Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves trade associations representing manufacturers of children's products challenging Oregon's Toxic-Free Kids Act (TFKA) and its implementing regulations. The TFKA requires the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) to maintain a list of high priority chemicals of concern for children's health and imposes reporting and removal requirements for these chemicals. The trade associations argued that these state requirements are preempted by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) and the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).The United States District Court for the District of Oregon partially dismissed the trade associations' claims and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court concluded that the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had not exercised independent judgment or expertise to trigger the express preemption provisions of the FHSA or CPSA for all 73 chemicals listed by the OHA. Therefore, the trade associations' facial challenges failed because they could not show that the Oregon statute and its regulations were invalid in all their applications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the FHSA and CPSA did not expressly preempt the TFKA and its regulations because the CPSC had not promulgated regulations for all the chemicals at issue. The court also found that the CPSA did not impliedly preempt the TFKA through principles of conflict preemption. The court concluded that the state law did not interfere with the federal regulatory scheme and upheld the district court's judgment. The decision was affirmed. View "AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION, INC. V. BADEN" on Justia Law

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) brought an action against Townstone Financial, Inc. and its CEO, Barry Sturner, alleging that they discouraged black prospective applicants from applying for mortgage loans, violating Regulation B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). The CFPB cited several statements made by Townstone on their radio show that it claimed would discourage black applicants. These statements included derogatory comments about predominantly black areas and other racially insensitive remarks. The CFPB also provided statistical evidence showing that Townstone received fewer mortgage applications from black applicants compared to its peers.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Townstone's motion to dismiss. The court held that the ECOA does not authorize liability for discouraging prospective applicants, focusing on the ECOA’s definition of "applicant" as someone who has applied for credit. The court concluded that the ECOA’s protections do not extend to prospective applicants who have not yet applied for credit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ECOA, when read as a whole, does authorize the imposition of liability for discouraging prospective applicants. The court found that the ECOA’s broad purpose of preventing discrimination in credit transactions includes actions taken before an application is submitted. The court also noted that the ECOA’s text and legislative history support the interpretation that discouraging prospective applicants is prohibited. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Townstone Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., Smith & Wesson Sales Company, and Smith & Wesson Inc. (collectively, “Smith & Wesson”) and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs. The New Jersey Attorney General issued a subpoena to Smith & Wesson under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, seeking documents related to the company's advertising practices. Smith & Wesson filed a federal lawsuit to enjoin enforcement of the subpoena, alleging it violated various constitutional provisions. The New Jersey Attorney General then filed a subpoena enforcement action in state court. The state court rejected Smith & Wesson’s objections and ordered the company to comply with the subpoena.The state court proceedings concluded before the federal case, with the state court ordering Smith & Wesson to comply with the subpoena. The federal court then dismissed Smith & Wesson’s civil rights action on claim preclusion grounds, giving preclusive effect to the state court’s order. The state appellate court later affirmed the state court judgment. Smith & Wesson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that the District Court should not have given preclusive effect to the state court order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The court found that all elements of New Jersey’s claim preclusion test were satisfied. The court also rejected Smith & Wesson’s argument that it had reserved its right to litigate in federal court, finding that such reservation was unavailable in this case. The court emphasized that litigants get one opportunity to make their arguments, not two, and they cannot file a federal lawsuit to hedge against a potentially unfavorable state ruling. View "Smith & Wesson Brands Inc. v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey" on Justia Law

A group of business associations, including the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB). The plaintiffs challenged a new Final Rule issued by the CFPB regarding credit card late fees and sought a preliminary injunction against the rule. The plaintiffs requested expedited briefing and review due to the imminent effect of the rule and the substantial compliance it required.The district court, instead of ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, considered whether venue was appropriate in the Northern District of Texas and invited the CFPB to file a motion to transfer the case. The CFPB complied, and the district court granted its motion, transferring the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs then petitioned for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by transferring the case while their appeal was pending and, alternatively, lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, stating that the district court acted without jurisdiction. The court explained that once a party properly appeals something a district court has done, in this case, the effective denial of a preliminary injunction, the district court has no jurisdiction to do anything that alters the case’s status. The court clarified that its decision was not about the correctness of the district court’s transfer order but rather about whether the court had jurisdiction to enter it. The court concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction to transfer the case.The court granted the petition for mandamus, vacated the district court’s transfer order, and ordered the district court to reopen the case. The court also instructed the district court to notify the District of Columbia that its transfer was without jurisdiction and should be disregarded. View "In re: Chamber of Commerce" on Justia Law

The case involves the Arkansas Voter Integrity Initiative, Inc., and Conrad Reynolds (appellants) who filed a complaint against John Thurston, the Arkansas Secretary of State, the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, and Election Systems and Software, LLC (appellees). The appellants claimed that the voting machines approved by the state did not comply with the Arkansas Code and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) because voters could not independently verify their selections on the ballot before casting their votes. They argued that the machines printed ballots with both bar codes and the voter's selections in English, but the vote tabulator only scanned the bar codes. Since most voters cannot read bar codes, the appellants claimed that voters were unable to verify their votes as required by state and federal law. They also alleged that the appellees committed an illegal exaction by using public funds for the purchase and maintenance of these machines and that Election Systems and Software, LLC violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and committed fraud by claiming that its machines complied with state and federal law.The Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the appellants' complaint. The court found that the voting machines complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also denied the appellants' motion for recusal and their motion for a new trial. The appellants appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the voting process complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also found that the appellants failed to demonstrate evidence of bias or prejudice sufficient to warrant the recusal of the circuit court judge. Finally, the court found that the appellants were not deprived of their right to a jury trial and that the circuit court did not err by denying their motion for a new trial. View "ARKANSAS VOTER INTEGRITY INITIATIVE, INC., AND CONRAD REYNOLDS v. JOHN THURSTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE; THE ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, IN ITS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND ELECTION SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE, LLC" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled on a case involving the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and a group of trusts associated with the National Collegiate Student Loan Trust. The central questions in the case were whether the trusts were "covered persons" under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), and whether the CFPB was required to ratify the underlying action.The CFPB had initiated enforcement proceedings against the trusts for alleged violations related to servicing and collecting student loans, which the trusts had contracted out to third parties. The trusts argued that they were not "covered persons" under the CFPA and that the CFPB's action was untimely because it was initiated when the CFPB director was unconstitutionally insulated from presidential removal and ratified after the statute of limitations had expired.The Third Circuit held that the trusts were indeed "covered persons" under the CFPA because they were engaged in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service. The court also held that the CFPB was not required to ratify the action before the statute of limitations had run, following the Supreme Court's decision in Collins v. Yellen. The court concluded that there was no indication that the unconstitutional limitation on the President's authority to remove the CFPB Director harmed the Trusts, and thus no need for ratification. Therefore, the case was affirmed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings with these determinations in mind. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust" on Justia Law

SmartEnergy Holdings, LLC, a retail electricity supplier, was found to have violated various provisions of Maryland law governing retail electricity suppliers, including engaging in deceptive, misleading, and unfair trade practices. The Supreme Court of Maryland upheld the decisions of lower courts and the Maryland Public Service Commission, affirming that the Commission has the authority to determine whether electricity suppliers under its jurisdiction have violated Maryland’s consumer protection laws, including the Maryland Telephone Solicitations Act (MTSA). The court also determined that the MTSA applies to SmartEnergy’s business practices, as it applies to sales made over the telephone where the consumer places the telephone call to the merchant in response to a merchant’s marketing materials. The court found substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's factual findings and determined that the remedies imposed by the Commission were within its discretion and not arbitrary or capricious. View "In the Matter of SmartEnergy" on Justia Law

This case pertains to the enforcement of the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 (the Act), a voter-enacted statute that expanded and amended the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. The California Privacy Protection Agency (the Agency) failed to adopt final regulations by the July 1, 2022 deadline set out in the Act. The California Chamber of Commerce sought a court order to delay enforcement of the Act until one year after the agency adopted all required regulations. The trial court granted the petition in part, ruling that the Agency could not enforce any regulation until one year after that regulation became final. The Agency appealed, arguing that the Act did not mandate a one-year delay between the approval of a final regulation and its enforcement. The appellate court agreed with the Agency, finding that the Act's language did not unambiguously require a one-year delay between approval and enforcement. The court ordered a new trial court order denying the Chamber's petition and allowing the trial court to consider any remaining issues regarding the prompt development of regulations. View "California Privacy Protection Agency v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A consumer, Reginald Kirtz, secured a loan from the Rural Housing Service, part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Although Kirtz repaid his loan by mid-2018, the USDA continued to tell credit report company TransUnion that his account was past due, harming his credit score. The USDA failed to correct its records after being notified of the error, and Kirtz sued the agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.The USDA argued that the case should be dismissed based on sovereign immunity, since the Supreme Court has held that the federal government is immune from suits for damages unless Congress waives that immunity. The agency claimed that the FCRA does not make the federal government amenable to suit for a violation. The district court agreed, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the FCRA authorizes suits for damages against any person who violates the Act, and “person” is defined to include any government agency.The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit, finding that sovereign immunity did not bar Kirtz’s claim. The Court held that the federal government is susceptible to suit when it provides false information to credit reporting agencies. It noted that dismissing a suit like Kirtz’s case would effectively negate a claim that Congress has clearly authorized. The Court’s ruling resolved a circuit split between the Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits, with which the Court agreed, and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, with which it disagreed. View "Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz" on Justia Law

Debt collector Rent Recovery Solutions (“RRS”) called Plaintiff to collect an alleged $900 debt to her former landlord. In June, without sending the relevant documents to Plaintiff, RRS reported her debt to TransUnion, a credit reporting agency, failing to tell TransUnion that the debt was disputed. Plaintiff commenced this action against RRS, alleging that it violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Plaintiff requested an award of $18,810 in attorneys’ fees for work by two attorneys and a paralegal. RRS challenged the fees requested by both attorneys, who submitted sworn declarations and detailed billing records. The district court, applying the lodestar method of calculating an attorney fee award, found that the attorneys’ claimed hourly rates were reasonable, but the hours expended on the case were excessive. The court reduced the claimed attorney hours by fifty percent, exclusive of paralegal work, and awarded Plaintiff $9,480 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff’s attorneys accused the district court of departing from the lodestar calculation by imposing a “cap” that violates FDCPA policies and deprives counsel of full compensation for bringing consumer enforcement actions under this complex federal statute.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court followed the lodestar method, reducing the award based on its determination of the number of attorney hours reasonably expended on litigation. There is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar method represents a reasonable fee. The court wrote that the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in finding that fifty hours was unreasonable for such a claim. View "Adrianna Beckler v. Rent Recovery Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law