Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Christopher Dallas Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) revealed that Nelson possessed 3,699 images, including 196 images of his seven-year-old daughter and 25 images of his five-year-old daughter. Nelson admitted to downloading child pornography and taking images of his older daughter but denied producing images of his younger daughter. He also attempted to obstruct justice by hiding a laptop and cellphone containing evidence. Nelson's total offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 43, and he filed objections to the PSR.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced Nelson to 240 months in prison, a $250,000 fine, additional restitution and special assessments totaling $10,100, and supervised release for life. The court imposed mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release and added discretionary special conditions barring Nelson’s access to the Internet. Nelson objected to these special conditions, and the court’s written judgment contained less severe versions of the Internet-related conditions. Nelson timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility, finding no abuse of discretion. The court also found that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding Internet restrictions, holding that the oral pronouncement controls. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a lifetime Internet ban without exceptions, as it was not narrowly tailored. The court affirmed Nelson’s sentence except for the special conditions of supervised release, vacated the Internet-related conditions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "U.S. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers challenged their inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), claiming their placement was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct. Approximately twenty years ago, the troopers inflated traffic stop records in their activity logs to meet mandated quotas. An internal investigation led to their discipline but not termination. Initially placed on the "Laurie List," their names were later removed, only to be reinstated on the EES over a decade later.The Superior Court dismissed the troopers' complaint, finding their conduct potentially exculpatory and their placement on the EES appropriate. The court also ruled that the troopers had received adequate due process. The troopers appealed, arguing that their conduct was not fraudulent and that the age of the conduct diminished its relevance.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case, focusing on whether the troopers' conduct was "potentially exculpatory" under RSA 105:13-d. The court noted that "potentially exculpatory evidence" includes evidence that could be material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. The court emphasized that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should be considered in determining its relevance.The court concluded that the limited record did not establish whether the troopers' conduct was potentially exculpatory, as it could have been a result of a mistaken interpretation of reporting requirements rather than dishonesty. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the potential exculpatory nature of the conduct, considering its admissibility and relevance in future criminal cases. View "Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Chitta Roy, challenged the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's (the "Department") denial of her criminal history background clearance during her certified family home (CFH) recertification. Roy had a 2008 conviction for involuntary manslaughter, which was dismissed in 2011 under Idaho Code section 19-2604 after she successfully completed probation. Despite this, the Department denied her 2021 application for background clearance, citing the conviction as a disqualifying crime under its updated rules.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho upheld the Department's decision, rejecting Roy's arguments that the dismissal of her conviction should preclude the Department from denying her clearance and that the Department should be bound by its 2009 decision to grant her an exemption. The district court also determined that Roy failed to show substantial prejudice from the denial, as the Department could still approve her CFH recertification through a separate process.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its conclusions. The Supreme Court held that the Department improperly based its denial on the dismissed conviction, which, under Idaho Code section 19-2604, should be treated as if it never existed. The Court also determined that the case was ripe for adjudication and that Roy's substantial rights were prejudiced by the Department's denial. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Roy was awarded costs on appeal. View "Roy v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Arturo Cuellar ("AC") and Ricardo Quintanilla, were involved in a scheme to bribe city commissioners in Weslaco, Texas, to secure contracts for an infrastructure project. The bribes were intended to influence the awarding of contracts to Camp Dresser & McKee (CDM) and Briones Consulting and Engineering, Ltd. Quintanilla bribed Commissioner Gerardo Tafolla, while AC bribed Commissioner John Cuellar (JC). Leo Lopez, a consultant for CDM and Briones, facilitated the bribes. The scheme involved multiple meetings and payments, with both commissioners taking actions to favor CDM and Briones. The city paid approximately $42.5 million to CDM, Briones, and LeFevre, with Lopez distributing funds to AC and Quintanilla.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas convicted Quintanilla and AC of various federal offenses, including conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud, honest-services wire fraud, federal program bribery, conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, and money laundering. Quintanilla was sentenced to 200 months in custody, while AC received 240 months. Both were also ordered to pay fines, special assessments, restitution, and forfeiture amounts. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court addressed several issues raised by the defendants, including claims of constructive amendment of the indictment, sufficiency of the indictment, recusal of the district judge, and evidentiary rulings. The court found that the government did not constructively amend the indictment and that the evidence supported the convictions. The court also held that the district judge did not need to recuse herself and that the evidentiary rulings were within the court's discretion. The court concluded that the defendants' arguments were either forfeited, not meritorious, or both. View "USA v. Quintanilla" on Justia Law

Curtis Terrell, after consuming a significant amount of alcohol, pain pills, and methamphetamine, began running erratically in a residential neighborhood. His wife, Angela Terrell, called 911, requesting an ambulance. Officer Jason Allgrunn arrived and arrested Mr. Terrell. When Mrs. Terrell began filming the incident, she was also arrested. The Terrells filed multiple federal and state claims against Allgrunn and other officers involved.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, rejecting their qualified immunity defense. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment for the defendants on the Terrells' false arrest claims, finding that Officer Allgrunn had probable cause to arrest both Mr. and Mrs. Terrell. The court also reversed the denial of summary judgment on Mrs. Terrell's excessive force claim, concluding that there was no clearly established law prohibiting the officer's conduct. However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding Mr. Terrell's excessive force claim for lack of jurisdiction, as there were genuine disputes of material fact about what occurred when Mr. Terrell was out of the video frame.Additionally, the court reversed the denial of summary judgment on the Terrells' malicious prosecution and First Amendment retaliation claims, citing the presence of probable cause. The court also reversed the denial of summary judgment for Officers Henderson and Banta on the failure-to-intervene claims, as there were no violations of clearly established constitutional law.Finally, the court vacated the district court's denial of summary judgment on the Louisiana state law claims and remanded for reconsideration in light of the appellate court's opinion. View "Terrell v. Allgrunn" on Justia Law

Victor Raul Tellez was charged with three counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child and faced a maximum prison term of 12 years. On the advice of his attorney, he accepted a plea deal, pleading guilty to one count and receiving a three-year prison sentence. Tellez was not informed that his conviction would make him eligible for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). After completing his prison term, the District Attorney initiated SVPA proceedings for his involuntary commitment to a state hospital.Tellez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not being advised of the SVPA consequences. The superior court denied his petition, and the Court of Appeal also denied it, stating that prevailing norms did not require such advisement and that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. Tellez then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.The California Supreme Court held that Tellez did not sufficiently demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise him of the SVPA consequences. The court noted that Tellez provided insufficient evidence that he would not have accepted the plea deal had he been informed of the SVPA consequences. Therefore, the court did not address whether his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. However, recognizing the significant liberty deprivation involved in SVPA commitments, the court exercised its supervisory powers to require trial courts to inform defendants of potential SVPA consequences when pleading guilty or no contest to a qualifying offense. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed on the ground that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. View "In re Tellez" on Justia Law

John David Wurdemann was convicted of seven felonies related to a 2000 attack on a woman in Canyon County, Idaho. Sixteen years later, a district court granted his petition for post-conviction relief, vacating his convictions due to ineffective assistance of counsel. This decision was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2017. Wurdemann was not retried. In 2021, Idaho enacted the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act, which allows for compensation for wrongfully convicted individuals who meet specific criteria. Wurdemann filed a petition under this Act seeking compensation and a certificate of innocence.The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Wurdemann had not established that the basis for vacating his conviction was not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence, as required by the Act. Wurdemann appealed this decision.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and interpreted the statutory language of the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act. The Court held that the phrase “not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence” means “legal error related to his factual innocence.” The Court concluded that the legal error in Wurdemann’s case—ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to challenge a suggestive police lineup—did not establish his factual innocence. The reversal of his convictions was based on the deficient performance of his trial attorneys, not on evidence proving his innocence. Therefore, Wurdemann did not meet the statutory requirement for compensation under the Act.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that Wurdemann could not satisfy the necessary element of showing that the basis for reversing his conviction was related to his factual innocence. View "Wurdemann v. State" on Justia Law

Darrie Rushin was indicted on multiple charges, including first-degree burglary and first-degree sodomy. He pled guilty to amended charges and was sentenced to seven years in prison, followed by a five-year period of postincarceration supervision. After completing his initial sentence, Rushin was released but later reincarcerated for violating the terms of his supervision.Rushin requested the Department of Corrections (DOC) to review his sentence calculation, arguing he was wrongfully denied sentence credits that would reduce his reincarceration period. The DOC denied his request, and his subsequent administrative appeal was also denied. Rushin then filed a motion in his underlying criminal case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed his claim on separation-of-powers grounds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court improperly dismissed the petition but affirmed on other grounds, holding Rushin was not entitled to relief as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that inmates reincarcerated for violating postincarceration supervision terms are entitled to earn statutory sentence credits under KRS 197.045 during their reincarceration. The court reasoned that the initial term of imprisonment and the subsequent period of postincarceration supervision are parts of a single sentence. The court emphasized that statutory sentence credits apply to all inmates unless explicitly excluded by statute. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "RUSHIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In 2016, John O. Kalu, an inmate at FCI Allenwood, alleged that he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by Lieutenant K. Middernatch. Kalu reported the first two incidents to Warden Spaulding, who responded that he would investigate but took no further action. Following his report, Kalu was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and later returned to the general population, where he was assaulted a third time. Kalu also claimed that he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, including being forced to sleep on a cold metal bunk in freezing temperatures without adequate clothing.Kalu filed a pro se complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Spaulding and Lt. Middernatch, seeking damages under Bivens for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Kalu’s claims against Warden Spaulding for lack of personal involvement but allowed the sexual assault claim against Lt. Middernatch to proceed. Kalu later amended his complaint, but the District Court ultimately dismissed all claims, determining that they presented new Bivens contexts and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that Kalu’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault and conditions-of-confinement claims presented new Bivens contexts. It found that special factors, including the availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program, Congress’s omission of a standalone damages remedy in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and separation of powers principles, counseled against extending Bivens liability. The court also agreed that Kalu’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim against Warden Spaulding for deliberate indifference or failure to protect. View "Kalu v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

In 1999, Mark McCloy was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) for tampering with a potential witness in an EEOC proceeding. In 2021, he applied to purchase a handgun in Maryland, stating he had no disqualifying convictions. The Maryland State Police (MSP) disapproved his application, determining his federal conviction was equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime under CR § 9-305.McCloy appealed the MSP's decision to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) was not equivalent to CR § 9-305 but sua sponte determined it was comparable to CR § 9-306, affirming the MSP's disapproval. McCloy sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision but on the grounds that CR § 9-305 was the appropriate equivalent Maryland crime.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the relevant Maryland law for determining equivalency is the law in effect at the time of the application, not the conviction. The court used a two-step approach to determine equivalency, comparing the elements of the statutes and considering whether a reasonable mind could conclude the statutes prohibit similar conduct.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. It held that the relevant Maryland law for determining whether an out-of-State crime is disqualifying is the law in effect when the application is submitted. The court adopted a modified categorical approach, comparing the elements of the out-of-State crime with the Maryland crime. If the elements are broader, the MSP must have conclusive evidence of the acts forming the basis of the conviction to determine if those acts would support a conviction under a disqualifying Maryland crime. The court concluded that McCloy’s federal conviction was not equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the MSP’s disapproval of McCloy’s firearm application. View "In the Matter of McCloy" on Justia Law