Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, Appalachian Power Company and Wheeling Power Company sought to recover approximately $552.9 million in under-recovered costs for the period from March 1, 2021, through February 28, 2023. The Public Service Commission of West Virginia disallowed $231.8 million of the requested amount, concluding that the companies had made imprudent and unreasonable decisions regarding their coal stockpiling, which led to higher costs from purchasing energy rather than generating it themselves. The Commission allowed the recovery of the remaining $321.1 million over a ten-year period with a 4% carrying charge.The Commission's decision followed a series of proceedings, including the 2021 and 2022 ENEC cases, where it had expressed concerns about the companies' reliance on purchased power and their failure to maintain adequate coal supplies. The Commission had previously ordered the companies to increase self-generation and maintain a minimum 69% capacity factor for their coal-fired plants. Despite these directives, the companies continued to rely heavily on purchased power, leading to significant under-recoveries.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's finding that the companies acted imprudently and unreasonably. However, the Court reversed the Commission's disallowance of $231.8 million, finding that the Commission had relied on extra-record evidence (coal reports) without giving the companies notice or an opportunity to address this evidence, thus violating their due process rights. The Court remanded the case to the Commission to allow the companies to address the coal reports and the calculation of the disallowance. View "Appalachian Power Company and Wheeling Power Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

Laura Marie Obert, a former Broadwater County Commissioner, was investigated by the Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2015 for allegedly receiving unlawful overtime pay and potential ethics violations. In 2016, Obert entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the Assistant Attorney General, agreeing to repay the excess wages and abstain from voting on matters where she had a conflict of interest. In 2019, based on new allegations of violating the agreement, Obert was charged with felony theft and misdemeanor official misconduct. The district court dismissed these charges in 2021, finding Obert had complied with the agreement and there was insufficient evidence for the misconduct charge.Obert then sued the State of Montana and Broadwater County Attorney Cory Swanson, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, due process violations, and malicious prosecution. The First Judicial District Court dismissed her claims, leading to this appeal.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and made several determinations. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of Obert's breach of contract and good faith and fair dealing claims, holding that these claims were not time-barred and did not accrue until the criminal charges were dismissed. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Obert's bad faith claim, finding no special relationship existed between Obert and the State that would support such a claim. The court also upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, ruling that Swanson was protected by prosecutorial immunity as he acted within his statutory duties. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim, concluding that Obert's procedural due process rights were not violated as the State followed proper procedures in charging her and the district court provided an appropriate forum to address the alleged breach of the agreement. View "Obert v State" on Justia Law

the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. The Act makes clear that MOHELA’s debts and obligations are not debts or obligations of the State. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.410. This includes any judgments against MOHELA. The State’s lack of legal liability for MOHELA’s debts and judgments is a strong indicator that MOHELA’s finances are independent from the State’s. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978.In sum, the third Steadfast factor weighs against arm-of-the-state status. MOHELA receives no direct financial assistance from the State, has the ability to generate its own revenue, retains control over its own funds, and the State bears no legal liability for MOHELA’s debts or judgments.d. Factor Four: State or Local AffairsThe fourth Steadfast factor considers whether the entity is concerned primarily with state or local affairs. This factor examines the entity’s function, composition, and purpose. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528; Steadfast, 507 F.3d at 1253. Here, the district court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of arm-of-the-state status, and we agree.MOHELA’s primary function is to help Missourians access student loans needed to pay for college. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. This is a statewide concern, not a local one. MOHELA’s activities are not confined to any particular locality within Missouri; rather, they are intended to benefit residents across the entire state. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366 (noting that MOHELA was established to perform the “essential public function” of helping Missourians access student loans).Moreover, MOHELA’s board is composed of members appointed by the Governor and representatives from state agencies, further indicating that its focus is on statewide, rather than local, affairs. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. The fact that MOHELA’s profits are used to fund education in Missouri, including providing grants and scholarships for Missouri students, also supports the conclusion that MOHELA is concerned with state affairs. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366.In conclusion, the fourth Steadfast factor weighs in favor of arm-of-the-state status.3. The Second Step of the Arm-of-the-State Test: The Twin Goals of the Eleventh AmendmentBecause the Steadfast factors point in different directions, we proceed to the second step of the Hennessey test and consider the twin goals underlying the Eleventh Amendment: avoiding an affront to the dignity of the state and the impact of a judgment on the state treasury. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.As discussed above, the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. This means that a judgment against MOHELA would not impact the state treasury. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978. The lack of impact on the state treasury is a strong indicator that MOHELA is not an arm of the state. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.Regarding the dignity of the state, MOHELA operates with substantial autonomy and is financially independent from the State. The State has not clearly demarcated MOHELA as sharing its sovereignty. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 529. Therefore, treating MOHELA as an arm of the state would not accord with the dignity interests protected by the Eleventh Amendment.In conclusion, considering the twin goals of the Eleventh Amendment, we determine that MOHELA is not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Good v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

The National Association of Government Employees, Inc. (NAGE) challenged the constitutionality of the Debt Limit Statute, alleging that it posed an imminent risk to its members, who are federal employees. NAGE claimed that if the debt limit was not raised, its members would face layoffs, furloughs, unpaid work, and loss of pension funding. NAGE sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and President Joseph R. Biden.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that NAGE's claims of past injuries were moot due to the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which suspended the debt limit until January 1, 2025, and required the Treasury Secretary to make whole the G Fund accounts. The court also determined that NAGE's claims of future harm were too speculative to establish standing, as they relied on a series of unlikely events, including a federal default, which has never occurred.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that NAGE lacked standing to pursue prospective relief because the anticipated future harms were speculative and not certainly impending. The court also found that NAGE's claims of past injuries were moot, as the Fiscal Responsibility Act had addressed the immediate concerns, and there was no reasonable expectation that the same harm would recur. The court rejected NAGE's arguments that the voluntary-cessation and capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exceptions to mootness applied, concluding that the legislative action was independent and not related to the litigation, and that the risk of future harm was not reasonably expected. View "National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. Yellen" on Justia Law

Tricia Jackson and Jennifer Krouse, members of the Jefferson County Commission, refused to attend Commission meetings in the fall of 2023, preventing the Commission from conducting business, including appointing a replacement commissioner and releasing a development bond. Their refusal to attend meetings was in protest of the appointment process for the vacant seat, which they believed was flawed. This led to a petition for their removal by Matthew Harvey, the Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney, under West Virginia Code § 6-6-7.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County, composed of three judges, found that Jackson and Krouse engaged in official misconduct and neglect of duty by willfully refusing to attend Commission meetings and fulfill their statutory duty to appoint a replacement commissioner. The court ordered their removal from office. Jackson and Krouse appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support their removal, that the court erred in drawing an adverse inference from their assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, and that the court erred in denying their motion to continue the removal hearing.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that sufficient evidence supported the finding of official misconduct and neglect of duty, as Jackson and Krouse willfully refused to attend meetings and fulfill their statutory duties. The court also held that the adverse inference drawn from their assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege was not preserved for appellate review. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to continue the removal hearing, as Jackson and Krouse had been aware of the potential for criminal charges since November 2023. View "Jackson v. Harvey" on Justia Law

Appellant A. Thomas Jones challenged the City of Atlanta's imposition of charges through two ordinances, arguing that these charges, levied on the Department of Watershed Management (DWM) customers, are unlawful taxes. The ordinances in question impose a franchise fee on DWM's gross revenue and a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) on DWM's real property, with the collected sums deposited into the City's General Fund. Jones contended that these charges exceed the costs they purportedly cover and are instead used to generate general revenue, violating various constitutional and statutory provisions.The trial court initially dismissed Jones's suit on procedural grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision in part. Upon remand, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Jones filed motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the City's motion and denied Jones's motions, leading to this appeal. Jones argued that the trial court erred in its application of the standard of review and in its conclusions regarding the nature of the charges.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to treat Jones's allegations as true, particularly his claims that he paid the disputed charges, that the revenue generated from these charges grossly exceeded the associated costs, and that these costs were covered by other transfers from DWM to the City's General Fund. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings.However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jones's motions for partial summary judgment. The Court concluded that Jones failed to demonstrate the absence of genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the charges were taxes or fees and whether the revenue generated exceeded the associated costs. The case was remanded for reconsideration of Jones's claims under the proper standard of review. View "Jones v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation. Despite the objection, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld the decision, finding the road adequate for the project.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, required JCCrandall’s consent under state law, and violated County standards for private roads. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court also found that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court concluded that the County’s reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b) was misplaced, as it defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Jason Lee, an American citizen of Chinese ancestry, was employed by the FBI and held a Top Secret security clearance. After failing three polygraph examinations, the FBI revoked his security clearance and subsequently terminated his employment, as his job required such clearance. Lee contended that the revocation was based on race, national origin, and protected speech, and he brought claims under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and Title VII.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Lee's claims. It held that his Title VII claims were not timely exhausted, that Title VII preempted his Fifth Amendment claims against the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that Lee lacked a cause of action to press constitutional claims for damages against individual DOJ officials. The court also denied Lee's motion for leave to amend his complaint to include additional claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), barred judicial review of Lee's statutory and constitutional claims. The court reasoned that the decision to grant or revoke a security clearance is a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch. The court also found that Lee's constitutional claims were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, as they involved national security matters committed to the political branches and lacked judicially manageable standards for resolution. View "Lee v. Garland" on Justia Law

Three practicing Muslim men alleged that federal agents asked them to serve as informants in Muslim communities. When they refused, the agents placed or retained them on the "No Fly List" and suggested they could be removed from the list if they agreed to work as informants. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), claiming that their religious beliefs precluded them from serving as informants and that the agents substantially burdened their exercise of religion by conditioning their removal from the No Fly List on actions that violated those beliefs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, concluding that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right not to be pressured to inform on members of one's religious community through the coercive or retaliatory use of the No Fly List.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in their position would not have understood that their conduct implicated the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not disclose their religious objections to the agents, and there were no facts plausibly supporting the conclusion that the agents knew the plaintiffs' objections were grounded in their religious beliefs. Therefore, the agents were entitled to qualified immunity from damages in their personal capacities. View "Tanvir v. Tanzin" on Justia Law

A man was unable to purchase a firearm because a background check revealed he was subject to a long-term domestic violence protective order (DVPO). He sued the State, claiming he was no longer subject to a protective order as defined by federal statute and sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment to have the Department of Public Safety (DPS) notify a national database that he was no longer subject to a protective order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He filed a motion for summary judgment, which the State opposed, filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted the State’s cross-motion, and the man appealed.The superior court found that the DVPO had not expired and remained a qualifying order under Section 922(g)(8). It also concluded that the man’s constitutional claims were not ripe because he had not initiated modification or dissolution of the order. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the State.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the DVPO remained in effect and was a qualifying order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The court found that the legislative history supported the interpretation that DVPOs issued under AS 18.66.100(c)(1) are effective until further order of the court. The court also concluded that the man’s remaining claims were not ripe for adjudication because he had not attempted to dissolve or modify the DVPO. View "Eng v. State" on Justia Law