Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Vermont's Prescription Confidentiality Law, Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4631(d), restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that revealed the prescribing practices of individual doctors. Respondents, Vermont data miners and an association of brand-name drug manufacturers, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials, contending that section 4631(d) violated their rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. At issue was whether section 4631(d) must be tested by heightened judicial scrutiny and, if so, whether Vermont could justify the law. The Court held that the Vermont Statute, which imposed content-based and speaker-based burdens on protected expression, was subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. The Court also held that Vermont's justifications for section 4631(d) did not withstand such heightened scrutiny and therefore, affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment that section 4631(d) unconstitutionally burdened the speech of pharmaceutical marketers and data miners without adequate justification.

Plaintiffs filed suit under the federal Driverâs Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that personal information, as defined by the DPPA, was disclosed by individual defendants while acting as agents of the Ohio Department of Public Safety or the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV). The BMV apparently made bulk disclosures of personal information from motor vehicle records to a company, for an asserted permissible purpose, and the company resold or redisclosed the information. The district court determined that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. On interlocutory appeal. the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The DPPA is not a strict liability statute and the defendants made the disclosures for a purportedly permitted purpose; they did not violate plaintiffs' "clearly established" rights. The DPPA does not impose a duty to investigate requests for disclosure nor does it clearly prohibit bulk disclosures.

Plaintiffs, manufactures of a bear-resistant container called the Ursack S29 model and three individual users of the Ursack, sued the Sierra Interagency Black Bear Group ("SIBBG"), as well as national and forest park services (collectively, "defendants"), where defendants withdrew conditional approval of the S29 model and refused to permit backpackers to use the S29 in the container-only areas of defendants' national parks and forests. At issue was whether SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was not arbitrary or capricious where the court could not conclude that the SIBBG, although it did not mention overflow food problems in the course of its debate, ignored this aspect of the problem; where the distinctions the SIBBG made between the BearVault and the Ursack were rational; and where SIBBG's tree-damage rationale, prohibiting users from tying the S29 model to trees, was not arbitrary or capricious.

Plaintiff, a former Nelnet, Inc. ("Nelnet") loan advisor, alleged that certain Nelnet marketing practices were continuing violations of the Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP") established under Part B of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 1071, that rendered Nelnet liable under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a). Plaintiff joined JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, Inc. as defendants alleging they were knowing participants in a conspiracy to submit false claims. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's third amended complaint. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that there was no abuse of discretion in dismissing plaintiff's claims where plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

Appellees filed a suit challenging the Federal Trade Commission's ("Commission") Extended Enforcement Policy claiming that the Commission had intruded upon an area of traditional regulation when it authorized the Fair Trade Reporting Act ("FACT"), 15 U.S.C. 1681, and that the policy was unlawful absent a clear statement from Congress authorizing federal regulation over the practice of law. Shortly after oral arguments, Congress passed the Red Flag Program Clarification Act of 2010 which expressly amended the FACT Act by changing the definition of "creditor." Therefore, the court vacated the district court's opinion holding that legislation had clearly altered the posture of the case such that there was no longer a live "case or controversy" before the court.