Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Ahmed Alahmedalabdaloklah, a Syrian national, was convicted after a jury trial for participating in a conspiracy that targeted US military personnel and property in Iraq. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed some convictions and reversed others. The court agreed with both parties that Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same could not stand after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis. The court reversed these convictions and remanded to the district court to vacate them. However, the court affirmed Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring to damage US government property by means of an explosive. The court held that the statutes under which Alahmedalabdaloklah was convicted applied extraterritorially, meaning they applied to acts committed outside the United States. The court also held that the district court properly used procedures set forth in the Classified Information Procedures Act to withhold or substitute classified information from discovery. Despite several errors by the government in invoking the state-secrets privilege, the court excused these errors because remanding for proper invocation would be of little or no benefit. Finally, the court held that the use of overseas deposition testimony did not violate Alahmedalabdaloklah's rights under the Confrontation Clause or other constitutional and evidentiary rules. The court remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. View "USA V. ALAHMEDALABDALOKLAH" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma considered whether an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges constituted a "pending charge" for the purposes of expungement. The appellant, Andrew Dale Brassfield, sought to expunge his arrest records under Oklahoma law. The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation objected, arguing that Brassfield was not qualified for expungement because he had pending charges against him due to an ongoing investigation by the federal government and the Cherokee Tribe. The district court and Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed these decisions. The court held that an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges is not a pending charge under the relevant Oklahoma statute, and therefore, the appellant qualified to seek expungement. The court reasoned that a criminal investigation into whether an individual's conduct is chargeable as a crime is not the same as the individual having a pending felony or misdemeanor charge. The court also found that the requirement that the prosecuting agency will not refile the charge is satisfied, as the State of Oklahoma lacks jurisdiction to do so in this case. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "BRASSFIELD v. STATE" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant Mary Linnell appealed her conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The case arose after a traffic stop during which law enforcement officers found methamphetamine, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Linnell moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the patrol officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The district court denied the motion, and Linnell entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal the suppression ruling. She was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment with 5 years of supervised release to follow.On appeal, Linnell contended that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress, asserting that the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The appellate court disagreed, ruling that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the officer observed three traffic violations (running a stop sign, following another vehicle too closely, and speeding), and therefore had probable cause to conduct the traffic stop. The court gave deference to the lower court's credibility determination of the officer's testimony, noting that the officer had several years of experience and had been involved in hundreds of traffic stops. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Linnell" on Justia Law

In the case presented, Wesley McDowell Jr. was convicted of human trafficking of a minor and other offenses, leading to a sentence of 23 years to life in prison. McDowell appealed this sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss his elevated sentence of 15 years to life under section 236.1(c)(2) of the Penal Code, which pertains to human trafficking of a minor with aggravating circumstances. He cited Senate Bill 81, claiming it compelled the sentencing courts to dismiss enhancements under certain circumstances, applicable to his elevated sentence.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three held that Senate Bill 81 applies only to enhancements--additional terms of imprisonment added to the base term. As McDowell conceded, section 236.1(c)(2) provides an alternative punishment for the underlying offense and is therefore not an enhancement. Thus, Senate Bill 81 did not apply to McDowell’s elevated sentence under section 236.1(c)(2). The court affirmed the original sentence. View "People v. McDowell" on Justia Law

The defendant, Melvin Lear, was charged with a felony offense by the State of Nebraska. Lear requested a continuance in order to conduct additional discovery, which was granted by the court. However, the continuance extended the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. Lear then filed a motion for absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds. The district court denied the motion, finding that Lear had waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory limit. Lear appealed the decision, arguing that the waiver provision in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) only applies to a continuance granted at the sole request of the defendant, not a request joined in by the State. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected Lear's argument, interpreting the waiver provision to apply to a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his or her counsel, regardless of whether the State joins the request, when the period of delay resulting from the continuance extends a trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision to deny Lear's motion for absolute discharge. View "State v. Lear" on Justia Law

In the early 1980s, Arturo Franco, the defendant, committed two sexual offenses against his minor stepdaughter. After serving his sentence and completing his probation, Franco complied with the requirement to register as a sex offender for 37 years. In 2021, Franco petitioned to be removed from California's registry of sex offenders, arguing that he had lived a law-abiding life for over three decades since his conviction. However, the People opposed the petition, primarily arguing that one of Franco's crimes would render him ineligible for removal from the registry if prosecuted under a statute enacted 21 years after his conviction.The trial court denied Franco's petition, giving significant weight to the egregious nature of the underlying offenses and the age of the victim, despite Franco's 37 years of law-abiding behavior and no evidence suggesting a current risk of reoffending. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision, finding that it contravened the precedent set in People v. Thai, which held that mere focus on the nature of the initial crime without evidence of the defendant's current likelihood of reoffending was not sufficient to deny removal from the sex offender registry. The appellate court also rejected the People's argument that Franco "could have been convicted" of a crime that did not exist at the time of his offense, noting that the relevant legislation tied tier placement in the registry to the offense for which the defendant "was convicted". View "People v. Franco" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of California was asked to interpret the "collective engagement" requirement under the California Penal Code section 186.22(f) and its application to the proof of predicate offenses. This requirement was introduced through Assembly Bill 333, which amended gang sentencing provisions. The defendant, Kejuan Darcell Clark, a member of the Northside Parkland street gang, was charged with several offenses related to a home invasion and assault. The prosecution sought to apply gang enhancements under section 186.22, subdivision (b).The court held that the term "collective engagement" in section 186.22(f) does not require that each predicate offense must have been committed by at least two gang members acting in concert. Rather, the court interpreted the term to require a showing that links the two predicate offenses to the gang as an organized, collective enterprise. This can be demonstrated by evidence linking the predicate offenses to the gang's organizational structure, its primary activities, or its common goals and principles.The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal as to Clark's gang enhancement and remanded the case for further proceedings to apply this interpretation of the collective engagement requirement. View "P. v. Clark" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Rozalyn Rinde appealed from a criminal judgment after the district court revoked her probation and resentenced her. Rinde was initially charged with five counts, including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult. She pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to 360 days with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, with all but 63 days suspended for two years of supervised probation. However, after multiple violations of her probation, the court revoked her probation and resentenced her to 360 days on the misdemeanor count and to five years on the felony count. Rinde argued that the court imposed an illegal sentence, exceeding the maximum penalty allowed at the time of her original offenses. She also claimed that the sentence violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court had not imposed an illegal sentence. The court stated that the determining factor in applying the statute governing probation revocation (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6)) was the date of the original convictions and sentencing, not the date of the offense. Since Rinde’s original conviction and sentencing occurred after the August 2021 amendment of the statute, which removed the restriction on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant in the case of a suspended sentence, the court was not limited by the pre-amendment version of the statute. Therefore, the court was within its rights to resentence Rinde to five years on her felony count. The court also rejected Rinde's claim of an "ex post facto application," stating that the amendment did not increase the maximum possible punishment for her crime, nor did it make an innocent act criminal, aggravate the crime, or relax the evidence required to prove the offense. As such, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "State v. Rinde" on Justia Law

In a healthcare fraud case involving Medicare kickbacks, defendants Lindell King and Ynedra Diggs appealed their convictions and sentences. They challenged the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas's decision to admit recordings involving them and other co-conspirators, and disputed the court's calculation of the improper benefit received for the purpose of their sentence, as well as the restitution award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined these arguments and ruled in favor of the lower court.The defendants were accused of receiving bribes from a Medicare provider, Dr. Paulo Bettega, for referring Medicare beneficiaries to him for unnecessary treatment or non-provided treatment. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' Confrontation Clause arguments, stating the recordings were not testimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. It further dismissed the defendants' assertion that the recordings were impermissible hearsay.Regarding the calculation of the improper benefit, the court concluded that the government had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the entire operation was fraudulent. The defendants failed to provide rebuttal evidence of any legitimate medical expenses that should offset the amount paid to Bettega for treatment provided to residents of their group homes.The Court of Appeals also upheld the restitution award. It rejected the defendants' argument that their maximum restitution was limited to the $70,000 they received in kickbacks. The court held the defendants jointly and severally liable for all foreseeable losses within the scope of their conspiracy.In conclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, finding no error in its proceedings or decisions. View "USA v. King" on Justia Law

In this case decided by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, the defendant, Ronald Gordon Ferenz, had pleaded no contest to charges of rape of an unconscious person, forcible rape, and dissuading a witness. He was sentenced to a 12-year term in state prison and was imposed a criminal justice administration fee. On appeal, Ferenz challenged the trial court's denial of his post-plea motion to substitute his counsel, the court's decision to not strike certain exhibits attached to the prosecutor’s statement of view, and the imposition of the criminal justice administration fee.The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ferenz’s motion to substitute his counsel as there was no showing of a breakdown in communication between Ferenz and his counsel, nor was there any evidence that the counsel's conduct fell below the standard of care. The court also held that the trial court did not err in declining to strike portions of the prosecutor’s statement of view as the material was not expressly precluded by section 1203.01 and the court had inherent authority to accept the material. However, the court agreed with Ferenz that the criminal justice administration fee must be stricken due to the effect of Assembly Bill No. 1869 which rendered such fees unenforceable and uncollectible after July 1, 2021.The court modified the judgment to vacate the $129.75 criminal justice administration fee, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Ferenz" on Justia Law