Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a written agreement between the City of Rutland and the Vermont Swim Association (VSA) that granted VSA the right to host its annual swim meet at a facility in a city park. VSA appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the City. Because the plain language of the parties' contract did not require VSA to pay attorney's fees incurred by the City in pursuing either indemnity from VSA or other third-party actions, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Five companies entered into special contracts with the Toledo Edison Company for the sale of electricity. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) established February 2008 as the termination date for the contracts, basing its finding on the language of the special contracts and its orders in earlier electric-deregulation cases. Appellants challenged the decision, contending (1) Toledo Edison agreed in 2001 that the contracts would not terminate until Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges from its customers, and (2) December 31, 2008 was the date when Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PUCO ignored the plain language of the 2001 amendments to Appellants' special contracts, and accordingly, the PUCO unlawfully and unreasonably allowed Toledo Edison to terminate the special contracts in February 2008.

Eric Walters was a federal employee covered by a Standard Option health insurance plan (the Plan) administered by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City (Blue Cross). In November 2007 he went to Weight Loss Healthcare Centers of America, Inc. (Weight Loss) to inquire about surgical treatment for obesity. Because Weight Loss had no contractual arrangement with Blue Cross as either a preferred provider or a participating provider, Walters would expect to pay more than if he used a provider that had a contract. Nevertheless, Walters had outpatient laparoscopic surgery at Weight Loss to help him better control his weight. Although Walters obtained preauthorization from Blue Cross for the surgery, there was no indication in the record that he requested or received information about his out-of-pocket costs. Weight Loss billed Blue Cross for the procedure. The Blue Cross Plan paid $2,300 according to the Planâs benefit for out-of-network providers. Weight Loss appealed the payment to the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which held that Blue Crossâs interpretation of Waltersâs Plan was correct and it had paid the proper amount. The district court affirmed OPMâs decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit determined that OPM reasonably interpreted the Plan language. However, the Court reversed the district courtâs decision because OPM neither (1) reviewed the evidence that would show whether Blue Cross had correctly calculated the Plan allowance, nor (2) explained why such review was unnecessary.

The Industrial Development Board of the City of Montgomery (IDB) appealed a circuit court's interlocutory order that denied its motion for summary judgment as to a breach-of-contract claim asserted against it by George and Thomas Russell as co-executors and co-trustees of the wills and testamentary trusts of Earnest and Myrtis Russell, Price and Mary McLemore and several others. In 2001, various officials of the State of Alabama, the City of Montgomery, the Montgomery County Commission, Montgomery Chamber of Commerce and the local water works board began making preparations to secure options to purchase property in the Montgomery area in an attempt to persuade Hyundai Motor Company to build an automobile plant in the area. All the trusts owned acres of land in the targeted area. The IDB signed separate options with the Russells, the McLemores and other trusts to purchase the respective properties. Hyundai's plans for its manufacturing plant changed, and subsequently, not all of the options were exercised. The Russells and the McLemores each filed breach-of-contract actions against the IDB and Hyundai alleging that neither adhered to the terms of their respective options. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the IDB's motion for summary judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Two appeals between MPQ, Inc. (d/b/a Freedom Enterprises) and Birmingham Realty Company were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purposes of this opinion. The parties entered into a commercial lease agreement. Birmingham Realty filed suit against MPQ for unpaid rent in circuit court. MPQ filed a counterclaim. Birmingham Realty filed a separate unlawful-detainer action against MPQ in district court. The district court dismissed the detainer action, reasoning that the simultaneous actions in the district and circuit courts violated Alabama's abatement statute. Birmingham Realty appealed the district court's dismissal to the circuit court and filed a motion to dismiss MPQ's counterclaim. The circuit court conducted a hearing on all pending motions. It then entered an order affirming the district court's dismissal of the unlawful-detainer action and dismissed MPQ's counterclaims in the rent action. The court suggested that Birmingham Realty move to dismiss the rent action without prejudice so it could refile its unlawful-detainer action in the district court and then later refile an action in circuit court to seek the unpaid rent. Birmingham Realty took the court's advice and filed the suggested motions. MPQ filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the court's decision in its counterclaim. The circuit court did not rule on either motion. The parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Birmingham Realty's appeal from the district court to the circuit court was not timely, and as such, the court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal with regard to the unlawful-detainer action and remanded the remaining issues for further proceedings.

This case arose when the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), division of the Department of Homeland Security, changed local work assignments for its inspectors without first negotiating with their union. CBP petitioned for review of the Federal Labor Relations Authority's (Authority) affirmance of an arbitrator's conclusion that this was an unfair labor practice. The court denied the petition for review and rejected CBP's argument that it had no duty to bargain over the disputed changes in work assignment policies because the changes were "covered by" the Revised National Inspectional Assignment Policy (RNIAP) and that, in the alternative, that CBP had no duty to bargain over the changes it made pursuant to the RNIAP because they did not alter inspectors' "conditions" of employment. Accordingly, the court deferred to the Authority's reasonable determination that the RNIAP was not a collective bargaining agreement subject to the "covered by" doctrine and the Authority's reasonable conclusion that the cases CBP cited did not govern the dispute here. Therefore, the court held that the Authority adequately explained its conclusion.

Employee was injured while working in Minnesota for Wisconsin-based Employer. Employee applied for Wisconsin and Minnesota workers' compensation benefits. Employer's insurance company, Travelers Insurance, covered the Wisconsin benefits but denied the claim for Minnesota benefits based on an exclusion of Minnesota coverage in Employee's policy. Employee then filed a claim for Minnesota benefits with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry. After settling the claim, the Department pursued a petition for reimbursement it had filed against Employer. A compensation judge found that Employer was not insured for Minnesota workers' compensation liability and ordered Employer to reimburse the Department. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that Employer was entitled to coverage from Travelers under the reasonable expectations doctrine. On review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of a recent Court decision clarifying that the doctrine should not be used to provide coverage in contravention of unambiguous policy terms. On remand, the WCCA again reversed the compensation judge. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WCCA had no authority to declare unambiguous language of an insurance contract to be invalid and unenforceable because the exclusion conflicted with Wisconsin statutory provisions and public policy.

The qui tam suit, brought by a former contractor for one of the defendants, alleges that defendants violated the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1) in connection with a sale of F-16 fighter jets to Greece, which paid for the jets with money borrowed from the United States. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. An FCA claim requires proof of an objective falsehood. There was no evidence to support allegations: that defendant lied about use of funds loaned by the U.S. to capitalize a Greek business development company; that defendant failed to disclose promptly its decision to delete a price adjustment clause from the draft contract; that defendant made misrepresentations relating to provisions concerning spare part purchases and an ill-fated "depot program;" and concerning a number of misrepresentations in two amendments to the contract.

The Maryland State Retirement System (System) filed a claim against Milliman, an actuary, asserting that Milliman had understated the contributions required to fund three of the State's ten retirement and pension systems because of Milliman's misinterpretation of a particular data code. The Retirement System Procurement Officer determined that Milliman had failed to comply with its contractual duties and awarded damages to the System. On appeal, the State Board of Contract Appeals determined that the actuary had substantially breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the damages. The circuit court affirmed the Board's findings that Milliman breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the award of lost investment earnings but reversed the Board's award of amounts equaling lost contributions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding (1) Milliman was liable to the System for repeatedly misinterpreting a data code; (2) the System was not negligent in the development or transmission of data provided to Milliman and, therefore, contributory negligence did not bar the System's recovery; and (3) the circuit court erroneously reduced the Board's damage award representing lost contributions. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment of the circuit court and affirmed the Board's decision.

This case stemmed from petitioner's rates filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for its Michigan oil pipeline where petitioner agreed with two of its three shippers to restrict rate increases for a three-year moratorium period. At issue was the initial rate petitioner must use to calculate its new annual ceiling levels. Petitioner argued that after the end of the moratorium period, its ceiling levels should be calculated as if its maximum rates had been set under FERC's indexing methodology all along. In contrast, FERC would simply pick up the rates where the settlement agreement left off, using the last rate under the agreement as the initial rate for the period after the agreement. The court held that neither the agreement nor the relevant regulations clearly laid out how to determine the rates petitioner could charge now that the three-year period had past. Therefore, finding both the agreement and the regulations ambiguous, the court deferred to the reasonable views of FERC and denied petitioner's petition for review.