Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In 1994, the petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder and first-degree robbery following a fatal shooting during a robbery. He received a life sentence with a mandatory minimum of 30 years for aggravated murder and a consecutive 72-month sentence for robbery, with additional consecutive sentences for later in-prison offenses. After nearly 27 years, he became eligible to seek release from his aggravated murder sentence under Oregon’s three-step process: a murder-review hearing, a determination of a projected release date, and an exit interview. The petitioner successfully completed these steps; the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision affirmed his release date following the exit interview.The Oregon Board of Parole first set the petitioner’s projected release date as January 5, 2022, but after applying some earned-time credits, adjusted it to November 18, 2021, the date of the exit interview. The petitioner argued that the Board should have adjusted his release date further back, to September 23, 2017, based on all available earned-time credits calculated by the Department of Corrections. The Board believed it could not set a release date before the exit interview, relying on prior Oregon Supreme Court cases. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s approach, holding that earned-time credits could not be applied to adjust the release date to a time before the exit interview, reasoning that the term of incarceration is not set until after the Board schedules and affirms the release date.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the Court of Appeals and the Board’s final order. The court held that, for inmates serving consecutive sentences, once the Board affirms release after the statutory three-step process, the Board must fully apply all available earned-time credits under ORS 421.121, even if that results in a release date before the exit interview. The case was remanded to the Board for further proceedings. View "Barrett v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

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A man with a history of sexual offenses, including a 2017 conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree, was later incarcerated for violating the terms of a special sentence imposed due to that conviction. While serving time for this parole revocation, the State petitioned to civilly commit him as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Iowa Code chapter 229A. The petition was filed shortly before his anticipated discharge from prison. The man had a long criminal record and numerous behavioral violations in prison, several involving sexual misconduct.The Iowa District Court for Polk County conducted a trial, during which the respondent moved to dismiss the petition. He argued that because he was only confined for a nonsexual violation of his special sentence at the time of the petition, he was not “presently confined” as required by statute, and that due process required the State to prove a recent overt act indicating a risk of future violence. The district court denied the motion, found that the State had proven the statutory elements beyond a reasonable doubt—including that the respondent was an SVP and was presently confined as defined in the statute—and ordered his commitment. The respondent appealed, reasserting his statutory and constitutional arguments.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the appeal. The court held that the statutory definition of “presently confined” includes incarceration resulting from a special sentence for a sexually violent offense, and that the State was not required to prove a recent overt act under these circumstances. The court further concluded that this statutory scheme did not violate federal or state due process, as long as the respondent was presently confined due to a sexually violent offense and found to be an SVP under the statute. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "In Re Detention Of Harlow" on Justia Law

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Brian Pyle sought a writ of mandamus to compel several South Dakota law enforcement agencies and officials to provide him with investigative records regarding the disappearance and death of his son, Ryan. Ryan was reported missing in August 2020, and his remains were found in November 2020 near the Snake Creek Recreation Area. Pyle alleged that he had made numerous requests for medical records and investigative reports, but had not received any documents. He cited Marsy’s Law in the South Dakota Constitution, asserting that as a victim or relative of a victim, he was entitled to these records.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Charles Mix County, initially issued a peremptory writ requiring the respondents to answer. The State, representing all respondents, moved to quash the writ, arguing that the requested records contained confidential criminal justice information exempt from disclosure by law, and that Pyle had not exhausted administrative remedies for accessing such records. The State also contended that, since law enforcement found no evidence of foul play and concluded no crime had occurred, Marsy’s Law did not apply. After a hearing, in which no testimony or evidence was presented, the circuit court granted the State's motion, quashed the writ, and denied Pyle's application, finding Pyle was not a victim under Marsy’s Law and that no mandatory duty existed to disclose the records.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the circuit court’s decision for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo. The Supreme Court held that Marsy’s Law requires a crime to have occurred for someone to be considered a victim and to invoke its rights. Because law enforcement determined no crime had been committed, Pyle was not entitled to the records under Marsy’s Law. Further, the Supreme Court found that South Dakota statutes exempt criminal investigative records from mandatory disclosure. The circuit court’s decision was affirmed. View "Pyle v. S.D. Division Of Criminal Investigation" on Justia Law

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During the COVID-19 pandemic, federal relief programs such as the EIDL and PPP were implemented to assist small businesses. In Puerto Rico, a scheme led by Manfred Pentzke-Lemus fraudulently obtained such loans using fabricated documents and kickbacks. Jayson Pastrana-Román, owner of a food kiosk, became involved after Pentzke contacted him and assisted with loan applications. Pastrana allowed co-conspirators to alter his documents and apply for loans in his name, resulting in approved loans and kickbacks paid to Pentzke. Pastrana also recruited his brother and friends into the scheme, relaying instructions and collecting their kickback payments, though he did not retain these funds.A federal grand jury indicted Pastrana on ten counts, including wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy. He initially planned to go to trial but later pleaded guilty to all counts. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the court determined Pastrana acted as a "manager" in the conspiracy, applying a three-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The court declined to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, finding his acceptance was not timely and he had not admitted to his full role as recruiter and intermediary. The court imposed a 33-month concurrent sentence for all counts, below the calculated Guidelines range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Pastrana challenged the sentencing enhancements and denial of the acceptance reduction. The First Circuit held the district court did not err in applying the managerial role adjustment but did clearly err in denying the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, as Pastrana had admitted relevant conduct and timely notified the government of his intent to plead guilty. The court vacated Pastrana’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "US v. Pastrana-Roman" on Justia Law

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The City of Los Angeles received millions in federal housing grants over a period of years, certifying compliance with federal housing accessibility laws as a condition of those funds. Mei Ling and the Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley (FHC) brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that the City had falsely represented its compliance with accessibility requirements. The United States later intervened in the case. Separately, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) investigated the City for noncompliance and, after its own findings, entered into a Voluntary Compliance Agreement (VCA) with the City. Under the VCA, the City agreed to spend at least $200 million over ten years to remediate or build accessible housing, but the VCA explicitly excluded the FCA claims at issue in the litigation.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over years of discovery and litigation. Eventually, the United States, FHC, and the City agreed to settle the FCA claims for $38,266,989. The district court approved the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and dismissed all claims against the City, with relators entitled to a statutory share of the settlement proceeds. Mei Ling appealed, arguing that the VCA constituted an “alternate remedy” under the FCA, which would entitle her to a share of the VCA’s value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the VCA was not an alternate remedy within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) because it did not take the place of the FCA suit or settlement. The VCA addressed the City’s civil rights violations, not the alleged fraud underlying the FCA action, and expressly carved out the FCA claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of the FCA settlement. View "LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

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Federal agents lawfully searched the home of an individual under investigation for drug trafficking and seized $585,000 in cash from a safe. Before the cash could be processed, an FBI agent stole $218,200 from the seizure. The agent was later prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgment that included funds traceable to the stolen cash. The individual from whom the money was seized later pleaded guilty to drug-trafficking charges and agreed to forfeit only $366,800—the amount remaining after the theft. The government did not seek forfeiture of the additional $218,200, and the final forfeiture order reflected only the lower amount.The individual then moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, seeking the return of the $218,200 that was stolen and never forfeited. The district court, treating the Rule 41(g) motion as a civil complaint, granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the individual had agreed to forfeit all cash seized and that his evidence of lawful ownership was insufficient. The court further found that no reasonable jury could conclude that any portion of the seized money was lawfully obtained while the remainder was subject to forfeiture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that sovereign immunity did not bar the individual's Rule 41(g) claim for the return of cash that was seized, lost, but then recovered by the government in forfeiture proceedings. The court clarified that when the government possesses money traceable to previously seized funds, the claimant may seek its return, and the government bears the burden to justify retention. Finding that the government failed to meet this burden, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CANNON V. USA" on Justia Law

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In 1989, Sean Worrell was murdered in a Bronx movie theater. The police investigation initially focused on Ricardo Jimenez after he was identified by teenager Esco Blaylock, allegedly through a suggestive photo procedure. The official reports linked Jimenez to the nickname “Leon,” though evidence later suggested this identification process was flawed and possibly fabricated. The case remained dormant for a decade. Around 1999, Detective Wendell Stradford reopened the investigation, securing incriminating testimony from witnesses, including Andrew O’Brien, a federal inmate, and Blaylock, who had ceased cooperating years earlier. O’Brien’s cooperation was allegedly induced by the promise of a sentence reduction, and additional testimony came from a jailhouse informant with a history of unreliability. In 2007, Jimenez was convicted of murder based solely on these witnesses’ testimony and was sentenced to 22 years to life.Jimenez appealed his conviction through the New York State courts without success. He then sought federal habeas relief. In 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York vacated his conviction, finding that the prosecutor had committed Brady violations by suppressing exculpatory and impeachment evidence regarding the key witnesses. The charges were dismissed in 2023.Jimenez then sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging malicious prosecution, denial of fair trial rights, failure to intervene by the officers, and Monell liability against the City and the District Attorney’s Office. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed all claims, finding, among other reasons, that Jimenez failed to overcome the presumption of probable cause from the grand jury indictment and that the pleadings were insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claims, the fair trial claims against the original investigating officers, the failure to intervene claims, and the Monell claim against the District Attorney’s Office. However, it vacated the dismissal of the fair trial claim against Detective Stradford, the Monell claim against the City of New York, and the negligence claim against the City, remanding those issues for further proceedings. The court held that Jimenez plausibly alleged fabrication and forwarding of false evidence by Detective Stradford and that the Monell and negligence claims warranted further consideration. View "Jimenez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a former Senior Reimbursement Manager at a national pharmacy provider, alleged that her employer engaged in a scheme to overcharge government healthcare programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. She claimed the company exploited billing system discrepancies and other tactics to cause overpayments, including billing for deceased patients and miscoding pharmacy types for higher reimbursements. The company allegedly concealed these overpayments in its internal accounting and, after a period, transferred the unreturned funds into its own revenues. The plaintiff reported these practices to management and internal audit, but the issues persisted.After filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the plaintiff amended her allegations. The District Court dismissed all federal claims with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff did not meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for “direct” False Claims Act (FCA) claims (those based on submitting fraudulent invoices or statements to the government). The court also denied leave to further amend the complaint, and denied reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s direct FCA claims, holding that she did not identify any specific fraudulent submissions to the government, nor adequately allege that such information was solely within the defendants’ control. However, the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of the “reverse” FCA claim, which is based on knowingly retaining government overpayments. The court found the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the company had an obligation to return identified overpayments and knowingly concealed or improperly avoided that obligation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reverse FCA claim. View "United States v. Amerisource Bergen Corp." on Justia Law

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Two individuals associated with a Russian nonprofit registered the domain name waronfakes.com through a Russian registrar in March 2022. This domain hosted content focused on Russian political issues. In August 2024, the United States government seized the domain and others, alleging violations of the international money laundering statute and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The government claimed the domain was used to promote Russian disinformation on behalf of sanctioned individuals and entities, and that the purchase of the domain involved funds transferred for the benefit of a blocked person under U.S. sanctions. Five days after the seizure, the nonprofit and its director were added to the U.S. Treasury’s blocked persons list, which prohibits the transfer or dealing in their U.S.-based property without a license.The applicants, Timofey V and ANO Dialog, moved in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for the return of the domain under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). The government opposed the motion, arguing that the applicants were not lawfully entitled to possess the property as they were now blocked persons under U.S. sanctions and lacked the required license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The District Court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the applicants could not lawfully receive the domain.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that although the applicants had standing due to a sufficient possessory interest, they failed to establish lawful entitlement to the property because transfer to them was blocked by sanctions and no OFAC license had been obtained. The court further found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing, as the legal impediment to transfer was undisputed. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Timofey V v. USA" on Justia Law

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An individual was accused by his stepdaughter of multiple incidents of sexual abuse when she was eleven years old. He denied these allegations, but in 2017, a jury convicted him of two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen. These convictions required him to register as a sex offender. Over the next several years, the relevant state board classified him multiple times as a level two sex offender, with each classification subject to objections, appeals, or procedural errors that resulted in vacatur or amendment. In his most recent classification proceeding, he requested funds for an expert to testify about the relationship between repetitive sexual offenses and dangerousness, particularly whether current research supported using multiple offenses as a factor in assessing his future dangerousness. The hearing examiner denied this request, finding the proposed testimony would not be unique to his case. The examiner then found by clear and convincing evidence that he posed a moderate risk of reoffense and dangerousness, ordering registration as a level two offender.He sought judicial review in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which affirmed both the substantive classification decision and the denial of expert funds. He timely appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the denial of funds for expert testimony was an abuse of discretion. The court found that the request for expert funds was sufficiently specific and relevant to the novel application of a regulatory factor assessing dangerousness based on multiple offenses, especially given recent changes in the application of similar factors and the lack of clear empirical support. The court vacated the Superior Court judgment and remanded the matter to the board for further proceedings, including granting the request for expert funds. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law