Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Consumer Law
Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Foundation
In November 2013, the Consumer Credit Research Foundation (CCRF) entered a consulting agreement with the Kennesaw State University Research and Service Foundation under which Dr. Jennifer Lewis Priestley, a professor at Kennesaw State University (KSU), would research the effects of payday loans on the financial health of their consumers. As part of this project, Dr. Priestley – but not KSU or the KSU foundation – signed a confidentiality agreement with CCRF agreeing not to disclose any information “relating in any manner to CCRF or CCRF’s contributing sponsors.” Dr. Priestley published an article about her findings in December 2014. In June 2015, the Campaign for Accountability (CFA) sent a request to KSU under Georgia’s Open Records Act, asking for copies of all correspondence, electronic or otherwise, between Dr. Priestley and a number of organizations and individuals, including CCRF and its chairman and CEO. After KSU notified CFA and CCRF that it intended to disclose the requested records subject to possible redactions, CCRF filed a complaint against the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (the Board). CCRF sought a declaratory judgment that the records requested by CFA were exempt from disclosure under OCGA 50-18-72(a)(35) and (36) and a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from disclosing the records. The trial court granted CFA’s motion to intervene in the case as a party defendant. The Court of Appeals held, based on its reading of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. Shelton, 453 SE2d 741 (1995), Georgia’s Open Records Act prohibited the disclosure of all information that was not required to be disclosed based on the ORA exemptions listed the statute. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to address that issue, disapproved of the Court of Appeals’ broad reading of Bowers and reversed the court’s judgment. View "Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Foundation" on Justia Law
Federal Trade Comm’r v. Universal Processing Services of Wisconsin, LLC
In 2011 and 2012, a number of individuals and closely held corporations known as Treasure Your Success (TYS) operated a fraudulent credit card interest reduction scheme. Universal Processing Services of Wisconsin, LLC (Universal) violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), 16 C.F.R. 310.1 et seq., by providing substantial assistance to the TYS schemers. The district court found that a violation of the TSR constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. As such, the district court was authorized to order restitution and disgorgement. Furthermore, the court clarified that substantial assistance under the TSR was itself sufficient to justify joint and several liability. The court reaffirmed its order holding Universal jointly and severally liable; Universal contended that was error and joint and several liability can only lie where the defendant is a participant in a common enterprise with the primary violators. The Eleventh Circuit concluded after review the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding Universal jointly and severally liable with the members of the TYS scheme. View "Federal Trade Comm'r v. Universal Processing Services of Wisconsin, LLC" on Justia Law
Ex parte The City of Selma.
The City of Selma ("the City") filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting the Alabama Supreme Court direct the Dallas Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in its favor, based on State-agent immunity, as to claims Gregory Pettaway filed against it. Pettaway financed the purchase of a 2006 Nissan Armada sport-utility vehicle. Subsequently, Santander Consumer USA, Inc. ("Santander"), took over the loan. Santander contracted with Par North America, Inc. ("Par"), to handle repossessions for it and that Par used Central Alabama Recovery Systems ("CARS") to carry out the actual repossessions. Early on November morning in 2010, two men from CARS came to Pettaway's residence and told him that they were there to repossess the vehicle. By the time Pettaway got dressed and walked outside, the men had already hooked the Armada up to the tow truck and lifted it. Pettaway objected and telephoned the Selma Police Department; Officer Jonathan Fank responded to the call. After Officer Fank told Pettaway that the repossession was a civil matter and that he could not do anything because the vehicle was already hooked up to the tow truck, Pettaway again called the Selma Police Department to ask that Officer Fank's supervisor come to the scene. Pettaway filed a complaint against Santander, Par, CARS, and the City, alleging conversion, negligence, wantonness, and trespass claims. Although he stated conversion, negligence, wantonness, and trespass claims, Pettaway admitted that his only complaint against the City was that the officers told the repossession men to take the vehicle. The City admitted that officers were called to the scene at Pettaway's request to keep the peace but denied the remaining allegations as to the actions of its officers, raising the affirmative defense of immunity. The City argued the trial court erred in denying its motion for a summary judgment: at the time of the incident that formed the basis for Pettaway's complaint, Officers Fank and Calhoun were performing discretionary functions within the line and scope of their law-enforcement duties and that, therefore, they would be entitled to State-agent immunity. The Supreme Court concluded the City established that it has a clear legal right to a summary judgment in its favor based on State-agent immunity. View "Ex parte The City of Selma." on Justia Law
Kentucky State Police v. Scott
The failure of Terry Scott and Damon Fleming to appeal the denial of their respective grievances against the Kentucky State Police (KSP) by the Personnel Cabinet precluded their subsequent action filed in the circuit court. The trial court dismissed most of Scott’s and Fleming’s claims but nevertheless permitted the case to go forward. After a trial, the court held that Scott and Fleming had met their burden of showing a prima facie case of an equal protection violation, entitling them to equitable relief. The court of appeals affirmed, thus rejecting KSP’s argument that Scott and Fleming had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Scott’s and Fleming’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies barred their direct action in the circuit court. View "Kentucky State Police v. Scott" on Justia Law
Daniel N. Gordon, PC v. Rosenblum
The issue presented for the Supreme Court’s review was whether provisions of Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA) that prohibited using “unconscionable tactic[s]” to collect certain debts, and causing likely “confusion” or “misunderstanding” regarding loans and credit, applied to the debt collection activities of plaintiffs, Daniel N. Gordon, P.C. and Daniel Gordon. The trial court held that those provisions applied only to certain consumer relationships and that plaintiffs’ roles as a lawyer and law firm engaged in debt collection activities, and not as a lender or debt owner, removed their activities from the scope of the UTPA. The court granted plaintiffs’ request for an injunction preventing the Oregon Department of Justice from enforcing the UTPA against plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the UTPA did apply to plaintiffs’ debt collection activities. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Daniel N. Gordon, PC v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law
Knox County Emergency Communications District v. BellSouth Telecommunications LLC
Plaintiffs, municipal corporations operate the local “emergency communications” or “911” programs in their respective counties, alleged that the telephone company, to reduce costs, offer lower prices, and obtain more customers, engaged in a covert practice of omitting fees mandated by Tennessee’s Emergency Communications District Law (Code 7-86-101), and sought compensation under that statute. They also alleged that, while concealing this practice, the telephone company violated the Tennessee False Claims Act. The district court dismissed the first claim, finding that the statute contained no implied private right of action, and rejecting the second claim on summary judgment on the second claim, finding that the statements at issue were not knowingly false. In consolidated appeals, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs provided evidence of a “massive quantity of unexplained unbilled lines,” establishing a disputed question of material fact. The Law does not require the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted in some form of bad faith, given that the statute imposes liability for “deliberate ignorance” View "Knox County Emergency Communications District v. BellSouth Telecommunications LLC" on Justia Law
ECM BioFilms, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
ECM BioFilms manufactures an additive that it claims accelerates the rate at which plastic biodegrades. In 2013, the Federal Trade Commission filed an administrative complaint, claiming that several of ECM’s biodegradability claims were deceptive. The full Commission ultimately found that three of ECM’s claims were false and misleading under 15 U.S.C. 45. The Commission’s order prohibits ECM from representing that ECM plastic is biodegradable “unless such representation is true, not misleading, and, at the time it is made, respondent possesses and relies upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates the representation,” The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting claims that part of the Commission’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence and that the Commission violated ECM’s rights under the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Due Process Clause. ECM had adequate notice and the order is not a prohibition on claims of biodegradability. View "ECM BioFilms, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law
Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC
Until 1997, Illinois residents could only purchase power from a public utility, with rates regulated by the ICC. The Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law allows residents to buy electricity from their local public utility, another utility, or an Alternative Retail Electric Supplier (ARES). The ICC was not given rate-making authority over ARESs, but was given oversight responsibilities. The Law did not explicitly provide a mechanism for recovering damages from an ARES related to rates. Zahn purchased electricity from NAPG, after receiving an offer of a “New Customer Rate” of $.0499 per kilowatt hour in her first month, followed by a “market-based variable rate.” Zahn never received NAPG’s “New Customer Rate.” NAPG charged her $.0599 per kilowatt hour for the first two months, followed by a rate higher than Zahn’s local public utility charged. Zahn filed a class-action complaint, claiming violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or for failure to state a claim. After the Illinois Supreme Court answered a certified question, stating that the ICC does not have exclusive jurisdiction to hear Zahn’s claims, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court had jurisdiction and Zahn alleged facts that, if true, could constitute a breach of contract or a deceptive business practice. View "Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law
Mississippi, Ex Rel. Hood, Attorney General v. Louisville Tire Center, Inc.
In 2007, the State of Mississippi, through the Attorney General’s office, filed suit against Louisville Tire Center, Inc. d/b/a Fair Oil Company (Fair Oil) for violating Mississippi’s price-gouging statute. Fair Oil filed a successful motion for summary judgment on the basis that the price-gouging statute was unconstitutional as written; however, on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the Chancery Court to examine Fair Oil’s conduct in light of the statute’s language. After remand, several years passed without activity in the case, and in July 2015, the Chancery Court granted Fair Oil’s motion to dismiss for want of prosecution pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The State appealed that decision. Finding no error in the dismissal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mississippi, Ex Rel. Hood, Attorney General v. Louisville Tire Center, Inc." on Justia Law
Zen Magnets v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n
Petitioner Zen Magnets, LLC (“Zen”) challenged a regulation promulgated by Respondent Consumer Product Safety Commission (“the Commission”) restricting the size and strength of the rare earth magnets that Zen sold. The sets consisted of small, high-powered magnets that users could arrange and rearrange in various geometric designs. The component magnets are unusually small (their diameters are approximately five millimeters) and unusually powerful. Magnets of this type have been marketed and sold to consumers (by Zen and other distributors) as desktop trinkets, stress-relief puzzles, and toys, and apparently also for educational and scientific purposes. Although the strength of these magnets was part of their appeal, it could also pose a grave danger when the magnets are misused, particularly if two or more magnets were ingested. During 2011, in response to reports of injured children, Commission staff began evaluating whether the magnet sets currently on the market complied with ASTM F963 (“the toy standard”). In May 2012, the Commission required the thirteen leading magnet set distributors to report any information of which they were aware reasonably supporting the conclusion that their magnets did not comply with an applicable safety standard, contained a defect, or created an unreasonable risk of serious injury. Four months after eliminating ten of the leading magnet set distributors, the Commission proposed a new safety standard aimed at regulating the size and strength of all magnet sets. Unlike the toy standard, the final rule was not limited to magnets designed or marketed as toys for children under fourteen years of age, but rather applied to all magnet sets. Zen was the only remaining importer and distributor of the magnet sets targeted by the final rule. Over the years, Zen made efforts to comply with the toy standard by implementing age restrictions and placing warnings on its website and packaging, as well as by imposing sales restrictions on its retail distributors. Its magnet sets, however, did not comply with the strength and size restrictions of the final rule. Zen sought judicial review of that safety standard. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission’s prerequisite factual findings, which were compulsory under the Consumer Product Safety Act, were incomplete and inadequately explained. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded this case back to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Zen Magnets v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n" on Justia Law