Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant used an email application on his laptop to send Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") records requests to fourteen components of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Not having received any response, he filed a complaint in district court almost seven months later seeking an order to require the DOD to conduct a search for and promptly produce the requested records. Appellant attached copies of the emails to the complaint. The DOD responded by moving for summary judgment, relying on a DOD official’s declaration that all fourteen components had searched for but had not received any request from Appellant. The district court granted the DOD’s motion, concluding that Appellant had not created a genuine dispute as to the DOD’s “receipt” of the requests under 5 U.S.C. Section 552(a)(6)(A)(i).   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the DOD. First, Appellant argued that it “goes well beyond any agency deference and borders on vacuous” to allow the government to prevail based solely on a declaration that it could not find a request. But, the court reasoned, Appellant’s framing—that any declaration denying receipt after a search would warrant granting summary judgment to the government—is flawed. The court affords a presumption of good faith only if we conclude that an agency’s declaration is “relatively detailed and non-conclusory, and . . . submitted in good faith.”  The court explained that Appellant, who filed suit over six months after saving the requests on his computer, has presented insufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding the DOD’s “receipt” of his FOIA requests View "Patrick Eddington v. DOD" on Justia Law

In June 2019, Plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to the IRS seeking disclosure of the terms of a third-party authentication process set forth within IRM Sec. 21.1.3.3, pertaining to the tax professional authentication process. in August 2019, the IRS denied Plaintiffs' request citing the material was properly withheld pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(E), and then plaintiffs filed an action in federal court.The district court granted the IRS’s motion for summary judgment, rejecting Plaintiffs' request for an in-camera review of the documents.The Eighth Circuit reversed, remanding for the district court to conduct an in-camera inspection of the documents. To meet its burden under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(E), the IRS must prove the withheld material was “compiled for law enforcement purposes." Here, to effectively determine whether the IRS meets the requirements of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(E), an in-camera review is necessary. Thus, the district court erred in failing to hold an in-camera review. View "T. Keith Fogg v. Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a North Carolina attorney, believed he uncovered fraud perpetrated by forty-five adult care homes upon the United States and the State of North Carolina. According to Plaintiff, Defendants violated a North Carolina Medicaid billing regulation, and did so knowingly, as evidenced by the clarity of the regulation and by the fact Defendants did not ask the regulators for advice. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff failed to proffer evidence showing “that the bills submitted by Defendants to North Carolina Medicaid for PCS reimbursement were materially false or made with the requisite scienter.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that no reasonable juror could find Defendants acted with the requisite scienter on Plaintiff’s evidence. The court explained that The False Claims Act (“FCA”) imposes civil liability on “any person who . . . knowingly presents, or causes to be presented” to the Federal Government “a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” The Act’s scienter requirement defines “knowingly” to mean that a person “has actual knowledge of the information,” “acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,” or “acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” Here, Plaintiff failed to identify any evidence that Defendants knew, or even suspected, that their interpretation of the relevant policy and the guidance from NC Medicaid was incorrect. Nor did Plaintiff identify any evidence that Defendants attempted to avoid discovering how the regulation applied to adult care homes. View "US ex rel. Stephen Gugenheim v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC" on Justia Law

On the panel's initial hearing of the case, Judge Higginson concluded that the restrictions on the President's removal authority under the Consumer Financial Protection Act are valid and constitutional. Judge Higginson found that neither the text of the United States Constitution nor the Supreme Court's previous decisions support appellants' arguments that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is unconstitutionally structured, and thus he affirmed the district court's judgment.More than two years later, and after conducting a vote among the circuit judges, the Fifth Circuit vacated its previous opinion and elected to hear the case en banc. View "CFPB v. All American Check Cashing, et al" on Justia Law

Outstanding debt for Chicago traffic tickets surpassed $1.8 billion last year. Under a 2016 Chicago ordinance, when a driver incurs the needed number of outstanding tickets and final liability determinations, Chicago is authorized to impound her vehicle and to attach a possessory lien. Many drivers cannot afford to pay their outstanding tickets and fees, let alone the liens imposed on their cars through this process. Mance incurred several unpaid parking tickets; her car was impounded and subject to a possessory lien of $12,245, more than four times her car’s value. With a monthly income of $197 in food stamps, Mance filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and sought to avoid the lien under 11 U.S.C 522(f). When a vehicle owner files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, she can avoid a lien under 522(f) if the lien qualifies as judicial and its value exceeds the value of her exempt property (the car). If the lien is statutory, it is not avoidable under the same provision.The bankruptcy and district courts and the Seventh Circuit concluded that the lien was judicial and avoidable. The lien was tied inextricably to the prior adjudications of Mance’s parking and other infractions, so it did not arise solely by statute, as the Bankruptcy Code requires for a statutory lien. View "City of Chicago v. Mance" on Justia Law

This case arose from an ongoing investigation by the district attorneys’ offices of several California counties into the debt collection practices of Alorica Inc. (Alorica), specifically the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act. In November 2019, the district attorneys' offices (collectively referred to as the State) served Alorica with an investigative subpoena. The subpoena contained 11 separate document requests and covered the time period from February 2015 through the date the subpoena was served. The State directed Alorica to respond by December 13, 2019, and to specify whether any of the requested records were no longer in Alorica’s “possession, custody or control.” Alorica served its objections and responses to the subpoena. Alorica objected to most of the requests, and argued that the requests violated Alorica’s right to privacy and right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Alorica claimed that it did not have any debt collection clients, so it denied having any of the requested agreements with clients related to debt collection, policies and procedures relating to the collection of consumer debt, or call records of debt collection calls as to the defined top five clients. One year later, in November 2020, the People petitioned for an order compelling full compliance with the subpoena. Alorica opposed and argued that it was not a debt collector subject to the Rosenthal Act, so the subpoena was invalid as it was not reasonably relevant to an investigation concerning debt collection. Alorica ultimately lost its argument and was ordered to produce files in accordance with the administrative subpoena. View "California v. Alorica, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Robin Thornton and Michael Lucero alleged defendants Tyson Foods, Inc., Cargill Meat Solutions, Corp., JBS USA Food Company, and National Beef Packing Company, LLC, used deceptive and misleading labels on their beef products. In particular, plaintiffs contended the “Product of the U.S.A.” label on defendants’ beef products was misleading and deceptive in violation of New Mexico law because the beef products did not originate from cattle born and raised in the United States. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the federal agency tasked with ensuring the labels were not misleading or deceptive preapproved the labels at issue here. In seeking to establish that defendants’ federally approved labels were nevertheless misleading and deceptive under state law, plaintiffs sought to impose labeling requirements that were different than or in addition to the federal requirements. The Tenth Circuit concluded plaintiffs’ deceptive-labeling claims were expressly preempted by federal law. Further, the Court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for false advertising. View "Thornton, et al. v. Tyson Foods, et al." on Justia Law

Winn-Dixie sells Bacardi’s Bombay Gin in its stores. According to Bombay’s marketing and labeling, the gin contains ten “hand-selected botanicals from exotic locations around the world,” including “grains of paradise.” Marrache filed a class action under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) and for unjust enrichment, alleging that the inclusion of grains of paradise violated Florida Statute 562.455.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. FDUTPA’s safe harbor provision exempts acts or practices required or specifically permitted by federal law. Under the Food Additives Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA had expressly identified grains of paradise as a substance “generally recognized as safe.” In addition, the complaint did not sufficiently allege any actual damages resulting from the purported unfair or deceptive act. Marrache’s amended complaint made no allegations of actual damages, but rather, alleged that he and the other class members were injured by purchasing an illegal product that he claimed was worthless. Marrache did not, however, allege that he could not or did not drink the gin, that he sought a refund of or complained about the Bombay, or that he suffered any side effect, health issue, or harm from the grains of paradise. View "Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

The 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, implemented through the FDA, 21 U.S.C. 387a(b), 393(d)(2), prohibits manufacturers from selling any “new tobacco product” without authorization. The FDA’s 2016, “Deeming Rule” classified electronic nicotine delivery systems (e-cigarettes) as a “new tobacco product.” To avoid an overnight shutdown of the e-cigarette industry, the FDA delayed enforcement of the Deeming Rule then required e-cigarette makers to submit premarket tobacco applications (PMTAs). Originally, the FDA required that all PMTAs be filed by 2018. The FDA later extended the PMTA deadline to 2022 but then moved the deadline to 2020. Initially, the FDA’s guidance stated that “in general, FDA does not expect that applicants will need to conduct long-term studies to support an application” but later changed course and required long-term studies of e-cigarettes.Triton had e-cigarette products on the market before the Deeming Rule. Triton (and others) submitted PMTAs for flavored e-cigarettes. In August 2021, the FDA announced that it would deny the PMTAs for 55,000 flavored e-cigarettes, stating it “likely” needed evidence from long-term studies." Less than a week later, Triton submitted a letter stating that it intended to conduct long-term studies of its products. About two weeks later, the FDA issued Triton a marketing denial order. The Fifth Circuit granted a temporary administrative stay and, later, a full stay, “to prevent the FDA from shutting down Triton’s business” pending disposition of Triton’s petition. View "Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C. v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed a putative class action challenge to ConAgra’s poultry labels and its website advertising, alleging that ConAgra falsely advertised its frozen chicken products as natural and preservative-free, when in fact they contain synthetic ingredients. The court found the claims preempted by the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), 21 U.S.C. 467e, under which the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service’s (FSIS) had approved ConAgra’s poultry labels.The Ninth Circuit reversed in part; the mere existence of the label was insufficient to establish that it was reviewed and approved by FSIS. Preemption is an affirmative defense, and when the parties dispute whether review occurred at all, the defendant must produce evidence that the label was reviewed and approved by FSIS. If the evidence on remand shows that ConAgra’s label was approved by FSIS, then the claims are preempted. The plaintiff may not assert that FSIS’s approval decision was wrong. ConAgra’s website representations were not reviewed by FSIS. The label and the website were not materially identical. A challenge to that part of the website’s representation that was materially different from the representations on the label is not preempted. The court rejected an argument under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, a prudential doctrine under which courts may determine that the initial decision-making responsibility should be performed by the relevant agency rather than the courts. View "Cohen v. ConAgra Brands, Inc." on Justia Law