to weigh such a determination. To this end, the Court granted Petitioners declaratory relief; the Court deemed writs of mandamus or probation inappropriate. View "Oklahoma State Medical Association et al. v. Corbett" on Justia Law

Verizon California Inc.’s (Verizon) petitioned the California State Board of Equalization’s (Board) to reduce its assessments for the tax years 2008 through 2012. Verizon paid the taxes levied by the counties for each year based on the Board-assessed values set forth in its petitions. Verizon then joined with Board staff to seek approval from the Board of joint recommendations to lower the assessed values of its property set forth in its petitions. The Board approved the joint recommendations. Verizon then filed actions for refunds for the years 2008 through 2012 arguing that the Board should have adopted the valuations proposed in its petitions. The trial court consolidated the actions. The Board moved for summary adjudication of the claims on the ground the court lacked jurisdiction because in approving the Verizon/Board staff recommendations for reduced valuations Verizon failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with respect to the valuations it claimed in its petitions. The trial court granted the motion for summary adjudication of the consolidated actions based on the Board’s approvals of the parties’ joint recommendations for a reduction in assessed valuations. On this basis, the trial court concluded: “Because of the mutually agreed recommendation[s] on value, no disputed issues were presented to the Board for [tax years] 2008 through 2012. In each of those five years, the Board adopted the revised value that had been jointly recommended by Verizon and [the Board] staff, reducing Verizon’s tax basis by over $1.1 billion in the aggregate. [¶] . . .Verizon cannot ask the Board to adopt a jointly presented reduction in value, receive the agreed reduction, and then turn around and sue for a lower value than it asked the Board to adopt.” Verizon timely appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing again that the Board should have adopted the valuations it proposed in its petitions to the Board to reassess its property. The Court of Appeal determined the statutory ground of the actions required a “dispute” regarding the Board’s assessments of the property. Finding none, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Verizon California v. Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

In 2018, Colorado voters Amendments Y and Z to the state constitution that vested the authority to draw congressional and legislative districts with new, independent commissions made up of ordinary voters. The Amendments laid out instructions for how the commissions should draw district maps, including criteria to be considered in determining boundaries and detailed timetables that require public feedback and judicial review of the final plans. The cascading deadlines set out in Amendments Y and Z were based on an assumption that the United States Census Bureau would release its decennial census data in a timely fashion, as required by federal law. Delays caused by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, however, mean that the Census Bureau was operating months behind schedule and did not yet to release crucial redistricting data to which the redistricting commissions expected to already have access. This delay has thrown into question the feasibility of complying with the timelines established by Amendments Y and Z. To address the resulting uncertainty, the General Assembly introduced Senate Bill 21-247 (“SB 21-247”). Among other things, the bill would amend a recently enacted statutory definition of “necessary census data” to allow the commissions’ work to move forward based on preliminary census data and any other state or federal demographic data the commissions see fit to consult. The General Assembly petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and answer two interrogatories about Amendments Y and Z. The Court determined the Amendments did not require the exclusive use of final census data as the commissions and their nonpartisan staff begin their work; the commissions wer thus free to consult other reliable sources of population data, such as preliminary census data and interim data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. However, the Court determined the General Assembly did not have the power to compel the independent commissions or their nonpartisan staff to consider a particular source of population data or take any action beyond what Amendments Y and Z already required. “The Amendments were expressly intended to remove the General Assembly from the redistricting process, instead vesting all authority to draw district maps with independent commissions. Under this new scheme, the General Assembly has a discrete and limited role in appropriating funds for the commissions and nominating a limited number of applicants for consideration as commission members.” View "In re Interrogatories on Senate Bill 21-247 Submitted by the Colorado General Assembly" on Justia Law

Defendants Florin County Water District (district), its board of directors (board), and its general manager appealed a trial court judgment setting aside the district’s December 2016 water rate increase for violating Proposition 218 (known as the Right to Vote on Taxes Act), as requested by Plaintiffs KCSFV I, LLC and KCSFV II, LLC in their verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (petition). Defendants claimed the rate increase complied with the procedural and substantive requirements of Proposition 218, and the trial court erred in rejecting their affirmative defenses under Government Code section 66022 and the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. Defendants further challenged the trial court’s judgment awarding plaintiffs their attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected defendants’ arguments pertaining to the validity of the water rate increase. The Court further rejected defendants’ challenge to the attorney fees decision in the unpublished portion of the opinion. View "KCSFV I, LLC v. Florin County Water District" on Justia Law

The issue before the Washington Supreme Court’s in this case was whether an individual’s YouTube channel qualified as “news media” for requests for certain records under the Washington Public Records Act (PRA). In 2014, Brian Green and Peter Auvil went to the County-City Building in Tacoma to file a document and pay a parking ticket. As they went through security, the guard asked to search Auvil’s bag. Auvil refused. A Pierce County deputy sheriff came to assist, and Auvil began to record a video of the interaction on his phone. Auvil continued to refuse to allow the security guard to search the bag, arguing that the security checkpoint was a violation of his privacy rights. The conversation escalated, and the deputy asked the men to leave. When Green stood too close to him, the deputy shoved Green and caused him to fall backward onto the floor. The deputy arrested Green for criminal obstruction and took him to jail. He was released approximately 24 hours later. The prosecuting attorney’s office dismissed the charge. In December 2017, Green e-mailed a PRA request to the Pierce County Sheriff’s public records office requesting “[a]ny and all records of official photos and/or birth date and/or rank and/or position and/or badge number and/or date hired and/or ID Badge for all detention center and/or jail personnel and/or deputies on duty November 26 & 27 2014.” A representative of the Sheriff’s “Public Disclosure Unit” sent 11 pages of records, but did not include photographs or dates of birth as requested, explaining that the information was exempt under the PRA. Green said he was “working on a story concerning the Pierce County Jail” and again signed his e-mail with the title, “Investigative Journalist.” Green claimed his 6,000-subscriber YouTube channel met the definition of “news media” under the PRA. The Supreme Court concluded the statutory definition of “news media” required an entity with a legal identity separate from the individual. Green did not prove that he or the Libertys Champion YouTube channel met the statutory definition of “news media,” and, thus, he was not entitled to the exempt records. Therefore, the trial court was reversed in part. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Pierce County’s motion to compel discovery. View "Green v. Pierce County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, All of Us or None–Riverside Chapter (All of Us or None), Jane Roe, and Phyllis McNeal, filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, Superior Court of California, County of Riverside (Riverside Superior Court), and its Executive Officer and Clerk, W. Samuel Hamrick, Jr. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants improperly maintained the Riverside Superior Court’s records in criminal cases in various ways. Plaintiffs alleged that these practices invaded their right to privacy as embodied in the California Constitution (fifth cause of action). Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and writ of mandate (seventh cause of action) to remedy these violations. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s demurrer and summary judgment rulings. The Court of Appeal agreed with Plaintiffs the trial court erred in its ruling on the first, third, and fifth causes of action; as a result, the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ remedial causes of action for declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and injunctive relief (seventh cause of action) were also reversed. The matter was thus remanded for further proceedings. View "All of Us or None etc. v. Hamrick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the City of Cleveland's taxation of Hazel Willacy's stock-option income that she realized in 2016, holding that Willacy's propositions of law lacked merit.Willacy earned the disputed stock options in 2007 from her former employer while she was working in Cleveland. In 2009, Willacy retired and moved to Florida without having exercised any of the options. In 2014 and 2015, Willacy exercised the majority of the options and immediately resold the shares. In 2016, Willacy exercised the remaining options. Her former employer withheld her municipal-income-tax obligation and paid it to Cleveland. Willacy sought a refund on the grounds that she did not live or work in Cleveland. The refund was denied, and the BTA affirmed the denial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cleveland's taxation of Willacy's 2016 compensation was required under municipal law and did not violate her due process rights under either the United States or Ohio constitutions. View "Willacy v. Cleveland Board of Income Tax Review" on Justia Law

Plaintiff New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust (SAE) appealed a superior court order ruling that the Town of Hanover Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) had subject matter jurisdiction to hear SAE’s administrative appeal in the related case of New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover, 172 N.H. 69 (2019) (SAE I). Defendant Town of Hanover (Town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees. Dartmouth College notified the Planning and Zoning Office that the chapter of the New Hampshire Alpha Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon was suspended by the national organization. The College officially derecognized the fraternity, which meant the facility became ineligible to operate as an “I” district student residence. Continued use of the property as a residence would have been a violation of the zoning ordinance. In subsequent proceedings, SAE challenged the ZBA’s jurisdiction to hear SAE’s appeal in the first instance. The Town argued it was entitled to attorney’s fees because SAE’s challenge in this case was frivolous with no good faith basis in fact or law, and asserted that it was only intended to waste time and needlessly delay final judgment in this matter. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed judgment to SAE’s appeal and the Town’s cross-appeal. View "New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law

In separate criminal cases, a trial court found 37 defendants incompetent to stand trial (IST) and ordered the State Department of State Hospitals (Department) to admit them within 60 days of the receipt of an informational packet. The Department failed to timely admit 31 of the 37 defendants. These defendants separately sought sanctions against the Department pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, claiming violation of the court’s order. The trial court found the Department in violation of the order, and imposed monetary sanctions. The Department appealed, contending the trial court was not authorized to impose sanctions against it under section 177.5. Additionally, it claimed good cause or substantial justification for violating the order even assuming the court could impose sanctions under section 177.5. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Department’s arguments and affirmed. View "California v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

Venoco operated a drilling rig off the coast of Santa Barbara, transporting oil and gas to its Onshore Facility for processing. Venoco did not own the Offshore Facility but leased it from the California Lands Commission. Venoco owned the Onshore Facility with air permits to use it. Following a 2015 pipeline rupture, Venoco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and abandoned its leases, relinquishing all rights in the Offshore Facility.Concerned about public safety and environmental risks, the Commission took over decommissioning the rig and plugging the wells, paying Venoco $1.1 million per month to continue operating the Offshore and Onshore Facilities. After a third-party contractor took over operations, the Commission agreed to pay for use of the Onshore Facility. The Commission, as Venoco’s creditor, filed a $130 million claim for reimbursement of plugging and decommissioning costs. Before the confirmation of the liquidation plan, Venoco and the Commission unsuccessfully negotiated a potential sale of the Onshore Facility to the Commission. The Commission stopped making payments, arguing it could continue using the Onshore Facility without payment under its police power.After the estates’ assets were transferred to a liquidation trust, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding, claiming inverse condemnation, against California. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rejection of California's assertion of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed. By ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, states waived their sovereign immunity defense in proceedings that further a bankruptcy court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over the debtor's and the estate's property. View "In re Venoco, LLC" on Justia Law