Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Calvary Chapel challenges Nevada Governor Steve Sisolak's Directive 021, which prohibits certain gatherings because of the COVID-19 pandemic, as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Specifically, Calvary Chapel challenges section 11 of the Directive, which imposes a fifty-person cap on indoor in-person services at houses of worship.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the church's request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Directive against houses of worship. The panel held that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, --- S. Ct. ----, 2020 WL 6948354 (2020) (per curiam), arguably represented a seismic shift in Free Exercise law, and compels the result in this case. Similar to the pandemic-related restrictions in Roman Catholic Diocese, the panel explained that the Directive treats numerous secular activities and entities significantly better than religious worship services. The panel explained that the Directive, although not identical to New York's, requires attendance limitations that create the same "disparate treatment" of religion. Because disparate treatment of religion triggers strict scrutiny review, the panel reviewed the restrictions in the Directive under strict scrutiny. Exercising its discretion, the panel concluded that, although slowing the spread of COVID-19 is a compelling interest, the Directive is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest. In this case, the Directive—although less restrictive in some respects than the New York regulations reviewed in Roman Catholic Diocese—is not narrowly tailored because, for example, "maximum attendance at a religious service could be tied to the size of the [house of worship]."Therefore, Calvary Chapel has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its Free Exercise claim. Calvary Chapel has also established that the occupancy limitations contained in the Directive—if enforced—will cause irreparable harm, and that the issuance of an injunction is in the public interest. The panel reversed the district court, instructed the district court to employ strict scrutiny review to its analysis of the Directive, and preliminarily enjoined the State from imposing attendance limitations on in-person services in houses of worship that are less favorable than 25% of the fire-code capacity. View "Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak" on Justia Law

Delaware’s Constitution contains a political balance requirement for appointments to the state’s major courts. No more than a bare majority of judges on any of its five major courts “shall be of the same political party.” Art. IV, section 3. On three of those courts, those members not in the bare majority “shall be of the other major political party.” Adams, a Delaware lawyer and political independent, sued, claiming that those requirements violate his First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him ineligible to become a judge unless he joins a major political party.The Supreme Court held that because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he failed to show a “personal,” “concrete,” and “imminent” injury necessary for Article III standing. A grievance that amounts to nothing more than abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the proper application of the law is not an “injury in fact.” Adams must at least show that he is likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future if not barred because of political affiliation. Adams’ only supporting evidence is his statements that he wanted to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any of Delaware’s courts. The evidence fails to show that, when he filed suit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in the reasonably foreseeable future. Adams’ statements lack supporting evidence, like efforts to determine possible judicial openings or other preparations. Adams did not apply for numerous existing judicial vacancies while he was a registered Democrat. He then read a law review article arguing that Delaware’s judicial eligibility requirements unconstitutionally excluded independents, changed his political affiliation, and filed suit. View "Carney v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals living with HIV/AIDS who have employer-sponsored health plans, and who rely on those plans to obtain prescription drugs, filed suit alleging that CVS's program violates the anti-discrimination provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act); denies them benefits to which they are entitled under the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA); and violates California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit held that Section 1557 of the ACA does not create a healthcare-specific anti-discrimination standard that allowed plaintiffs to choose standards from a menu provided by other anti-discrimination statutes. Because plaintiffs claim discrimination on the basis of their disability, to state a claim for a Section 1557 violation, they must allege facts adequate to state a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Applying the section 504 framework, the panel concluded that plaintiffs adequately alleged that they were denied meaningful access to their prescription drug benefit under their employer-sponsored health plans because the program prevents them from receiving effective treatment for HIV/AIDS. Therefore, plaintiffs have stated a claim for disability discrimination under the ACA.However, plaintiffs have failed to establish a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, because they have not plausibly alleged that their benefit plan is a place of public accommodation. Finally, the panel upheld the district court's denial of plaintiffs' claims under ERISA and their cause of action under California's Unfair Competition Law. The panel affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

Eseos Igiebor, a citizen and native of Nigeria, entered the United States as a visitor in 1998. He became a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) in 2004. In 2014, he pleaded guilty to: (1) aggravated identity theft; and (2) conspiracy to commit wire fraud, mail fraud, and bank fraud. He was sentenced to ninety-six months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against Igiebor in 2018. Igiebor conceded removability, but sought deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He asserted that due to his status as a homosexual, he would be tortured if removed to Nigeria. An immigration judge (“IJ”) concluded Igiebor’s testimony was not credible and found Igiebor failed to show it was more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Nigeria. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) determined the IJ did not commit clear error in finding Igiebor not credible and, given that adverse credibility determination, the IJ correctly found Igiebor did not carry his burden of proving it was more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Nigeria. Igiebor petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review, challenging several aspects of the BIA’s decision. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Igiebor failed to identify any legal or factual error on the part of the BIA. Thus, the court denied Igiebor’s petition for review. View "Igiebor v. Barr" on Justia Law

El Paso County and BNHR, a community organization headquartered in El Paso, filed suit challenging the government's use of funds allocated for 10 U.S.C. 284 and 2808 purposes to construct a wall on the southern border. The district court enjoined defendants from using section 2808 funds to build the border wall but declined to enjoin defendants from using section 284 funds.The Fifth Circuit held that El Paso County and BNHR do not have standing to challenge either the section 2808 or section 284 expenditures. The court concluded that a county's loss of general tax revenues as an indirect result of federal policy is not a cognizable injury in fact. In this case, El Paso County only alleges a loss of general tax revenue, and thus has not established a cognizable injury in fact sufficient to establish standing to challenge the government's section 2808 expenditures. Even if El Paso County's alleged economic injury were cognizable, the county fails to demonstrate that the injury is redressable by a favorable decision in this case. The court explained that an order granting relief against the section 2808 expenditures would not rescind the proclamation and accordingly would not redress any harm caused by the proclamation. Therefore, the alleged reputational injuries do not provide El Paso County standing to challenge the section 2808 expenditures. Furthermore, BNHR failed to establish standing to challenge the government's section 2808 expenditures by establishing an injury in fact. In this case, BNHR's single vague, conclusory assertion that the organization had to divert resources is insufficient to establish that the section 2808 construction has "perceptibly impaired" the organization's ability to carry out its mission. Likewise, the court concluded that El Paso County and BNHR do not have standing to challenge the government's section 284 expenditures. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs; vacated the district court's injunction enjoining the section 2808 expenditures; and remanded for dismissal of all claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "El Paso County v. Trump" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the petition for judicial review filed by Silverwing Development challenging the fine imposed upon it by the Nevada State Contractors Board for improperly entering into contracts with contractors that exceeded the contractors' license limits in conjunction with Silverwing's condominium development projects, holding that the term "subdivision site" in Nev. Rev. Stat. 624.220(2) is not unconstitutionally vague.Section 624.220(2) requires the Board to impose a monetary license limit on the amount a contractor can bid on a project and calculates the limit with respect to "one or more construction contracts on a single construction site or subdivision site for a single client." In fining Silverwing, the hearing officer determined that the term "subdivision site" refers to the general location of a subdivision rather than a particular location within a subdivision. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Silverwing's petition for judicial review, holding that "subdivision site" in section 624.220(2) plainly refers to the general physical location of a subdivision and that the statute provides an adequate standard to preclude the Board from enforcing it discriminatorily. View "Silverwing Development v. Nevada State Contractors" on Justia Law

The Rye School District (District) appealed a New Hampshire State Board of Education (State Board) decision that overturned a Rye School Board (School Board) decision. The School Board denied C.B. and E.B.'s (Parents) request to reassign their child (Student) to a school in another district pursuant to RSA 193:3 (2018) (amended 2020). According to the testimony of Student’s mother (Mother), Student had a growth hormone deficiency that hindered her physical growth and caused Student to fall behind academically and socially. Due to Student’s small size, she was often picked up and carried by other pupils, and assaulted. Parents met with the Rye Elementary School principal, but a bullying report was not filed. The school responded to this incident and a subsequent incident by promising to keep Student and the other child apart. At the start of fifth grade, Mother first requested Student's reassignment, alleging the principal did not understand Student’s 504 plan and was not aware of Student’s attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and anxiety issues. Mother requested an Individual Education Program (IEP) meeting, but the school believed that such a meeting was not necessary because the 504 plan could meet Student’s needs. During that academic year, Student was again assaulted by a peer, had issues with anxiety, and was not gaining weight. Sometime before the end of the 2016-2017 school year, Parents decided to withdraw Student from Rye Elementary School and enroll her in an elementary school in a different town. According to Mother, the new school was following the 504 plan and Student no longer needed help with homework. Student’s anxiety decreased and she was gaining weight. In addition, according to Mother, there had been no bullying at Student’s new school. A School Board hearing officer concluded Parents “failed to demonstrate that attendance at the Rye School had a detrimental or negative effect on the Student” and that “[t]here was no basis for reassignment due to Manifest Educational Hardship,” but that was overturned by the State Board. After review of the State Board's record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the District failed to show the State Board's decision was "clearly unreasonable or unlawful," and affirmed its decision. View "Appeal of Rye School District" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit brought by the Attorney General against the Arizona Board of Regents challenging certain tuition policies, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action, holding that the Attorney General was not authorized to proceed with its first set of claims but that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss the latter challenge.The Attorney General alleged that the Board's tuition-setting policies violate Ariz. Const. art. XI, 6 and that subsidizing in-state tuition for students who are not lawfully present constitutes an unlawful expenditure of public funds. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the Attorney General lacked authority to bring it. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's decision, holding (1) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-212 did not provide a basis for counts I-V, and therefore, the trial court properly dismissed those claims for lack of authority on the part of the Attorney General to prosecute them; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing count VI because the Attorney General was entitled to prove that, in providing in-state tuition on behalf of students were not not lawfully present, the Board illegally expended funds beyond the amount of tuition collected. View "State ex rel. Brnovich v. Arizona Board of Regents" on Justia Law

E-cigarette manufacturers and retailers, as well as a nonprofit organization, challenged the FDA's Deeming Rule, which deemed e-cigarettes to be "tobacco products" subject to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act's requirements, under the Appointments Clause and the First Amendment of the Constitution.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FDA and held that appellants' Appointments Clause challenge lacks merit and their First Amendment challenge is foreclosed. In this case, even assuming for purposes of argument, that Associate Commissioner for Policy Kux's issuance of the Deeming Rule violated the Appointments Clause and that FDA Commissioner Califf's general ratification of prior actions by the FDA as part of an agency reorganization was invalid, FDA Commissioner Gottlieb's ratification cured any Appointments Clause defect. Furthermore, appellants' challenge to the Act's preclearance pathway for modified risk tobacco products as violative of the First Amendment is foreclosed by Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 944 F.3d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In Nicopure Labs, the court found unpersuasive the objection that appellants make now, namely that the Deeming Rule violates the First Amendment because it places the burden on manufacturers to show that certain of their marketing claims are truthful and not misleading before they make them. View "Moose Jooce v. Food & Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Clerk of Erie County, filed suit alleging that he could be prosecuted under federal immigration law for performing certain duties under New York's Driver's License Access and Privacy Act (the "Green Light Law"), which establishes certain policies and procedures related to standard licenses. The Green Light Law directs the New York State DMV to accept various foreign documents as proof of identification and age for standard licenses, and prohibits DMV from inquiring about the immigration status of standard-license applicants; restricts DMV’s retention and use of certain applicant information; and requires that within three days of receiving a request for information or records from federal immigration authorities, DMV provide written notification to the subject of the request and inform the person of the identity of the requesting agency. New York law designates certain county clerks as agents of the DMV Commissioner and assigns them discrete functions in that regard. Plaintiff challenges the licensing, nondisclosure, and notification provisions of the Green Light Law.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit based on lack of Article III standing, holding that compliance with the state law would not expose plaintiff to a credible threat of prosecution under federal law. The court explained that the REAL ID Act permits states to issue noncompliant licenses provided that they meet certain requirements, which do not include the verification of lawful status. Furthermore, 6 C.F.R. 16 37.71(a), promulgated by DHS, permits states that issue REAL ID Act-compliant licenses also to issue licenses "that are not acceptable by Federal agencies for official purposes," provided they meet certain requirements. The court concluded that the theory that issuing standard licenses constitutes criminal harboring is directly at odds with federal law that expressly permits the issuance of such licenses, and thus plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the licensing provisions of the Green Light Law. The court also concluded that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the nondisclosure and notification provisions of the Green Light Law. Finally, the court concluded that the threat that plaintiff will be removed from office is speculative. For largely the same reasons that he lacks standing in his individual capacity, plaintiff lacks standing in his official capacity. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Kearns v. Cuomo" on Justia Law