Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

On March 25, 2021, Georgia Governor Kemp signed into law Senate Bill 9 (“SB 9”), which created from the former Augusta Judicial Circuit two new judicial circuits: the Columbia Judicial Circuit, and the Augusta Judicial Circuit. The judicial circuit split, which was slated to become effective on July 1, 2021, was briefly stayed by three lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of SB 9. The lawsuits were filed in the Superior Court of Richmond County, one by Columbia County citizen Willie Saunders and two by the nonprofit, voting advocacy organization, Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. (“BVMF”). At the heart of each of these suits was a claim that Columbia County officials sought to form their own judicial circuit as a racially discriminatory reaction to the election of District Attorney Jared Williams in November 2020. These appeals and cross-appeals arose from the trial court’s July 13, 2021 final judgment addressing the merits of the appellants’ challenges to SB 9 in each of the three suits. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected the appellants’ challenges to SB 9, declaring it “valid and enforceable” and allowing the circuit split to proceed. However, The Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment as to BVMF and remanded those cases to the trial court with instruction that they be dismissed because BVMF lacked standing to pursue its actions. As to Saunders, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of his appeal because Saunders failed to challenge the trial court’s dispositive ruling dismissing the defendants he sued. Thus, the Supreme Court also vacated the judgment as to Saunders’ complaint and directed the trial court to dismiss his action upon remand. View "Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v. Kemp" on Justia Law

In Case No. S21A0899, Lynnette Riley, the former State Revenue Commissioner, appealed the partial grant of summary judgment in favor of petitioner Georgia Association of Club Executives (“GACE”), contending that the trial court erred by permanently enjoining the enforcement of OCGA 15-21-201(1)(B) – one of the definitions of “adult entertainment establishment” – based on the court’s ruling that the provision was unconstitutionally vague. In Case No. S21X0900, GACE cross-appealed, contending the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in Riley’s favor on the remaining claims of GACE’s petition, arguing that OCGA 15-21-209, by imposing an annual assessment on adult entertainment establishments, violated constitutional due process and free speech protections. Although these appeals presented challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes, the Georgia Supreme Court did not address the merits of the appellant’s or the cross-appellant’s claims of error. Instead, the Court vacated the trial court’s summary judgment order and subsequent final judgment because the Court determined GACE’s action against Riley was moot when the trial court ruled. "Because Riley was no longer Revenue Commissioner at the time the trial court entered its summary judgment order and subsequent final judgment, an injunction against her in her individual capacity could not give GACE the relief it seeks. ... A court may not address the constitutionality of the tax at issue absent the presence of a proper defendant in the action." View "Riley v. Georgia Assn. of Club Executives., Inc." on Justia Law

The League of Women Voters, Progress Michigan, the Coalition to Close Lansing Loopholes, and Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Michigan Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of 2018 PA 608, which changed the procedures by which the people of Michigan could circulate petitions to invoke the referendum, initiative, and constitutional-amendment processes set forth in Michigan’s Constitution and statutory election laws. The Court of Claims struck down the geographical limitation in MCL 168.471 as well as the checkbox requirement of MCL 168.482(7); however, it ruled that the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a, was constitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the Court of Claims’ decision, striking as unconstitutional the geographic limitation in MCL 168.471 and the requirement in MCL 168.482(4) that petitions include language identifying the signer’s congressional district. The Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Claims as to the checkbox and affidavit requirements, holding that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.482 was constitutional but the affidavit requirement in MCL 168.482a overly burdened the free-speech rights of the petitions’ sponsors. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, arguing that the checkbox requirement, MCL 168.482(7), was unconstitutional. The Department of the Attorney General sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ holdings as to the 15% geographic requirement, MCL 168.471, and the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a. Defendant Secretary of State sought leave to appeal in order to request that, regardless of the outcome, the decision be applied only prospectively. The Michigan Supreme Court held the 15% cap on signatures from any one congressional district and the pre-circulation affidavit requirement for paid circulators violated the Michigan Constitution. The checkbox requirement, however, passed constitutional muster. "In light of the chaos and injustice that would ensue were the opinion to be applied retroactively," the decision was given prospective effect only. View "League Of Women Voters Of Michigan, et al. v. Secretary Of State" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied defendants' motion for a partial stay of the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining the Department of Defense, United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and United States Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro from enforcing certain COVID-19 vaccination requirements against 35 Navy special warfare personnel and prohibiting any adverse actions based on their religious accommodation requests. Specifically, defendants seek a partial stay pending appeal insofar as the injunction precludes them from considering plaintiffs' vaccination statuses "in making deployment, assignment and other operational decisions."The court weighed the Mindes abstention factors and determined that this dispute is justiciable. However, the court concluded that defendants have not carried their burden to warrant the issuance of the stay. The court agreed with the district court that defendants have not shown a compelling interest to deny religious accommodations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to each of the 35 plaintiffs at issue. Rather, the "marginal interest" in vaccinating each plaintiff appears to be negligible and thus defendants lack a sufficiently compelling interest to vaccinate plaintiffs. The court also concluded that the preliminary injunction does not irreparably damage the Navy and the public; partially staying the preliminary injunction pending appeal would substantially harm plaintiffs; and issuance of the requested stay would disserve the public interest. View "U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court denying the State's motion to dismiss and granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiff, holding that the preliminary injunction was granted erroneously.Plaintiff, a hearing-instrument dispenser whose license was not renewed, brought this action against the Arkansas Department of Health, the Secretary of Health, and Arkansas Board of Hearing Instrument Dispensers, and the Executive Director of the Board of Hearing Instrument Dispensers (collectively, the State), arguing that the Board's refusal to provide him a proper renewal notice and a hearing violated his due process and equal protection rights and was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of the Board's power. The circuit court granted Plaintiff's request for a temporary injunction and declaratory relief. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff adequately pleaded a due process claim; (2) Plaintiff's equal protection claim was barred by sovereign immunity; and (3) because the preliminary injunction order contained no findings on irreparable harm or likelihood of success on the merits, the case must be remanded for findings in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). View "Arkansas Department of Health v. Solomon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the ruling of the superior court entering declaratory judgment in favor of the city council of Springfield and held that the city council may reorganize the Springfield police department based on the plain language of the relevant statutes and city ordinances.At issue was whether the city council had the authority to reorganize the police department to be headed by a five-person board of police commissioners rather than a single commission under the provisions of the Springfield city charter passed in accordance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 43, 46-55. After the mayor refused to implement the city council's ordinance restructuring the police department the city council brought this action. The court entered a judgment declaring that the mayor must appoint qualified individuals to serve on the board. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the ordinance was clearly within the scope of the city council's power to reorganize municipal departments; and (2) there was no separation of powers problem in this case. View "City Council of Springfield v. Mayor of Springfield" on Justia Law

Heather operated a health-coaching business called Constitution Nutrition. She started her business in California, which did not require a license. After moving to Florida in 2015, she continued to run her business—meeting online with most of her clients and meeting in person with two clients who lived in Florida. She described herself as a “holistic health coach” and not as a dietician. Heather tailored her health coaching to each client, which included dietary advice. After a complaint was filed against her and she paid $500.00 in fines and $254.09 in investigatory fees, Heather sued, claiming that Florida’s Dietetics and Nutrition Practice Act, which requires a license to practice as a dietician or nutritionist, violated her First Amendment free speech rights to communicate her opinions and advice on diet and nutrition to her clients. The district court granted the Florida Department of Health summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, after considering the Supreme Court’s decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018). The Act “is a professional regulation with a merely incidental effect on protected speech,” and is constitutional under the First Amendment. View "Del Castillo v. Secretary, Florida Department of Health" on Justia Law

These consolidated appellate proceedings arose from a quo warranto action filed by the State of Alabama, on the relation of Charles Driggars, challenging Governor Kay Ivey's appointment of James Naftel II to the office of Judge of Probate of Jefferson County, place no. 1. In case no. 1200755, Judge Naftel, individually and in his official capacity, and Governor Ivey appealed a circuit court order denying their motion for a summary judgment. After review, a majority of the Alabama Supreme Court reversed that order and the case remanded for the circuit court to enter summary judgment in Judge Naftel and the Governor's favor. The Court's resolution of the appeal in favor of Judge Naftel and Governor Ivey made the relief sought in their petition for a writ of mandamus moot; the petition was therefore dismissed. View "Naftel v. Alabama ex rel. Driggars" on Justia Law

Relator was a prospective candidate for Oregon governor. After he filed his declaration of candidacy with the Secretary of State, the secretary asked relator for additional information to substantiate that he will “have been three years next preceding his election, a resident within this State,” as required to serve as governor by Article V, section 2, of the Oregon Constitution. Relator submitted additional materials in support of his claim that he met the constitutional eligibility requirement. Upon reviewing those materials, the secretary determined that, although relator had previously been a resident of Oregon, he had been a resident of New York since at least 2000 and he had not reestablished Oregon residency by November 2019. The secretary therefore concluded that relator did not meet the constitutional requirement, and informed him his name would not be placed on the ballot in the primary election. The next day, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Oregon Supreme Court, asking the Court to direct the secretary to reverse her determination and to instruct county officials to place relator’s name on the ballot. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review were: (1) the meaning of “resident within this State,” as those words are used in Article V, section 2, of the Oregon Constitution; and (2) whether the secretary was required to conclude that relator met that legal standard. The Court concluded that “resident within,” when viewed against the legal context that surrounded the Oregon Constitution’s 1857 ratification, was best understood to refer to the legal concept of “domicile,” which required “the fact of a fixed habitation or abode in a particular place, and an intention to remain there permanently or indefinitely[.] Under that legal concept, a person can have only a single residence at a time." Further, the Court held the secretary was not required to conclude that relator was domiciled in Oregon between November 2019 and December 2020. Although relator challenged the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement in Article V, section 2, that question was not properly considered through a mandamus proceeding. The Court therefore dismissed the alternative writ and denied relator’s petition. View "Oregon ex rel Kristof v. Fagan" on Justia Law

This matter involved a legal challenge to the congressional redistricting map selected by the New Jersey Congressional Redistricting Commission (Commission). On December 22, 2021, a majority of the Commission’s members that included the Chair, voted in favor of the map the Democratic delegation presented. Plaintiffs, the Republican delegation to the Commission, filed an amended complaint on January 5, 2022 to challenge that map. Plaintiffs filed their complaint directly with the New Jersey Supreme Court, pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Supreme Court observed it had no role in the outcome of the redistricting process unless the map is "unlawful." The Supreme Court found none of plaintiffs' arguments asserted the plan was unlawful or the result of "invidious discrimination." Because plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted, defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice was granted. View "In the Matter of Establishment of Congressional Districts by the New Jersey Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law