Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire (ACLU) and the Concord Monitor, appealed a superior court order which ruled that portions of a contract between an equipment vendor and defendant City of Concord, for the purchase of “covert communications equipment,” were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. Plaintiffs argued the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that redacted portions of the contract were exempt from disclosure, and that the trial court erred when it held an ex parte in camera hearing, during which the City presented evidence supporting exemption. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err when it conducted the hearing, and that it properly determined that most of the redacted information was exempt from disclosure. However, the Court also concluded that it erred by not disclosing one provision of the agreement. That provision was ordered disclosed on remand. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire & a. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

In November 2021, the Secretary of Health and Human Services issued an interim rule that requires facilities that provide health care to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to ensure that their staff, unless exempt for medical or religious reasons, are fully vaccinated against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,555. Under the rule, covered staff must request an exemption or receive their first dose of a two-dose vaccine or a single-dose vaccine by December 6, 2021. Florida unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to bar the interim rule’s enforcement.The Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of the motion, first deciding not to apply the mootness doctrine and to exercise jurisdiction despite another district court’s issuance of a nationwide injunction. Florida failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits, that it will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction, or that the balance of the equities favors an injunction. The Secretary has express statutory authority to require facilities voluntarily participating in the Medicare or Medicaid programs to meet health and safety standards to protect patients. The Secretary provided a detailed explanation for why there was good cause for dispensing with the notice-and-comment requirement. Ample evidence supports the Secretary’s determination that facility staff vaccination will provide important protection for patients. View "State of Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the Texas Attorney General a stay pending appeal of the permanent injunction that bars him from enforcing Texas Governor Greg Abbott's Executive Order GA-38, which prohibits local governmental entities from imposing mask mandates.After determining that plaintiffs have likely failed to demonstrate standing, the court concluded that the Attorney General has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits as a matter of law. In this case, the district court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims where plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Furthermore, even if a failure to exhaust remedies does not bar plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs likely failed to make out a prima facie case under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. The court explained that, given the availability of vaccines, voluntary masking, and other possible accommodations, the record before the court likely does not support the conclusion that a mask mandate would be both necessary and obvious under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. The court also held that it was likely erroneous for the district court to hold that GA-38 was preempted by either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. To the extent that it is even properly before the court, the court did not read the American Rescue Plan Act to preempt GA-38's prohibition of local mask mandates, as the district court did. The court further concluded that, assuming plaintiffs' claims are otherwise viable, at a minimum, the district court's blanket injunction prohibiting the enforcement of GA-38 in all public schools across the State of Texas is overbroad. Finally, the court concluded that the Attorney General has demonstrated the prospect of irreparable injury absent a stay; has shown that maintaining the status quo ante pending appeal will not risk substantial injury to plaintiffs; and that the public interest favors a stay. View "E.T. v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Appellants John Tos et al. (Tos parties) appealed a trial court's a judgment that section 2704.78 of the Safe, Reliable High-Speed Train Bond Act for the 21st Century (Bond Act) (Sts. & Hy. Code, section 2704 et seq.) did not violate the state debt provision of the California Constitution set forth in article XVI, section 1. Subdivision (d) of section 2704.08 of the Bond Act, approved by the voters in 2008 as Proposition 1A, required an independent financial report indicating, among other things, that each corridor or segment of a corridor of the high-speed train system, if completed according to a “detailed funding plan,” would be “suitable and ready for high-speed train operation.” The Tos parties contended the meaning of “suitable and ready for high-speed train operation” set forth in section 2704.78 (a), constituted an implied partial repeal of the Bond Act in violation of section 1 of article XVI of the California Constitution. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "The 'single object or work' of the Bond Act was (1) the initial planning and construction of a high-speed train system under (2) a 'mandatory multistep process to ensure the financial viability of the project,' which we described in California High- Speed Rail Authority v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 676 (Rail Authority). ... The multistep planning and review process in section 2704.08, subdivision (d), remained intact." The judgment was thus, affirmed. View "Tos, et al. v. California" on Justia Law

Verisign, Inc. claimed large net operating loss deductions on its 2015 and 2016 Delaware income tax returns, which reduced its bill to zero in both years. The Division of Revenue reviewed the returns and found that Verisign’s use of net operating losses violated a longstanding, but non-statutory, Division policy. Under the policy, a corporate taxpayer that filed its federal tax returns with a consolidated group was prohibited from claiming a net operating loss deduction in Delaware that exceeded the consolidated net operating loss deduction on the federal return in which it participated. The Division applied the policy, determined that Verisign had underreported its income, and assessed the company $1.7 million in unpaid taxes and fees. After Verisign’s administrative protest of the assessment was denied, it appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court held that the policy violated the Uniformity Clause of Article VIII, section 1 of the Delaware Constitution. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that the Division’s policy was invalid, but it affirmed on alternate grounds: the policy exceeded the authority granted to the Division by the General Assembly in 30 Del. C. sections 1901– 1903. As a result, the Court declined to reach Verisign’s constitutional claims. View "Director of Revenue v. Verisign, Inc." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the Commonwealth Court’s holding that, to be held liable for damages under Pennsylvania’s inverse condemnation statute, an entity had to be "clothed with the power of eminent domain" to the property at issue. In 2009, Appellee, UGI Storage Company filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the “Commission” or “FERC”), seeking a certificate of public convenience and necessity to enable it to acquire and operate certain natural gas facilities. Appellee wished to acquire and operate underground natural gas storage facilities, which the company referred to as the Meeker storage field. Appellee also sought to include within the certificated facilities a 2,980-acre proposed "buffer zone." FERC ultimately granted the application for Appellee to acquire and assume the operation of the Meeker storage field, but denied Appellee’s request to certificate the buffer zone. Appellants petitioned for the appointment of a board of viewers to assess damages for an alleged de facto condemnation of their property, alleging that though their properties had been excluded by FERC from the certificated buffer zone, they interpreted Appellee’s response to the Commission’s order as signaling its intention to apply for additional certifications to obtain property rights relative to the entire buffer zone. The common pleas court initially found that a de facto taking had occurred and appointed a board of viewers to assess damages. Appellee lodged preliminary objections asserting Appellants’ petition was insufficient to support a de facto taking claim. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court: "we do not presently discern a constitutional requirement that a quasi-public entity alleged to have invoked governmental power to deprive landowners of the use and enjoyment of their property for a public purpose must be invested with a power of eminent domain in order to be held to account for a de facto condemnation. ... a public or quasi-public entity need not possess a property-specific power of eminent domain in order to implicate inverse condemnation principles." The case was remanded for the Commonwealth Court to address Appellants’ challenge to the common pleas court’s alternative disposition (based upon the landowners’ purported off-the-record waiver of any entitlement to an evidentiary hearing), which had been obviated by the intermediate court’s initial remand decision and that court’s ensuing affirmance of the re-dismissal of Appellants’ petitions. View "Albrecht, et al. v. UGI Storage Co. et al." on Justia Law

Teachers and school administrators challenge the denial of motions to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of an order issued by the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene mandating that individuals who work in New York City schools be vaccinated against the COVID-19 virus.The Second Circuit concluded that the Vaccine Mandate does not violate the First Amendment on its face. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs have established their entitlement to preliminary relief on the narrow ground that the procedures employed to assess their religious accommodation claims were likely constitutionally infirm as applied to them. The court explained that the Accommodation Standards as applied here were neither neutral nor generally applicable to plaintiffs, and thus the court applied a strict scrutiny analysis at this stage of the proceeding. The court concluded that these procedures cannot survive strict scrutiny because denying religious accommodations based on the criteria outlined in the Accommodation Standards, such as whether an applicant can produce a letter from a religious official, is not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's orders denying preliminary relief and concurred with and continued the interim relief granted by the motions panel as to these fifteen individual plaintiffs. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Kane v. De Blasio" on Justia Law

David Bronner, secretary-treasurer of the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), and individual members of the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), the remaining defendants in this action (collectively, "defendants"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs and members of a purported class, who were all active public-education employees and PEEHIP participants married to other active public-education employees and PEEHIP participants and who had dependent children. Before October 1, 2010, all public-education employees participating in PEEHIP earned a monthly "allocation" or benefit, which could be used to obtain certain coverage alternatives under PEEHIP. In May 2010, the PEEHIP Board voted to eliminate "the combining allocation program" and to phase in a new premium rate structure ("the 2010 policy"), which required a public-education employee married to another public-education employee to gradually begin paying the same monthly premiums for family hospital-medical coverage that other PEEHIP participants were required to pay. In May 2014, the original named plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, filed a purported class action against the defendants, among others, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. In their complaint, the original named plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the 2010 policy was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because, they claimed, the 2010 policy denied them and the members of the purported class a benefit for the payment of insurance accorded every other PEEHIP participant. The original named plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the defendants from denying them and the members of the purported class the use of that benefit, which, they claimed, would permit them and the members of the purported class to obtain family coverage at no cost. The defendants thereafter moved for a summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding nothing to indicate that the defendants intended to single out the public-education plaintiffs for disparate treatment under the 2010 policy. Accordingly, the Court concluded the 2010 policy was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and that it did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "Bronner, et al. v. Barlow et al." on Justia Law

In 1992, Michigan voters, wanting to amend Michigan’s Constitution to establish term limits for state legislators, state executives, and members of Congress, got a petition on the ballot; 58.8% of voters approved the measure. Term limits became part of the Michigan Constitution (six years in Michigan’s House of Representatives; eight years in the Michigan Senate). Some voters sued, arguing that the term limits violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit upheld the term limits. About 20 years later, a bipartisan group of veteran legislators challenged the term-limit provision, making many of the same ballot-access and freedom-of-association claims, and citing two procedural provisions of the Michigan Constitution.The district court granted Michigan summary judgment. After determining that it had jurisdiction because the legislators raise claims under the Federal Constitution, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent bars their claims as voters. Voters have no fundamental right to “vote for a specific candidate or even a particular class of candidates.” As candidates, the legislators hold no greater protection than the voters they wish to represent. Candidates do not have a fundamental right to run for office. Michigan has several legitimate government interests in enacting term limits, including its sovereign interest in structuring its government as it sees fit. View "Kowall v. Benson" on Justia Law

At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case centered on a determination of Appellant Manheim Township School District (“School District”) that one of its students, Appellee J.S., made terroristic threats to another student through social media – outside of the school day and off school property – substantially disrupting the school environment, and leading to his expulsion. The Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the School District denied J.S. due process during the expulsion process and to consider the proper standard by which to determine whether J.S. engaged in threatening speech unprotected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, or created a substantial disruption of the school environment. The Court determined J.S. did not engage in unprotected speech, and did not cause a substantial disruption to the school environment. Therefore, the Court concluded that the School District improperly expelled J.S., and affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "J.S., et al. v. Manheim Twp. SD" on Justia Law