Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Air Evac EMS, Inc., is an emergency air ambulance provider. Because the company's services are expensive, it markets and sells what it characterizes as a "debt cancellation program." Under this program, West Virginia residents pay a sum of money annually and any amount due on their bill in excess of what is covered by insurance will be canceled by the company.Through a series of communications and actions taken by West Virginia, Air Evac determined that the state was favoring a competitor. Air Evac brought several suits in district court. This one alleges that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner from taking any enforcement efforts. Following this case, Air Evac brought another case against the Commissioner that remains pending at the time of this appeal.The district court determined that the abstention doctrine applied, however, because the case presented "extraordinary circumstances," the court determined that abstention was not appropriate.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction to consider matters related to ongoing state criminal proceedings as well as quasi-criminal proceedings if the state proceeding is ongoing, implicates important state interests and provides an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. The Fourth Circuit determined that the district court properly analyzed the abstention factors. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Allan McVey" on Justia Law

A father going through a contentious divorce was accused by his young daughter of sexual abuse. A Department of Human Services social worker observed the forensic interview, believed it was credible, obtained additional information primarily from the mother, and obtained an ex parte court order requiring the father to leave the family home. An ensuing adversary proceeding determined that the allegation was unfounded and that the mother had “wanted [the father] out of the house.” The DHS finding was set aside and, eventually, the father obtained physical care of the children. In the father's subsequent suit, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The claim of intentional interference with the parent-child relationship fails because that claim applies to extralegal actions— such as absconding with a child—not to judicially-approved acts. The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because the conduct here did not reach the level of an “outrage” necessary to sustain such a claim. The unreasonable search and seizure claim cannot succeed because there was no showing that the DHS social worker falsified the affidavit she submitted to the court or that the removal order would not have been granted without her questioned statements. The substantive due process claim fails because DHS’s conduct does not “shock the conscience.” A procedural due process claim cannot prevail because the father was provided with adequate process, which ultimately cleared his name. View "Lennette v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the circuit court dismissing Jefferson County Foundation, Inc.'s suit seeking a declaration that a series of transactions were an unlawful "de facto tax abatement," holding that there was no error.After the West Virginia Economic Development Authority (WVEDA) adopted a resolution to undertake a series of transactions with Roxul USA, Inc. (Rockwool) to finance the construction of a manufacturing plant the Foundation filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the transactions were a de facto tax abatement for Rockwool that violates both statute and the West Virginia Constitution. The business court dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) WVEDA was statutorily authorized to engaged in the transactions; (2) the transactions were not an exemption from tax; (3) the West Virginia Economic Development Act does not conflict with W. Va. Code 11-3-9; and (4) the transactions did not violate W. Va. Const. art. X, 1. View "Jefferson County Foundation, Inc. v. W. Va. Economic Development Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this coordinated proceeding appealed postdismissal orders denying their motions for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In 2017, plaintiffs filed petitions against defendant Department of Water Resources (DWR) challenging the California WaterFix (WaterFix), a proposal to improve the State’s water supply infrastructure by constructing two 35-mile-long tunnels that would convey fresh water from the Sacramento River to pumping stations in the southern Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta (Delta). The lawsuits sought to compel DWR to rescind the WaterFix approvals, decertify the environmental impact report (EIR), and suspend activities related to the project until DWR complied with applicable laws. In 2019, while the coordination proceeding was pending, California’s newly elected Governor announced that he did not support WaterFix’s dual tunnel proposal and directed DWR to instead pursue a single tunnel conveyance. Shortly thereafter, DWR decertified the EIR and rescinded the project approvals. Consequently, all pending actions, including the validation suit, were dismissed. After the cases were dismissed, plaintiffs moved for attorney fees, asserting that they were “successful” parties under the catalyst theory because the litigation motivated DWR to voluntarily provide the relief sought in their petitions and answers. On appeal, plaintiffs argued: (1) the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard in determining there was no causal connection between the litigation and the relief obtained; and (2) the trial court’s finding of no causation is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard and therefore failed to consider all relevant evidence in the record. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for redetermination of the issue. View "Dept. of Water Resources Environmental Impact Cases" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged they were sexually abused by Tyler, a Kentucky probation and parole officer, 2017-2019, while Plaintiffs served sentences for state convictions. In 2018, one victim filed a sexual harassment complaint but Tyler’s supervisor, Hall, concealed the complaint. The state terminated Hall and charged Tyler with rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, tampering with physical evidence, official misconduct in the first degree, and harassment.Plaintiffs brought their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Thirteenth Amendment, arguing that Defendants directly violated their rights. to be free from involuntary sexual servitude guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment and violated Plaintiffs’ Thirteenth Amendment rights to be free from “unwanted sexual physical contact,” “unwanted intrusion upon Plaintiffs’ person(s) for the sexual gratification of Defendants’ employee,” “sexual physical assault,” and “unwanted sexual contact.” Because the section 1983 limitations period had expired, Plaintiffs amended their complaint and claimed that their action arose out of the Thirteenth Amendment exclusively, disclaimed their arguments against Governor Beshear, and asserted that jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit; the Thirteenth Amendment neither provides a cause of action for damages nor abrogates state sovereign immunity against private damages actions. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that no state or federal law prohibits them from filing suit directly against the Commonwealth. View "Smith v. Commonwealth of Kentucky" on Justia Law

On appeal, the district attorney argued that The Association of Deputy District Attorneys for Los Angeles County (“ADDA”) lacks standing to seek mandamus relief on behalf of its members and that he does not have a ministerial duty to comply with the legal duties ADDA alleges he violated, that the trial court’s preliminary injunction violates the doctrine of separation of powers and that the balance of the harms does not support preliminary injunctive relief.   The Second Appellate District affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order. The court concluded that ADDA has associational standing to seek relief on behalf of its members. The court concluded the voters and the Legislature created a duty, enforceable in mandamus, that requires prosecutors to plead prior serious or violent felony convictions to ensure the alternative sentencing scheme created by the three strikes law applies to repeat offenders. This duty does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by materially infringing on a prosecutor’s charging discretion; to the contrary, the duty affirms the voters’ and the Legislature’s authority to prescribe more severe punishment for certain recidivists. Further, neither the voters nor the Legislature can create a duty enforceable in mandamus to require a prosecutor to prove allegations of prior serious or violent felony convictions, an inherently discretionary act. Nor is mandamus available to compel a prosecutor to exercise his or her discretion in a particular way when moving to dismiss allegations of prior strikes or sentence enhancements under section 1385. View "The Association of Deputy District Attorneys etc. v. Gascon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs., a Florida-based wine retailer, plus its owner and three North Carolina residents, initiated a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action, challenging a North Carolina alcoholic beverage control regime as unconstitutional. More specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that North Carolina’s regime, which prohibits out-of-state retailers — but not in-state retailers — from shipping wine directly to consumers in North Carolina (the “Retail Wine Importation Bar”), contravenes the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause. The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and named the Chair of the North Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission as a defendant (“N.C. Commission”). The district court awarded summary judgment to the N.C. Commission.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling, holding that even though the Retail Wine Importation Bar discriminates against interstate commerce — it is authorized by Section 2 of the 21st Amendment. The court explained that its analysis of North Carolina’s Retail Wine Importation Bar under the Tennessee Wine framework led the court to conclude that, although the Bar discriminates against interstate commerce, it is nevertheless justified on the legitimate non- protectionist ground of preserving North Carolina’s three-tier system. View "B-21 Wines, Inc. v. Hank Bauer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the superior court reversing the decision of the Board to revoke Plaintiff's pension, ordering the permanent reinstatement of the pension, and declaring the pension revocation ordinance of the Town of Narragansett to be unconstitutionally vague, holding that the Board failed to make findings of fact or conclusions of law to support its decision.Plaintiff was a police officer with the Narragansett Police Department for twenty-eight years prior to his retirement. After Plaintiff pled guilty to transferring obscene matter to a person under the age of sixteen years the Board voted to revoke his pension under the pension revocation ordinance. Plaintiff and his wife sued. The trial justice concluded that the Board had violated Plaintiffs' due process rights in several respects and erred in declaring the pension revocation ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case, holding that the trial court failed to make competent factual findings on which to base an as-applied analysis of the constitutionality of the pension revocation ordinance. View "Riley v. Narragansett Pension Board" on Justia Law

Following floods at Houston’s Buffalo Bayou watershed, the federal government built the Barker and Addicks Dams. By 1963, each dam held a large reservoir with gated outflowing conduits. The Army Corps of Engineers’ 2012 Water Control Manual provides that if an inch of rain falls within a 24- hour period or if downstream flooding is expected, the Corps must close the floodgates. If “inflow and pool elevation conditions dictate,” the Corps releases water according to a schedule. The reservoirs were empty before Hurricane Harvey made landfall. On August 25, 2017, the Corps closed the floodgates; more than 30 inches of water poured onto the city in four days. The Corps released water. Some downstream properties were flooded for more than 11 days, some at more than eight feet above the first finished floor. Suits alleging that the flooding constituted an uncompensated, physical taking of property were split. In the Upstream Sub-Docket, the Claims Court found that plaintiffs were owners of land not subject to flowage easements and had valid property interests and that the government flooded plaintiffs’ properties and engaged in a taking. The court dismissed the Downstream Sub-Docket claims, finding that the owners did not articulate a cognizable property interest; “neither Texas law nor federal law creates a protected property interest in perfect flood control.” The court reasoned that the plaintiffs acquired their properties subject to the superior right of the Corps to engage in flood mitigation.The Federal Circuit reversed. The government is not immune from suit under the Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. 702c. There is no blanket rule under Texas law that property rights are held subject to owners’ expectations on acquisition. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that private property is subject to “unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power." View "Milton v. United States" on Justia Law

Connecticut State Police Union (“CSPU”) brought suit against the Commissioner of Connecticut’s Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (the “Commissioner”), alleging that the FOIA-related portions of the state law violated the Contracts Clause and moved for a preliminary injunction. The law at issue is Public Act 20–1: An Act Concerning Police Accountability (“the Act”). Section 8 of the Act took aim at FOIA exemptions under Connecticut law.   The district court denied the motion primarily on the ground that the CSPU was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim since the law was reasonable and necessary to promote transparency and accountability for law enforcement. The Second Circuit affirmed concluding that the law served a legitimate public purpose and that the legislature, in passing it, acted not self-servingly but in the public interest.   The court explained that determine whether a law violates the Contracts Clause, it asks (1) whether the contractual impairment is substantial, (2) whether the law serves “a legitimate public purpose such as remedying a general social or economic problem,” and (3) whether the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are reasonable and necessary.  Here, the Act served two legitimate public purposes: ensuring the transparency and accountability of law enforcement and promoting “FOIA’s strong legislative policy in favor of the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.” Moreover, because the district court did not err in concluding that the CSPU could not succeed on the merits of its claim, the court did not need to address the remaining prongs of the preliminary injunction test. View "Conn. State Police Union v. Rovella" on Justia Law