Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After law enforcement stopped the appellant while he was driving in 2020, officers discovered over a pound of methamphetamine and evidence consistent with drug sales in his vehicle. He was charged with two felonies: possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and selling, offering to sell, and transporting a controlled substance. In 2024, the appellant entered a no contest plea to the possession for sale charge, with the other charge dismissed as part of a global resolution. The trial court specifically informed him that his driver’s license could be revoked as a result of his plea, and the court docket reflected a corresponding abstract sent to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The DMV received an electronic abstract from the court indicating the use of a motor vehicle in the commission of a felony and subsequently revoked the appellant’s driving privilege.The appellant filed a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County, arguing that his conviction did not justify license revocation, that the DMV lacked a proper abstract, and raising issues of notice and double jeopardy. At the hearing, the court requested the DMV’s supporting documentation and permitted both parties to supplement the record. The DMV provided evidence, including the appellant’s driving record and a declaration by a DMV employee explaining the electronic transmission and certification process. The trial court denied the appellant’s motion to strike this evidence and denied his writ, finding the DMV’s revocation was proper under the law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, held that a writ petition against the DMV cannot be used to collaterally attack criminal court findings and that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the DMV received a duly certified abstract as required by law. The court also found that arguments raised for the first time on appeal were waived. The judgment was affirmed. View "Pipitone v. Dept of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

A company operating as a mortgage lender applied for and received a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company’s PPP loan was later forgiven. A private party, acting as a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleged that the company and its chief executive officer made several false statements in their loan application and forgiveness process. The key allegations were that the company was ineligible for PPP funds as a financial business primarily engaged in lending, that it misrepresented its use and need for the loan, and that it falsified the number of employees to increase the loan amount. The relator argued that these misrepresentations led the government to approve and forgive the loan improperly.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the relator’s amended complaint. The district court found that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied, reasoning that the necessary information supporting the ineligibility allegation was already publicly available on a government website, specifically concerning the company’s business classification. The district court also concluded that the relator’s allegations regarding the inflated employee count were speculative. The relator was denied leave to further amend the complaint, on the basis that amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the public disclosure bar did not apply because the information on the government website was not “substantially the same” as the relator’s allegations, and the company’s own website did not qualify as “news media” under the statute. The appellate court agreed that the relator’s claim regarding the number of employees was not sufficiently pleaded but found the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "RELATOR, LLC V. ERSKINE" on Justia Law

The case centers on an FBI investigation into Lionel Cannon for federal drug trafficking. During a lawful search, agents seized $585,000 in cash from Cannon’s bedroom safe. However, FBI Special Agent Scott Bowman stole $218,200 of that cash before it was officially inventoried. Bowman was later indicted and pleaded guilty to conversion of property and related crimes, with a money judgment of forfeiture reflecting the proceeds of his theft, much of which was attributable to Cannon’s safe.After Bowman’s conviction and forfeiture proceedings, Cannon pleaded guilty to drug-trafficking charges and agreed to forfeit $366,800, the amount remaining after Bowman’s theft. Despite awareness of the larger sum, the government never initiated forfeiture proceedings for the stolen $218,200. Cannon subsequently filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for the return of the un-forfeited cash.The United States District Court for the Central District of California treated Cannon’s motion as a civil complaint and granted summary judgment for the government. The district court concluded that Cannon had agreed to forfeit all property seized and found his evidence regarding lawful possession of some of the funds insufficient.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that sovereign immunity does not bar a Rule 41(g) claim for the return of cash when the government has recovered money traceable to funds it lost, even if it is not the exact physical currency seized. The court determined that Cannon had provided evidence of lawful sources for some of the cash and that the government had not rebutted this evidence sufficiently. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the proper disposition of the recovered funds. View "CANNON V. USA" on Justia Law

Two major airline crashes in 2018 and 2019 involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft led to the deaths of hundreds of passengers and crew. Investigations revealed that Boeing had concealed important safety information about modifications to the planes’ flight control system, contributing to the crashes. The Department of Justice (DOJ) charged Boeing with conspiracy to defraud the United States but later entered a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) in 2021, requiring Boeing to pay significant penalties and undertake compliance measures. After Boeing allegedly breached the DPA, the DOJ pursued a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again imposing penalties and compliance obligations in exchange for dismissing the criminal charge. Family members of crash victims challenged both agreements, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that while the DOJ had originally failed to confer with families before the 2021 DPA due to a legal error, there was no bad faith, and the court lacked authority to modify or review the substance of the DPA or NPA. The district court later granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss the prosecution against Boeing after the NPA, finding the DOJ’s actions were not in bad faith and were adequately explained.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the families’ challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot since the agreement was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. Addressing the NPA, the Fifth Circuit concluded the DOJ had fulfilled its obligation to confer with the families and had not misled them. The court also determined it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review the district court’s dismissal of the prosecution. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied. View "Ryan v. USA" on Justia Law

A motorist was stopped by law enforcement after driving the wrong way on a one-way street. The officer who made the stop observed signs of intoxication, including slurred speech and the odor of alcohol. The driver admitted to consuming alcohol and performed poorly on field sobriety tests. Preliminary breath tests conducted at the scene showed blood-alcohol concentrations (BAC) of 0.160 and 0.162 percent. The driver was arrested, and later, two chemical breath tests at the police station indicated BAC levels of 0.15 and 0.16 percent. The officer certified compliance with the requirement to observe the motorist continuously for 15 minutes before the chemical breath test, as mandated by California regulations.The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended the driver’s license, and after an administrative per se (APS) hearing, the administrative hearing officer upheld the suspension. The driver challenged this decision by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Kern County. The trial court reviewed body-worn camera footage and determined that the arresting officer had not continuously observed the driver for the required 15-minute period prior to the breath test. The trial court found that this regulatory violation called the reliability of the test results into question. The court excluded the chemical breath test results and granted the writ of mandate, setting aside the DMV’s order of suspension.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the officer had not complied with the observation requirement. The appellate court held that the presumption of reliability for the chemical breath test results was rebutted by the video evidence and that the DMV failed to establish the reliability of the tests despite the regulatory violation. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order setting aside the suspension of the driver’s license. View "Myers v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

In 2007, the plaintiff was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary after he drove accomplices to a location where a planned marijuana theft resulted in the victim’s death. The evidence showed he participated in planning and facilitating the crime, and the jury found him guilty under both aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories. The conviction and sentence of 26 years to life were affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. Later, in an uncontested habeas proceeding, the murder conviction was reduced to second degree and the sentence reduced accordingly.Following legislative changes in 2018 that redefined murder under Senate Bill No. 1437 and created a process for retroactive relief, the trial court vacated the plaintiff’s murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6 and resentenced him on the remaining charges. Having served more time than the revised sentence required, he was released. The plaintiff then applied to the California Victim Compensation Board, seeking compensation under Penal Code section 4900 for time served beyond his new sentence, arguing he was “innocent” under the current definition of murder.The Board denied his application, finding he did not allege innocence under the law as it stood at the time of his conviction and that his claim did not state a cognizable basis for relief. The Board also relied on a regulation allowing dismissal of such claims without a hearing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied his writ petition challenging both the Board’s decision and the validity of the regulation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed. It held that compensation under section 4900 requires an “erroneous conviction,” and a conviction valid when rendered does not become erroneous due to subsequent legislative changes. The court also upheld the Board’s regulation as consistent with its statutory authority. View "Gardner v. Cal. Victim Comp. Bd." on Justia Law

In this case, Montgomery County, Maryland, enacted amendments to its County Code in 2021 and 2022 regulating firearms. The amendments expanded the definition of “place of public assembly,” prohibited the possession of firearms (including “ghost guns”) in or within 100 yards of such places, and removed exceptions for state-issued handgun permit holders. The amendments also imposed new restrictions concerning minors’ access to firearms and regulated ghost guns and their components. The petitioners, two businesses and eight individuals, claimed these provisions were preempted by state law, not a valid local law, and amounted to an unconstitutional taking.After removal to federal court and a partial remand, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled in favor of the challengers, finding the county’s provisions preempted by state law, not a local law, and an unconstitutional taking, and issued declaratory and injunctive relief. The Appellate Court of Maryland remanded for further analysis of preemption and takings issues, particularly concerning the expansion of “place of public assembly.”The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case, holding that new issues may only be properly added by amending the complaint, not through summary judgment motions. The Court determined that Criminal Law § 4-209(b)(1) authorizes charter counties to regulate firearms in limited contexts (with respect to minors, law enforcement, and within 100 yards of certain public places), and that this authority was not abrogated by other state preemption statutes. The Court found Montgomery County’s regulation valid for parks, places of worship, schools, libraries, courthouses, legislative assemblies, recreational and multipurpose exhibition facilities, and polling places, but invalid for hospitals, health centers, long-term care, childcare facilities, government buildings as broadly defined, and generalized gatherings. The Court also clarified the scope of local regulation regarding minors and found no unconstitutional taking occurred. The judgment of the Appellate Court was vacated and remanded with instructions for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Engage Armament v. Montgomery Cnty." on Justia Law

A longtime Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives was prosecuted in federal court for engaging in extensive bribery schemes. The first involved a major utility company, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), which, facing financial difficulties, funneled more than $3 million to the defendant’s political associates through intermediaries and sham contracts in exchange for the defendant’s legislative support of ComEd’s agenda over several years. The government presented evidence that these payments resulted in concrete legislative actions by the defendant that benefitted ComEd, including support for specific bills and regulatory changes. The second scheme involved the defendant’s agreement to recommend a Chicago alderman for a state board appointment in exchange for business referrals and benefits to the defendant’s family.Following a lengthy trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury convicted the defendant on several counts, including conspiracy, federal-program bribery, honest-services wire fraud, and Travel Act violations. The jury acquitted him on some counts and was deadlocked on others. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial, then imposed a sentence of imprisonment and a substantial fine.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the adequacy of the jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported each conviction and found no prejudicial error in the jury instructions, including those related to the definition of “official act,” “corruptly,” and the intent elements of bribery. The court also concluded that any potential instructional error regarding state law bribery under the Travel Act was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Arthur Miles was sentenced to a total of 300 months’ imprisonment following two separate federal convictions. After his first sentencing in October 2022, Miles was housed at the Marion County Jail in Indiana for fifteen months—some of this time was before and some after his second federal sentencing. During his time at the county jail, Miles worked as an orderly. He later argued that under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), he was entitled to earn time credits for this work, which could reduce his sentence, because his federal sentence had commenced and the work was equivalent to an evidence-based recidivism reduction (“EBRR”) program.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed Miles’s habeas petition after a magistrate judge recommended denying the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge found that BOP regulations preventing prisoners from earning FSA credits until they arrived at a federal facility conflicted with the FSA’s language. The district court, however, rejected this recommendation and dismissed Miles’s petition, holding that the BOP’s rules did not violate the FSA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the BOP’s regulation, which delayed the accrual of FSA time credits until a prisoner’s arrival at a federal facility, was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory definition of when a sentence commences. The court further held that a risk and needs assessment is not a prerequisite for earning FSA credits, and that prisoners may earn credits for qualifying programming—such as work as an orderly—performed after sentencing even while housed in non-federal facilities. The court vacated the dismissal of Miles’s habeas petition and remanded for further proceedings to determine his entitlement to credits for his time at the county jail. View "Miles v. Bowers" on Justia Law

John Mercer was charged with two counts of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in Garland County, Arkansas, in 2017. He pled no contest to both charges in 2018. The Garland County District Court imposed fines, required alcohol education, and placed Mercer on at least six months of probation, which included a $25 monthly probation fee and conditions such as random drug and alcohol testing. Mercer made several probation-fee payments as a result. Mercer later filed a lawsuit, alleging that probation and associated fees in DWI cases are not authorized under Arkansas law and therefore constitute an illegal exaction. He also asserted federal and state due-process claims, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and repayment of the fees collected.The Garland County District Court moved to dismiss Mercer’s complaint in the Garland County Circuit Court, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, rejecting the sovereign immunity defense. After further proceedings and amended complaints, the district court again sought dismissal, but the circuit court denied the motion. The district court then filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, challenging the denial of sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Mercer’s illegal-exaction claim may proceed because the Arkansas Constitution expressly authorizes such claims, overriding sovereign immunity. The court also held that Mercer’s federal due-process claim survives dismissal, as state sovereign immunity cannot categorically bar federal causes of action in state courts of general jurisdiction. However, the court ruled that Mercer’s Arkansas Civil Rights Act claim is barred by sovereign immunity, as there is no constitutional authorization for such suits against the state. The court affirmed the circuit court’s order in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GARLAND COUNTY DISTRICT COURT v. MERCER" on Justia Law