Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Consumer Law
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Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, alleging twenty-one causes of action stemming from the Government's collection, maintenance, and use of information about him. The court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss each claim except those brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that DHS is in possession of his full and specific credit card number, along with information regarding the type and issuer of the card. That plaintiff possesses a major credit card of a specific type and number bears on his mode of living for purposes of the definition of "consumer report" within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's ruling that the Act's claims failed on the first prong of the definition of "consumer report" and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abdelfattah v. DHS" on Justia Law

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The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, targets “independent debt collectors,” but excludes in-house collectors, including “any officer or employee of . . . any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” In Ohio, consumer debts that remain uncollected by a state entity are “certified” to the Attorney General (OAG), which enlists “special counsel” as independent contractors for collections. Actions taken by special counsel are dictated by an agreement, which requires special counsel to comply with FDCPA standards. All collections must be endorsed to the OAG before special counsel is entitled to a fee. Special counsel were orally directed to use OAG letterhead for all collections (including consumer debts, although contrary to Ohio’s code). Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the FDCPA by use of OAG letterhead. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that special counsel are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, and that, even if they were, use of OAG letterhead was not a “false, deceptive or misleading” communication. The Sixth Circuit vacated. A jury could reasonably find that the use of the OAG letterhead by the “special counsel,” in the manner and under the circumstances present here, resulted in letters that were actually confusing to the least sophisticated consumer. View "Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Brett Woods and Kathleen Valdes were state employees and representatives of a class of New Mexico state and local government employees who alleged they paid for insurance coverage through payroll deductions and premiums pursuant to a policy issued by Standard Insurance Company (Standard), but did not receive the coverage for which they paid and, in some cases, were denied coverage entirely. Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court against three defendants: Standard, an Oregon company that agreed to provide the subject insurance coverage; the Risk Management Division of the New Mexico General Services Department (the Division), the state agency that contracted with Standard and was responsible for administering benefits under the policy; and Standard employee Martha Quintana, who Plaintiffs allege was responsible for managing the Division’s account with Standard and for providing account management and customer service to the Division and state employees. Plaintiffs' ninety-one-paragraph complaint, stated causes of action against Standard and the Division for breach of contract and unjust enrichment; against Standard for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and Unfair Practices Act violations; and against Standard and Ms. Quintana for breach of the New Mexico Trade Practices and Fraud Act. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether remand to the state court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was required under either of two CAFA provisions: the state action provision, which excludes from federal jurisdiction cases in which the primary defendants are states; or the local controversy exception, which requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction where, among other things, there is a local defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by plaintiffs and from whom plaintiffs seek significant relief. The Court concluded that neither provision provided a basis for remand, and therefore reversed the decision of the magistrate judge remanding the case to state court. But because the Tenth Circuit could not determine whether Defendants have established the amount in controversy required to confer federal jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the district court for the resolution of that issue.View "Woods v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendants alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and New York statutory and common law. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants obtained unauthorized attorneys' fees and costs in connection with actions to foreclose liens on plaintiffs' properties arising out of unpaid municipal property taxes and water and sewer charges. The court held that liens for mandatory water and sewer charges imposed by New York City as an incident to property ownership, which are treated as akin to property tax liens, are not subject to the FDCPA because they do not involve a "debt" as that term is defined in the statute. The court also held that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Boyd v. J.E. Robert Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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The FTC appealed the damages portion of a district court order granting in part the FTC's motion for contempt relating to defendants' violation of a Consent Order. The FTC argued that it was entitled to a presumption that consumers relied, when deciding to purchase defendants' products, on defendants' omissions and misrepresentations. Therefore, the FTC sought over $14 million in contempt damages, an amount equal to defendants' gross receipts. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the FTC may pursue recovery for contempt damages based on alleged violations of a Consent Order. The court agreed with the FTC and joined its sister circuits in holding that the FTC is entitled to a presumption of consumer reliance. Here, in the context of a contempt action arising out of violations of a promise to refrain from misrepresentations concerning material terms or omissions of material terms, the court held that the calculation of the appropriate measure of loss begins with defendants' gross receipts derived from such contumacious conduct. After the court uses defendants' gross receipts as a baseline for calculating damages, the court must permit defendants to put forth evidence showing that certain amounts should offset the sanctions assessed against them. The court vacated that portion of the district court's contempt order that has calculated damages and remanded for further proceedings. View "FTC v. BlueHippo, et al." on Justia Law

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MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC (MPHJ) owned several patents relating to network scanner systems. Through subsidiary licensees, MPHJ wrote to various business and non-profit organizations operating in Vermont, requesting the recipient to confirm it was not infringing MPHJ’s patents or, alternatively, to purchase a license. If there was no response, a Texas law firm sent follow-up correspondence stating that an infringement suit would be filed. The State of Vermont filed suit against MPHJ in Vermont state court alleging MPHJ engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices under the Vermont Consumer Protection Act, stating that the letters contained threatening, false, and misleading statements. MPHJ removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, asserting federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. The State moved to remand the case back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. MPHJ opposed the State’s motion to remand, and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and a motion for sanctions. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant MPHJ its requested relief, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and appeal. View "Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments" on Justia Law

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Bormes, an attorney, tendered the filing fee for a lawsuit via pay.gov, which the federal courts use to facilitate electronic payments. The web site sent him an email receipt that included the last four digits of his credit card’s number, plus the card’s expiration date. Bormes, claiming that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1) allows a receipt to contain one or the other, but not both, filed suit against the United States seeking damages. In an earlier appeal the Supreme Court held that the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), does not waive sovereign immunity on a suit seeking to collect damages for an asserted violation of FCRA and remanded for determination of “whether FCRA itself waives the Federal Government’s immunity to damages under 1681n.” The Seventh Circuit held that although the United States has waived immunity against damages actions of this kind, it did not violate the statute on the merits. The statute as written applies to receipts “printed … at the point of the sale or transaction.” The email receipt that Bormes received met neither requirement. View "Bormes v. United States" on Justia Law

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Paul Lightner filed a consumer complaint on behalf of himself and other policyholders before the Insurance Commissioner against CitiFinancial and Triton Insurance Company challenging the rates for certain insurance products. Following the Commissioner’s investigation and consideration of Lightner’s complaint, the Commissioner denied Lightner’s request for a hearing and found the challenged rates were reasonable. Lightner filed a petition appealing the Commissioner’s order denying his request for a hearing. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in upholding the Commissioner’s order denying a hearing because this case did not present any factual disputes warranting a hearing in this case; and (2) properly concluded that the Commissioner’s handling of the rate issues raised in Lightner’s complaint met statutory, regulatory, and constitutional standards. View "Lightner v. Riley" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs involved in, or wishing to be involved in the “death care industry” challenged Pennsylvania’s Funeral Director Law, 63 Pa. Stat. 479.1 provisions that: permit warrantless inspections of funeral establishments by the state Board of Funeral Directors; limit the number of establishments in which a funeral director may have an ownership interest or practice the provision; restrict the capacity of unlicensed individuals and certain entities to hold ownership interests in a funeral establishment; require every funeral establishment to have a licensed full-time supervisor; require funeral establishments to have a “preparation room”; prohibit service of food in a funeral establishment; prohibit use of trade names by funeral homes; govern the trusting of monies advanced under pre-need contracts for merchandise; and prohibit payment of commissions. The district court found several provisions unconstitutional. The Third Circuit reversed: invalidation of the warrantless inspection scheme; holdings on dormant Commerce Clause challenges to certain provisions; conclusions that disputed provisions violate substantive due process; a ruling that the Board’s actions unconstitutionally impair private contractual relations with third parties; and invalidation of the ban on payment of commissions to unlicensed salespeople. The court affirmed that the ban on the use of trade names in the funeral industry violates First Amendment protections. The court noted that antiquated provisions are not necessarily unconstitutional. View "Heffner v. Murphy" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a consumer telephone service complaint against Verizon New England. The Department of Telecommunications and Cable eventually dismissed Plaintiff's claim as moot because, during the course of the proceedings, Plaintiff's customer relationship with Verizon had been terminated. On appeal, a single justice dismissed Plaintiff's complaint because it failed to comply with the timely filing requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5. Plaintiff appealed to the full court. The Department subsequently afforded Plaintiff a renewed opportunity to pursue a timely appeal under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5, and Plaintiff chose to do so. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the ruling of the single justice that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5 governs appeals from final orders issued by the Department; and (2) declared the remainder of the matter moot because Plaintiff filed a new petition for judicial review within the time period required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5. Remanded. View "Olmstead v. Dep't of Telecommunications & Cable" on Justia Law