Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Tristan T. Horne, was charged with attempted possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. As part of a plea agreement, Horne was admitted into a problem-solving court program (Wellness Court) designed to assist defendants with mental health diagnoses. The program defers sentencing and provides treatment, supervision, and judicial oversight. Successful completion of the program may result in the defendant being allowed to withdraw their plea and have their charges dismissed. However, if the participant is removed from the program or withdraws before successful completion, the conviction stands and the case proceeds to sentencing.Throughout Horne's participation in the program, he repeatedly violated program requirements. These violations included missed drug tests, dishonesty with probation officers, not completing community service hours ordered by the District Court, failing to successfully complete multiple residential treatment programs, testing positive for marijuana, removing his court-ordered GPS monitoring device, and failing to report to jail as ordered after leaving a treatment program. Following these violations, the State moved to remove Horne from the program. The District Court accepted Horne's admission to the violations and removed him from the program. Subsequently, Horne was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.On appeal, Horne challenged his removal from the program, the fact that the District Court did not order a presentence investigation before sentencing him, and the length of his sentence. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, finding no reversible error. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in removing Horne from the program given his multiple failures to comply with program requirements. The Supreme Court also held that the District Court did not plainly err in not ordering a presentence investigation before sentencing Horne. Lastly, the Supreme Court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Horne. View "State v. Horne" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, James Herman Dye was charged with murdering a woman over forty years ago. During pretrial hearings, Dye indicated that he might present evidence suggesting another person, an alternate suspect, committed the crime. The Supreme Court of Colorado clarified that the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Discovery and Procedure Before Trial”) Rule 16(II)(c) requires a defendant to disclose the nature of any defense, including an alternate suspect defense, prior to trial. The Court also clarified that the requirement to disclose the nature of a defense includes identifying any alternate suspects, along with their addresses if they are to be called to testify at trial. However, the Court found that the lower court's order for Dye to disclose "all evidence" related to the alternate suspect defense was overbroad. The Court ruled that the prosecution should conduct its own investigation into any alternate suspect identified. The Court also held that disputes over the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence should be resolved prior to trial. The Court therefore vacated the lower court’s discovery order and directed the lower court to follow the procedures outlined in its opinion. View "People v. Dye" on Justia Law

In Minnesota, a man convicted of taking pornographic photographs of a child was ordered by a district court to pay restitution for therapy costs and lost wages incurred by the child's mother. The appellant argued that the mother, as a secondary victim, was only eligible for restitution for losses suffered directly by the child. The State contended that under Minnesota Statutes section 611A.01, family members of the direct victim are part of a singular class of victims because when a child suffers, their parents suffer as well. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the State's argument and affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that Minnesota Statutes section 611A.01(b) creates a singular class of victims that includes the direct victims of a crime and, if the direct victim is a minor, those family members of the minor who incur a personal loss or harm as a direct result of the crime. View "State of Minnesota vs. Allison" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Thomas O’Lear, was convicted of healthcare fraud, making a false statement in connection with healthcare services, and aggravated identity theft. O’Lear ran a company that provided mobile x-ray services to residents in nursing homes. However, he used the company to defraud Medicare and Medicaid programs by billing for fictitious x-rays using the identities of nursing-home residents. When an audit revealed the fraud, O’Lear attempted to conceal it by forging staff names and duplicating x-rays in the patient files.On appeal, O’Lear raised several questions. Firstly, he questioned whether his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated by excluding individuals who had not been vaccinated against COVID-19 from the jury pool. The court ruled that the unvaccinated do not qualify as a “distinctive group” that can trigger Sixth Amendment concerns. Secondly, O’Lear questioned whether the nursing-home residents were “victims” of his fraud under a “vulnerable victims” sentencing enhancement, even though the monetary losses were suffered by Medicare and Medicaid. The court ruled that the residents were indeed victims, as O’Lear had used their identities and health records without their permission, which constituted taking advantage of them.O’Lear also challenged his two aggravated-identity-theft convictions and objected to his 180-month sentence on various grounds, but these arguments were also dismissed by the court. Ultimately, the court affirmed O’Lear's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. O'Lear" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Patrick Thompson, was convicted of making false statements about his loans to financial institutions. Thompson took out three loans from a bank totaling $219,000. After the bank failed, its receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and a loan servicer, Planet Home, attempted to recoup the money owed by Thompson. However, Thompson disputed the loan balance, insisting that he had only borrowed $110,000. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of making false statements to influence the FDIC and a mortgage lending business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.On appeal, Thompson argued that his statements were not “false” under § 1014 because they were literally true, and that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him. He also claimed that the government constructively amended the indictment and that the district court lacked the authority to order him to pay restitution to the FDIC.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Thompson's arguments and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that under its precedent, § 1014 criminalizes misleading representations, and Thompson's statements were misleading. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Thompson's conviction and that the indictment was not constructively amended. Finally, the court held that the district court properly awarded restitution to the FDIC, as the FDIC had suffered a financial loss as a direct and proximate result of Thompson's false statements. View "USA v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Idaho, Michael W. Skehan appealed a decision affirming the Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry's ruling that he must register as a sex offender in Idaho. Skehan had been convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree in Oregon in 2001 and later moved to Idaho. He argued that the procedures used by the Registry were improper and that he should not be required to register.The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Skehan failed to demonstrate that the Registry's ruling was deficient under Idaho Code section 67-5279(3). The court also found that Skehan failed to preserve several arguments for appeal, offered little rebuttal to the Registry's position, and did not provide a sufficient record to substantiate his claims on appeal.The court also held that Skehan failed to demonstrate that the Registry's consideration of other information in addition to the Oregon and Idaho statutes was arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, the court found that the Registry did not abuse its discretion by not considering whether his Oregon conviction was a misdemeanor or felony. Lastly, the court concluded that the Registry was not required to compare Skehan’s Oregon conviction to Idaho offenses that do not require registration.The Registry was awarded its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-117. View "Skehan v. ISP" on Justia Law

In the case of Joshua Zamora Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Board, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two affirmed a lower court ruling that upheld the California Victim Compensation Board's denial of compensation to Gonzales. Gonzales was previously convicted of a gang-related shooting but had his convictions overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit due to insufficiency of evidence. Subsequently, he applied for compensation for the time he was wrongfully imprisoned. The Board denied his claim, finding that he failed to prove his factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. Gonzales then filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, which was denied by the lower court. Upon appeal, the appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, concluding substantial evidence supported the Board's ruling that Gonzales failed to establish his factual innocence. View "Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Bd." on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Myron Motley, was convicted and sentenced for his involvement in a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances—oxycodone and hydrocodone. Motley appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence obtained from two GPS tracking warrants and a wiretap warrant was obtained illegally.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Motley's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracking warrants. The court held that Motley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his opioid prescription records maintained in Nevada's Prescription Monitoring Program database due to the government's long-standing and pervasive regulation of opioids. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment challenge to the GPS tracking warrants failed.Additionally, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that the wiretap warrant was supported by probable cause and was necessary. The court found that the affidavit supporting the wiretap warrant application contained sufficient evidence establishing probable cause that Motley was engaged in a conspiracy to illegally distribute prescription opioids. The affidavit also contained enough information for the court to reasonably conclude that a wiretap was necessary to identify the full scope of the conspiracy.The court dismissed Motley's counterarguments, stating that the government's need for a wiretap was not negated simply because it managed to obtain some evidence of a conspiracy without a wiretap. The court explained that the government has a powerful interest in identifying all conspirators and the full scope of the conspiracy. For these reasons, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "USA V. MOTLEY" on Justia Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, the appellants, Stephon Anthony, Rafael Campbell, Samuel Flowers, and Anthony B. Price, were seeking relief from their first degree murder convictions on multiple grounds. The court found that the trial court was entitled to consider the jury's intent-to-kill findings at the prima facie stage, but that these findings did not preclude relief as a matter of law. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. Furthermore, the court agreed with the People that recent amendment of the gang statutes requires retrial or resentencing on gang-related special-circumstance and enhancement allegations. The court also ordered a remand to strike the multiple-murder special circumstance for Campbell, Flowers, and Price, and to reconsider sentencing on their Vehicle Code convictions in light of recent legislative changes. The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to strike the enhancements and prior strikes. View "P. v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed a case involving appellant David McCord, who was stopped by law enforcement due to a license plate frame partially covering the word "NEVADA." Law enforcement subsequently found contraband in McCord's car, leading to his conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance. McCord contested the legality of the traffic stop, arguing that the license plate frame did not constitute "foreign materials" as outlined in NRS 482.275(4), and that his license plate was "clearly legible" as the statute requires.The court held that a license plate frame does not constitute "foreign materials" under NRS 482.275(4), and that a license plate is "clearly legible" if the required registration information is readily identifiable. The court reasoned that the term "foreign materials" should not be interpreted to include all license plate frames, as this could potentially lead to arbitrary or pretextual traffic stops. It also determined that even though the license plate frame partially covered the word "NEVADA," the license plate was still legible as the essential information was readily identifiable.The court concluded that the law enforcement officer lacked probable cause to justify the traffic stop for a violation of NRS 482.275(4). Consequently, the district court had erred in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable and in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized during the stop. The court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MCCORD VS. STATE" on Justia Law