Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A municipal corporation operating a large regional commuter rail system in the Chicago area provided rail service on lines owned by a freight rail company. For decades, this service was conducted under a series of agreements, but in 2019, the freight rail company announced it would cease operating the commuter trains. Following litigation, the freight company obtained a declaratory judgment that it had no ongoing obligation to provide such service. While the commuter rail operator began transitioning to run the service itself, the parties failed to reach agreement on compensation for continued use of the lines. With no long-term agreement in place and negotiations at an impasse, the commuter rail operator applied to the federal Surface Transportation Board for terminal trackage rights, which would allow it to use the lines despite the lack of agreement.The Surface Transportation Board granted the application, finding the lines to be terminal facilities for a reasonable distance from the terminal, and that the use would be practicable, in the public interest, and not substantially impair the freight carrier’s operations. The Board did not set compensation or use conditions at that time but pledged to do so retroactively if the parties could not agree. The freight rail company sought review of this decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.The Eighth Circuit held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in granting terminal trackage rights to the commuter operator, including over the full extent of the lines at issue, and properly concluded the public interest was served. However, the court found that the Board erred by granting immediate rights without first ensuring that compensation was paid or adequately secured, as required by statute. The court vacated the Board’s order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing time for the parties to address compensation. View "Union Pacific Railroad Company v. STB" on Justia Law

A developer formed a company in 2006 and purchased property in the Town of West Yellowstone, Montana, intending to construct a 48-unit condominium project. The developer obtained a building permit and a “Will Serve Letter” from the Town, confirming that water, sewer, and storm drainage services would be provided. Construction began in 2007 but ceased in 2011, after which the building permit expired due to inactivity. The developer did not reapply for a permit, nor did it renew related approvals. In 2019, the Town adopted a resolution limiting new wastewater connections due to capacity concerns. In 2020, the developer attempted to sell the property, contingent on confirmation that service connections would still be honored. The Town responded that hookups would be permitted when capacity allowed but did not guarantee immediate service.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied the Town’s argument that the developer’s claims were time-barred under statutory limitations, ruling that the claims accrued only when the Town refused to guarantee connections in 2020. However, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Town on the merits, finding that the Will Serve Letter did not create an enforceable contract or vested right to service after years of inactivity and expired permits, and that the Town did not owe a special duty under the public duty doctrine.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that the developer’s claims were timely but that, even assuming a contract existed, any right to service under the Will Serve Letter expired after a prolonged period of project inactivity and lapsed permits. The Court further held that the Town owed no special duty to the developer beyond its general obligations to the public, and summary judgment for the Town was appropriate. View "West Development, LLC v. Town of W. Yellowstone" on Justia Law

Two companies competed for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) hardware contract related to air traffic control tower simulators. Adacel, having already secured a related software contract, knew that its own software would be used, giving it an informational advantage over Adsync, which was unaware of the software selection. Adacel’s bid was lower, and it initially won the hardware contract. Adsync protested, and the FAA’s Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA) found Adacel’s advantage unfair. The FAA allowed Adsync to revise its bid with knowledge of the software, but restricted changes to those attributable to the new information and barred Adacel from revising its bid.After Adsync revised its proposal with significant price reductions, the FAA’s contracting team accepted most, but rejected about $734,000 in reductions pertaining to basic hardware, finding Adsync had failed to justify their connection to the software selection. As a result, Adacel’s bid remained lower, and it again won the contract. Adsync filed a second protest with ODRA, challenging the FAA’s rejection of some price reductions, the technical evaluation, and the best value determination. ODRA concluded that the FAA had a rational basis for its decisions and recommended denial of the protest. The FAA adopted ODRA’s recommendations.Adsync sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court held that the FAA did not violate its Acquisition Management System Guidance’s “price realism” provision, as it was not applicable to the remedial rebid context. The court further found substantial evidence supported the FAA’s rejection of certain price reductions and concluded that ODRA did not abuse its discretion in denying bid and proposal costs. Accordingly, the petition was denied. View "Adsync Technologies, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

In the aftermath of severe flooding in Whitley County, Kentucky, the county government sought bids for infrastructure repair projects, specifying that bids should use unit pricing for materials. King-Crete Drilling, Inc. submitted bids and was awarded contracts for two projects. During the bidding and performance phase, King-Crete asserted that a county official directed it to rely on FEMA specifications for material quantities but assured payment for actual quantities required to complete the projects, even if these exceeded the bid amounts. After completing the work, King-Crete invoiced the county for the unit prices multiplied by the actual quantities used. The county, however, paid only the original bid amounts.King-Crete sued the county and the official, claiming breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and seeking to enforce oral modifications to the contract. The Whitley Circuit Court denied the county’s motion to dismiss, allowing the claims to proceed. The county and the official appealed. The Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that the county was immune from suit due to sovereign immunity and dismissed all claims against it. The Court of Appeals also found the official could not be personally liable but remanded for further proceedings to clarify his immunity status.On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that, while the Kentucky Model Procurement Code does not waive counties’ sovereign immunity, longstanding common law allows enforcement of express written contracts against counties. The Court reversed in part, holding that King-Crete’s claim to enforce the express written contract may proceed. However, the Court affirmed dismissal of claims based on oral contract modifications and unjust enrichment, as sovereign immunity bars such relief. The case was remanded to the circuit court to interpret the written contract’s terms and determine whether the county met its contractual obligations. View "KING-CRETE DRILLING, INC. V. WHITLEY COUNTY FISCAL COURT" on Justia Law

Several employees of Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc. sued their employer, seeking prevailing wages under the Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) for certain repair and replacement work they performed pursuant to a contract between Veolia and the Springfield Water and Sewer Commission. That contract was authorized by a 1997 Massachusetts Special Act, which provided that work falling within "the construction and design of improvements" remained governed by the PWA. The disputed work occurred during the contract’s second stage, which involved ongoing operation, maintenance, repair, and replacement of wastewater facilities.After both sides moved for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled for Veolia. The court concluded that the employees’ work did not fall under "construction and design of improvements" as used in the Special Act and, relying on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s (SJC) decision in Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc., determined that the structure of the procurement scheme made the PWA inapplicable to the service contract as a whole. The employees appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, reviewing the case, certified two questions regarding Massachusetts law to the SJC. The SJC clarified that "construction and design of improvements" in the Special Act is broader than the PWA’s definition of “construction” but does not include ordinary repairs or maintenance. The SJC also held that the Special Act was not incompatible with the PWA and that Metcalf was not controlling. Based on the SJC’s answers, the First Circuit held that the district court’s summary judgment for Veolia could not stand, reversed the order, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine which, if any, of the employees’ tasks fell within the statutory phrase. View "Nicholls v. Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc." on Justia Law

A conservation district in Montgomery County, Texas, required large water users to reduce groundwater usage by 30%. To facilitate compliance, the San Jacinto River Authority (the “River Authority”), a political subdivision of Texas, created a joint groundwater reduction plan and entered into contracts with about 80 utilities, including Quadvest, L.P. (“Quadvest”). These contracts required participants to pay certain fees and, at the River Authority’s discretion, to connect to surface water provided by the River Authority. The fees aimed to equalize costs between groundwater and surface water users and to finance new infrastructure. Quadvest, a family-owned utility, initially operated only in the retail market and later expanded into wholesale water supply.After the relevant groundwater regulations were rescinded due to political changes and litigation, Quadvest challenged the lawfulness of its contract with the River Authority in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. It alleged that the contract constituted an unlawful restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, specifically as per se illegal horizontal price-fixing and market allocation. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the River Authority, concluding that Quadvest failed to prove its claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenged contract did not constitute a per se illegal horizontal restraint because the parties were not competitors at the time of contracting, and the agreement was vertical in nature. The court further determined that the contract did not fix prices or allocate markets in a manner prohibited by the Sherman Act. Under the rule of reason, Quadvest also failed to define the relevant market and thus could not demonstrate anticompetitive effects. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Quadvest v. San Jacinto River Auth" on Justia Law

Water districts in California that received water from the federal Central Valley Project sought to convert their water service contracts into repayment contracts under the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act. This conversion allowed the districts to prepay construction costs in exchange for contracts that would last indefinitely, rather than for a set term. The Bureau of Reclamation, which manages the Central Valley Project, converted 67 contracts upon request from water districts, modifying only the payment terms and leaving other contractual rights unchanged. The Bureau did not conduct contract-specific environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or consult with wildlife agencies under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) before making these conversions.The Center for Biological Diversity and other plaintiffs challenged the Bureau’s actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. They argued that the Bureau was required to undertake NEPA review and ESA consultation before converting each contract, because the conversions would impact the environment and protected species in the Bay-Delta ecosystem. The district court compelled joinder of the affected water districts and granted summary judgment to the Bureau and the water districts. The court found that the WIIN Act imposed a mandatory duty on the Bureau to convert contracts upon request, and that the Bureau lacked discretion to alter terms for environmental protection, so NEPA and the ESA did not apply.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that section 4011(a) of the WIIN Act requires the Bureau to convert water service contracts upon request, permitting only changes related to payment structure and not to other contractual rights. Because the conversions are nondiscretionary, the Bureau is not required to conduct NEPA review or ESA consultation. The Ninth Circuit also found that this interpretation does not violate the WIIN Act’s savings clauses. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION" on Justia Law

A Chinese drone manufacturer and its subsidiary challenged their designation by the U.S. Secretary of Defense as a “Chinese military company” under Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act. The designation, which is published annually, restricts the company from contracting with certain government agencies and can damage its business reputation. DJI was added to the list in 2022 and again in 2024 and 2025 without prior notice. DJI petitioned for removal, which was denied, and subsequently received a report explaining the designation, though portions of the rationale were redacted.DJI filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. The company argued that it was denied due process, that there was insufficient evidence for the designation, that the agency failed to explain disparate treatment compared to other companies, and that the Secretary’s finding that DJI “contributes” to the Chinese defense industrial base was unsupported. The district court granted summary judgment against DJI, relying solely on the unclassified administrative record and declining to review the classified materials.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s rejection of DJI’s due process, evidentiary, and disparate treatment claims, holding that DJI failed to show deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest, and that sufficient evidence supported the finding that DJI received government assistance. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s conclusion regarding DJI’s “contribution” to the Chinese defense industrial base, finding that the lower court improperly relied on post hoc agency arguments and failed to review the classified record. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. v. DOD" on Justia Law

A student enrolled in a respiratory therapy program at a public university in Georgia was disciplined following an incident during his clinical externship, where he was found responsible for endangering the health or safety of a patient. As a result, the university assigned him a failing grade in his clinical class. The student, who has attention deficit disorder, anxiety, and depression, alleged that university personnel were aware of his conditions. He claimed that prior to the disciplinary hearing, he was denied access to evidence and that the hearing procedures did not comply with the university’s written policies.After exhausting internal university appeals, the student filed a lawsuit in Georgia state court against the Board of Regents and several employees, asserting breach of contract and disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, among other claims. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The district court dismissed the breach of contract claim on the basis of state sovereign immunity, finding no enforceable written contract that would waive immunity. The court also dismissed the disability discrimination claims for failure to state a claim, holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege adverse action taken because of the student’s disability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that neither the admission letter nor the student handbook, alone or together, constituted a written contract sufficient to waive Georgia’s sovereign immunity, as neither document set forth all essential terms, especially as to consideration. The court further held that the student’s complaint failed to plausibly allege that the university’s actions were taken because of his disabilities. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the student’s breach of contract and disability discrimination claims. View "Waller v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia" on Justia Law

Daryl Moore was employed by the Coahoma County School District Board as an at-will assistant coach for the high school boys’ basketball team during the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years. He was paid $1,500 per year for his assistant coaching duties. Moore claimed that, at the request of the athletic director, he also performed the duties of the head coach for the junior-high boys’ basketball team but was never compensated for those additional responsibilities. He asserted that he was entitled to $5,000 for serving as the junior-high head coach over two years and brought suit against the Board for unjust enrichment and underpayment.The County Court of Coahoma County reviewed Moore’s claims after he filed suit for unpaid compensation. The Board moved for summary judgment, relying on Mississippi’s “minutes rule,” which requires that any binding contract with a public board be reflected in the board’s official minutes. The court denied summary judgment, finding that factual disputes remained regarding Moore’s coaching roles and compensation, and granted Moore additional time for discovery. The Board appealed, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted interlocutory review under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 5.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Moore’s claims were barred by the minutes rule because there was no evidence in the Board’s minutes of any agreement to pay Moore as head coach or to increase his compensation. The Court found that, since the Board’s minutes did not reflect approval of additional pay for head-coaching duties, Moore could not recover under theories of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court reversed the county court’s decision and rendered summary judgment in favor of the Board. View "Coahoma County School District Board of Education v. Moore" on Justia Law