Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between a taxpayers' association and a water district over the imposition of groundwater replenishment charges. The taxpayers' association alleged that the water district's charges violated constitutional provisions and unfairly benefited large agricultural businesses. The association sought a writ of mandate to stop the collection of these charges and to vacate the resolutions imposing them. They also claimed conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against the water district's board members, general manager, and consulting firms.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike several causes of action on the grounds that they arose from protected activities. The court found that the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute applied. Additionally, the court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the first amended petition and complaint, finding the claims time-barred under the validation statutes. The court also awarded over $180,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, deeming the anti-SLAPP motion frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the public interest exemption did not apply because the relief sought could only be provided by the water district, not the individual defendants. The court found that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted for most causes of action, except for conversion and the writ of mandate against the general manager. Consequently, the fee award was reversed. The court also affirmed the demurrer ruling, as the claims against the individual defendants were not legally sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell" on Justia Law

A patron at Encore Boston Harbor Casino challenged the casino's practice of redeeming slot-machine tickets. When patrons finish using a slot machine, they receive a TITO ticket, which can be redeemed for cash. The casino offers two redemption options: cashier cages, which provide full cash value, and self-serve kiosks (TRUs), which dispense only bills and issue a TRU ticket for any remaining cents. The TRU ticket can be redeemed at the cashier cage or used in another slot machine. The plaintiff argued that this practice was unfair and deceptive, violating Massachusetts regulations and consumer protection laws.The case was initially filed in Massachusetts state court and then removed to federal court. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, ruling that an adequate legal remedy was available under Chapter 93A. The court later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining claims, including breach of contract, promissory estoppel, conversion, and unfair and deceptive business practices. The court found that the casino's practice did not violate its internal controls or Massachusetts regulations and that the plaintiff failed to show the practice was unfair or deceptive.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, agreeing that Chapter 93A provided an adequate legal remedy. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the remaining claims, concluding that the casino's practice of issuing TRU tickets for cents did not violate regulations or constitute unfair or deceptive practices. The court found no evidence that the practice was immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, and ruled that the plaintiff's common law claims also failed. View "Schuster v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Absolute Essence LLC sought to enter the medical marijuana market in Arkansas but was unable to secure a license. The company invested over a million dollars in the application process, including finding a location and addressing zoning issues. The Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission outsourced the review process to Public Consulting Group, Inc., which scored 197 applications in two weeks. Absolute Essence received a low score and alleged that the scoring process was manipulated, with conflicts of interest among the scorers favoring larger, established players and resulting in racial disparities in license awards.The case was initially filed in state court, alleging tortious interference, fraud, racial discrimination, and civil conspiracy. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, which dismissed the case for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court found that Absolute Essence's tortious interference claim failed because it did not establish a precise business expectancy with a specific third party. The fraud claim was dismissed due to a lack of justifiable reliance, as the company’s actions predated the involvement of the outside scorers. The race-discrimination claims were dismissed for failing to allege intentional discrimination, as the complaint only suggested a disparate impact without sufficient factual support. Finally, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed because it could not stand without an underlying tort.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Absolute Essence did not plead enough facts to support any of its claims. View "Absolute Essence LLC v. Public Consulting Group LLC" on Justia Law

Nine Black, female, low- to moderate-income first-time homebuyers purchased condominium units at the RiverEast at Grandview Condominium complex through the District of Columbia’s Housing Purchase Assistance Program. Shortly after moving in, they encountered severe habitability issues, including foundation problems, sewage, and mold. Their attempts to resolve these issues were unsuccessful, leading them to file a thirteen-count lawsuit against the developers, the District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD), and the RiverEast at Grandview Condominium Owner’s Association. The developers later filed for bankruptcy, and the plaintiffs were forced to evacuate their units.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the District and the Association for failure to state a claim. The court found that DHCD, as a District agency, was non sui juris and thus incapable of being sued. It also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) because the District could not be considered a “merchant” under the statute. The court dismissed other claims, including violations of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the CPPA claim, holding that the District could be considered a merchant under the statute. The case was remanded for further consideration of whether the District’s trade practices were unfair or deceptive. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the DCHRA, breach of contract, IIED, and negligence claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts to support these claims. The court also upheld the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint. View "May v. River East at Grandview" on Justia Law

Daniel Pomerantz appealed the Cannabis Control Board’s denial of his request to waive application and licensing fees for his proposed commercial cannabis cultivation establishment. Pomerantz claimed he qualified as a “social equity applicant” due to past incarceration for a cannabis-related offense and coming from a community historically impacted by cannabis prohibition. The Board determined he did not meet the criteria and denied his request.Initially, Pomerantz applied for a Tier 5 cultivation license on behalf of Rebel East, LLC, asserting he qualified for social equity status due to a past cannabis-related offense in Nevada. The Board found he was not eligible because his sentencing was deferred, and he was not incarcerated as a penalty for the offense. Pomerantz then argued he qualified as a socially disadvantaged individual due to his residency in Humboldt County, California, a region he claimed was disproportionately affected by cannabis prohibition. The Board allowed him to amend his application but ultimately found he did not demonstrate personal harm from living in Humboldt County.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision. The Court upheld the Board’s interpretation that “incarcerated” meant serving a prison sentence as a penalty for a cannabis-related conviction, which Pomerantz did not. The Court also agreed with the Board’s assessment that merely living in Humboldt County did not automatically qualify Pomerantz as being from a disproportionately impacted community. Furthermore, the Court found that Pomerantz did not sufficiently demonstrate personal harm from his residency in Humboldt County, noting his significant personal and professional advancements during that time.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that Pomerantz did not qualify as a social equity individual applicant under the Board’s rules. View "Pomerantz v. Cannabis Control Board" on Justia Law

Bruce Jacobs, a Florida foreclosure attorney, filed a qui tam action against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., alleging violations of the False Claims Act (FCA). Jacobs claimed that JP Morgan Chase forged mortgage loan promissory notes and submitted false reimbursement claims to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He asserted that JP Morgan Chase used signature stamps of former Washington Mutual employees to endorse loans improperly, thereby defrauding the government by seeking reimbursement for loan servicing costs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Jacobs's initial complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). The court also noted that Jacobs needed to establish that he was an original source of the information under the FCA’s public disclosure bar. Jacobs amended his complaint, but the district court dismissed it again, this time with prejudice. The court found that Jacobs still failed to meet the Rule 9(b) requirements and that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied because the allegations had already been disclosed in three online blog articles, and Jacobs was not an original source of the information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the blog articles, which were publicly available before Jacobs filed his lawsuit, qualified as "news media" under the FCA. The court found that the allegations in Jacobs's complaint were substantially the same as those disclosed in the blog articles. Additionally, Jacobs did not qualify as an original source because his information did not materially add to the publicly disclosed allegations. Therefore, the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded Jacobs's lawsuit. View "Jacobs v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

A consumer of a glucosamine-based dietary supplement filed a putative class action lawsuit against the supplement’s manufacturer and retailer under New York law. The plaintiff alleged that the supplement was mislabeled because it contained a different formulation of glucosamine than what was displayed on the front of the label and disclosed as the main ingredient on the side. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the product contained blended glucosamine rather than single-crystal glucosamine, which she believed to be more effective for alleviating joint pain.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment for the defendants on federal preemption grounds. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s state law mislabeling claims were preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which establishes national standards for the labeling of dietary supplements. The district court found that the FDCA’s comprehensive regulatory scheme and its broad preemption clauses foreclosed the plaintiff’s state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff’s state law mislabeling claims were expressly preempted by the FDCA. The court reasoned that the FDCA preempts any state law that imposes labeling requirements not identical to those set forth in the FDCA and its regulations. The court found that the product’s labeling complied with the FDCA’s requirements, as the dietary ingredient “glucosamine sulfate potassium chloride” was identified using methods endorsed by the FDA. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims were preempted, and the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Jackson-Mau v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Jacquelyn N’Jai filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Education, New York University (NYU), Long Island University (LIU), Immediate Credit Recovery, Inc. (ICR), and FMS Investment Corporation (FMS), alleging various violations of federal law. N’Jai claimed that she had repaid her student loans but was falsely certified for additional loans by a bank analyst, with NYU and LIU allegedly signing her name on fraudulent loan applications. She contended that the Department of Education and its debt collectors used unlawful practices to collect on these loans, including garnishing her tax refund and threatening to garnish her Social Security checks.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed N’Jai’s claims against LIU, NYU, ICR, and FMS for lack of personal jurisdiction, citing the government contacts exception. This exception prevents the assertion of personal jurisdiction based solely on a defendant’s contact with federal government agencies in the District of Columbia. The court dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants for other reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the government contacts exception under D.C. law is limited to First Amendment activities. The court noted the ongoing uncertainty about the scope of this exception, referencing previous cases where the D.C. Court of Appeals had not definitively resolved whether the exception is confined to First Amendment activity. Due to this uncertainty, the appellate court certified two questions to the D.C. Court of Appeals: whether the government contacts exception is limited to First Amendment activity and, if so, whether the contacts alleged in this case fall under that exception. The appellate court did not make a final ruling on the personal jurisdiction issue, pending the D.C. Court of Appeals' response to the certified questions. View "N'Jai v. Department of Education" on Justia Law

The case involves the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) challenging the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) approval of Perdue's "Fresh Line" chicken and turkey product labels. ALDF claimed that the labels, which depicted birds roaming outside, were misleading because the birds were raised indoors. ALDF requested the USDA to disapprove these labels, arguing that they misled consumers. The USDA declined, leading ALDF to sue, alleging violations of the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed ALDF's complaint, concluding that ALDF lacked standing to challenge the USDA's actions. The court found that ALDF failed to establish both organizational and associational standing. Specifically, the court determined that ALDF's member, Marie Mastracco, did not suffer a sufficiently concrete injury to confer standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the district court, finding that ALDF did not demonstrate that Mastracco faced an ongoing or imminent injury. The court noted that while Mastracco was misled by the labels in the past, she now knows the truth about the birds' living conditions, making any future reliance on the labels self-inflicted. Additionally, the court found that ALDF failed to show that other poultry-product labels with similar misleading graphics existed, which would be necessary to establish a substantial likelihood of future harm.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of ALDF's complaint without prejudice, holding that ALDF lacked standing to pursue its claims. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation (DOT) issued a Rule on April 30, 2024, requiring airlines to disclose ancillary service fees, such as baggage and change fees, during the booking process. The Rule aims to protect consumers from surprise charges and is expected to provide significant societal and consumer benefits. The Rule took effect on July 1, 2024, with compliance deadlines for airlines and third-party ticket agents set for later dates. Various airlines and airline associations challenged the Rule, arguing it exceeds DOT’s authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and bypassed the required notice and comment process.The airlines and associations first sought a stay from the DOT, which was denied. They then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a stay pending review. The petitioners argued that the Rule exceeds DOT’s statutory authority under 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a), which allows the DOT Secretary to investigate and adjudicate unfair or deceptive practices but does not authorize the creation of detailed legislative rules. The petitioners also claimed that the Rule imposes significant compliance costs that would cause irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the stay, finding that the petitioners made a strong showing that the Rule likely exceeds DOT’s authority. The court noted that the Rule mandates specific disclosure practices without the adjudicatory process required by the statute. The court also found that the petitioners would suffer irreparable harm due to the nonrecoverable compliance costs. The court concluded that there is no public interest in perpetuating unlawful agency action and expedited the petition for review to the next available oral argument panel. View "Airlines for America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law