Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the United States government alleging that Regeneron Pharmaceuticals violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by covering copayments for patients prescribed Eylea, a drug used to treat wet age-related macular degeneration. The government contends that this action induced doctors to prescribe Eylea, leading to Medicare claims that were "false or fraudulent" under the False Claims Act (FCA) because they "resulted from" the AKS violation.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case and agreed with Regeneron's interpretation that the phrase "resulting from" in the 2010 amendment to the AKS requires a but-for causation standard. This means that the government must prove that the AKS violation was the actual cause of the Medicare claims. The district court noted the conflict in case law and sought interlocutory review, which was granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the phrase "resulting from" in the 2010 amendment to the AKS imposes a but-for causation requirement. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of "resulting from" requires actual causality, typically in the form of but-for causation, unless there are textual or contextual indications to the contrary. The court found no such indications in the 2010 amendment or its legislative history. Therefore, to establish falsity under the FCA based on an AKS violation, the government must prove that the kickback was a but-for cause of the submitted claim. View "United States v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

Angelo Jackson was identified as a suspect in a double murder in Montgomery County, Maryland, based on information from law enforcement officers. Detective Michael Carin used this information to obtain an arrest warrant for Jackson. After Jackson's arrest, Carin continued the investigation and found exculpatory evidence, including DNA and cellphone records, which led to the charges being dropped and Jackson's release after 65 days of detention.Jackson filed a lawsuit against Carin, alleging that Carin's affidavit for the arrest warrant and his grand jury testimony were deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth. Jackson claimed that if the commissioner and grand jury had been presented with truthful evidence, they would not have found probable cause for his arrest and indictment.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment in favor of Carin, finding that even with disputed material removed, the affidavit still provided probable cause for Jackson's arrest. The court also found that Carin was protected by qualified immunity on Jackson's federal claims and dismissed Jackson's gross negligence claim under Maryland law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that Carin did not violate legal standards in his investigation and was shielded by qualified immunity. The court also found that Carin's actions were reasonable and based on information he received from other officers, and that Jackson failed to meet the burden of proving that Carin's statements were false, made with reckless disregard for the truth, or material to the probable cause determination. View "Jackson v. Carin" on Justia Law

In February 2024, Cailin Leann Gackle was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the police department, Officer Cullen Hall conducted two breath test sequences using the Intoxilyzer 8000. The first test sequence was invalidated due to a "Difference Too Great" between the two samples. Officer Hall began the second test sequence 18 minutes after the first test ended, instead of the required 20 minutes. Gackle's driving privileges were suspended for 365 days based on the results of the second test.Gackle requested an administrative hearing, arguing that the breath test was not fairly administered because Officer Hall did not comply with the 20-minute waiting period required by the approved method. The hearing officer overruled her objection, admitted the test records, and upheld the suspension. Gackle appealed to the District Court of Ward County, which affirmed the Department of Transportation's decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Department failed to establish the fair administration of the breath test. The court determined that the approved method requires a 20-minute wait before beginning a new test sequence after an invalid test. Since Officer Hall only waited 18 minutes, the test was not administered in accordance with the approved method. The court held that without expert testimony to address the deviation, the test results could not be considered reliable. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case to the Department for reinstatement of Gackle's driving privileges. View "Gackle v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Christopher Hamilton was convicted of federal felony possession of child pornography. After a federal district court terminated his federal sex offender registration requirement, the California Attorney General notified him of his lifetime obligation to register under California law, pursuant to Penal Code section 290.005(a). The Attorney General determined that the state law equivalent of Hamilton’s federal offense required lifetime registration, placing him in the highest tier of California’s three-tier scheme.Hamilton petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to terminate his state registration requirement. The Superior Court denied his petition and a subsequent amended motion. Hamilton appealed the denials, arguing violations of equal protection and due process.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Attorney General’s classification of Hamilton’s offense as a felony with a lifetime registration requirement did not violate equal protection. The court reasoned that the federal offense’s classification as a felony, based on custodial exposure, justified the equivalent state offense’s classification as a felony. Additionally, the court found that the federal offense’s requirement of interstate or foreign commerce provided a rational basis for the different treatment.The court also rejected Hamilton’s due process challenge, concluding that he received notice and had opportunities to contest his tier designation through his petition and amended motion. Lastly, the court dismissed Hamilton’s vagueness challenge, finding that the term “equivalent” in section 290.005(a) was sufficiently clear when considered in context with other statutory provisions.The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s orders denying Hamilton’s petition and amended motion. View "People v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

On December 19, 2023, Lee Meiers was arrested for driving under the influence. The arresting officer read Meiers the implied consent advisory and conducted a chemical breath test, which showed an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. The officer completed and certified a report and notice form, printed and signed the test record and checklist, and provided copies to Meiers and the North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT). However, the officer did not certify the test record and checklist before forwarding it to the NDDOT.Meiers requested an administrative hearing, where he objected to the admission of the uncertified test record and checklist, arguing that it was not certified as required by N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1, and thus the NDDOT lacked authority to suspend his driving privileges. The hearing officer overruled the objection, admitted the test record and checklist, and suspended Meiers’s driving privileges for 180 days. Meiers appealed to the District Court of Mountrail County, which reversed the hearing officer’s decision, concluding that a certified copy of the test record and checklist was required to invoke the NDDOT’s authority.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the requirement in N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1(4) for the test record and checklist to be certified is not a basic and mandatory provision that impacts the NDDOT’s authority to suspend a driver’s privileges. The court emphasized that the certification requirement is for evidentiary purposes and can be accomplished through other means. Therefore, the NDDOT had the authority to suspend Meiers’s driving privileges despite the lack of certification on the test record and checklist. The Supreme Court reinstated the NDDOT’s decision to suspend Meiers’s driving privileges. View "Meiers v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

In 2015, Jesus Rodriguez-Morelos began offering Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) classes, falsely claiming they were affiliated with the nonprofit organization United with Migrants. He charged students for these classes, which were not state-approved, and used the nonprofit's name and tax-exempt document without authorization. Complaints about the classes led to an investigation by the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies (DORA), revealing that Rodriguez-Morelos was unlawfully receiving money for the unapproved classes.Rodriguez-Morelos was charged with several crimes, including identity theft under section 18-5-902(1)(a), C.R.S. (2024). A jury convicted him on all charges. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the theft and criminal impersonation convictions but vacated the identity theft conviction. The court concluded that the identity theft statute's definition of "personal identifying information" pertains to individuals, not organizations, and thus did not apply to Rodriguez-Morelos's use of the nonprofit's name and document.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the identity theft statute's reference to "personal identifying information" applies only to information concerning single, identified human beings, not organizations. Therefore, Rodriguez-Morelos's actions did not constitute identity theft under the statute. View "People v. Rodriguez-Morelos" on Justia Law

Two state forensic chemists in Massachusetts tampered with drug evidence and falsified test results, affecting tens of thousands of drug cases. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) vacated over 30,000 criminal cases due to this misconduct. The SJC ruled that under the Fourteenth Amendment, affected individuals were entitled to the repayment of most funds collected due to their vacated convictions but not the automatic return of forfeited property. Instead, individuals had to file motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.The plaintiffs, whose criminal convictions were vacated, sought a federal court order for the automatic return of their forfeited property and related relief. The Commonwealth defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits suits in federal court against a state by its own citizens. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint in part, ruling that it could not order the automatic return of forfeited property but allowed other claims to proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars all the relief sought by the plaintiffs. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims focused on a past wrong, and the Ex parte Young exception applies only to prospective relief against ongoing violations of federal law. Additionally, the state officials sued lacked the authority to enforce or change the state court procedures. The court reversed the district court's partial denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case in full. View "Cotto v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to 60 months in prison for Count 1, 100 months for Count 3, and 100 months for Count 5, with the sentences for Counts 3 and 5 to be served consecutively. The trial court also imposed terms of post-prison supervision (PPS) for each count, calculated as 240 months minus the term of imprisonment served for each count. The petitioner completed his prison terms and was released in April 2016.The Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision calculated the PPS terms by subtracting the time served for each count from the 240-month maximum, resulting in 180 months for Count 1 and 140 months for Counts 3 and 5. The petitioner argued that the "term of imprisonment served" should be the total time served for all counts, which would result in a shorter PPS term. The board rejected this argument, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the board's decision.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the "term of imprisonment served" in ORS 144.103 refers to the time spent in prison for the specific count of conviction, not the total time served for all counts. The court also concluded that the PPS term begins when the offender is released into the community, not while still incarcerated on other counts. Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. View "Kragt v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that one of the investigating officers had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the officer’s department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense counsel requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). Concurrently, the petitioner filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material from the officer’s personnel file. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the disclosure of the records related to the officer’s dishonesty, but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate the protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The trial court had issued the protective order under Evidence Code section 1045(e), which restricts the use of disclosed records to the court proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court noted that Senate Bill No. 1421 amended sections 832.7 and 832.8 to make certain law enforcement personnel records, including those involving sustained findings of dishonesty, nonconfidential and subject to public disclosure. The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for records that are nonconfidential under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer’s sustained finding of dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Leonardo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. The trial court found Garcia had made a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary hearing. Garcia's counsel subpoenaed the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for contact information of two witnesses, but the trial court granted the LAPD's motion to quash, ruling that section 1172.6 did not allow for postconviction discovery. Garcia then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging this decision.The trial court had previously found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, but on appeal, his first-degree murder conviction was reversed due to a change in the law, and his sentence was reduced to second-degree murder. Garcia's subsequent petitions for resentencing were initially denied, but his third petition led to the current proceedings. The trial court's decision to quash the subpoena was based on the belief that the evidentiary hearing should be limited to the facts presented at trial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that section 1172.6 allows for postconviction discovery after an order to show cause is issued. The court held that denying Garcia the ability to obtain relevant evidence would thwart his right to present or respond to new or additional evidence at the evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing Garcia from obtaining contact information for the witnesses, which could be crucial for his defense against new theories of liability. The appellate court granted Garcia's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the LAPD's motion to quash and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Garcia v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law