Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Hamilton County Clerk of Courts Pavan Parikh to provide copies of three oaths of office and various court records from a 2001 case and awards of statutory damages and costs, holding that Relator was entitled to mandamus in part.Relator, an inmate, sent a public records request requesting three judges' oaths of office and documents from a case filed in 2001. When the clerk of courts did not respond to the public-records request Relator filed this action. The Supreme Court granted relief in part, holding (1) Relator used the incorrect vehicle for requesting copies of the oaths of office; and (2) the clerk did not meet his burden to show that Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B)(8) foreclosed Relator's right to receive the second portion of his records request. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh" on Justia Law

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Appellant California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed from a judgment granting Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate (judgment). DMV contends the issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred in overturning the suspension of Plaintiff’s driver’s license (1) “by applying [former] Government Code section 11440.30.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the “Judgment Granting Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Awarding Costs And Attorney Fees To Petitioner” and remanded the cause to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment to provide that the matter shall thereafter be remanded to the DMV for further proceedings. The court concluded that former Government Code section 11440.30 was applicable to Plaintiff’s DMV driver’s license suspension hearing. Said former statute is fully consistent with other relevant statutes, including, without limitation, Vehicle Code sections 14100 through 14112 and Government Code section 11501. Further, the court concluded that both CCR section 115.07 and former Government Code section 11440.30 were mandatory and not merely directory. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an implied finding that Plaintiff was prejudiced by DMV’s failure to adhere to former government code section 11440.30. View "Ramirez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the county court neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying, without a hearing, Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.In 1985, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated rape and other offenses. In 2005, the Sex Offender Registration Board issued a decision ordering Petitioner to register as a level three sex offender, thereafter denying Petitioner's motion for relief from the registration requirement. In this petition, Petitioner brought, among other claims, constitutional challenges to both federal and state sex offender registration laws. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that no exceptional circumstances were present in this case warranting extraordinary relief. View "Rancourt v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

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In three separate cases consolidated for appeal, a trial court found defendants incompetent to stand trial and ordered them be committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for competency treatment. When DSH failed to admit the defendants in a timely manner, the trial court issued orders to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, and it directed DSH to admit each defendant by a particular deadline. When the defendants were not admitted by that deadline, the trial court issued sanctions of $1,000 for each day past the deadline that the defendants were not admitted, for a total of $91,000. Although only one of the sanctions orders stated sanctions were imposed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, the parties proceeded on the assumption that sanctions were imposed pursuant to that section in all three cases. DSH all three sanctions orders, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in concluding DSH lacked good cause or substantial justification for failing to admit defendants by the court-ordered deadline; (2) the written orders imposing sanctions fail to specify the conduct or circumstances justifying the order in sufficient detail; and (3) the amount of sanctions imposed in each case exceeds the $1,500 limit provided in section 177.5. The Court of Appeal interpreted section 177.5 as allowing sanctions of up to $1,500 for each separate violation of a court order. The Court reversed judgment and remanded for the trial court to determine in the first instance whether DSH committed separate acts of violating a court order on each day that it failed to admit the defendants past the court-ordered deadline, or whether its failure to admit the defendants could only be considered one act of violating a court order. "If the trial court determines DSH committed separate acts of violating a court order, its written order imposing sanctions 'shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying' that determination." View "California v. Edwards, et al." on Justia Law

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Theopalis Gregory, a former City of Wilmington Council President and Delaware lawyer, was convicted by jury for official misconduct. The charges stemmed from a $40,000 discretionary grant Gregory earmarked for his non-profit organization before leaving office. He personally received at least $15,000 of the grant after he left office. On appeal, Gregory argued the jury instructions were flawed because the trial judge did not define for the jury “official functions,” a necessary element of an official-misconduct conviction. He also argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because he was not performing official functions when he earmarked funds for his nonprofit. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Gregory’s conviction: Gregory did not object to the jury instructions, and the trial judge did not plainly err when he instructed the jury using the words of the statute. Further, the Court was satisfied that the jury had more than sufficient evidence to find that Gregory was performing official functions when he earmarked the $40,000. View "Gregory v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the order of the circuit court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the Hawai'i Criminal Justice Data Center (HCJDC) and dismissing Phillip Barker's action seeking to require the HCJDC to expunge his arrest record, holding that the ICA gravely erred.Barker, who was convicted of disorderly conduct as a violation, applied for expungement of his arrest, asserting that because Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-107(7) provides that a violation does not constitute a crime, he was entitled to expungement pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 831-3.2. The HCJDC denied the application, concluding that Barker had been convicted of a "crime" within the meaning of section 831-3.2(a). The circuit court denied Barker's request for an order requiring the HCJDC to expunge his arrest record. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments below, holding that under the plain language of Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-107(7) and §§ 831-3.2(a), a person arrested for or charged with a crime, including a petty misdemeanor, but convicted of a violation is eligible for expungement because a “violation” is not a “crime.” View "Barker v. Young" on Justia Law

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Brian Sternberg appealed a district court order civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. In 1992, Sternberg was convicted of corruption of a minor. He was incarcerated in late 1993 and remained on probation until January 1994. In 2000, the State charged Sternberg with committing three or more sexual acts with a child who was then his stepdaughter and under the age of fifteen. Sternberg was charged with one class A felony and five class C felonies. He also has convictions involving deceitful behavior, including financial fraud and bad checks. The court sentenced him to incarceration from October 2000 to February 2021. Peter Byrne, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who conducted Sternberg’s evaluation, testified that there was no record of Sternberg’s having undergone treatment to deal with his “sexual interest or arousal to children” and reported that at the end of treatment it was recommended Sternberg continue sexual offender specific treatment. Sternberg has both pedophilic and antisocial personality disorders, which predisposed him to intense sexual fantasies and urges and to disregard “the rights and wishes of others.” The district court held a commitment hearing and granted the State’s petition for civil commitment. The court reported that its biggest concern with releasing Sternberg is that he has been living in a supervised environment while incarcerated and “[i]mmediate release into the community without support or supervision would ‘very likely result in a serious difficulty controlling his behaviors.’” On appeal, Sternberg argues the district court erred in finding the State had met its burden in proving that he is likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and that he has serious difficulty in controlling behavior. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the trial court record did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Sternberg presently had a serious difficulty controlling behavior. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Interest of Sternberg" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. Section 552, seeking documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) related to himself, speculating that they might include exculpatory information that the government had not disclosed in his recent criminal trial. The government produced sets of responsive documents and an index detailing FOIA exemptions under which it withheld other responsive documents, and the district court granted summary judgment for the government. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the United States Department of Justice.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued (1) that summary judgment was improperly granted because his FOIA action is an effort to vindicate his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and (2) that, in the alternative, the district court erred in not conducting an in-camera inspection of withheld documents. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in Brown v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 658 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1981), FOIA and the criminal discovery process provide distinct tracks for seeking disclosure from the government. That a FOIA action might lead to the discovery of documents useful to a particular criminal defendant changes neither the government’s statutorily defined obligations under FOIA nor the government’s burden at summary judgment. View "Jabar v. U.S. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed a judgment of the district court committing him to the custody of the Attorney General for medical care and treatment under 18 U.S.C. Section 4246. The court found that Defendant presently suffered from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release from custody posed a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the findings underlying the commitment were not clearly erroneous. The court explained that the district court’s finding that Defendant posed a substantial risk to persons or property was adequately supported in the record. The court relied on the unanimous recommendation of the experts. The experts observed that the most reliable predictor of future violence is past violence, and they detailed Defendant’s history of random and unpredictable violent actions. The court further found that the parties have not made a sufficient showing to justify sealing the briefs in this appeal. View "United States v. Dewayne Gray" on Justia Law

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Suspecting that Troconis-Escovar was involved in the illegal drug business, the DEA searched his vehicle. Agents found $146,000 in cash, which they believed represented drug proceeds. DEA notified Troconis-Escovar that it intended to effect an administrative forfeiture of the funds (to declare them to be government property). Illegal drug proceeds are eligible for civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6), subject to the procedural safeguards of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 983. Troconis-Escovar’s attorney tried to contest the forfeiture, but filed the wrong form—a “petition for remission” rather than a “claim.” Only a claim may be used to challenge a proposed forfeiture. After the mistake was discovered, DEA gave Troconis-Escovar an extra 30 days to supplement his petition for remission. Troconis-Escovar did not do so and lost the money. He filed a Motion for the Return of Property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g).The district court dismissed his lawsuit, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dismissal was correct, but not because jurisdiction was lacking. Troconis-Escovar does not explain why he should be able to obtain relief outside section 983 when Congress expressly conditioned relief from civil forfeiture on circumstances that do not apply to him. He did not explain his argument about the untimeliness or sufficiency of the DEA’s notice. View "Troconis-Escovar v. United States" on Justia Law