Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Criminal Law
Flanagan v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.
Martin Flanagan, a former employee of Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against his former employer. He alleged that Fresenius engaged in a fraudulent kickback scheme to induce referrals to its dialysis clinics, violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). Flanagan claimed that Fresenius offered below-cost contracts to hospitals, overcompensated medical directors, and provided other benefits to secure patient referrals, which were then billed to Medicare and Medicaid.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland initially handled the case, which was later transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed Flanagan's complaint for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that the amended complaint did not adequately allege specific false claims or provide representative examples. Additionally, the court ruled that some of Flanagan's claims were barred by the FCA's public-disclosure and first-to-file rules. The district court also denied Flanagan's motion to amend his complaint, citing undue delay and potential prejudice to Fresenius.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Flanagan failed to plead the alleged fraud with the required particularity. The appellate court also upheld the denial of the motion to amend, noting that Flanagan had ample time to address the deficiencies in his complaint but failed to do so. The First Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Flanagan v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law
USA v Mesner
Derrick Clark and Shawn Mesner worked for Didion Milling, Inc., a corn milling company. In May 2017, Didion’s grain mill exploded, killing five employees. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) investigated and referred Didion for criminal prosecution. The government charged Didion and several employees with federal crimes related to their work at the mill. Clark and Mesner proceeded to trial, challenging the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality of their convictions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin convicted Clark on four counts and Mesner on two counts. Clark was found guilty of conspiracy to commit federal offenses, false entries in records, using false documents within the EPA’s jurisdiction, and obstruction of agency proceedings. Mesner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit federal offenses. Both defendants were sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated Mesner’s conviction on Count 4, remanding for an entry of judgment of acquittal and further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, as well as Clark’s convictions and Mesner’s conviction on Count 1. The court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions and determined that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, accurately reflected the law. The court also rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the OSHA regulation involved. View "USA v Mesner" on Justia Law
Counts v. General Motors, LLC
The plaintiffs, a group of consumers, filed a lawsuit against General Motors (GM) and Robert Bosch LLC, alleging that the companies misled consumers about the emissions produced by certain Chevrolet Cruze vehicles. They claimed that the vehicles emitted higher levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx) than advertised and that the emissions control systems were manipulated to pass regulatory tests. The plaintiffs sought damages under various state fraud laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially dismissed some of the plaintiffs' claims, ruling that those based on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards were preempted by the Clean Air Act. The court allowed other claims to proceed, particularly those alleging that GM's advertising misled consumers about the vehicles' emissions. However, after the Sixth Circuit's decision in a similar case (In re Ford Motor Company F-150 and Ranger Truck Fuel Economy Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation), the district court revisited its decision and dismissed the remaining fraud claims, concluding they were preempted by federal law. The court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on the RICO claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court should determine whether the plaintiffs' remaining claims could proceed without relying on a disagreement with the EPA's determinations. The court remanded the case for the district court to decide if the claims were preempted under the analysis described. The court affirmed the dismissal of the RICO claims and the denial of the plaintiffs' post-judgment motion to vacate the judgment in part and approve a preliminary settlement agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Counts v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law
Bailey v State of Oklahoma ex rel. Service Oklahoma
Treyton Bailey was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested for suspicion of DUI after officers observed signs of impairment. Although Bailey consented to a blood test, the result was excluded due to a discrepancy in the chain of custody. Despite the lack of a valid test result, Service Oklahoma revoked Bailey's license. Bailey argued that Service Oklahoma lacked statutory authority to mail the revocation notice by regular mail, that revocation is invalid absent a certificate or affidavit of mailing even where the licensee received and acted upon the notice, and that revocation cannot be sustained without a valid test result when the driver did not refuse testing.The district court rejected Bailey's arguments, finding that Section 2-116 applies to Service Oklahoma and authorizes the agency to serve revocation notice by regular mail. The court also found that the State's proof of service was admissible and sufficient to establish adequate proof that notice was properly served. Additionally, the court determined that despite the exclusion of the blood result, the State met its burden of proof based on other competent evidence. The district court entered a Final Order Sustaining Revocation, which Bailey appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the district court's order. The court held that Service Oklahoma is authorized to provide revocation notice by regular mail under Title 47, Section 2-116, and that this interpretation is necessary to preserve the coherence of the statutory scheme following the Legislature's transfer of authority to Service Oklahoma. The court also held that Bailey's due process challenge failed, as the record reflected that he received written notice of the revocation and acted upon it by filing a petition for judicial review. Finally, the court held that the district court properly sustained the revocation of Bailey's license based on the officer's sworn report and other competent evidence, despite the exclusion of the blood test result. View "Bailey v State of Oklahoma ex rel. Service Oklahoma" on Justia Law
Mohamed v. Bondi
Zackaria Dahir Mohamed, a native of Somalia, entered the United States as a child refugee in 1998. He was later convicted of several offenses, including theft and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him due to these convictions. An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered his removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. Mohamed then petitioned for review.The IJ initially found Mohamed removable for aggravated felony theft and crimes of violence. In 2020, the IJ ordered his removal to Somalia. Mohamed appealed to the BIA, which remanded the case to the IJ to assess Mohamed’s competency. On remand, Mohamed presented evidence of his mental health history, including a psychological evaluation by Dr. Jerry Kroll. The IJ ruled in 2021 that Mohamed was competent during the 2020 merits hearing, based on Dr. Kroll’s testimony and the IJ’s observations. The BIA dismissed Mohamed’s appeal on de novo review, leading to the current petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Mohamed argued that the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s competency finding was unsupported by the record. The court noted that it has jurisdiction to review final agency removal orders but not factual findings related to criminal offenses. The court found that Mohamed’s competency determination was a factual finding, which is generally affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Mohamed’s claims were barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).Even if Mohamed presented a legal or constitutional claim, the court found no fundamental procedural error or resulting prejudice. The IJ had considered all appropriate evidence, including Dr. Kroll’s testimony and Mohamed’s behavior during proceedings. The court concluded that there was no procedural error in holding a retroactive competency hearing. The petition for review was denied. View "Mohamed v. Bondi" on Justia Law
USA V. PANGANG GROUP COMPANY, LTD.
The case involves four affiliated companies, collectively known as the Pangang Companies, which were indicted for economic espionage related to their alleged efforts to steal trade secrets from E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company (DuPont) concerning the production of titanium dioxide. The Pangang Companies argued that they were immune from criminal prosecution in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because they are owned and controlled by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the Pangang Companies' motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that the FSIA did not apply to criminal cases and that even if it did, the commercial activity and implied waiver exceptions to the FSIA would apply. The Pangang Companies appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially held that the companies failed to make a prima facie showing that they were covered entities under the FSIA.Upon remand, the district court again denied the motion to dismiss, reiterating that the Pangang Companies did not qualify for immunity under the FSIA and also rejecting their claims to common-law immunity. The court found that the companies did not exercise functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC and thus were not entitled to immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that under federal common law, the Pangang Companies did not make a prima facie showing that they exercised functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC. Therefore, they were not eligible for foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution. The court also noted that principles of deference to the political branches on matters touching on foreign relations reinforced this conclusion. View "USA V. PANGANG GROUP COMPANY, LTD." on Justia Law
Skobodzinski v. NDDOT
Artur Skobodzinski was driving a commercial vehicle when he was stopped by a North Dakota Highway Patrol trooper for a safety inspection. The trooper detected an odor of alcohol and observed that Skobodzinski had bloodshot eyes. Skobodzinski denied recent alcohol consumption and refused field sobriety tests. He also refused an on-site screening test and a chemical breath test, leading to his arrest for driving under the influence. Skobodzinski requested to speak with an attorney but was only allowed to do so over an hour later at the law enforcement center.The Department of Transportation held an administrative hearing and found that Skobodzinski refused the chemical test and had a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. Consequently, his driving privileges were revoked for 180 days. The district court affirmed this decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the hearing officer did not err in finding that Skobodzinski refused the chemical test. However, the court found that the hearing officer erred in determining that Skobodzinski was given a reasonable opportunity to speak with an attorney. The court noted that the trooper could have allowed Skobodzinski to contact an attorney immediately after his request, rather than delaying it until they reached the law enforcement center. The court emphasized that the trooper's delay deprived Skobodzinski of a meaningful opportunity to consult with an attorney and potentially cure his refusal to take the chemical test.The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and the hearing officer’s decision, thereby reinstating Skobodzinski’s driving privileges. View "Skobodzinski v. NDDOT" on Justia Law
Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles
Anthony Frank Romane, Jr. was arrested for driving under the influence after being found unconscious in his car. He exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests. At the police station, he refused to submit to a chemical test after being read the Chemical Test Admonition. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initiated proceedings to suspend his license for one year due to his refusal to submit to testing. Romane requested an Administrative Per Se (APS) hearing to challenge the suspension.The APS hearing was conducted by a single hearing officer, Trena Leota, who introduced three documents into evidence: the arresting officer’s sworn DS 367 form, the unsworn arrest report, and Romane’s driving record. Romane’s counsel objected, arguing that the hearing officer was acting as an advocate, violating due process as explained in California DUI Lawyers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The hearing officer overruled the objections and admitted the documents. Romane’s bodyworn camera footage was also admitted into evidence. The hearing officer ultimately sustained the suspension of Romane’s license.Romane filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of San Diego County, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and adjudicator. The superior court agreed and ordered the DMV to set aside the suspension unless a new hearing was conducted with separate individuals acting as advocate and adjudicator.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer did not act as an advocate but merely collected and developed evidence, which is constitutionally permissible. The case was remanded to the superior court to consider Romane’s contention that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s findings. View "Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law
Kazelka v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles
A member of the public reported Gregory Kazelka for erratic driving, leading to a traffic stop by Officer Phillips of the California Highway Patrol. Kazelka admitted to drinking excessively and failed field sobriety tests. He underwent a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test, which showed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. Kazelka was arrested, and a subsequent chemical breath test confirmed his intoxication. However, Officer Phillips did not provide the statutory admonition that the PAS test was voluntary.The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Kazelka’s license following an administrative hearing. Kazelka challenged the suspension in the Lake County Superior Court, which found that the PAS test results should have been excluded due to the lack of statutory admonition and reversed the suspension.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory admonition was not a foundational requirement for the admissibility of the PAS test results. The court also determined that the exclusionary rule, typically applied in criminal cases, does not apply to administrative per se (APS) hearings. The court found that Officer Phillips’s failure to provide the admonition did not violate Kazelka’s constitutional rights and that the hearing officer did not act as both advocate and adjudicator, thus not violating due process.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, directing the trial court to deny Kazelka’s petition for writ of mandate and reinstate the DMV’s suspension order. The DMV was awarded costs on appeal. View "Kazelka v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law
McClain v. Delgado
Texas Game Warden Dustin Delgado arrested Joshua McClain for driving while intoxicated after observing his truck swerve and conducting field sobriety tests. McClain later sued Delgado for false arrest. The district court denied Delgado qualified immunity. However, because McClain did not carry his burden to show Delgado violated his constitutional rights, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. Delgado moved for summary judgment on both the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion for the malicious prosecution claim but denied it for the false arrest claim. Delgado appealed the denial of qualified immunity for the false arrest claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Delgado had reasonable suspicion to stop McClain based on his swerving and probable cause to arrest him after observing clues of intoxication during field sobriety tests. The court found that McClain did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Delgado's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's denial of Delgado's motion for summary judgment, granting Delgado qualified immunity. View "McClain v. Delgado" on Justia Law