Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2017 the Police Protective League (“PPL”)—an employee organization that represents peace officers employed by the City—filed an action against the City and its Chief of Police (collectively “the City”), seeking a declaration section 148.6, subdivision (a)(2), was “legally valid [and] enforceable.” PPL also sought an order enjoining the City from accepting an allegation of misconduct against” peace officers represented by the Police Protective League “without the complainant being required to read and sign” the required advisory.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of The Los Angeles Police Protective League. The court held that it must follow Stanistreet because the United States Supreme Court has not ruled section 148.6 or an analogous statute is unconstitutional. The court reasoned that Section 148.6 is not an impermissible content-or viewpoint-based speech restriction. Further, the City’s constitutional challenge is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stanistreet. The Supreme Court in Stanistreet did not reject the exact argument the City now makes for why section 148.6 is an impermissible content- and viewpoint-based speech restriction. But the California Supreme Court’s analysis of why the three R.A.V. exceptions apply to section 148.6 applies to the City’s arguments. Additionally, the court held that the advisory and signature requirements of Section 148.6 do not chill protected speech and the City forfeited its argument that Section 148.6 violates the First Amendment by prohibiting anonymous complaints. View "L.A. Police Protective League v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Congress passed ARPA, American Rescue Plan Act, to help state, local, and tribal governments mitigate the ongoing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The statute contains a provision (the “Offset Provision”) – challenged in this appeal – prohibiting a State from using ARPA funds to subsidize a tax cut or otherwise a reduction in state net tax revenue. Specifically, Arizona contended that it was coerced into accepting the Offset Provision because of the size of the funds offered under ARPA and the financial situation brought on by the pandemic. Arizona sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the federal defendants from recouping funds or otherwise enforcing the Offset Provision, and declaratory relief that the Offset Provision violated the Constitution. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held that Arizona had standing to challenge ARPA both because there was a realistic danger of ARPA’s enforcement, and because there was a justiciable challenge to the sovereignty of the State, which alleges infringement on its authority to set tax policy and its interest in being free from coercion impacting its tax policy. The court reasoned that standing is measured at the time of the complaint, and when the complaint was filed, there was not a required compliance scheme. The court declined to consider the merits of Arizona’s constitutional claims. The court remanded for the district court to consider the merits of Arizona’s Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment claims. View "STATE OF ARIZONA V. JANET YELLEN" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a reallocation of local-government funds regarding fines collected from the use of traffic cameras during the preceding fiscal year, called the "spending setoff," and the "deposit requirement" that municipalities file a civil action to enforce citations issued using traffic cameras to pay an advance deposit in the court are not unconstitutional.Appellees, municipalities that both operated programs to enforce their traffic laws with cameras, brought this action for a declaratory judgment and for injunction relief asserting that the "spending setoff" and the "deposit requirement" infringed on its municipal home rule powers, in violation of Ohio Const. art. XVIII, 3. Appellees requested a preliminary injunction, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the spending setoff and deposit requirement unconstitutionally penalize municipalities for exercising their home-rule authority to enforce their traffic laws with cameras. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the spending setoff nor the deposit requirement are unconstitutional. View "Village of Newburgh Heights v. State" on Justia Law

This putative class action against California and San Diego County officials challenged California Governor Gavin Newsom’s emergency orders and related public health directives restricting business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs, owners of affected restaurants and gyms (Owners), primarily contended the orders were procedurally invalid because they were adopted without complying with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Furthermore, Owners contended that the business restrictions were substantively invalid because they effected a taking without compensation, violating the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rejecting these claims, the superior court sustained demurrers to the third amended complaint without leave to amend and dismissed the action. While the Court of Appeal sympathized with the position some Owners find themselves in and the significant financial losses they alleged, the unambiguous terms of the Emergency Services Act and controlling United States Supreme Court regulatory takings caselaw required that the judgment be affirmed. View "640 Tenth, LP v. Newsom" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Theresa Norelli, Christine Fajardo, Matt Gerding, and Palana Hunt-Hawkins, filed a complaint against the New Hampshire Secretary of State to challenge the constitutionality of New Hampshire’s current congressional districts. Plaintiffs contended the districts were rendered unconstitutionally malapportioned due to population shifts reported by the United States Census Bureau’s 2020 census. This case presented two preliminary questions for the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s review: (1) whether the current statute establishing a district plan for New Hampshire’s two congressional districts violated Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution; and (2) if so, whether the Supreme Court had to establish a new district plan if the legislature failed to do so “according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.” The Supreme Court answered the first question in the affirmative. In answering the second question, it determined that, upon a demonstrated legislative impasse, the Supreme Court had to establish a new district plan and, in doing so, it would apply the “least change” approach. View "Norelli, et al. v. New Hampshire Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, described as “political candidates, political associations, and individuals who engage in political activities relating to political elections and campaigns in Minnesota”, brought a case under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to assert a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge to Minn. Stat. Section 211B.02. Plaintiffs sued four Minnesota county attorneys with the authority to criminally prosecute violations of 211B.02. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the county attorneys from enforcing 211B.02 pending the district court’s entry of final judgment. The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction holding that Defendants had not enforced the statute and had not threatened to do so and were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court reasoned that the record showed that after the motion-to-dismiss stage and in response to Plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion, the four county attorneys filed substantially similar affidavits providing that they had “no present intention” to prosecute anyone for violating 211B.02. Further, because county officials’ affidavits all show that they have not enforced or threatened to enforce 211B.02 the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Immunity is inapplicable. View "Minnesota RFL Caucus v. Mike Freeman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the 2021 Hawai'i Reapportionment Commission (the Commission) discharged its obligations under Haw. Const. art. I, 6 and Haw. Rev. Stat. 25-2(b) in developing the 2021 Final Legislative Reapportionment Plan.Petitioners, voters in the state, argued that the plan violated article I, section 6 because it did not reflect that "representative districts shall be wholly included within senatorial districts" and violated Haw. Rev. Stat. 25-2(b)(5) by placing nine O'ahu legislative districts into both congressional districts. The Supreme Court held that the Commission satisfied its obligations under article IV, section 6 and section 25-2(b) by considering the constitutional and statutory district within district guidelines in developing the plan and did not abuse its discretion in adopting the plan. View "Hicks v. 2021 Hawai'i Reapportionment Commission" on Justia Law

In 2016, voters elected Kent to the Ohio House of Representatives; she became a member of the House Democratic Caucus. In 2018, she distributed a press release that accused the Columbus Chief of Police of wrongdoing; another press release accused the Department of failing to take child-abuse reports seriously. She attached a letter from the Ohio Legislative Black Caucus to the mayor. Kent submitted the documents to the Caucus for public distribution. Strahorn, then the Minority Leader, prohibited the communications team from posting the press release online and blocked any publication of the release because the attached letter included unauthorized signatures. Strahorn publicly stated that he would not “tolerate a member of the caucus using staff and tax-payer funded resources to fake, forge or fabricate any claim, request or document to further their own political interest or personal vendetta.” The Caucus voted to remove Kent, who lost access to policy aides, communications professionals, lawyers, and administrative staff. Kent was reelected. In 2019, Kent was blocked from attending a Democratic Caucus meeting. Kent did not run for reelection in 2020.Kent filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, alleging that she suffered retaliation for speech protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her suit, citing legislative immunity. The Caucus is inextricably bound up in the legislative process. “Whatever the lawmakers’ motives, principles of immunity fence [courts] out of the legislative sphere.” View "Kent v. Ohio House of Representatives" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that Defendants, prison officials, were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, when despite his numerous complaints over a period of years and a visibly deteriorating condition, they ignored his enlarged prostate. After the district court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, he was left with two claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The remaining officials claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. The district court disagreed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order denying qualified immunity to prison officials. The Ninth Circuit determined that only examination of the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis was necessary—whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation—because doing so would not hamper the development of precedent and both parties expressly acknowledged that this case turned on the second prong. The court reasoned it was clearly established at the time of Plaintiff’s treatment that prison officials violated the constitution when they choose a medically unacceptable course of treatment for the circumstances and a reasonable jury could find that the prison officials did just that. View "LEWIS STEWART V. ROMEO ARANAS" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court overturned Plaintiff’s Louisiana capital murder conviction, Plaintiff brought Section 1983 and 1988 suits against the state prosecutor and a sheriff’s detective, alleging that they fabricated evidence that deprived him of due process and a fair trial. Defendants, District Attorney and Livingston Parish Sheriff’s, each moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(c) based on assertions of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The district court denied the motions, holding that neither defendant was entitled to absolute immunity for fabricating evidence by intimidating and coercing a juvenile to adopt a false narrative the defendants had concocted out of whole cloth.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that a police officer is not entitled to absolute immunity reserved for a prosecutor. The court held that neither the Detective nor the District attorney is owed absolute immunity under the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has made clear that police officers, even when working in concert with prosecutors, are not entitled to absolute immunity. Nor are prosecutors when they step outside of their role as advocates and fabricate evidence. The facts and actions alleged by the complaint are fundamentally investigatory in nature, and therefore absolute immunity is not warranted. View "Wearry v. Foster" on Justia Law