Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Hunt arrived at the Lee County Courthouse to testify in a criminal case. Directed outside due to courtroom scheduling, Hunt re-entered and sat on a staircase. Officer Dale Acosta confronted Hunt, leading to a heated exchange. Despite Hunt's explanation of his courthouse business, Acosta arrested him for obstruction, claiming Hunt disrupted the county tax office.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed most of Hunt's claims but allowed his Fourth Amendment claim against Acosta, a failure to train or supervise claim against Mayor Jimmy Williams and Chief of Police Martin Wilson, and a Monell claim against the City of Marianna. The court denied qualified and quasi-judicial immunity for Acosta and qualified immunity for Williams and Wilson. Acosta, Williams, and Wilson appealed the denial of immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of quasi-judicial immunity for Acosta's initial stop of Hunt, as Acosta acted under a judge's directive. However, the court affirmed the denial of quasi-judicial and qualified immunity for Acosta's arrest of Hunt, finding no probable cause for obstruction. The court also reversed the denial of qualified immunity for Williams and Wilson, ruling that Hunt failed to show a pattern of unconstitutional acts by Acosta that would have put them on notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Hunt v. Acosta" on Justia Law

Marc D. Curtis, an inmate at the North Central Correctional Complex, requested records from the Cleveland Municipal Court Clerk, Earle B. Turner, related to his criminal case. Curtis sought documents including arrest warrants, DNA search warrants, and cellphone search warrants. The clerk provided some documents but withheld others, citing that Curtis, as an inmate, could not access certain records without a judge's approval per R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Curtis filed a mandamus complaint to compel the clerk to produce the remaining records or confirm their nonexistence.The Eighth District Court of Appeals denied Curtis's writ of mandamus. The court relied on an affidavit from Ronald Tabor, the clerk’s assistant director, who stated that the clerk did not possess the requested records. The court found this affidavit sufficient to establish that the records were not in the clerk’s possession and noted that respondents are not required to create or provide access to nonexistent records.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eighth District's judgment. The court held that Curtis failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the clerk possessed the requested records. The court also denied Curtis's motion to take judicial notice of new documents and granted the clerk's motion to strike certain personal information from the record. The court concluded that the clerk had adequately demonstrated that the requested records were not in his possession, and Curtis did not rebut this evidence. View "State ex rel. Curtis v. Turner" on Justia Law

David Lesh, a social media content creator and owner of an outdoor apparel brand, posted photos on Instagram of himself snowmobiling at Keystone Resort, Colorado, during its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States charged him with using an over-snow vehicle on National Forest Service (NFS) land off a designated route and conducting unauthorized work activity on NFS land. A magistrate judge convicted him of both counts after a bench trial.The magistrate judge found Lesh guilty of using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, taking judicial notice of a publicly available map indicating that Keystone Resort was not designated for snowmobile use. Lesh's argument that the map's undated nature failed to provide sufficient notice was not preserved for appeal. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Lesh's conviction for using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, finding that Lesh had waived his challenge to the judicial notice of the map. However, the court reversed his conviction for unauthorized work activity under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). The court held that the regulation was impermissibly vague as applied to Lesh's conduct, as it did not provide fair warning that posting images on social media could constitute a federal crime. The court also found insufficient evidence to prove that Lesh's primary purpose in posting the photos was to sell goods or services, as required by the regulation. The court concluded that Lesh was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as the maximum penalty he faced did not exceed six months of imprisonment. View "United States v. Lesh" on Justia Law

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Gerardo Arvizu Velador was charged with battery on a peace officer, resisting or obstructing a peace officer, and reckless driving. His counsel requested a competency evaluation, and proceedings were suspended pending this determination. While the competency evaluation was ongoing, Velador's counsel filed a motion for mental health diversion, supported by various reports and records indicating Velador's mental health issues.The trial court granted the motion for mental health diversion before determining Velador's competency, which led the People to appeal to the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The appellate division upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the court had jurisdiction to grant mental health diversion even while the competency determination was pending. The appellate division reasoned that the statutes governing mental health diversion and competency did not require a competency determination before granting diversion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case to settle the legal question. The court affirmed the appellate division's decision, holding that a trial court can grant mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 before resolving a defendant's competency to stand trial. The court found that the statutory language of section 1001.36 and the competency statutes allowed for diversion regardless of the defendant's competency status. The court also determined that the suspension of criminal proceedings under section 1368 did not preclude the trial court from considering and granting diversion. The decision emphasized that diversion could be granted to both competent and incompetent defendants, aligning with legislative intent to provide alternatives to incarceration for individuals with mental health disorders. View "People v. Velador" on Justia Law

This case involves four individuals, Joao Neves, Keith Nunes, Pablo Ortega, and Mario Monteiro, who were convicted of various crimes in Rhode Island and were serving multiple sentences, including life sentences. The issue at hand is the interpretation of a Rhode Island statute, G.L. 1956 § 13-8-13(e), which was enacted in 2021 and provides that any person sentenced for any offense committed prior to their twenty-second birthday, other than a person serving life without parole, shall be eligible for parole review after serving no fewer than twenty years' imprisonment.The state argued that the statute applies only to individuals serving a single sentence and does not require the aggregation of multiple sentences for parole eligibility. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the statute applies to "any offense," and thus requires the aggregation of multiple sentences, including consecutive sentences, for parole eligibility.The trial justice agreed with the respondents and ordered that each respondent be immediately released on parole. The state appealed, arguing that the trial justice's interpretation of the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by modifying judicial sentences.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the statute mandates the aggregation of a qualified offender’s sentences, including consecutive sentences, for parole eligibility. The court also concluded that the statute, as interpreted, does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. However, the court found that the trial justice erred in ordering each respondent to be immediately released on parole, as the statute only provides a qualified offender the opportunity to appear before the parole board, not the right to be paroled. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgments of the lower court, and remanded the cases to the parole board for further proceedings. View "Neves v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Maurice Williams, whose supervised release was revoked after evidence was presented that he sold fentanyl to a confidential informant (CI) during a controlled buy. Williams had previously pleaded guilty to charges of distributing crack cocaine and unlawful possession of a firearm. His supervised release was revoked in 2020 due to violation of his release conditions, and he was sentenced to an additional 18 months’ imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release. In 2023, his supervised release was recommended for revocation again due to alleged violations including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and committing another crime.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas held a revocation hearing where the government introduced evidence of the controlled buy, including testimony from Kansas City Police Officers and a video of the controlled buy. The court found that Williams sold fentanyl and therefore committed a Grade A violation, but did not find a violation related to the firearm. The court revoked his term of supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Williams argued that the district court erred by admitting evidence of the controlled buy without conducting an interest-of-justice balancing test under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) to determine whether the CI should have been required to be available for cross-examination at the hearing, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that he sold fentanyl. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating that no balancing test was required because the court did not rely on any hearsay statements by the CI, and the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt by a preponderance of the evidence. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The case revolves around John Thomas Bujak, who pleaded guilty to grand theft and was placed on probation with the condition of serving thirty days in jail. Bujak scheduled his jail time on weekends to maintain his employment during the week. After serving his first jail stay from Friday morning to Sunday morning, Bujak learned that he would receive credit for two days of jail time. He then moved the district court for credit for time served, arguing that he should receive three days credit because he served time over the course of three calendar days.The district court denied Bujak’s motion, interpreting that the terms of its probation order required Bujak to serve thirty, twenty-four-hour periods in jail. Bujak appealed this decision, arguing that Idaho Code section 18-309 required the district court to award him one day of credit for each partial day of jail time he served.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that neither section 18-309 nor section 19-2603 applies to the calculation of Bujak’s time served. Instead, the court found that Idaho Code section 19-2601(3) controls, which allows a district court to withhold judgment and impose probation terms it deems necessary and appropriate. The court agreed with the district court's interpretation that Bujak was required to serve thirty, twenty-four-hour days in jail as a term of his probation. View "State v. Bujak" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Huazhi Han, who was convicted on charges of money laundering and related offenses. Han used his electronic goods business to launder drug proceeds for Mexican drug traffickers. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Chicago Police Department (CPD) began investigating a money laundering organization in Chicago, in which Han played a key role. Han received cash proceeds from a drug trafficker, Rafiq Roman, on multiple occasions. After Roman's arrest, he cooperated with the authorities, leading to Han's arrest. The officers found a loaded firearm, approximately $200,000 in cash, and lookalike currency in Han's car. They also searched Han's home, where they found nearly $1.3 million in cash, a money counter, rubber bands, and firearms.Han was indicted on four charges, including conspiracy to commit money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Before trial, Han moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing that the officers searched his home without a warrant or consent. The district court denied the motion, finding that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Han was convicted on all counts.On appeal, Han argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, admitting threat evidence, and denying his motion for a mistrial based on the government’s closing argument. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found no error and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search of their home, the threat evidence was admissible as it was directly related to Han's crimes, and the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not result in an unfair trial. View "United States v. Huazhi Han" on Justia Law

A state agency (the Agency) is under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) for alleged criminal wrongdoing by senior Agency personnel. The DOJ requested the district court to determine that certain Agency communications were not protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court agreed, ruling that the Agency could not invoke the attorney-client privilege to avoid producing evidence and witness testimony regarding four general categories of information. The Agency did not challenge the district court’s ruling as to the first three categories, but disputed the fourth category, which pertained to any actions or communications contemplated or undertaken by the Agency to interfere in or obstruct the current Federal investigation.The district court had previously granted the DOJ's application, ruling that the Agency could not invoke the attorney-client privilege to avoid producing evidence and witness testimony regarding four general categories of information. The Agency sought to modify or rescind this order, but the district court only partially granted the Agency's motion. In April 2024, DOJ served grand jury subpoenas on two senior Agency employees. The Agency moved to quash the subpoenas, but the district court denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the Agency's petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to override the district court's order allowing grand jury testimony to proceed. The court found that the Agency failed to show a clear and indisputable right to relief. The court also denied the Agency's emergency motion to stay grand jury proceedings. The court clarified that government attorneys may assert the attorney-client privilege as to state agency communications that were conducted in confidence and for the purpose of providing legal advice. However, the court also noted that the crime-fraud exception to the privilege may apply, and left this determination to the discretion of the district court. View "In re Sealed Petitioner" on Justia Law