Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1973, Fred Krug committed murder and other violent crimes while on parole, leading to his conviction and a life sentence plus additional consecutive terms. Over the years, Krug accumulated numerous disciplinary infractions in prison but had maintained a largely clean record since 2003, aside from a single incident in 2017. He was denied parole in 1994, 1995, 2012, and 2016. In 2022, at age 75, Krug became eligible for parole again. A two-member panel of the New Jersey State Parole Board denied his application in 2023, citing both old and new information, including his criminal history and institutional behavior, and set his next eligibility for thirty-six months later.Krug appealed the denial to the full Parole Board, arguing that the panel violated the 1979 Parole Act by failing to present new evidence since his last denial, as that Act required only “new information” to be considered at subsequent hearings. The full Board affirmed the denial, explaining that a 1997 amendment had removed the new-information limitation, allowing consideration of the entire record at each hearing. Krug then appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, which upheld the Board’s decision, relying on its earlier ruling in Trantino v. State Parole Board (Trantino V) that the 1997 amendment was a procedural change and did not violate ex post facto protections.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that constitutional ex post facto prohibitions bar only punishment beyond what was contemplated at the time the crime was committed. Since the law in effect when Krug committed his offenses (the Parole Act of 1948) permitted the Board to consider all available information, the retroactive application of the 1997 amendment did not increase his punishment. The Court therefore rejected Krug’s ex post facto challenge and affirmed the lower court’s judgment as modified. View "Krug v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

A former Massachusetts State Police trooper retired in March 2018 after a 21-year career. While assigned to overtime patrol programs funded by federal grants, he falsely reported working over 700 overtime hours in 2015 and 2016, receiving more than $50,000 in unearned pay. He attempted to conceal his conduct by submitting falsified motor vehicle citations. In July 2018, he pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of embezzlement from an agency receiving federal funds, was sentenced to three months in prison, one year of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution.Following his conviction, the State Board of Retirement suspended his pension and held a hearing. The hearing officer recommended, and the board adopted, a finding that under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), the plaintiff and his beneficiaries were not entitled to any retirement benefits due to his conviction for an offense involving violation of laws applicable to his office. The board ordered the return of his accumulated contributions, less certain deductions. The plaintiff sought judicial review in the Massachusetts District Court, raising constitutional challenges under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, arguing the forfeiture was an excessive fine and cruel or unusual punishment. The District Court judge entered judgment for the retirement board.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the pension forfeiture constituted a fine under Article 26 but was not excessive, adopting the United States Supreme Court’s multifactor analysis for excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that, even assuming Article 26’s cruel or unusual punishment provision applied to fines, the forfeiture was not cruel or unusual. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment and the retirement board’s decision. View "Raftery v. State Board of Retirement" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company challenged the federal government’s implementation of a new program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which authorizes the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to negotiate prices for certain high-expenditure prescription drugs under Medicare. The company’s drug was selected for the program, and it signed an agreement to participate “under protest” while filing suit. The company alleged that the program violated its constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, and that CMS failed to follow required notice-and-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when issuing the standard agreement for participation.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment to the government on all claims. The district court found that participation in the program was voluntary, so there was no unlawful deprivation of rights. It also held that the program did not impose unconstitutional conditions on participation in Medicare and Medicaid, and that the Inflation Reduction Act expressly allowed CMS to implement the program for its first three years without notice-and-comment rulemaking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that, under its precedent in Garelick v. Sullivan, participation in the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program is voluntary, and thus the program does not effect a taking, deprive the company of property without due process, or compel speech in violation of the First Amendment. The court further held that the program does not impose unconstitutional conditions because it is designed to control Medicare spending and does not regulate the company’s private market conduct. Finally, the court concluded that the Inflation Reduction Act expressly exempted CMS from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement for the program’s initial years. View "Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc. v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs." on Justia Law

A group of individuals and organizations challenged a longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), codified as Rule 202.5(e), which requires defendants in civil enforcement actions to agree not to publicly deny the allegations against them as a condition of settlement. This “no-deny” provision has been in place since 1972 and is incorporated into settlement agreements, with the SEC’s remedy for a breach being the ability to ask the court to reopen the case. The petitioners argued that this rule violates the First Amendment and was improperly adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).Previously, the New Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA) petitioned the SEC to amend Rule 202.5(e) to remove the no-deny requirement, citing constitutional concerns. The SEC denied the petition, explaining that defendants can voluntarily waive constitutional rights in settlements and that the rule preserves the agency’s ability to litigate if a defendant later denies the allegations. After the denial, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, asserting both First Amendment and APA violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s denial. Applying the Supreme Court’s framework from Town of Newton v. Rumery, the court held that voluntary waivers of constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, are generally permissible if knowing and voluntary. The court concluded that Rule 202.5(e) is not facially invalid under the First Amendment, as it is a limited restriction tied to the settlement context and does not preclude all speech. The court also found that the SEC had statutory authority for the rule, was not required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking, and provided a rational explanation for its decision. The petition for review was denied, but the court left open the possibility of future as-applied challenges. View "POWELL V. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted legislation to provide financial assistance to small businesses, including relief payments on certain small business loans. PACEM Solutions International, LLC applied for a $5 million loan under the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 7(a) loan program. Due to repeated missed payments, PACEM and its lender, Atlantic Union Bank, modified the loan multiple times. When the CARES Act was passed, PACEM's loan was not in "regular servicing status," a requirement for receiving relief payments under the Act. The SBA determined that PACEM's loan was ineligible for relief payments and requested the return of previously disbursed funds.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the SBA. The court found that the SBA did not violate the CARES Act, as PACEM's loan was not performing appropriately and was in default. The court also concluded that the SBA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its decision to withhold payments and that any notification defects were harmless.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the SBA acted reasonably in determining that PACEM's loan was ineligible for relief payments under the CARES Act. The court found that the SBA provided a satisfactory explanation for its actions and did not violate the terms of the CARES Act. The court also declined to address PACEM's constitutional claim regarding the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as PACEM sought only a declaratory judgment without requesting a hearing before the SBA. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the SBA. View "PACEM Solutions International, LLC v. U. S. Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

The case involves an executive order issued by President Trump, which excluded over 40 federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining requirements, citing national security concerns. The plaintiffs, six unions representing federal employees, argued that the executive order constituted First Amendment retaliation, was ultra vires, violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process, abrogated contractual property rights, and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment.The Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction against the executive order, focusing on the First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court found that the plaintiffs had raised serious questions about whether the order was retaliatory, citing statements from a White House Fact Sheet that criticized federal unions. The court concluded that the balance of hardships and public interest favored the plaintiffs, as the order threatened union operations and collective bargaining rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government's request for an emergency stay of the district court's preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit granted the stay, finding that the government was likely to succeed on the merits of the retaliation claim. The court concluded that the executive order and the accompanying Fact Sheet demonstrated a focus on national security, and that the President would have issued the order regardless of the plaintiffs' protected conduct. The court also found that the government would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, as the injunction impeded the government's ability to manage national security-related functions. The court determined that the public interest favored granting the stay to preserve the President's authority in national security matters. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding a rule requiring broadcasters to disclose if any programming was paid for by a foreign governmental entity. The FCC's 2021 Rule mandated such disclosures and included specific diligence steps for broadcasters to follow. NAB challenged the rule, leading to a court decision that vacated part of the rule requiring broadcasters to search federal databases.The FCC then issued a revised rule in 2024, which retained the core disclosure requirements but modified the diligence steps. The new rule exempted commercial ads and political candidate ads from the disclosure requirement but included paid public service announcements (PSAs) and issue advertisements. NAB challenged the 2024 Rule, arguing it violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the First Amendment, and exceeded the FCC's statutory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2024 Rule complied with the APA's notice-and-comment requirements and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the rule did not violate the First Amendment, as it was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest in preventing foreign influence in U.S. broadcasting. The court further determined that the FCC did not exceed its statutory authority with the reasonable diligence requirements, as the rule did not directly regulate lessees but required broadcasters to seek information from them.Ultimately, the court denied NAB's petition for review, upholding the FCC's 2024 Rule. View "National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implementing a cap-and-trade program to reduce hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) as mandated by the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act of 2020. The AIM Act requires an 85% reduction in HFC production and consumption by 2036. The EPA issued a rule in 2021 to allocate allowances for 2022 and 2023 based on historical market share data from 2011 to 2019. In 2023, the EPA issued a new rule for 2024-2028, again using the same historical data.The petitioners, RMS of Georgia, LLC (Choice) and IGas Holdings, Inc. (IGas), challenged the 2024 Rule. Choice argued that the AIM Act violated the nondelegation doctrine by giving the EPA too much discretion in allocating allowances. IGas contended that the EPA's exclusion of 2020 data from its market-share calculations was arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed Choice's argument, holding that the AIM Act did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power because it provided sufficient guidance to the EPA, modeled on previous cap-and-trade programs under the Clean Air Act. The court found that Congress intended for the EPA to allocate allowances based on historical market share, providing an intelligible principle to guide the agency's discretion.Regarding IGas's challenge, the court found that the EPA's decision to exclude 2020 data was reasonable. The EPA determined that 2020 data was unrepresentative due to the COVID-19 pandemic and supply chain disruptions and that including it could disrupt the market. The court held that the EPA's methodology was not arbitrary and capricious, as the agency provided a rational explanation for its decision.The court denied both petitions for review, upholding the EPA's 2024 Rule. View "IGas Holdings, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Deckard, an inmate at the Nebraska State Penitentiary, filed a mandamus action against the Nebraska Board of Parole, alleging that the Board had a clear ministerial duty under the 1971 statutes to provide him with a parole discharge date. Deckard was convicted in 1974 of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, with an additional 10-year sentence for escape, to be served concurrently. He was initially released on parole after 12½ years but had his parole revoked in 1995 and again in 2022. Deckard argued that under the statutes and Board practices in effect at the time of his conviction, he should have been discharged from parole after 2 to 3 years of good behavior.The district court for Lancaster County denied Deckard’s petition, finding that the Board had no clear ministerial duty to determine a parole discharge date for an inmate serving a life sentence. The court noted that the 1971 statutes provided the Board with discretion regarding parole discharge and that the 2018 statutory amendments, which introduced a mathematical formula for determining parole discharge, did not apply to life sentences as they are indefinite and cannot be quantified in numerical terms.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that neither the 1971 nor the 2018 statutes created an absolute ministerial duty for the Board to set a mandatory parole discharge date for Deckard. The court also rejected Deckard’s ex post facto argument, concluding that the 2018 amendments did not increase his punishment or affect his parole eligibility. The court emphasized that there is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence and that Deckard’s life sentence precludes a mandatory parole discharge date. View "Deckard v. Cotton" on Justia Law

Seth Hettena, an investigative journalist, submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for a report on the death of an Iraqi national, Manadel al-Jamadi, who died in CIA custody at Abu Ghraib prison in 2003. The CIA disclosed parts of the report but redacted most of it, including the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) conclusions and recommendations. Hettena sued the CIA, arguing that the redactions did not comply with FOIA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA, concluding that the redactions were justified under FOIA exemptions. The court found that the redacted information pertained to the CIA's intelligence activities, sources, and methods, which are protected under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court agreed that most of the redactions were justified, as they contained information about CIA covert personnel, intelligence methods, and locations of Agency facilities. However, the court found that the CIA had not adequately justified the redactions related to the OIG's findings on potential obstruction by CIA officers. The court noted that the CIA's declaration and Vaughn index did not address these findings, and it was unclear why disclosing them would reveal protected information.The appellate court also found that factual questions remained regarding whether the redactions contained information that the CIA had already officially acknowledged, such as references to a "hood" or "head cover." The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the CIA another opportunity to explain its redactions and potentially develop the record further. View "Hettena v. CIA" on Justia Law