Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois that a tin can filled with energetic powder, sealed with adhesive, and outfitted with a fuse qualifies as a "destructive device" under the National Firearms Act.The case involved Jeffrey E. Creek, who was found in possession of such a device, firearms, magazines, ammunition, and a silencer that had been shipped from China. Creek was subsequently charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. At his sentencing hearing, the district court applied a two-level "destructive device" enhancement in calculating his Guidelines range.Creek appealed the decision, arguing that his device was a firework and not a destructive device. However, the appellate court found that the district court correctly classified the device as a bomb under the National Firearms Act due to it having a metal casing, an adhesive seal, explosive powder, and a fuse. It was irrelevant that Creek intended to use the device as a firework, as the device was fully assembled and fit the definition of a destructive device.Creek also challenged the district court's consideration of his criminal history and substance abuse disorder in his sentencing. However, the appellate court dismissed these arguments, stating that the district court correctly exercised its discretion in considering Creek's full criminal history and the risk to public safety. As a result, the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "USA v. Creek" on Justia Law

In this case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Raquan Emahl Gray was convicted of conspiracy to commit a controlled-substances offense, after helping transport a car filled with drugs to a state prison. Gray appealed his conviction, arguing that the government failed to prove that he knowingly possessed a Schedule II controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, rather than a controlled substance generally. The appeals court affirmed Gray's conviction, holding that the government only needed to prove general knowledge to obtain a controlled-substances conviction, which it did. Gray also argued that the district court erred when it denied his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal due to his failure to timely renew the motion at the conclusion of the evidence. The appeals court acknowledged that Gray's renewed motion was timely, but deemed the district court's error as harmless because enough evidence supported Gray's conviction. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

In South Dakota, Kenneth Leroy Kurtz pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The circuit court determined there were aggravating circumstances that justified a departure from the presumptive probation sentence, and Kurtz was sentenced to five years in prison. Kurtz appealed the decision, arguing that he did not pose a significant risk to the public and therefore should have received probation. Alternatively, he claimed the court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum prison sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court had wrongly applied the statute for presumptive probation. The court noted that while the circuit court had identified aggravating circumstances, it had also found that Kurtz did not pose a significant risk to the public. The Supreme Court pointed out that the law allows for a departure from presumptive probation only if aggravating circumstances that pose a significant risk to the public are found.The court concluded that the circuit court's statement that punishment was warranted regardless of whether Kurtz posed a threat to society contradicted the mandate in the statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's sentence and remanded the case for the circuit court to issue a sentence of probation. View "State v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

The case involved Rhonda Persiani, a defendant charged with multiple counts of driving under the influence (DUI) in California. Due to doubts about Persiani's mental competence, the criminal proceedings were suspended, and she was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Persiani was evaluated and found suitable for outpatient treatment through mental health diversion. However, the court and parties believed Persiani was ineligible for such treatment due to a California Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion in cases where a defendant is charged with DUI. Persiani sought dismissal of her cases, asserting that dismissal was required under the Penal Code because she was ineligible for any of the treatment options. The court denied Persiani’s motion to dismiss and imposed mental health treatment provisions as conditions of her release. In an appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District held that a trial court has the authority under the Penal Code to order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with DUI. The court concluded that the Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion for DUI does not prevent a court from ordering a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant to receive treatment through mental health diversion after criminal proceedings have been suspended. The matter was remanded back to the lower court to determine whether to order Persiani to receive mental health diversion treatment. View "Persiani v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The defendant, Ahmed Alahmedalabdaloklah, a Syrian national, was convicted after a jury trial for participating in a conspiracy that targeted US military personnel and property in Iraq. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed some convictions and reversed others. The court agreed with both parties that Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same could not stand after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis. The court reversed these convictions and remanded to the district court to vacate them. However, the court affirmed Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring to damage US government property by means of an explosive. The court held that the statutes under which Alahmedalabdaloklah was convicted applied extraterritorially, meaning they applied to acts committed outside the United States. The court also held that the district court properly used procedures set forth in the Classified Information Procedures Act to withhold or substitute classified information from discovery. Despite several errors by the government in invoking the state-secrets privilege, the court excused these errors because remanding for proper invocation would be of little or no benefit. Finally, the court held that the use of overseas deposition testimony did not violate Alahmedalabdaloklah's rights under the Confrontation Clause or other constitutional and evidentiary rules. The court remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. View "USA V. ALAHMEDALABDALOKLAH" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma considered whether an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges constituted a "pending charge" for the purposes of expungement. The appellant, Andrew Dale Brassfield, sought to expunge his arrest records under Oklahoma law. The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation objected, arguing that Brassfield was not qualified for expungement because he had pending charges against him due to an ongoing investigation by the federal government and the Cherokee Tribe. The district court and Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed these decisions. The court held that an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges is not a pending charge under the relevant Oklahoma statute, and therefore, the appellant qualified to seek expungement. The court reasoned that a criminal investigation into whether an individual's conduct is chargeable as a crime is not the same as the individual having a pending felony or misdemeanor charge. The court also found that the requirement that the prosecuting agency will not refile the charge is satisfied, as the State of Oklahoma lacks jurisdiction to do so in this case. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "BRASSFIELD v. STATE" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant Mary Linnell appealed her conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The case arose after a traffic stop during which law enforcement officers found methamphetamine, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Linnell moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the patrol officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The district court denied the motion, and Linnell entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal the suppression ruling. She was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment with 5 years of supervised release to follow.On appeal, Linnell contended that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress, asserting that the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The appellate court disagreed, ruling that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the officer observed three traffic violations (running a stop sign, following another vehicle too closely, and speeding), and therefore had probable cause to conduct the traffic stop. The court gave deference to the lower court's credibility determination of the officer's testimony, noting that the officer had several years of experience and had been involved in hundreds of traffic stops. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Linnell" on Justia Law

In the case presented, Wesley McDowell Jr. was convicted of human trafficking of a minor and other offenses, leading to a sentence of 23 years to life in prison. McDowell appealed this sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss his elevated sentence of 15 years to life under section 236.1(c)(2) of the Penal Code, which pertains to human trafficking of a minor with aggravating circumstances. He cited Senate Bill 81, claiming it compelled the sentencing courts to dismiss enhancements under certain circumstances, applicable to his elevated sentence.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three held that Senate Bill 81 applies only to enhancements--additional terms of imprisonment added to the base term. As McDowell conceded, section 236.1(c)(2) provides an alternative punishment for the underlying offense and is therefore not an enhancement. Thus, Senate Bill 81 did not apply to McDowell’s elevated sentence under section 236.1(c)(2). The court affirmed the original sentence. View "People v. McDowell" on Justia Law

The defendant, Melvin Lear, was charged with a felony offense by the State of Nebraska. Lear requested a continuance in order to conduct additional discovery, which was granted by the court. However, the continuance extended the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. Lear then filed a motion for absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds. The district court denied the motion, finding that Lear had waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory limit. Lear appealed the decision, arguing that the waiver provision in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) only applies to a continuance granted at the sole request of the defendant, not a request joined in by the State. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected Lear's argument, interpreting the waiver provision to apply to a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his or her counsel, regardless of whether the State joins the request, when the period of delay resulting from the continuance extends a trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision to deny Lear's motion for absolute discharge. View "State v. Lear" on Justia Law

In the early 1980s, Arturo Franco, the defendant, committed two sexual offenses against his minor stepdaughter. After serving his sentence and completing his probation, Franco complied with the requirement to register as a sex offender for 37 years. In 2021, Franco petitioned to be removed from California's registry of sex offenders, arguing that he had lived a law-abiding life for over three decades since his conviction. However, the People opposed the petition, primarily arguing that one of Franco's crimes would render him ineligible for removal from the registry if prosecuted under a statute enacted 21 years after his conviction.The trial court denied Franco's petition, giving significant weight to the egregious nature of the underlying offenses and the age of the victim, despite Franco's 37 years of law-abiding behavior and no evidence suggesting a current risk of reoffending. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision, finding that it contravened the precedent set in People v. Thai, which held that mere focus on the nature of the initial crime without evidence of the defendant's current likelihood of reoffending was not sufficient to deny removal from the sex offender registry. The appellate court also rejected the People's argument that Franco "could have been convicted" of a crime that did not exist at the time of his offense, noting that the relevant legislation tied tier placement in the registry to the offense for which the defendant "was convicted". View "People v. Franco" on Justia Law