Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Construction Law
State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship
At issue in this case was the State Center Project, a $1.5 billion redevelopment project intended to revitalize property owned by the State in Baltimore. In 2005, the State issued a public request for qualifications to solicit a master developer for the project. The State Center, LLC was chosen as the master developer. The Maryland Department of General Services (“DGS”), the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) and the State Center, LLC negotiated for the Project, entering a series of agreements between 2007 and 2010 to complete the Project in a timely manner. In 2010, Plaintiffs, property owners in downtown Baltimore and taxpayers, filed suit against the DGS, MDOT, and the State Center and its subsidiaries, seeking a declaratory judgment that the formative contracts for the Project were void and seeking an injunction to halt the Project. The trial court voided the formative contracts, concluding that they violated the State Procurement Law. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches due to an unreasonable delay in bringing their claims, causing prejudice to the defendants. View "State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law
White v. Valley County
A certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho was presented to the Idaho Supreme Court. Karen White and her development company, Elkhorn, LLC, sought to recover $166,496 paid to Valley County for "capital investments for roads in the vicinity of [their] White Cloud development." Phase I of White Cloud was completed and it was undisputed by the parties that the tax monies paid for Phase I were used by the County to complete capital investments for roads in the vicinity of the White Cloud development. The County conceded that it did not adopt an impact fee ordinance or administrative procedures for the impact fee process as required by the Idaho Development Impact Fees Act (IDIFA). The County also conceded it did not enact an IDIFA-compliant ordinance, because, at the time, the County believed in good faith that none was required. Plaintiff filed suit against the County claiming that the road development fee imposed by the County as a condition for approval of the White Cloud project violated Idaho state law and deprived Plaintiff of due process under both the federal and Idaho constitutions. In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff raised two claims for relief. The first claim for relief alleged that “Valley County’s practice of requiring developers to enter into a Road Development Agreement ("RDA," or any similar written agreement) solely for the purpose of forcing developers to pay money for its proportionate share of road improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by their development is a disguised impact fee, is illegal and therefore should be enjoined." The first claim for relief also alleged that, because the County failed to enact an impact fee ordinance under IDIFA, the imposition of the road development fees constituted an unauthorized tax. Plaintiff’s second claim for relief alleged that the County’s imposition of the road development fee constituted a taking under the federal and Idaho constitutions. The County argued Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to pay the RDA monies. Plaintiff denies that the payment was voluntary since it was required to obtain the final plat approval. The issue the federal district court presented to the Idaho Supreme Court centered on when the limitations period commences for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax. The Court answered that the limitations period for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax commences upon payment of the tax.
View "White v. Valley County" on Justia Law
Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo
In 1999, Redondo Construction Corporation pled guilty to aiding and abetting the making of false statements during its work on a federal highway project. The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) and the Puerto Rico Public Guildings Authority (“PBA”) subsequently revoked the bids it had awarded Redondo before the plea and suspended Redondo from bidding on new contracts. Redondo challenged both decisions, which resulted in settlement agreements with both agencies allowing Redondo to resume bidding for contracts. After Puerto Rico passed Law 458, which prohibited Puerto Rico agencies from awarding contracts corporations convicted of offenses involving public funds, the PBA cancelled several of Redondo’s bids and the contract it had executed with Redondo, and the PRHTA withdrew from its settlement with Redondo. Redondo sued PRHTA, PBA, and several officials at both agencies, alleging that Defendants were in breach of the settlement agreements, that this caused Redondo’s bankruptcy, and that Defendants were liable in damages. The district court granted the PRHTA’s and the individual defendants’ motions for summary judgment and sua sponte dismissed Redondo’s claims against the PBA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the entry of summary judgment as to the PRHTA and the individual defendants, as Redondo had no record of evidence of damages against these defendants; but (2) vacated the dismissal of the claim against the PBA, as the court did not meet the necessary conditions for entering judgment sua sponte. View "Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo" on Justia Law
Bartlow v. Costigan
The Illinois Department of Labor sent Jack’s Roofing a notice of investigation of possible violation of the Employee Classification Act, 820 ILCS 185/3.25 by misclassifying employees as independent contractors. Jack’s provided the Department with requested information. Preliminary determination found misclassification of 10 individuals for eight to 160 days and calculated a potential penalty of $1,683,000. The Department requested a response within 30 days for consideration before final determination. Less than a month later, the Department sent notice of a second investigation Jack's sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional as violating: the special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution because it subjects the construction industry to more stringent employment standards than other industries; the due process clauses of the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions because it does not provide an opportunity to be heard and is impermissibly vague; the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against bills of attainder because it is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial; and the equal protection clauses of both constitutions because no other industry is subjected to the same standards when seeking to hire independent contractors. On remand, the court denied relief, finding the Act valid and enforceable. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part, rejecting facial constitutional challenges. A procedural due process challenge to enforcement provisions has been rendered moot by the recent amendments to the Act, which must be applied to plaintiffs in the future. The court also affirmed that section 10 of the Act is not unconstitutionally vague. Remaining constitutional challenges to the Act were forfeited. View "Bartlow v. Costigan" on Justia Law
Morris v. Pavarini Constr.
Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants, the construction manager and owner of a building at a construction site, after a large, flat object fell and injured his hand. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, a violation of N.Y. Lab. Law 241(6). Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, arguing the form that injured Plaintiff’s hand was not subject to the safety requirements of Industrial Code N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a). The Court of Appeals remitted the matter for further proceedings for a hearing on whether the object as issue was a “form” within the meaning of the Industrial Code. After a hearing, Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, concluding that the form at issue did not come within the coverage of the regulation or section 241(6). The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and concluded that the Appellate Division’s order should be affirmed, holding that the language of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a) could sensibly be applied to the form that fell on Plaintiff’s hand. View "Morris v. Pavarini Constr." on Justia Law
Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. v. United States
In 2001 KBR agreed to provide the Army with logistics support services during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Individual task orders required KBR to install, operate and maintain dining services near Mosul, Iraq on a cost-plus-award-fee basis. KBR selected ABC, a subcontractor, to build a prefabricated metal dining facility and to provide dining services for a camp population of 2,573. In June 2004, the Army ordered KBR to stop construction of the metal facility and begin construction of a reinforced concrete facility for an estimated 2,573 to 6,200+ persons. Instead of requesting bids for the new work, KBR kept ABC as the subcontractor due to the urgency of the request. ABC submitted a new proposal with a total monthly cost about triple the monthly cost initially quoted. ABC attributed the increased costs to additional labor and equipment to serve a larger population and to a drastic increase in the cost of labor and a severe shortage of staff willing to work in Iraq. Due to a calculation error, it was determined that ABC’s proposal was reasonable. KBR’s management reviewed and approved a change order, embodying ABC’s proposal. In 2005 the subcontract ended and title to the dining facility passed to the Army. In 2007, the Defense Contract Auditing Agency suspended payment of certain costs paid by KBR to ABC pursuant to the change order. KBR prepared a new price justification for the concrete dining facility and ultimately filed suit, seeking recovery of the $12,529,504 in costs disapproved for reimbursement. The Claims Court awarded $6,779,762. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. v. United States" on Justia Law
Hughes Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Utah Labor Comm’n
The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Division (UOSH) cited and fined Hughes General Contractors, which oversaw a construction project involving over 100 subcontractors, for a subcontractor’s violation on the project. In determining that Hughes was responsible for safety conditions for the subcontractor’s employees, the UOSH invoked the multi-employer worksite doctrine, which makes a general contractor responsible for the occupational safety of all workers on a worksite, including those who are not the contractor’s employees. Both an administrative law judge and the Labor Commission’s Appeals Board upheld the citation and the multi-employer worksite doctrine, which federal OSHA regulations have adopted and federal courts have upheld. The Supreme Court reversed the citation and penalty, holding (1) the multi-employer worksite doctrine is incompatible with the governing Utah statute, Utah Code 34A-6-201(1; (2) the responsibility for ensuring occupational safety under the governing statute is limited to an employer’s responsibility to its employees; and (3) because Hughes was not an employer of the workers in question in this case, Hughes was improperly cited and sanctioned. View "Hughes Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Utah Labor Comm'n" on Justia Law
Stringer v. Robinson
Defendant-Respondent Russell Griffeth, a licensed physical therapist, operated a clinic in Idaho Falls. He received no training as a contractor and was never licensed as a contractor. He did, however, act as a general contractor in the construction of his two homes. He organized and supervised various subcontractors. In early 2009, Griffeth decided to remodel his physical therapy clinic by constructing an addition to the existing building. Griffeth intended to be the general contractor for the project, but the city required a licensed commercial contractor. Consequently, Griffeth hired Bryan Robinson, a friend with construction experience, to serve as the general contractor. Robinson obtained a commercial contractor license for the project. Near the end of the project, Robinson hired Claimant Geff Stringer as a carpenter. As the clinic project neared completion, the construction workers used a hoist attached to the roof to move heavy beams into position in the attic. Unfortunately, on or near the last day of the project, the ceiling collapsed, and a beam fell on Stringer. The impact from the beam fractured Stringer's left ankle. At the time of the accident, Robinson did not have worker's compensation coverage. Stringer filed worker's compensation complaints against both Robinson and Griffeth. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Commission held that Robinson was Stringer's direct employer and that Griffeth was his category one statutory employer. Because Robinson did not pay worker's compensation benefits to Stringer, Griffeth, as the statutory employer, normally would be liable for such benefits. However, the Commission held that Griffeth was exempt from worker's compensation liability because Stringer's employment with Griffeth was "casual" under I.C. 72-212(2). Stringer appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Stringer v. Robinson" on Justia Law
North Pacific Erectors, Inc v. Alaska
The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court concerned a contract dispute between Appellant North Pacific Erectors, Inc. and the Alaska Department of Administration. North Pacific and the Department contracted for a renovation and asbestos removal project in a State office building. After work began, North Pacific requested additional payment for the asbestos removal, claiming there was a differing site condition that made the project more labor-intensive than it had expected. The Department denied the differing site condition claim, and North Pacific filed an administrative appeal. A hearing officer recommended that North Pacific was entitled to additional compensation. But the hearing officer's recommendation was rejected, and a final agency decision was issued denying North Pacific's claim for additional compensation. North Pacific challenged the agency decision in superior court, arguing that the agency decision was procedurally flawed and incorrectly resolved the contract issues. The superior court affirmed the agency decision. North Pacific appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that even if North Pacific could prevail on its differing site condition claim or its procedural claims, its failure to comply with express provisions of the contract would have barred recovery. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision affirming the agency decision. View "North Pacific Erectors, Inc v. Alaska" on Justia Law
MI Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Snyder
Project labor agreements (PLAs) are used in the construction industry to set common conditions of employment for large projects involving multiple subcontractors and unions. On a public construction project, a PLA can be entered into by the governmental unit paying for the project or by its general contractor; the other party is a labor organization. If the governmental unit enters into a PLA, all contractors bidding on the project must agree to abide by it. Opponents argue that PLAs discourage nonunion contractors from bidding on government contracts and increase construction costs. Proponents, such as the trades councils, claim that PLAs enhance job-site cooperation and reduce labor disputes. The federal government has gone back and forth on allowing PLAs. Michigan passed the first version of the Fair and Open Competition in Governmental Construction Act in 2011, restricting the use of PLAs on publicly funded projects. Following entry of an injunction, that version was superseded by an amended act, passed in 2012. The district court enjoined the current version as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the act furthers Michigan’s proprietary goal of improving efficiency in public construction projects, and is no broader than necessary to meet those goals. View "MI Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Snyder" on Justia Law