Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Danny Cruz, a prisoner, hatched a plan to smuggle cell phones into prison and sell them to fellow inmates by bribing a prison guard. Upon being caught, Cruz was charged with conspiring to violate the Travel Act under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Facing an additional five years in prison, Cruz entered a plea deal in which he pleaded guilty in exchange for the prosecution's agreement to recommend that the total offense level is 14. However, the Probation Office called for a four-level enhancement because the crime involved a public official in a sensitive position, leading to a dispute over whether this enhancement should apply.Cruz argued that if the government endorsed the enhancement, it would contravene the plea agreement, and the prosecution initially supported the enhancement during a presentence conference. Subsequently, the prosecution changed its stance in a brief, taking no position on the enhancement, and reiterated this at the start of the sentencing hearing. Despite this, the District Court found that the four-level enhancement did apply, leading to a final offense level of 15 and a final Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months.The Third Circuit Court concluded that the prosecution breached the plea agreement when it initially supported the four-level enhancement, as it had promised to recommend a total offense level no higher than 14. The Court further ruled that the prosecution's later neutral stance did not unequivocally retract its erroneous position, and thus did not cure its breach. Accordingly, the Third Circuit Court vacated Cruz's sentence and remanded the case, instructing that a different judge should decide whether to grant specific performance or allow withdrawal of the plea. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

The case involves Brian Benjamin, a state senator in New York from 2017 to 2021, who was indicted on charges of federal funds bribery, honest services wire fraud, conspiracy to commit each of those offenses, and falsifying records. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed three of the charges on the ground that the indictment failed to allege an explicit quid pro quo between Benjamin and his campaign donor. The government appealed this decision.According to the allegations, Benjamin agreed to allocate state funds to a non-profit organization controlled by a real estate developer in his district, in exchange for campaign contributions. The developer was allegedly aware of the quid pro quo arrangement and proceeded to provide funds to Benjamin's campaign. Furthermore, Benjamin allegedly attempted to conceal this arrangement by falsifying campaign forms and providing false information during his background check when he was nominated to be lieutenant governor of New York.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that an explicit quid pro quo does not need to be expressly stated; it can be inferred from the official’s and the payor’s words and actions. The court concluded that the indictment sufficiently alleged an explicit quid pro quo, as it stated that Benjamin obtained campaign contributions in exchange for his agreement to use his official authority to obtain a state grant for a non-profit organization. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Benjamin" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph A. Jakuttis, a former officer and detective in the Dracut Police Department, who also served as a Task Force Officer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration's Cross Borders Initiative. Jakuttis brought multiple federal and state claims against the Town of Dracut, certain Dracut police officers, and members of the federal law-enforcement task force. He alleged that he was demoted and faced retaliation after reporting serious criminal activities implicating two Dracut police officers, which he learned from a confidential drug informant.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's Bivens claims against Michael V. O'Hanlon and Richard P. Poirier, Jr., and his §1983 claim against the Town of Dracut, David J. Chartrand Jr., and Demetri Mellonakos. The court ruled that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as they could have reasonably thought that Jakuttis was speaking as part of his official duties rather than as a private citizen when he reported the misconduct, thus not clearly violating his First Amendment rights.The court also affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's state-law tort claims against Poirier, as Poirier was deemed to be acting within the scope of his federal employment during the relevant times. However, the court remanded the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act claim against the Town of Dracut and the Intentional Interference with Advantageous Economic Relationship claim against Chartrand and Mellonakos to the District Court. The court reasoned that these state-law claims should be resolved by a state court due to reasons of comity. View "Jakuttis v. Town of Dracut" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lawrence Weber, who was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Weber's driving privileges were suspended for 180 days by a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer following his refusal to take a chemical breath test after his arrest. Weber argued that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, which he claimed invalidated the authority of the North Dakota Department of Transportation to revoke his driving privileges.On February 26, 2023, Weber was arrested after an onsite screening test showed a blood alcohol content of .152 percent. Following his arrest, when asked to take a chemical breath test, Weber invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and requested an attorney. Despite being given access to his phone to contact his attorney, Weber made a call to an individual who refused to help him contact his attorney. Weber did not attempt to make further calls or ask for additional time to contact his attorney.The hearing officer found that Weber refused to take the chemical breath test and had a reasonable opportunity to call an attorney. The officer's findings were upheld by the district court. Weber appealed the decision, maintaining that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that Weber was provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney and his right to counsel was satisfied. Weber's claim that he was denied the opportunity to contact an attorney was not supported by the evidence. The court found that the hearing officer's findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and her conclusion that Weber was not deprived of his right to consult counsel was in accordance with the law. View "Weber v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

The case involved Martin William Luther Hamilton, who pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The probation agent preparing Hamilton's presentence report determined that three of Hamilton’s prior North Carolina convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum of fifteen years for defendants who have three prior convictions for offenses that qualify as a “violent felony or a serious drug offense.”Hamilton objected to the ACCA classification, disputing that the third conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon met the requirements of the ACCA. The district court followed a previous court's unpublished decision which held that a North Carolina conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. As a result, the court concluded that Hamilton qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment.Hamilton appealed, challenging only the district court’s determination that the attempted robbery conviction was a predicate offense under the ACCA. In response, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no error in the determination that Hamilton’s conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-87(a) qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. View "US v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois that a tin can filled with energetic powder, sealed with adhesive, and outfitted with a fuse qualifies as a "destructive device" under the National Firearms Act.The case involved Jeffrey E. Creek, who was found in possession of such a device, firearms, magazines, ammunition, and a silencer that had been shipped from China. Creek was subsequently charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. At his sentencing hearing, the district court applied a two-level "destructive device" enhancement in calculating his Guidelines range.Creek appealed the decision, arguing that his device was a firework and not a destructive device. However, the appellate court found that the district court correctly classified the device as a bomb under the National Firearms Act due to it having a metal casing, an adhesive seal, explosive powder, and a fuse. It was irrelevant that Creek intended to use the device as a firework, as the device was fully assembled and fit the definition of a destructive device.Creek also challenged the district court's consideration of his criminal history and substance abuse disorder in his sentencing. However, the appellate court dismissed these arguments, stating that the district court correctly exercised its discretion in considering Creek's full criminal history and the risk to public safety. As a result, the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "USA v. Creek" on Justia Law

In this case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Raquan Emahl Gray was convicted of conspiracy to commit a controlled-substances offense, after helping transport a car filled with drugs to a state prison. Gray appealed his conviction, arguing that the government failed to prove that he knowingly possessed a Schedule II controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, rather than a controlled substance generally. The appeals court affirmed Gray's conviction, holding that the government only needed to prove general knowledge to obtain a controlled-substances conviction, which it did. Gray also argued that the district court erred when it denied his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal due to his failure to timely renew the motion at the conclusion of the evidence. The appeals court acknowledged that Gray's renewed motion was timely, but deemed the district court's error as harmless because enough evidence supported Gray's conviction. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

In South Dakota, Kenneth Leroy Kurtz pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The circuit court determined there were aggravating circumstances that justified a departure from the presumptive probation sentence, and Kurtz was sentenced to five years in prison. Kurtz appealed the decision, arguing that he did not pose a significant risk to the public and therefore should have received probation. Alternatively, he claimed the court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum prison sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court had wrongly applied the statute for presumptive probation. The court noted that while the circuit court had identified aggravating circumstances, it had also found that Kurtz did not pose a significant risk to the public. The Supreme Court pointed out that the law allows for a departure from presumptive probation only if aggravating circumstances that pose a significant risk to the public are found.The court concluded that the circuit court's statement that punishment was warranted regardless of whether Kurtz posed a threat to society contradicted the mandate in the statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's sentence and remanded the case for the circuit court to issue a sentence of probation. View "State v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

The case involved Rhonda Persiani, a defendant charged with multiple counts of driving under the influence (DUI) in California. Due to doubts about Persiani's mental competence, the criminal proceedings were suspended, and she was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Persiani was evaluated and found suitable for outpatient treatment through mental health diversion. However, the court and parties believed Persiani was ineligible for such treatment due to a California Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion in cases where a defendant is charged with DUI. Persiani sought dismissal of her cases, asserting that dismissal was required under the Penal Code because she was ineligible for any of the treatment options. The court denied Persiani’s motion to dismiss and imposed mental health treatment provisions as conditions of her release. In an appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District held that a trial court has the authority under the Penal Code to order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with DUI. The court concluded that the Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion for DUI does not prevent a court from ordering a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant to receive treatment through mental health diversion after criminal proceedings have been suspended. The matter was remanded back to the lower court to determine whether to order Persiani to receive mental health diversion treatment. View "Persiani v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The defendant, Ahmed Alahmedalabdaloklah, a Syrian national, was convicted after a jury trial for participating in a conspiracy that targeted US military personnel and property in Iraq. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed some convictions and reversed others. The court agreed with both parties that Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same could not stand after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis. The court reversed these convictions and remanded to the district court to vacate them. However, the court affirmed Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring to damage US government property by means of an explosive. The court held that the statutes under which Alahmedalabdaloklah was convicted applied extraterritorially, meaning they applied to acts committed outside the United States. The court also held that the district court properly used procedures set forth in the Classified Information Procedures Act to withhold or substitute classified information from discovery. Despite several errors by the government in invoking the state-secrets privilege, the court excused these errors because remanding for proper invocation would be of little or no benefit. Finally, the court held that the use of overseas deposition testimony did not violate Alahmedalabdaloklah's rights under the Confrontation Clause or other constitutional and evidentiary rules. The court remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. View "USA V. ALAHMEDALABDALOKLAH" on Justia Law