Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the denial of declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus petitions filed by Charles Sims, an inmate in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC). Sims had sought a declaration that he was eligible for parole, contrary to the determination made by ADC. The court affirmed the circuit court's finding that Sims was ineligible for parole according to the Arkansas Code.Sims had pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in 1995 and was paroled in 2007. In 2010, he pleaded guilty to first-degree battery and kidnapping, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 180 months' imprisonment to run concurrently with his remaining sentence for first-degree murder. ADC records applied section 16-93-609 to Sims’s sentence for battery and kidnapping, determining him ineligible for parole.The court held that Sims had failed to establish a justiciable controversy or that he had a legal interest in the controversy, two prerequisites for declaratory relief. The court also noted that parole eligibility determinations fall within the purview of ADC, not the judiciary. The court further held that the absence of a reference to the parole-eligibility statute in the judgment did not constitute a requirement for parole eligibility.The court also dismissed Sims's argument that section 5-4-501(d)(2) was inapplicable to him, holding that the court has applied the relevant sections when the prior conviction consisted of only one offense. The court concluded that Sims had not established a right to parole eligibility, and therefore had no basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The court affirmed the circuit court's decisions, ruling it did not clearly err or abuse its discretion when it denied and dismissed Sims's petitions for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. View "SIMS v. DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Cedrick Conway, is awaiting trial on a petition to commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In preparation for the trial, he requested a court order directing a Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluator to update a previous evaluation of Conway which was done several years earlier and concluded that he did not meet the criteria for commitment as an SVP. The trial court denied the request, believing that the pertinent statute only allows the prosecution (the party seeking commitment) to request an updated evaluation—not the defense. Conway challenged this ruling, leading to the present case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five concluded that the trial court had misunderstood the statute. While the SVPA does allow the prosecution to request an updated evaluation from DSH, the court found nothing in the statute that would prohibit the defense from obtaining an updated evaluation if authorized by a court order. The court therefore held that the trial court erred in denying Conway’s request for an updated evaluation based on a mistaken understanding of the statute.The court also rejected the defense’s claim that the prosecution was not entitled to oppose the defense motion for an updated evaluation. The court determined that the trial court has discretion to decide whether to entertain opposition from the prosecution. The court therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reconsider Conway’s request for an updated evaluation, taking into account the court's discretion to authorize such an evaluation for the defense. View "Conway v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Petitioner had failed to state a ground for the writ.Petitioner pled guilty to rape and aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a habitual offender. In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner alleged that he was innocent of the offense of rape, that the State maliciously applied the habitual offender statute in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the Arkansas statute requiring that he serve 100 percent of his sentence was unconstitutional. The circuit court found that the claims were not cognizable in habeas and noted that parole eligibility falls within the domain of the executive branch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. View "White v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to produce a copy of a kite that he alleged he had exchanged with the "cashier" of the North Central Correctional Complex (NCCC), where Relator was incarcerated, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.According to Relator, an NCCC inspector denied Relator's kite request on the ground that she was not responsible for printing kites. After the department denied Relator's grievance Relator brought this mandamus action seeking production of the kite. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) Relator showed that he had a clear legal right to the requested relief and that the department had a clear legal duty to provide it; and (2) Relator was not entitled to statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Clark v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court reversing the final order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding Respondent's administrative driver's license revocation for a period of five years for driving under the influence, holding that the circuit court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the OAH and in using its determination as a basis for overturning the OAH's decision.After a hearing, the circuit court concluded that the OAH improperly weighed results of field sobriety tests against the negative findings of secondary chemical tests and that Respondent's expert's "unrebutted" testimony supported the negative findings of the secondary chemical test. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the OAH's factual determination that Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent had ingested controlled substances impairing his ability to operate a motor vehicle was entitled to substantial deference; and (2) the evidence in this case supported that factual determination. View "Frazier v. Ramadan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of possession of a controlled substance and vacated his sentence, holding that the Nebraska Probation Administration Act (the Act) does not permit the increase of the term of probation to which the offender was sentenced before a hearing where the violation of probation is established by clear and convincing evidence.The State charged Defendant with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, based on items found in his bedroom following a probation search. The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant was still on probation and subject to his probation terms at the time of the search. Defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search, and the special needs exception to the warrant requirement did not apply; (2) Defendant was not subject to conditions of probation and was not obligated to permit the search at issue; (3) the search of Defendant's bedroom was unreasonable, and the items found therein should have been suppressed; and (4) because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction, double jeopardy did not bar a second trial. View "State v. Simons" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Joshua Levy, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, in this case challenging the denial by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) of Levy's request for information related to a federal police misconduct investigation, holding that there was no error.Anthony Gulluni, District Attorney for Hampden County, Massachusetts, sent DOJ a letter (Touhy request) requesting all Springfield, Massachusetts Police Department (SPD) reports and documents supporting DOJ's specific and general findings in an attempt to identify SPD officers who were subject to the DOJ's findings of specific instances of misconduct and general failures within SPD's practices. DOJ denied Gullini's request in accordance with Touhy regulations. Gullini appealed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to its review of DOJ's denial of Gullini's Touhy request; and (2) did not err in finding that DOJ's privilege grounds were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. View "Gulluni v. Levy" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the legislature's grant of rulemaking authority to the Commission on Forensic Sciences was sufficient to authorize the Commission's promulgation of the Familial DNA Search (FDS) Regulations codified at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 6192.1 and 6192.3.In 2017, the DNA Subcommittee submitted to the Commission a recommendation to authorize familial DNA searches. The Commission adopted the recommendation, and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) formally adopted the recommendation as part of the FDS Regulations. Petitioners brought this N.Y. C.L.P.R. 78 proceeding arguing that Respondents lacked statutory authority to promulgate the FDA Regulations, therefore violating the New York Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court denied the petition on the merits, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had the statutory authority to promulgate the FDS Regulations. View "Stevens v. N.Y. State Division of Criminal Justice Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Kevin Payne against Kelly Rose, an inspector at the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI), holding that Payne did not have a cognizable claim in mandamus.Payne, an inmate at RCI, sent a public-records request to Rose for a copy of, among other things, JPay support ticket number MACI 1220002928. Rose responded that she obtained the requested record and provided a copy of it to Payne. Payne brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Rose to produce the requested record and statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) because Payne received his requested record before instituting this action he never had a cognizable claim in mandamus; and (2) statutory damages did not accrue. View "State ex rel. Payne v. Rose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's requested writ of mandamus against Respondent, the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, holding that the circuit court erred in denying a writ of mandamus.In his self-represented petition for a writ of mandamus Petitioner asserted that the Commissioner had a duty to "develop a policy directive and/or operational procedure" that was in compliance with W. Va. Code 15A-4-17(i), which was passed during the 2018 legislative session. The circuit court denied the requested writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 15A-4-17(i)(2) imposed upon the Commissioner a clear legal duty to adopt a written policy effectuating the purposes of "this subsection," which included the entirety of subsection (i); and (2) Petitioner had no other adequate remedy at law. View "Freeland v. Marshall" on Justia Law