Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentences of Theodore Browne and Karley Ann Smith, both of whom had pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Browne claimed that the district court erred in determining that he transported 10 pounds of meth, which influenced his base offense level. However, the Appeals Court ruled that the district court's approximation of the drug quantity, based on witness testimonies, was not clearly erroneous. Browne also argued that the district court wrongly applied a 4-level role enhancement, contending that there was insufficient evidence to show he was an "organizer or leader" of the conspiracy. The Appeals Court disagreed, ruling that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous based on witness testimonies. Smith argued that the district court abused its discretion by considering late-filed evidence in the government’s sentencing memorandum, which resulted in the imposition of an obstruction enhancement and the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The Appeals Court ruled that Smith had sufficient time to review and respond to the challenged exhibits, and that the district court did not err in finding obstruction of justice and rejecting the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. View "United States v. Browne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals upholding the conviction of Michael Pickell for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. The case centered around the legality of a traffic stop initiated by a Maui County police officer who observed Pickell executing a U-turn at a highway intersection with left turn only markings and signage but no signage explicitly prohibiting U-turns. Pickell argued that in the absence of an express sign prohibiting U-turns, as required by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-82(c), the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. The court held that the Maui County ordinance, which requires drivers to follow the directional movements exhibited on markings and signage at intersections, was neither preempted by HRS § 291C-82(c) nor in conflict with it. Therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on a violation of the Maui County ordinance, and the motion to suppress evidence from the stop was properly denied. View "State v. Pickell" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Christopher De Leon Guerrero, was convicted on two counts of attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and was sentenced to ten years in prison and five years of supervised release. Guerrero appealed his conviction and sentence.Guerrero's conviction was based on his online conversations with a fictional 13-year-old girl named "Emily," who was actually a federal agent. He made plans to meet "Emily" at Andersen Air Force Base for sexual activities. Guerrero argued that he could not be charged under Guam law for actions that took place on a federal enclave, Andersen Air Force Base. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing a precedent set in United States v. Lopez.The court affirmed Guerrero’s convictions under § 2422(b) by referencing another predicate offense, not specified in the indictment, with which he could have been charged. They concluded that both of Guerrero’s convictions could be supported by § 13.10, the Guam criminal attempt statute.As for the sentence, the court agreed with both parties that Guerrero’s sentence should be reversed, vacated, and remanded to the district court for reconsideration of three special conditions imposed on his supervised release. These conditions were that Guerrero must not go to places where children under the age of 18 are likely to be, must not view or possess any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, and must participate in a sex offense-specific treatment program.The court affirmed the convictions but reversed, vacated, and remanded the sentence to the district court for reconsideration of the three special conditions of supervised release. View "USA V. GUERRERO" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, Jason Thomas Wilcox, who was taken into police custody for public intoxication under ORS 430.399, a noncriminal statute. During this process, the police seized and inventoried his backpack, discovering a butterfly knife. As Wilcox had a prior felony conviction, he was charged and convicted for being a felon in possession of a restricted weapon under ORS 166.270(2). Wilcox appealed, arguing that the seizure of his backpack was unlawful under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the seizure was unlawful, and based its decision on a previous case, State v. Edwards.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had erred in its analysis because it treated the seizure as a criminal one rather than an administrative one. The Court pointed out that when a person or their property is seized under ORS 430.399, the seizure is administrative, not criminal, and such seizures must comply with a different set of constitutional standards. The Court also clarified that the state’s interference with a person’s possessory or ownership interests constitutes a seizure, regardless of whether the person objects to the interference.The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the backpack was indeed a seizure. However, it did not decide whether the seizure was lawful, instead remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether ORS 430.399, or some other source of authority, authorized the seizure of defendant’s backpack and if so, whether that seizure was effectuated in accordance with the requirements of State v. Atkinson, which set the framework for assessing the constitutionality of an administrative search or seizure. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered an appeal by Mark Meadows, former White House chief of staff under President Donald Trump, who sought to move his state criminal prosecution to federal court. The state of Georgia had indicted Meadows for crimes related to alleged interference in the 2020 presidential election. Meadows argued that because these actions were taken in his official capacity, they should be heard in federal court according to the federal-officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). The district court denied this request because Meadows' charged conduct was not performed under the color of his federal office. The court of appeals affirmed this decision. It ruled that the federal-officer removal statute does not apply to former federal officers and even if it did, the alleged actions leading to this criminal action were not related to Meadows’ official duties. The court concluded that the former chief of staff’s role does not include influencing state officials with allegations of election fraud or altering valid election results in favor of a particular candidate, regardless of the chief of staff's role with respect to state election administration. Therefore, Meadows was not entitled to invoke the federal-officer removal statute. View "The State of Georgia v. Meadows" on Justia Law

The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) in a case involving the SAPD's statutory duty to arrange for substitute counsel for indigent defendants when a conflict of interest arises. The SAPD filed a direct action against the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging that the court infringed on the SAPD’s statutory duty to arrange a new attorney for a defendant named Azad Abdullah. The SAPD had identified a conflict of interest in its own office and tried to substitute an attorney from Pennsylvania, but the district court refused the substitution and appointed a new attorney of its own choosing. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court had obstructed the SAPD's statutory duty and authority under Idaho Code section 19-5906. The Court ordered the district court's decisions to be vacated, restored the SAPD as attorney of record for the limited purpose of arranging for substitute counsel, and ordered the appointment of a new district judge to preside over Abdullah’s post-conviction proceeding. View "SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with interpreting N.C.G.S. § 14-208.12A, which allows for the removal of a registered sex offender from the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry ten years after initial registration. The defendant, Larry Fritsche, had argued that since he had registered as a sex offender in Colorado more than ten years ago, he was eligible for removal from the North Carolina registry. However, the trial court, using precedent set by the case In re Borden, denied his petition, stating that the ten-year period must be completed in North Carolina. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court determined that the term "county" in the relevant statutes refers to a county in North Carolina, not any state. The court also noted that the purpose of the Sex Offender Protection Registration Programs was to protect North Carolina communities, and this protection could not be ensured if sex offenders could avoid registering in North Carolina due to time spent on another state's registry. Therefore, the court held that the term "initial county registration" in section 14-208.12A requires ten years of registration in North Carolina, not simply ten years of registration in any state. View "State v. Fritsche" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant-appellant, Augusto Valdez, who appealed from his guilty plea and conviction for which he received 120 months' imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Valdez raised two issues: firstly, he asserted that the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he conspired only with a confidential source and not a co-conspirator, and that the court did not ensure that he knew he couldn't conspire illegally with a government agent. Secondly, he sought to vacate his sentence because the district court should have, on its own initiative, verified his eligibility for the safety valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The court found that Valdez knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and was not misled about the nature of the conspiracy charge, thereby rejecting his argument that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. His argument that he could not be convicted for conspiring only with a government agent was rejected because the facts revealed two true conspirators: Valdez and a Texas source. The court also found that Valdez waived his right to argue for the application of the safety valve because he failed to object to the PSR and requested the mandatory minimum sentence, which was inconsistent with his later argument for the application of the safety valve. View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

The case concerns Junaid Manzoor, who pleaded guilty in 2006 to a felony violation of attempting to distribute harmful material to a minor. As a result of his conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender for life under former section 290 of the Penal Code. Almost 14 years later, the trial court granted his petition to reduce his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. After the Legislature amended section 290 to provide for a tiered system of registration time periods, Manzoor filed a petition for relief from the registration requirements. The court summarily denied his petition. On appeal, Manzoor argued that due to the amendments to section 290, he was entitled to relief from the registration requirements because the reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor placed him in "tier one" under the statute. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order denying Manzoor's petition for relief. The court held that the reduction of Manzoor’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor did not qualify him for relief from the registration requirements, because subdivision (e) of section 17 of the Penal Code bars courts from granting such relief when the defendant was found guilty of an offense for which lifetime registration is required, and the amendments to section 290 do not reflect a legislative intent to create an exception to this rule. View "People v. Manzoor" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to interpret Code § 19.2-306.1, a statute enacted in 2021 that addresses the range of punishment a court may impose upon the revocation of a suspended sentence. The defendant, Emily Katherine Delaune, was convicted of three drug offenses in 2019 and was sentenced to six years of incarceration, with four years suspended. After her release, she violated the terms of her probation by using drugs and absconding from supervision. The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach revoked Delaune's suspended sentence based on these violations and ordered her to serve 60 days of active incarceration.Delaune appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that under Code § 19.2-306.1, the circuit court was prohibited from imposing more than 14 days of active incarceration based on her technical violations. The Attorney General asserted that Code § 19.2-306.1 did not retroactively apply to Delaune’s probation violations.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the parties had implicitly agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 during the probation revocation hearing, and that the Attorney General was bound by this agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia also agreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Code § 19.2-306.1, stating that the circuit court could not impose a term of active incarceration based on Delaune’s drug use, which constituted a first technical violation under the statute, and could impose a maximum of 14 days of active incarceration for Delaune’s absconding violation, which was automatically classified as a second technical violation under the statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the circuit court erred when it ordered Delaune to serve 60 days of active incarceration. View "Commonwealth v. Delaune" on Justia Law