Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two groups of petitioners challenged the ballot title that the Oregon Attorney General certified for Initiative Petition 41 (2022) (IP 41). IP 41 would add a new section 16 to Article IX of the Oregon Constitution, which would specify that a “public body may not assess a toll” on any part of an Oregon “highway” unless approved by the voters of nearby counties. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that petitioners identified two ways in which the ballot title failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Salsgiver/Iannarone v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

United Water Conservation District (“District”) manages the groundwater resources in Ventura County. City of San Buenaventura (“City)” pumps groundwater from the District’s territory and sells it to residential and commercial customers.   The District collects a fee from the city by applying a fixed ratio of rates for nonagricultural users, such as the City, who pump groundwater for municipal and industrial (M&I) uses. The District charged such users three times more than agricultural (also known as “Ag”) users in accordance with Water Code section 75594.   The City filed its complaint for determination of invalidity and declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate. The City alleged section 75594 is facially unconstitutional because the groundwater extraction rates charged for the water year 2019-2020 were not allocated to the City and other M&I users in a manner that bears a reasonable relationship to the City’s burdens on or benefits from the District’s activities.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment and held that the groundwater extraction charge is invalid as to nonagricultural users and must be set aside and section 75594 violates the California Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. The threshold issue concerned the applicable standard of review. The court held that District’s rates for the 2019-2020 Water Year do not comply with proposition 26. The court reasoned that the constitutional requirement of a ‘fair or reasonable relationship’ is not resolved by application of a rigid judicial standard nor by application of a deferential standard of substantial evidence. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

Defendants, ERR, LLC; Evergreen Resource Recovery, LLC (collectively “ERR”), owns and operates a wastewater treatment facility. One of ERR’s spill contractors, Oil Mop, performed oil removal and soil remediation. Oil Mop submitted a claim to the National Pollution Funds Center (“NPFC”) for reimbursement of removal costs after ERR refused to pay. The NPFC reimbursed Oil Mop and billed ERR for what it paid Oil Mop.   ERR refused to pay and the Government then sued ERR for what it paid Oil Mop. The Government moved to strike ERR’s demand for a jury trial.  The district court held a bench trial after concluding that the Government’s Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”) claims sound not in law but in equity.   On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed ERR’s Seventh Amendment challenge and held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees ERR’s right to a jury trial of the Government’s OPA claims. The court explained that it must consider two factors when determining whether a right of action requires a jury trial. First, the court compared the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, the court examined the remedy sought and determined whether it is legal or equitable in nature.   Here, the court concluded that the Recoupment Claim sounds in law and hence triggers ERR’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury. Next, the court held that both the nature of the Government’s action and the type of remedy sound in law. View "USA v. E.R.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an action challenging rules adopted by the Oklahoma Board of Tests for Alcohol and Drug Influence at one of its meetings. Those rules were subsequently used by the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety in actions to revoke plaintiffs' driver's licenses. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded: (1) the Board violated the Oklahoma Open Meeting Act; and (2) rules adopted by the Board at its meeting were invalid. Defendants appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals concluded a willful violation of the Open Meeting Act did not occur and reversed the district court. Plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari review, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals: the evidence was insufficient to make a prima facie case that the Board's Director willfully violated the Open Meeting Act when he failed to send the email notice of the special meeting to the Secretary of State. "The evidence showed a single event of an official's forgetfulness and omission when he sent an email notice to many individuals and failed to include the Secretary of State's address on the email, and additional evidence showed this omission was not a willful violation of the Act." View "Bailey, et al. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Tests for Alcohol & Drug Influence" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Development Finance Authority petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court to approve the issuance of ratepayer-backed bonds pursuant to the February 2021 Regulated Utility Consumer Protection Act, 74 O.S.2021, ch. 110A-1, sections 9070-9081. The Oklahoma Development Finance Authority sought to issue bonds to cover the debt incurred by Summit Utilities Oklahoma from unprecedented fuel costs during a February 2021 winter weather event. Summit Utilities’ ratepayers would then fund the bond payments through a monthly charge. The ratepayer-backed bonds would allow customers to pay their utility bills at a lower amount over a longer period of time. No protestants challenged the proposed bonds. The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and held that the ratepayer-backed bonds were properly authorized under the Act and were constitutional. View "In the Matter of the Application of the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Development Finance Authority petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court to approve the issuance of ratepayer-backed bonds pursuant to the February 2021 Regulated Utility Consumer Protection Act, 74 O.S.2021, ch. 110A-1, sections 9070-9081. The Oklahoma Development Finance Authority sought to issue bonds to cover the debt incurred by Public Service Company of Oklahoma from unprecedented fuel costs during a February 2021 winter weather event. Public Service Company of Oklahoma's ratepayers would then fund the bond payments through a monthly charge. The ratepayer-backed bonds would allow customers to pay their utility bills at a lower amount over a longer period of time. No protestants challenged the proposed bonds. The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and held that the ratepayer-backed bonds were properly authorized under the Act and were constitutional. View "In the Matter of the Application of the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Development Finance Authority petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court to approve the issuance of ratepayer-backed bonds pursuant to the February 2021 Regulated Utility Consumer Protection Act, 74 O.S.2021, ch. 110A-1, sections 9070-9081. The Oklahoma Development Finance Authority sought to issue bonds to cover the debt incurred by Oklahoma Natural Gas Company from unprecedented fuel costs during a February 2021 winter weather event. Oklahoma Natural Gas Company's ratepayers would then fund the bond payments through a monthly charge. The ratepayer-backed bonds would allow customers to pay their utility bills at a lower amount over a longer period of time. Protestants challenged the proposed bonds on several grounds, focusing on the constitutionality of the bonds. The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and held that the ratepayer-backed bonds were properly authorized under the Act and were constitutional. View "In the Matter of the Application of the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (together, “NetChoice”)—are trade associations that represent internet and social-media companies. They sued the Florida officials charged with enforcing S.B. 7072 under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. They sought to enjoin enforcement of Sections 106.072 and 501.2041 on a number of grounds, including, that the law’s provisions (1) violate the social-media companies’ right to free speech under the First Amendment and (2) are preempted by federal law.   The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it preliminarily enjoined those provisions of S.B. 7072 that are substantially likely to violate the First Amendment. But the district court did abuse its discretion when it enjoined provisions of S.B. 7072 that aren’t likely unconstitutional.   The court reasoned that it is substantially likely that social-media companies—even the biggest ones—are “private actors” whose rights the First Amendment protects, that their so-called “content-moderation” decisions constitute protected exercises of editorial judgment and that the provisions of the new Florida law that restrict large platforms’ ability to engage in content moderation unconstitutionally burden that prerogative. The court further concluded that it is substantially likely that one of the law’s particularly onerous disclosure provisions—which would require covered platforms to provide a “thorough rationale” for each and every content-moderation decision they make—violates the First Amendment. However, because it is unlikely that the law’s remaining disclosure provisions violate the First Amendment, the companies are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief with respect to them. View "NetChoice, LLC, et al. v. Attorney General, State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker issued a series of executive orders that first required Illinois residents to shelter in place at their residences, compelled “non-essential” businesses temporarily to cease or reduce their operations and prohibited gatherings of more than 10 people (later increased to 50 people). Believing that these orders violated numerous provisions of the U.S. Constitution, several individuals joined with some Illinois businesses and sued the Governor in his official capacity. After granting the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, the district court found that they lacked standing to sue. The court also concluded that it would be futile to allow a second amendment because, even if it had erred about the existence of a justiciable case or controversy, the plaintiffs could not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. With respect to five out of six counts, the plaintiffs have not satisfied the criteria for Article III standing to sue. The remaining count attempts to state a claim under the Takings Clause. The business plaintiffs “may have squeaked by the standing bar” for that theory but have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Nowlin v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

White Coat Waste Project (“WCW”) tried to run an advertisement denouncing animal experimentation with the Greater Richmond Transit Company (“Richmond Transit”) the ad was denied for being impermissibly “political.” WCW sued, challenging that denial as a violation of its First Amendment rights. Richmond Transit responded that, as a private company, it is not bound by the First Amendment, and even if it were, its policy passes constitutional muster because it only restrains speech in a nonpublic forum.   The district court disagreed on both counts, concluding that Richmond Transit is a state actor subject to constitutional constraints and that its policy violates the First Amendment right to free speech. But the district court granted WCW only partial summary judgment, holding that it could not provide the facial relief WCW sought because public-transit political-advertising bans can sometimes accord with the Constitution.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly identified Richmond Transit as a state actor and held that Richmond Transit’s policy is not “capable of reasoned application” and is therefore unconstitutionally unreasonable. Further, the court held that the district court erred in denying facial relief. Even if another public-transit political-advertising ban may be constitutional, this ban is incapable of reasoned, constitutional application in all circumstances. Thus, it is facially unconstitutional and warrants facial relief. View "White Coat Waste Project v. Greater Richmond Transit Co." on Justia Law