Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court reversing the final order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding Respondent's administrative driver's license revocation for a period of five years for driving under the influence, holding that the circuit court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the OAH and in using its determination as a basis for overturning the OAH's decision.After a hearing, the circuit court concluded that the OAH improperly weighed results of field sobriety tests against the negative findings of secondary chemical tests and that Respondent's expert's "unrebutted" testimony supported the negative findings of the secondary chemical test. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the OAH's factual determination that Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent had ingested controlled substances impairing his ability to operate a motor vehicle was entitled to substantial deference; and (2) the evidence in this case supported that factual determination. View "Frazier v. Ramadan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of possession of a controlled substance and vacated his sentence, holding that the Nebraska Probation Administration Act (the Act) does not permit the increase of the term of probation to which the offender was sentenced before a hearing where the violation of probation is established by clear and convincing evidence.The State charged Defendant with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, based on items found in his bedroom following a probation search. The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant was still on probation and subject to his probation terms at the time of the search. Defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search, and the special needs exception to the warrant requirement did not apply; (2) Defendant was not subject to conditions of probation and was not obligated to permit the search at issue; (3) the search of Defendant's bedroom was unreasonable, and the items found therein should have been suppressed; and (4) because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction, double jeopardy did not bar a second trial. View "State v. Simons" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Joshua Levy, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, in this case challenging the denial by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) of Levy's request for information related to a federal police misconduct investigation, holding that there was no error.Anthony Gulluni, District Attorney for Hampden County, Massachusetts, sent DOJ a letter (Touhy request) requesting all Springfield, Massachusetts Police Department (SPD) reports and documents supporting DOJ's specific and general findings in an attempt to identify SPD officers who were subject to the DOJ's findings of specific instances of misconduct and general failures within SPD's practices. DOJ denied Gullini's request in accordance with Touhy regulations. Gullini appealed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to its review of DOJ's denial of Gullini's Touhy request; and (2) did not err in finding that DOJ's privilege grounds were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. View "Gulluni v. Levy" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the legislature's grant of rulemaking authority to the Commission on Forensic Sciences was sufficient to authorize the Commission's promulgation of the Familial DNA Search (FDS) Regulations codified at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 6192.1 and 6192.3.In 2017, the DNA Subcommittee submitted to the Commission a recommendation to authorize familial DNA searches. The Commission adopted the recommendation, and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) formally adopted the recommendation as part of the FDS Regulations. Petitioners brought this N.Y. C.L.P.R. 78 proceeding arguing that Respondents lacked statutory authority to promulgate the FDA Regulations, therefore violating the New York Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court denied the petition on the merits, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had the statutory authority to promulgate the FDS Regulations. View "Stevens v. N.Y. State Division of Criminal Justice Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Kevin Payne against Kelly Rose, an inspector at the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI), holding that Payne did not have a cognizable claim in mandamus.Payne, an inmate at RCI, sent a public-records request to Rose for a copy of, among other things, JPay support ticket number MACI 1220002928. Rose responded that she obtained the requested record and provided a copy of it to Payne. Payne brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Rose to produce the requested record and statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) because Payne received his requested record before instituting this action he never had a cognizable claim in mandamus; and (2) statutory damages did not accrue. View "State ex rel. Payne v. Rose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's requested writ of mandamus against Respondent, the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, holding that the circuit court erred in denying a writ of mandamus.In his self-represented petition for a writ of mandamus Petitioner asserted that the Commissioner had a duty to "develop a policy directive and/or operational procedure" that was in compliance with W. Va. Code 15A-4-17(i), which was passed during the 2018 legislative session. The circuit court denied the requested writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 15A-4-17(i)(2) imposed upon the Commissioner a clear legal duty to adopt a written policy effectuating the purposes of "this subsection," which included the entirety of subsection (i); and (2) Petitioner had no other adequate remedy at law. View "Freeland v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—five individuals and the California Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.—filed this action in the Southern District of California challenging the constitutionality of Section 32310 under the Second Amendment. On September 22, 2023, the district court issued an order declaring Section 32310 “unconstitutional in its entirety” and enjoining California officials from enforcing the law. Defendant Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California, filed an emergency motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The Attorney General seeks to stay “all portions of the order except those regarding Sections 32310(c) and (d), which relate to large-capacity magazines that were acquired and possessed lawfully prior to the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction.”   The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. First, the court concluded that the Attorney General is likely to succeed on the merits. The court explained that the Attorney General makes strong arguments that Section 32310 comports with the Second Amendment under Bruen. Second, the Attorney General has shown that California will be irreparably harmed absent a stay pending appeal by presenting evidence that large-capacity magazines pose significant threats to public safety. Third, it does not appear that staying portions of the district court’s order while the merits of this appeal are pending will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings. Finally, the court concluded that the public interest tips in favor of a stay. View "VIRGINIA DUNCAN, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

William Kirkpatrick appealed a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges for one year for driving under the influence. Kirkpatrick argued the Department lacked authority to suspend his driving privileges because the arresting officer failed to forward the results of an analytical blood test report performed at the request of the officer to the Department. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred: Kirkpatrick’s alcohol-related breath and blood test results needed to be provided to the Department, and without them the Department did not have authority to suspend Kirkpatrick’s driver’s license. The Court reversed the district court’s judgment affirming the Department’s decision suspending Kirkpatrick’s driving privileges for one year. View "Kirkpatrick v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

While L.C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee, Lee. L.C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women and failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. L.C. filed a negligence claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The district court dismissed the assault-and-battery claim, holding that the FTCA’s exception to sovereign immunity does not apply to torts committed by federal employees who act beyond the scope of their employment. It dismissed her negligence claim under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on other grounds. The claims fall outside the discretionary-function exception; BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official and deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations. The negligence claim, however, should be dismissed for failure to allege sufficiently that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks. View "L. C. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's petition and amended petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus wherein Defendant alleged that the Arkansas Department of Correction illegally changed his discharge date, holding that the circuit court correctly denied the petition and amended petition.After being sentenced in 2007, Defendant was paroled in 2015. Defendant was taken into custody a year later. In his petition and amended petition Defendant alleged that after revocation of his parole and his return to prison, he was informed that his discharge date had been illegally moved. The circuit court denied the petition for failure to state a claim for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's petitions for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. View "Andrews v. Payne" on Justia Law