Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Dallas Fenton was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen-year-old child, including eight counts of third-degree sexual offense, one count of sexual solicitation of a minor, and one count of indecent exposure. He was sentenced to ten years for one of the third-degree sexual offenses (Count 1) and another ten years for a different third-degree sexual offense (Count 8), to be served consecutively.The Division of Correction (DOC) informed Fenton that he would not receive diminution of confinement credits for the sentence on Count 8 because he had been previously convicted of a similar offense (Count 1). Fenton's grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (IGO) was dismissed, and the Circuit Court for Washington County partially granted and partially denied his petition for judicial review, ruling that he was entitled to good conduct credits but not other types of diminution credits for Count 8.The Appellate Court of Maryland held that Fenton was not prohibited from accruing diminution credits for Count 8, as the statute only applied if the previous conviction occurred before the commission of the offense for which the sentence was being served. The court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for recalculation of Fenton's credits.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, holding that under Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-702(c), diminution credits are precluded only if the offense was committed after a previous conviction for the same offense. The court concluded that Fenton was entitled to diminution credits for Count 8, as he had not been "previously convicted" at the time of the offense. View "Dept. of Pub. Saf. & Corr. Serv. v. Fenton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jere Eaton sued the City of Stamford and police officer Steven Estabrook, alleging that Estabrook used excessive force during a protest on August 8, 2020. Eaton claimed that Estabrook lifted her by her bra strap, drove her backward several feet, and dropped her on the ground without warning, violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights and committing assault and battery under Connecticut state law. Estabrook and the City of Stamford moved for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity and state governmental immunity.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that while there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Estabrook used excessive force, Estabrook was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time that his actions were unconstitutional. The court also granted summary judgment on Eaton’s state law claims, concluding that Estabrook was entitled to state governmental immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the use of excessive force. However, the appellate court concluded that Estabrook was not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage because the same factual disputes also affected whether his actions were clearly established as unconstitutional at the time. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court upheld the district court’s decision regarding state governmental immunity for the state law claims. View "Eaton v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

Detective Genaro Hernandez, a Dallas Police Department detective, was involved in a shooting investigation outside The Green Elephant bar in August 2019. Hernandez, who also worked for the Stainback Organization, allegedly pursued false charges against the bar's owner, Shannon McKinnon, and a security guard, Guadalupe Frias, to benefit his private employer. Despite the Special Investigation Unit finding no criminal offense by the plaintiffs, Hernandez bypassed standard procedures and directly sought prosecution from the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office, leading to the plaintiffs' indictment for tampering with evidence. The charges were later dropped when Hernandez's conflict of interest was revealed during Frias's trial.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Hernandez, alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution, and state-law claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and civil conspiracy. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the federal malicious-prosecution claim but allowed the federal false-arrest claim and the state-law claims to proceed. Hernandez appealed, arguing he was entitled to governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Hernandez's actions, despite being motivated by personal interests, fell within the scope of his employment as a detective. The court held that Texas law provides broad immunity to state actors for actions within their employment scope, regardless of intent. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's decision denying dismissal of the state-law claims and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining federal claim. View "Frias v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Brian Beck was driving on Interstate 70 when a Geary County sheriff's deputy noticed that a frame around Beck's license plate partially obstructed the state name. The deputy executed a traffic stop, during which Beck appeared nervous and provided an odd explanation for his travel route. The deputy called for canine support, and the dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Beck consented to a search, and deputies found methamphetamine in his car. Beck was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possessing a controlled substance without a drug tax stamp, and interference with law enforcement.The Geary District Court denied Beck's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, ruling that the partial obstruction of the state name on the license plate justified the traffic stop. Beck was found guilty on all counts by a jury. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the partial obstruction of the state name constituted a violation of Kansas law, thus justifying the stop.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Kansas law does not require the state name on a license plate to be clearly legible, only the alphanumeric display and registration decal. Therefore, the partial obstruction of the state name did not provide reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The court reversed Beck's convictions based on the evidence obtained during the search and remanded the case to the district court for a new hearing to determine if there were other valid grounds for the stop and seizure. View "State v. Beck " on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law

Martin Flanagan, a former employee of Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against his former employer. He alleged that Fresenius engaged in a fraudulent kickback scheme to induce referrals to its dialysis clinics, violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). Flanagan claimed that Fresenius offered below-cost contracts to hospitals, overcompensated medical directors, and provided other benefits to secure patient referrals, which were then billed to Medicare and Medicaid.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland initially handled the case, which was later transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed Flanagan's complaint for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that the amended complaint did not adequately allege specific false claims or provide representative examples. Additionally, the court ruled that some of Flanagan's claims were barred by the FCA's public-disclosure and first-to-file rules. The district court also denied Flanagan's motion to amend his complaint, citing undue delay and potential prejudice to Fresenius.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Flanagan failed to plead the alleged fraud with the required particularity. The appellate court also upheld the denial of the motion to amend, noting that Flanagan had ample time to address the deficiencies in his complaint but failed to do so. The First Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Flanagan v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Derrick Clark and Shawn Mesner worked for Didion Milling, Inc., a corn milling company. In May 2017, Didion’s grain mill exploded, killing five employees. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) investigated and referred Didion for criminal prosecution. The government charged Didion and several employees with federal crimes related to their work at the mill. Clark and Mesner proceeded to trial, challenging the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality of their convictions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin convicted Clark on four counts and Mesner on two counts. Clark was found guilty of conspiracy to commit federal offenses, false entries in records, using false documents within the EPA’s jurisdiction, and obstruction of agency proceedings. Mesner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit federal offenses. Both defendants were sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated Mesner’s conviction on Count 4, remanding for an entry of judgment of acquittal and further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, as well as Clark’s convictions and Mesner’s conviction on Count 1. The court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions and determined that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, accurately reflected the law. The court also rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the OSHA regulation involved. View "USA v Mesner" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of consumers, filed a lawsuit against General Motors (GM) and Robert Bosch LLC, alleging that the companies misled consumers about the emissions produced by certain Chevrolet Cruze vehicles. They claimed that the vehicles emitted higher levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx) than advertised and that the emissions control systems were manipulated to pass regulatory tests. The plaintiffs sought damages under various state fraud laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially dismissed some of the plaintiffs' claims, ruling that those based on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards were preempted by the Clean Air Act. The court allowed other claims to proceed, particularly those alleging that GM's advertising misled consumers about the vehicles' emissions. However, after the Sixth Circuit's decision in a similar case (In re Ford Motor Company F-150 and Ranger Truck Fuel Economy Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation), the district court revisited its decision and dismissed the remaining fraud claims, concluding they were preempted by federal law. The court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on the RICO claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court should determine whether the plaintiffs' remaining claims could proceed without relying on a disagreement with the EPA's determinations. The court remanded the case for the district court to decide if the claims were preempted under the analysis described. The court affirmed the dismissal of the RICO claims and the denial of the plaintiffs' post-judgment motion to vacate the judgment in part and approve a preliminary settlement agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Counts v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Treyton Bailey was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested for suspicion of DUI after officers observed signs of impairment. Although Bailey consented to a blood test, the result was excluded due to a discrepancy in the chain of custody. Despite the lack of a valid test result, Service Oklahoma revoked Bailey's license. Bailey argued that Service Oklahoma lacked statutory authority to mail the revocation notice by regular mail, that revocation is invalid absent a certificate or affidavit of mailing even where the licensee received and acted upon the notice, and that revocation cannot be sustained without a valid test result when the driver did not refuse testing.The district court rejected Bailey's arguments, finding that Section 2-116 applies to Service Oklahoma and authorizes the agency to serve revocation notice by regular mail. The court also found that the State's proof of service was admissible and sufficient to establish adequate proof that notice was properly served. Additionally, the court determined that despite the exclusion of the blood result, the State met its burden of proof based on other competent evidence. The district court entered a Final Order Sustaining Revocation, which Bailey appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the district court's order. The court held that Service Oklahoma is authorized to provide revocation notice by regular mail under Title 47, Section 2-116, and that this interpretation is necessary to preserve the coherence of the statutory scheme following the Legislature's transfer of authority to Service Oklahoma. The court also held that Bailey's due process challenge failed, as the record reflected that he received written notice of the revocation and acted upon it by filing a petition for judicial review. Finally, the court held that the district court properly sustained the revocation of Bailey's license based on the officer's sworn report and other competent evidence, despite the exclusion of the blood test result. View "Bailey v State of Oklahoma ex rel. Service Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Zackaria Dahir Mohamed, a native of Somalia, entered the United States as a child refugee in 1998. He was later convicted of several offenses, including theft and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him due to these convictions. An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered his removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. Mohamed then petitioned for review.The IJ initially found Mohamed removable for aggravated felony theft and crimes of violence. In 2020, the IJ ordered his removal to Somalia. Mohamed appealed to the BIA, which remanded the case to the IJ to assess Mohamed’s competency. On remand, Mohamed presented evidence of his mental health history, including a psychological evaluation by Dr. Jerry Kroll. The IJ ruled in 2021 that Mohamed was competent during the 2020 merits hearing, based on Dr. Kroll’s testimony and the IJ’s observations. The BIA dismissed Mohamed’s appeal on de novo review, leading to the current petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Mohamed argued that the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s competency finding was unsupported by the record. The court noted that it has jurisdiction to review final agency removal orders but not factual findings related to criminal offenses. The court found that Mohamed’s competency determination was a factual finding, which is generally affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Mohamed’s claims were barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).Even if Mohamed presented a legal or constitutional claim, the court found no fundamental procedural error or resulting prejudice. The IJ had considered all appropriate evidence, including Dr. Kroll’s testimony and Mohamed’s behavior during proceedings. The court concluded that there was no procedural error in holding a retroactive competency hearing. The petition for review was denied. View "Mohamed v. Bondi" on Justia Law