Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An individual pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offenses committed against two girls, aged thirteen and fourteen, when he was eighteen years old. The offenses included several instances of rape and indecent assault. The individual had a history of psychological diagnoses, including autism spectrum disorder. After his conviction, the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) initially classified him as a level three sex offender, which would require the highest level of public notification. The individual challenged this classification, leading to a de novo hearing before a SORB hearing examiner.At the hearing, the examiner found by clear and convincing evidence that the individual posed a moderate risk of reoffense and a moderate degree of danger, resulting in a reclassification to level two. The examiner considered several statutory and regulatory factors, including the number of victims, the nature and location of the offenses, and the individual’s psychological profile. The examiner also considered the fact that the individual committed multiple offenses, including repeated offenses against one victim, as relevant to the degree of dangerousness. The examiner determined that Internet publication of the individual’s registration information would serve a public safety interest. The individual sought judicial review in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which affirmed the SORB’s decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the SORB hearing examiner did not err in considering the individual’s multiple offenses as relevant to dangerousness under regulatory factor thirty-seven, even though such consideration is limited under factor two, which addresses risk of reoffense. The court also declined to find the application of factor thirty-seven unconstitutional due to a lack of empirical evidence, given the statutory mandate to consider the number of offenses. The court affirmed the classification as a level two offender and the requirement for Internet dissemination of registration information. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

A government agency responsible for marketing hydroelectric power operated a warehouse in Colorado, where an employee, Jared Newman, orchestrated a fraudulent procurement scheme from 2014 to 2017. Newman arranged for the agency to purchase supplies from vendors owned by friends and family, including the defendant, who owned two such companies. The vendors submitted invoices for goods that were never delivered, received payments from the agency, and then funneled most of the money back to Newman, keeping a portion as a commission. The defendant received nearly $180,000 through 59 fraudulent payments, writing checks back to Newman and taking steps to conceal the scheme.A grand jury indicted the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on six counts of wire fraud, each corresponding to a specific transfer, and sought forfeiture of all proceeds. At trial, the government introduced evidence of a co-participant’s guilty plea and the district court instructed the jury that it could infer the defendant’s knowledge of the fraud if he was deliberately ignorant. The defendant was convicted on all counts. The district court limited forfeiture to the six charged transfers, totaling about $20,000, but ordered restitution for the full amount received, for which the defendant and Newman were jointly and severally liable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the co-participant’s guilty plea, as it was used to assess credibility and not as substantive evidence of guilt, and the jury was properly instructed on its limited use. The court also held that, because there was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s actual knowledge, any error in the deliberate ignorance instruction did not warrant reversal. On the government’s cross-appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that forfeiture should include all proceeds obtained through the fraudulent scheme, not just the charged transactions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Cline" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who, after responding to an online advertisement posted by an undercover police officer posing as two twenty-year-old women, learned that the supposed women were actually fifteen years old. Despite this, he continued to arrange a meeting for sexual services in exchange for money, drove from Massachusetts to Rhode Island, and was arrested upon arrival. He was found in possession of cocaine and ultimately pleaded nolo contendere in Rhode Island to indecent solicitation of a child, receiving a suspended sentence and probation. The individual also had a prior history of criminal justice involvement, including violations of abuse prevention orders and drug-related charges.Following his conviction, the Massachusetts Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) issued a preliminary determination classifying him as a level two sex offender. After a de novo hearing, a SORB hearing examiner confirmed this classification, applying several risk-elevating factors, including targeting children, stranger victims, substance abuse, criminal justice contact, hostility towards women, and number of victims. The individual challenged the classification in the Massachusetts Superior Court, arguing that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence, particularly contesting the application of certain risk factors. The Superior Court denied his motion for judgment on the pleadings and affirmed the SORB decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the hearing examiner did not abuse discretion in applying or weighing the challenged risk factors. However, the court found that the hearing examiner’s written decision was ambiguous regarding whether the individual’s information should be disseminated to the public, which is essential for determining the proper classification level. As a result, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the matter to SORB for a clear, written conclusion on both the need for dissemination and the classification level. View "Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528042 v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

A former Massachusetts State Police trooper retired in March 2018 after a 21-year career. While assigned to overtime patrol programs funded by federal grants, he falsely reported working over 700 overtime hours in 2015 and 2016, receiving more than $50,000 in unearned pay. He attempted to conceal his conduct by submitting falsified motor vehicle citations. In July 2018, he pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of embezzlement from an agency receiving federal funds, was sentenced to three months in prison, one year of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution.Following his conviction, the State Board of Retirement suspended his pension and held a hearing. The hearing officer recommended, and the board adopted, a finding that under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), the plaintiff and his beneficiaries were not entitled to any retirement benefits due to his conviction for an offense involving violation of laws applicable to his office. The board ordered the return of his accumulated contributions, less certain deductions. The plaintiff sought judicial review in the Massachusetts District Court, raising constitutional challenges under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, arguing the forfeiture was an excessive fine and cruel or unusual punishment. The District Court judge entered judgment for the retirement board.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the pension forfeiture constituted a fine under Article 26 but was not excessive, adopting the United States Supreme Court’s multifactor analysis for excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that, even assuming Article 26’s cruel or unusual punishment provision applied to fines, the forfeiture was not cruel or unusual. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment and the retirement board’s decision. View "Raftery v. State Board of Retirement" on Justia Law

Rodney Owen Skurdal, who is not a licensed attorney, attempted to represent Ronald Trow during Trow’s initial appearance in a criminal case in Yellowstone County Justice Court. Judge Jeanne Walker, presiding over the case, ordered Skurdal to vacate the defendant’s table and did not permit him to represent Trow, as Skurdal was not a member of the bar. Trow subsequently entered a plea of not guilty, and a public defender was appointed. Skurdal then filed a lawsuit in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court for Yellowstone County against Judge Walker, later joined by Yellowstone County as a defendant, alleging violations of his and Trow’s rights and advancing various arguments, including those associated with the “Sovereign Citizen” movement.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court dismissed Skurdal’s complaint with prejudice, holding that Judge Walker and Yellowstone County were protected by absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in the course of judicial duties. The court also found that Skurdal, as a non-lawyer, had no statutory or constitutional right to represent another individual in a criminal proceeding in Montana. The court denied leave to amend the complaint, finding that any amendment would be futile due to the immunity defense.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that Montana law does not permit non-lawyers to represent others in criminal cases, and that Judge Walker’s actions were judicial acts performed within her jurisdiction, entitling her and Yellowstone County to absolute immunity from suit. The Court also concluded that the District Court did not err in denying leave to amend, as further amendment could not overcome the immunity bar. View "Skurdal v. Walker" on Justia Law

In August 2019, a Jersey City Police Department (JCPD) lieutenant fired a shotgun during an argument with his girlfriend, leading to his arrest and charges of terroristic threats and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. He pled guilty to a lesser charge and completed a pre-trial intervention program. The JCPD conducted an internal affairs (IA) investigation, resulting in a ninety-day suspension for the lieutenant. Plaintiff States Newsroom Inc. sought access to the IA report under the common law.The trial court denied the plaintiff's request, citing the expungement statute and an expungement order that barred the release of information related to the lieutenant’s arrest and criminal case. The court also ordered the entire docket to remain sealed. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to apply the common law balancing test from Rivera v. Union County Prosecutors’ Office and to analyze the sealing of court documents individually.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the expungement statute does not categorically bar the release of IA reports but does prohibit the release of any information related to the lieutenant’s arrest, conviction, or criminal case disposition. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment with modifications, remanding the case to the trial court to redact such information from the IA report and then conduct the common law balancing test on the remainder. If the court finds that the interests favoring disclosure outweigh confidentiality concerns, it must further redact information as specified in Rivera before releasing the report. The Court also upheld the Appellate Division’s direction regarding the sealing of court documents. View "States Newsroom Inc. v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to allow the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) to award credits for good behavior and rehabilitative or educational achievements. The department adopted regulations to award credits beyond statutory limits and to use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and several family members of crime victims challenged these regulations through a petition for writ of mandate.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the writ in part and granted it in part, invalidating the department’s regulations to the extent they allowed the use of credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Both the department and the petitioners appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Proposition 57 properly removed statutory restraints on the department’s authority to award credits, allowing the regulations to supersede contrary statutes. However, the court also held that the department may use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates only if permitted by existing law, as Proposition 57 is silent on this issue. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to modify the writ of mandate and enter a modified judgment. View "Criminal Justice Legal Foundation v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

In this case, the father and mother of B.W. had a contentious relationship, and the father was involved in a criminal incident where he shot and killed a man. Following this incident, the father was advised by his criminal defense attorney not to contact the mother or B.W. to avoid jeopardizing his defense. The father was later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy but was acquitted in December 2021. In March 2022, the father sought to establish his parental rights, and the mother filed for termination of his parental rights based on abandonment.The Superior Court in Maricopa County found that the father had abandoned B.W. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship for over six months without just cause. The court rejected the father's argument that he had just cause for his inaction, noting that he did not take any legal steps to assert his parental rights. The court concluded that termination of the father's parental rights was in B.W.'s best interest. The father appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, agreeing that the father did not demonstrate just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship with B.W. The court held that the father's reliance on his criminal defense attorney's advice did not excuse his inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the meaning of "just cause" under A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The court held that "just cause" refers to a reasonable and justifiable reason for a parent's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, based on good faith. The court reversed the juvenile court's termination order and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the lower court to apply the clarified definition of "just cause" in determining whether the father's actions were justified. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated. View "In re Termination Parental Rights as to B.W." on Justia Law

Dallas Fenton was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen-year-old child, including eight counts of third-degree sexual offense, one count of sexual solicitation of a minor, and one count of indecent exposure. He was sentenced to ten years for one of the third-degree sexual offenses (Count 1) and another ten years for a different third-degree sexual offense (Count 8), to be served consecutively.The Division of Correction (DOC) informed Fenton that he would not receive diminution of confinement credits for the sentence on Count 8 because he had been previously convicted of a similar offense (Count 1). Fenton's grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (IGO) was dismissed, and the Circuit Court for Washington County partially granted and partially denied his petition for judicial review, ruling that he was entitled to good conduct credits but not other types of diminution credits for Count 8.The Appellate Court of Maryland held that Fenton was not prohibited from accruing diminution credits for Count 8, as the statute only applied if the previous conviction occurred before the commission of the offense for which the sentence was being served. The court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for recalculation of Fenton's credits.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, holding that under Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-702(c), diminution credits are precluded only if the offense was committed after a previous conviction for the same offense. The court concluded that Fenton was entitled to diminution credits for Count 8, as he had not been "previously convicted" at the time of the offense. View "Dept. of Pub. Saf. & Corr. Serv. v. Fenton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jere Eaton sued the City of Stamford and police officer Steven Estabrook, alleging that Estabrook used excessive force during a protest on August 8, 2020. Eaton claimed that Estabrook lifted her by her bra strap, drove her backward several feet, and dropped her on the ground without warning, violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights and committing assault and battery under Connecticut state law. Estabrook and the City of Stamford moved for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity and state governmental immunity.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that while there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Estabrook used excessive force, Estabrook was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time that his actions were unconstitutional. The court also granted summary judgment on Eaton’s state law claims, concluding that Estabrook was entitled to state governmental immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the use of excessive force. However, the appellate court concluded that Estabrook was not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage because the same factual disputes also affected whether his actions were clearly established as unconstitutional at the time. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court upheld the district court’s decision regarding state governmental immunity for the state law claims. View "Eaton v. Estabrook" on Justia Law