Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 1, which requires law enforcement officers to inform individuals suspected of driving under the influence that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime. The respondent, Brian Matthew Nash, was pulled over for suspected impaired driving. After failing field sobriety tests, he was arrested and a state trooper obtained a search warrant for a blood or urine test. The trooper informed Nash that refusal to take a test is a crime, and Nash complied. His blood test revealed the presence of a controlled substance, leading to the revocation of his driving privileges.Nash sought judicial review of his license revocation, arguing that the trooper's advisory did not comply with the statutory requirement. The district court rejected Nash's arguments and sustained the revocation. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, finding that the advisory given to Nash was misleading and an inaccurate statement of law.The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute. The court held that the trooper's statement that "refusal to take a test is a crime" satisfied the advisory required by section 171.177, subdivision 1. The court reasoned that the statute does not require officers to inform drivers of all the elements and permutations of what is required before the state may take adverse action against them. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the other issues raised by Nash in his appeal. View "Nash v. Commissioner of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Elden Don Brannan was living with his sister and her three children in Corpus Christi, Texas. In 2022, Brannan's sister called 911 to report that Brannan had assaulted her boyfriend and was threatening suicide. She informed the police that Brannan had a "pipe bomb" in his bedroom closet. The bomb squad removed the device and Brannan was arrested. He was later indicted by a grand jury for possessing an unregistered "destructive device" in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). His sister testified that Brannan had built the device from disassembled fireworks. Brannan's defense was that the device was not an explosive but a "makeshift roman-candle or fountain firework" designed to emit a pyrotechnic display.Brannan was found guilty by a federal jury. He moved for acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show he had designed the device as a weapon. These motions were denied. Brannan also requested the court to instruct the jury that to convict him under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), it had to find he had intentionally designed the device for use as a weapon. The court rejected this proposed instruction, reasoning that Brannan's intent to design the device as a weapon was not an element of the offense but an affirmative defense. The jury found Brannan guilty and he was sentenced to 24 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Brannan argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the jury instruction omitted an element of the offense. The court disagreed, affirming Brannan's conviction. The court held that under its binding precedent, the exception to § 5861(d) is an affirmative defense, not an element of the crime. Therefore, the government did not need to prove that the device was "designed for use as a weapon." The court also concluded that the district court did not err by following the circuit’s pattern instructions and declining to add "designed as a weapon" as an element of § 5861(d). View "United States v. Brannan" on Justia Law

In May 2020, Austin River Keller drove his car into a ditch and subsequently failed a breath alcohol test. The Kitsap County District Court suppressed the breath alcohol test results produced from the Dräger Alcotest 9510 machines in Keller’s case and in all other DUI cases in Kitsap County District Court. The district court concluded that the breath test results violated state statutes and regulations. The district court found that state law places strict limits on the admission of breath test results into evidence. The court also found that the Dräger machine had never rounded the mean before calculating the plus or minus 10 percent range, as required by state regulations. Instead, the Dräger was programmed to truncate the mean before performing that calculation. The district court ruled that the machine’s failure to do those necessary mathematical calculations itself rendered the results invalid and inadmissible under state law and court precedent.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the relevant statutes and regulations do not require the Dräger machine itself to perform the mean and the plus or minus 10 percent range calculation at the time of the test. The court found that the State could establish those required pieces of the foundation for admission of breath test results by doing the math discussed above in a different manner. The court reversed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and suppression order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Keller" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plea agreement between the State and Michael Brenum in a criminal case. The court ordered a pre-plea presentence investigation (PSI) and combined the change of plea and sentencing hearing. The risk assessment score from the PSI triggered a secondary phase of the assessment, which was referred to the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services (Department) and Dr. Hein-Kolo. They refused to approve the secondary process of the assessment based on a pre-plea PSI, arguing that the risk assessment process should be used only after a conviction has occurred according to assessment guidelines. The district court held the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt for not completing the risk assessment.The Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo petitioned the Supreme Court of North Dakota to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the law by ordering a risk assessment before acceptance of a guilty plea and that there is no other adequate remedy. They also argued that the issue is not appealable and no adequate alternative remedy exists.The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo, stating that the plain language of the statute gives the Department the authority to approve the secondary process of the risk assessment and the responsibility to perform that secondary process. The court also clarified that a risk assessment is conducted on “a person that committed an offense,” and a person is considered to have committed an offense only after a conviction. The court concluded that the district court may order a PSI at any time, but it may not require the Department to perform the risk assessment other than by its approved process or before the substantive requirements are met. The Supreme Court of North Dakota exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s order directing the Department to conduct a pre-plea risk assessment and the order holding the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt. View "State v. Thornton" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an appeal by Quinton Handlon, a prisoner convicted of producing, coercing, and possessing child pornography. Handlon had requested compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because his elderly father needed a caregiver. The district court denied the request as Handlon failed to provide substantial evidence about his father's condition or proving that he was the only available caretaker. Handlon appealed this decision.The Appeals Court upheld the district court's decision, affirming that Handlon's case did not meet the extraordinary and compelling reasons necessary for compassionate release under the policy statement of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. At the time of Handlon's motion, the policy statement recognized four categories for compassionate release, none of which included the incapacitation of a parent when the defendant could serve as a caregiver.The court noted that a recent amendment to the policy statement now includes such a scenario, but clarified that it could not be applied retroactively in this appeal because it was a substantive amendment, not a clarifying one. The court affirmed the denial of Handlon's motion for compassionate release, but hinted that Handlon might be able to file a new motion for compassionate release under the updated policy. View "USA v. Handlon" on Justia Law

The case arose from a drug trafficking operation led by Keith White in an Indiana prison. White, along with others, was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin after three inmates died of drug overdoses. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced under enhanced penalties due to his criminal history, which included two felony convictions for cocaine dealing. This was his second appeal challenging his sentence.White argued that his status as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines was improperly determined based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. He contended that the guideline’s definition of a “controlled substance offense” unambiguously excluded inchoate offenses, such as conspiracy, and thus the application note expanding this definition deserved no deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed. It noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor did not unsettle Stinson v. United States, which provided that commentary in the Guidelines interpreting or explaining a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution, a federal statute, or is inconsistent with the guideline. Thus, the court deferred to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the career-offender guideline.Additionally, the court rejected White's argument that the “major questions doctrine” invalidated the application note. The court concluded that the application note was not a “transformative expansion” of the Sentencing Commission’s authority, and, therefore, the doctrine did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment. View "USA v. White" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Jyoti Agrawal, was convicted of three financial crimes. Agrawal had obtained over $1.5 million in federal and state grants to research and develop a scanning electron microscope. However, she forged a letter in her company’s application to the Department of Energy, and later lied about how the funds were spent. She diverted a portion of the grant funds for personal expenses, including her MBA. The district court found that Agrawal's conduct caused a loss of $1,548,255, which was used to calculate her sentencing guidelines range. She was also ordered to pay restitution of the same amount.On appeal, Agrawal challenged the district court’s evidentiary and instructional rulings at trial, its estimate of the amount of loss from her fraud, and its decision to find her personal property forfeitable due to the fraud. However, the Court of Appeals found that the alleged evidentiary and instructional errors were harmless, the district court properly refused to offset its loss amount by her project expenses, and the court properly subjected her personal property to forfeiture because she commingled that property with grant funds.Furthermore, the court rejected Agrawal's challenges to her sentence, including her claim that the court identified an incorrect guidelines range, miscalculated the restitution amounts, and entered an illegal forfeiture judgment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "United States v. Agrawal" on Justia Law

In this case, the People of the State of California filed a lawsuit against Holiday Liquor (owned by Abdul Jamal Sheriff and operated under Freetown Holdings Company) for public nuisance. The People claimed that the store had become a hub for illegal drug transactions, with customers and dealers using the store as a meeting point. The store was accused of tolerating loitering and drug dealing, lacking security, operating until 2 a.m., and selling alcohol in cheap single-serving containers.The trial court granted summary judgment for the People, ordering the store to hire guards, stop selling single-serving containers of alcohol, and take other measures to address the issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision.The court held that Holiday Liquor had indeed facilitated a public nuisance by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent the sale of illegal drugs on its property. The court ruled that the proprietor was aware of the illegal activities as he had been informed multiple times by the police. Despite this knowledge, he failed to implement recommended measures to mitigate the issue, such as hiring security guards, limiting operating hours, and ceasing the sale of single-serving alcohol containers. The ruling was based on the violation of sections 11570 et seq. of the Health and Safety Code (the drug house law), sections 3479 et seq. of the Civil Code (the public nuisance law), and sections 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code (the unfair competition law). View "P. v. Freetown Holdings Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Christopher Kabew, who pleaded guilty to attempted residential burglary, his first felony conviction. His sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation with the condition that he complete a substance abuse treatment program. After successfully completing the program, Kabew petitioned the district court to set aside his conviction under NRS 176A.240(6)(a), which states that upon completing the terms and conditions of a drug court program, a court "shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings or set aside the judgment of conviction" unless the defendant has a prior felony conviction or previously failed to complete a specialty court program. The district court denied the motion, and Kabew petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the district court improperly denied Kabew's motion. The court held that NRS 176A.240(6)(a) is mandatory and does not afford district courts any discretion to deny a motion to set aside a judgment of conviction when the defendant meets the statutory requirements. The court further held that the statute does not intrude on judicial functions, as it is within the legislature's power to define crimes and determine punishments. The court concluded that the district court failed to perform a duty required by law by denying Kabew's motion, and ordered the district court to set aside Kabew's conviction. View "Kabew v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

In a case tried in the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, the appellant, Kim A. Judd, was charged with one count of felony injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle and one count of felony coercion. This came after an altercation where Judd struck a 1957 Chevrolet truck several times with a sledgehammer following a disagreement with the owner of the vehicle, Scott Reber, over payment for repairs.The key issue addressed by the court was the interpretation of the phrase "physical force" in NRS 207.190(2), which distinguishes between coercion being punished as a felony versus as a misdemeanor. The court needed to determine whether "physical force" should be limited to physical force against a person, and not merely against property.The court concluded that the Nevada Legislature intended for the distinguishing statutory element of "physical force" to be limited to force against a person. As such, the jury should have been instructed accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of giving proper jury instructions for the essential elements of a crime and ruled that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the definition of physical force as being limited to force against a person necessitated the reversal of this conviction.However, the court affirmed the felony conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle, concluding that the jury was correctly instructed on the proper measure of damages for the partial destruction of property. The conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle was based on the uncontroverted expert testimony at trial, which provided a replacement cost for the damaged parts of the vehicle. View "Judd v. State" on Justia Law