Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Municipal authorities in Oklahoma fined Plaintiff BNSF Railway Company for violating its Blocked Crossing Statute—setting up a preemption challenge between the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) and the Blocked Crossing Statute. Defendants argued the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), not the ICCTA, applied to Oklahoma’s statute and did not preempt it. The district court held that the ICCTA preempted Oklahoma’s Blocked Crossing Statute because it regulated railroad operations. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the federal district court and affirmed its decision. View "BNSF Railway v. City of Edmond, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted Petitioner's petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the immigration judge's (IJ) credibility judgment was not supported by substantial evidence.The IJ rejected Petitioner's petition for relief based on an adverse credibility determination that primarily drew its support from a gang assessment database. The BIA affirmed. Petitioner then petitioned for review, arguing that the agency's reliance on the flawed gang package undermined the credibility finding and resulted in a due process violation. The First Circuit granted the petition after noting the flaws in the gang assessment database, including the database's reliance on an erratic point system built on unsubstantiated inferences, holding that neither the agency's adverse credibility determination nor its denial of Petitioner's claims was supported by substantial evidence. View "Ortiz v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Detroit News, Inc., Detroit Free Press, Inc., and others filed suit against the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission, alleging that the commission violated the Michigan Const. 1963, art 4, section 6 by withholding certain data and supporting materials used to develop its proposed redistricting plans and by conducting business during a closed meeting. Plaintiffs sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that Article 4, section 6 required the commission to disclose all supporting materials that it uses to develop its plans; (2) a writ of mandamus compelling the release of supporting materials withheld; (3) a declaratory judgment that Article 4, section 6 required the commission to conduct all of its business in open meetings; and (4) a writ of mandamus requiring the release of the recording of a closed-session meeting and requiring that all future business meetings be open to the public. "From the titles of the memoranda discussed at that meeting, it is beyond dispute that the meeting involved the development of the redistricting maps. Such work is unquestionably within the Commission’s core 'business,' and it therefore needed to be conducted in the open." with respect to disclosure of 10 memoranda that the Commission claimed were privileged attorney-client communications, the Supreme Court concluded that, in light of the constitutional text requiring disclosure of materials that support development of redistricting plans, seven of the memoranda had to be published as “supporting materials” under Const 1963, art 4, section 6(9). "The other three are not 'supporting materials' and therefore need not be disclosed." View "The Detroit News, Inc. v. Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation acted within the authority provided by Cal. Const. art. I, 32(b) when it adopted regulations prohibiting early parole consideration under the scheme set forth in Proposition 57, The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, for inmates "currently serving a term of incarceration for a 'violent felony.'"After Petitioner was convicted of nine violent felony counts and six nonviolent felony counts voters approved Proposition 57. The Department subsequently adopted regulations implementing early parole considerations, including the regulations at issue here. Consistent with these regulations, the Department determined that Petitioner was ineligible for nonviolent offender early parole consideration because he was serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony. The court of appeal granted relief, concluding that the language of article I, section 32(a) requires early parole consideration for any inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony even when that inmate was also convicted of a violent felony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department acted within its authority provided by article I, section 32(b) when it adopted the regulation at issue. View "In re Mohammad" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether the Secretary of State was required to count the signatures on an initiative petition of voters whose registration was deemed “inactive.” Plaintiffs were supporters of Initiative Petition 50 (2016) (IP 50) who sought to qualify that initiative for the 2016 ballot. After the secretary subtracted the signatures of voters with inactive registration, the petition did not have enough signatures to be placed on the ballot. Plaintiffs brought this action challenging the secretary’s exclusion of those signatures. Plaintiffs argued that voters with inactive registration could sign initiative petitions because, even if their registration was inactive, they were still registered, and therefore remain “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The secretary responded that those voters could not sign initiative petitions because voters with inactive registration were not “registered * * * in the manner provided by law,” and they therefore were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded, like the secretary, that because voters whose registrations were inactive were not eligible to vote, they were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. Accordingly, the Court held that their signatures on initiative petitions could not be counted, and that the secretary properly excluded them when determining the number of signatures submitted in support of IP 50. View "Whitehead v. Fagan" on Justia Law

Mother J.B., lived with her two young children (“Y.W.-B” and “N.W.-B”) and the children’s father (“Father”) in Philadelphia. In 2019, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) allegedly received a general protective services report (“GPS report”) from an unidentified source alleging possible neglect by Mother. Although DHS referenced this GPS report several times at the evidentiary hearing and used it to refresh its sole witness’s recollection, it inexplicably never introduced it into evidence. The proceedings revealed the allegation suggested Mother was homeless and failed to feed one of her children during a single eight-hour period. DHS used this allegation as grounds to enter and inspect the family residence. The issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether DHS established sufficient probable cause for the trial court to issue the order permitting entry into the home without consent. To this, the Court concluded DHS did not establish probable cause, and thus reversed the order of the Superior Court holding to the contrary. View "In the Interest of: N.W.-B." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted expedited review of this direct appeal to decide whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that Acting Secretary of Health Alison Beam (“the Secretary”) lacked the power under existing law and Department of Health regulations to require individuals to wear facial coverings while inside Pennsylvania’s schools as a means of controlling the spread of COVID-19. Having determined that the Secretary exceeded her authority in issuing that directive, by per curiam order on December 10, 2021, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision nullifying the mandate, and published this opinion expounding on its reasoning. View "Corman, J., et al. v. Beam" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case was whether taxpayer, Ooma, Inc., a California company, had sufficient contacts or nexus with Oregon to make it subject to local tax. The Oregon Tax Court concluded that Ooma’s contacts and nexus with Oregon were sufficient to satisfy the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, and granted summary judgment to the Department of Revenue. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court. View "Ooma, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Walmart's action challenging the government's interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as it applies to pharmacists who dispense prescription opioids. In this case, Walmart points to no rule, guidance, or other public document setting forth the positions it seeks to contest. The court concluded that, because Walmart identifies no agency action, as that term is used in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the suit is barred by sovereign immunity. Furthermore, even if the action was not barred by sovereign immunity, the court concluded that Walmart's failure to contradict a definite government position means that it has not demonstrated the existence of a ripe case or controversy, as required by Article III. Accordingly, the district court appropriately dismissed based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Walmart v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

General Motors was a Delaware corporation engaged in the sale of motor vehicles in Pennsylvania, and subject to Pennsylvania’s corporate income tax. GM contested the calculation of its 2001 Tax Year corporate income tax, after filing a report of change in its federal taxable income in March 2010. In February 2012, GM timely filed a petition for refund with the Department of Revenue’s (“Department”) Board of Appeals. It claimed that the cap on the net loss carryover (NLC) resulted in a “progressive effective tax rate” which violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It explained that “a taxpayer conducting business on a larger scale in Pennsylvania pays a higher effective tax rate than a similarly situated taxpayer conducting business on a smaller scale.” In Nextel Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of Revenue, 171 A.3d 682 (Pa. 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the NLC deduction applicable to corporate income tax for the tax year ending December 31, 2007 (“2007 Tax Year”), violated the Uniformity Clause. Here, the Court applied Nextel and considered GM's constitutional challenges to the NLC provisions applicable to corporate income tax in the tax year ending December 31, 2001 (“2001 Tax Year”). The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court that Nextel applied retroactively to this case, however, it reversed the Commonwealth Court to the extent it remedied the violation of the Uniformity Clause by severing the $2 million NLC deduction cap, which would have resulted in an unlimited NLC deduction. Instead, the Supreme Court severed the NLC deduction provision in its entirety, resulting in no NLC deduction for the 2001 Tax Year. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order to the extent it directed the Department to recalculate GM’s corporate income tax without capping the NLC deduction and issue a refund for the 2001 Tax Year, which the Court concluded was required to remedy the due process violation of GM’s rights pursuant to McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18 (1990). View "General Motors Corp. v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law